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
*Principal Contents*

	PAGE
OFFICERS AND COUNCIL	2
IN MEMORIAM—ADMIRAL SIR CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B.	3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	4
THE HADHRAMAUT By COLONEL HUGH BOUSTEAD, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.	5
MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.	11
TIBET, THE END OF AN ERA By SIR OLAF CAROE, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.	22
SOME UNFAMILIAR ASPECTS OF U.A.R. By NEVILL BARBOUR	35
KHUSHHAL KHAN By GEORG MORGENSTIERNE	49
ZIMMERMAN TELEGRAM (Sketch map). By C. J. EDMONDS	58
REVIEWS	68
CORRESPONDENCE	86
NOTICES	88



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## CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL	2
IN MEMORIAM—SIR CECIL HARCOURT	3
ACKNOWLEDGMENT	4
THE HADHRAMAUT. By COLONEL HUGH BOUSTEAD, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.	5
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KHUSHHAL KHAN. By GEORG MORGENSTIERNE	49
ZIMMERMAN TELEGRAM (Sketch map). By C. J. EDMONDS	58
REVIEWS:	
Auchinleck, 68	Back to Bokhara, 78
India and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 70	Sinkiang, Pawn or Pivot, 78.
Handbook to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, 71	Tragic Destiny, 80
Economic Developments in India, 71	Princes of the Black Bone, 80
Leadership and Political Institu- tions in India, 72	The Soul of China, 81
Arabian Sands, 74	Approaches to Oriental Classics, 82
Antiquities of Jordan, 75	The Secret Name, 82
The Persian Gulf States, 76	The Red Mandarins, 83
Avicenna's De Anima, 77	Journey to the Beginning, 83
The Hashemite Kings, 78	Japanese Politics, 84
	Window on Nepal, 85
	The Forgotten Valley, 86
CORRESPONDENCE	86
NOTICES	88

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## IN MEMORIAM

ADMIRAL SIR CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B.

**A**DMIRAL SIR CECIL HARCOURT, G.B.E., K.C.B., whose recent sudden death has so shocked his friends, was a member of this Society for twenty-two years. He served on the Council for many years and was Chairman from 1952 to 1957. At the time of his death he was an Honorary Vice-President.

Born in 1892, he entered Osborne in 1904, and went on to Dartmouth College, passing out as a midshipman in May, 1909.

During the First World War he served in the battleship *Centurion* in the Grand Fleet and fought in the battle of Jutland. In March, 1919, he was posted to the R.N. Barracks, Chatham.

There followed the various peace-time postings and promotions; and in September, 1938, he joined the Operations Division as Deputy Director. At the beginning of the Second World War he became Director of this Division. For these services in 1940 he was made a C.B.E. His next appointment was command of the battleship *The Duke of York* in the Home Fleet in which he served until after his promotion to flag rank in 1942. In addition to various other operations the *Duke of York* conveyed Mr. Churchill to the United States and back.

The period upon which he looked back with the greatest satisfaction was between 1942 and early 1944 when he commanded, in succession, the 10th, 12th and 14th Cruiser Squadrons in the Mediterranean. It was during his command of the 10th Cruiser Squadron that he took part in the North Africa landings in November, 1942, for which the United States Government awarded him the Legion of Merit. The citation ran, "Admiral Harcourt commanded the British cruiser squadron which provided close support for the landings in North Africa. His unfaltering support in the face of heavy odds did much to make possible the success of that operation."

For his further conspicuous service in this theatre of war he was made a C.B. in September, 1943. He took part in the capture of Pantellaria and Lampedusa and in the landings in Sicily and Salerno.

In February, 1944, he was appointed Naval Secretary to the First Lord, which appointment he held for a year. Later he was selected to command the 11th Aircraft Carrier Squadron with the British Pacific Fleet. Following the capitulation of Japan he went to Hong Kong where, in September, 1945, he received the surrender of the Japanese, remaining in Hong Kong as Commander-in-Chief and virtually Governor until June, 1946, during this most difficult and critical period of reconstruction. The high praises he earned for these services were most richly deserved. He was awarded the K.C.B. in 1945, and promoted Vice-Admiral in February, 1946.

In January, 1947, he became Flag Officer (Air) and second in command until recalled to become Second Sea Lord in March, 1948. He was promoted Admiral in June, 1949, and in May, 1950, was appointed C.-in-C., The Nore. In 1953, on his retirement, he was advanced to G.B.E.

He was a very alert and hard-working Chairman of this Society. During a most difficult period he laid the foundation for the sound balance sheet we published in our last issue.

He was Chairman of The London and Greater London Playing Fields Association, the Thames Youth Venture Council and a past Chairman of the Victoria League.

In addition to British honours he held the Grand Cordon Order of Cloud and Banner, China; a Knight Commander of the Order of St. Olav, Norway; and Grand Cross Order of Dannebrog, Denmark.

Cecil Harcourt had a kindly and generous disposition and was a staunch friend. He was a convinced Christian Scientist whose unswerving devotion to his high principles made a deep impression on all who knew him.

JOHN SHEA.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENT

MRS. KATHLYN G. PUTNAM, M.B.E.

Her many friends in the Royal Central Asian Society will be sorry to hear that Lyn Putnam has had to give up the Secretaryship of the Society for health reasons.

Lyn Putnam joined the W.A.A.C. during the First World War straight from school, and although she was under age at the time, was posted to the Casualty Branch of G.H.Q., 3rd Echelon, at Rouen. She returned to the War Office in 1919, and later joined the staff of the National City Bank of New York, where she remained until her marriage in 1927.

With her husband, Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Putnam, she lived in India for over 15 years, at Delhi, Quetta, the Punjab and the United Provinces. She also trekked to Ladakh. Her husband was killed in the Middle East in 1942 while commanding a battalion of the 14th Punjab Regiment, Indian Army. She was left with two small daughters.

After her husband was killed in 1942, she was amongst the first to join the W.A.C. (India), which was raised to help in the War effort. She rapidly rose to the rank of Chief Commander, which was equivalent to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and was appointed in charge of the Casualty Directorate at G.H.Q., India, which had been formed to keep track of all prisoners of war, and the wounded, missing and killed, of the Indian Army and to keep in touch with their next-of-kin. Lyn Putnam did extraordinarily good work in this appointment, for which she was awarded the M.B.E. Her picture was painted by Simon Elwes, A.R.A., as a tribute both to her and to the W.A.C. (India). For some years the picture hung in the W.A.C. (India) Mess at Delhi, and it was presented to her when she left India in 1946.

On returning to the U.K., Lyn Putnam spent five years in Fleet Street, and in July, 1953, she joined the Royal Central Asian Society as its Secretary. Since then she has given of her utmost, and only now leaves the Society for health reasons. Our thanks and best wishes go with her and we hope that the rest from her exacting duties will lead to a full recovery to good health.

H. St. C. S.

# THE HADHRAMAUT

By COLONEL HUGH BOUSTEAD, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, July 1, 1959, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my privilege today to introduce Colonel Hugh Boustead, who will talk to us on "The Hadhramaut." I could take up almost the time of the talk in telling you what he has done in the various places to which he has been, but he has films and slides to show and it will be difficult to fit into the time allotted all he has to say. Therefore, I shall be brief.

I cannot help feeling, however, that we have with us someone of a very special category. Not only was Colonel Boustead a distinguished explorer, when he was in the Sudan Service, in the South-West Sudan. To go back a little earlier, as an Army Officer he was captain of the British pentathlon team at the Olympics in 1920, and, before that, he was the schoolboy hero who decided to leave the Navy to find more action at that time on land in the Army. There was an Everest exploration expedition dotted in in about 1930 and, more latterly, in Mukalla, with that dignity and wisdom that is so necessary in dealing with our Arab friends in those places, he maintained good relations. Now, he is on the other side of Arabia, in Muscat.

So we really have someone who is particularly knowledgeable in those parts of the world, with a great history of travel and of knowledge of the peoples there behind him.

## *Colonel Hugh Boustead:*

TO make the places, peoples and areas about which I shall talk clearer to you all, I have had a map prepared of the area of the East Aden Protectorate. I propose to show it first and to point out to you something of the terrain of the country about which I will be speaking and of the principal towns, the borders of the States, main roads and anything that is relevant either to the talk or to the slides that follow.

Before showing the slides, I propose to show the map again to remind you where everything is. The East Aden Protectorate lies along the coast of the Indian Ocean. At the centre, the town of Mukalla is about 280 miles east of Aden. The borders of the Protectorate are shown by dotted line. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman lies to the east and the whole of the Rub al Khali area to the north with, at its western end, the West Aden Protectorate. The main roads running up from the coast to the interior are shown, including one from Mukalla over a mountain range over 7,000 ft. in height. The coastal fringe varies between about half a mile to 10-15 miles in width from the coast.

In the northern desert area there are the Northern Bedouin, rather like the Bedouin of Northern Arabia and Saudi Arabia. The Kathiri State lies in the middle, like an island, trapped in with no access to the sea. To the east lies the Mahra, a vast, mainly desert, and rocky mountain area populated largely by Bedouin. Along the coastal area there is a fishing, agricultural and trading population who have a great sprinkling of African

blood, particularly among the fishermen. There are purer Arab tribes to the north and in the Wahidi.

I will start with the Hadhramaut under Herald Ingrams. He was the first Resident Adviser, appointed in 1938, and in a matter of six years, with the selfless help of Seiyid Sir Bu Bakr bin Shaikh Alkaf, and that of the late Sultan Saleh, and with the tireless work of Mrs. Doreen Ingrams, he so reduced inter-tribal wars that were crippling the Qaiti and Kathiri States in the Hadhramaut as to achieve a large measure of security in the central, and most important areas of the two States. Ingrams left behind him in these six years of work an ordered Central Government in the Qaiti State with a substantial revenue, an organized military force and *gendarmarie*, schools, dispensaries, decrees, standing orders, and State Councils. He was responsible for founding the administrations and for setting up an advisory relationship which is very important, because it was the basis of any progress with the co-operation of the rulers and the people. These stand today as a witness to Ingrams' inexhaustible energy and great ability.

The last time that Ingrams spoke to this Society was, I think, in 1945. Although I am aware that I am addressing a very well-informed audience, as Colonel Pickering put it so lucidly in "My Fair Lady," "a lot of water has passed under the . . . the . . . thing" since then. So I am taking the liberty of reminding you of the details of these States.

First, the question of the advisory relationship. When Ingrams went there, he proceeded to advise the Sultan to bring in foreign-trained Moslem executives for the heads of departments and for some of the provinces and governments. The State Secretaries were either Zanzibaris, or, afterwards, Sudanese. The masters of the schools were Sudanese. They had a dual role. One was to carry out the executive and the other to train the personnel who would carry on in the future.

The other thing that Ingrams did, which I cannot pass without referring to at this stage, was the bringing about a truce between the tribes and the Government whereby a very large number of warring tribes handed in their arms. On the whole, the security had become gradually fairly satisfactory, but at the end of Ingrams' time in the Wadi he was confronted with a major problem.

When Ingrams' peace came there was a flow of easy money from Singapore and East Indies, bringing in shipments of foodstuffs and luxury goods into the valley. This resulted in the fading of the will of the people to work on dams and cultivate their lands. When the Japanese war came these supplies and easy money from the Far East to Arabia were cut off and in 1943 the valley was caught unguarded, without food, and thousands died of starvation. The sardines failed on the coast and the camels, which were engaged in the carrying trade to the interior, largely died or were too weak to carry. Some £150,000 of H.M.G.'s money had to be used to supply the interior with grain by air and squadrons of the R.A.F. were making air-drops.

This process recurred in 1948 in the western valleys. In 1949 I was made responsible for the East Aden Protectorate, and the first problem with which I was confronted was to try to ensure that such a famine did



not occur in the future. The measures to combat this were, first, to tour the country and to inspire the people, through the medium of their own governors of provinces, District Commissioners and so on, to get down to agriculture and to train people to start up a workshop and to set up a complete pumping scheme in the Wadi, the water being some 25-60 ft. below the surface. At the same time, it was necessary to repair the old dam systems which lie along the Wadi bed and which had collapsed and eroded because of the lack of any effort on the part of the people owing to easy flow of money mentioned earlier. The inhabitants were too rich. They had neither attempted to keep up the irrigation works nor to get their serf class to do so. I have no time now to go into more detail on that score.

The third thing was to set up grain reserves in the main wadi towns, in Sai'un and Shibam. Those grain reserves stood us in some stead later when we had trouble in the Bedouin areas, but during the succeeding years the pump scheme and the irrigation works were successful. During the following seven years, all the major irrigation works were repaired and put into order. The water table rose in the wells and we had by that time some 700 diesel pumps working in the Wadi. The wheat crop was more than doubled and, for the first time in the history of the Hadhramaut, wheat was being sold to the West.

During that time, it had been one of our anxieties to build up a fleet of motor transport, so that in the event of another period of grain shortage, we should be able to send up grain by motor and not be dependent on the camels. The motor trade grew enormously. Whereas there were only some 50 rather bad lorries when I went there, there were over 200 about eight years later.

The next crisis that arose was about 1954, when the lorries started to compete with the camel transport to the interior, and the Bedouin, frightened of losing their livelihood, cut the roads and started to interfere with the main lines of communication. They held up lorries and caused a very great deal of anxiety to the Government. The resulting danger to security was very considerable.

There were about 150,000 people, including the Wadi Duan to the west, in the interior and without the means of supply. We had some nasty headaches before settling this tiresome problem. The measures taken were, first, to try to contact the Bedouin, while, at the same time, holding the main roads and forming convoys. In the end, the introduction of armoured cars acted as one of the best restraints on the Bedouin.

When Ingrams started with security, he introduced a social force into the Hadhramaut called the Hadhramaut Bedouin Legion. It had its roots and being in Glubb's Arab Legion and was of the same style. It was a very happy method of taming the Bedouin.

The Bedouin of the Jol are very primitive. They are akin to Dravidian Tribes in Southern India and are not pure Arabs, but, some believe, are the results of a migration from India many years ago. They are very virile. They wear practically no clothes. They prefer oil and indigo, as we used to do also many years ago. They wear their hair long. They cut neither their hair nor their beards, and they make tough soldiers.

They are cheerful, full of fun and fairly easy to manage, provided their commanders have a sense of humour.

The Bedouin Legion were very largely responsible for maintaining security over the whole of the interior in the first instance. During the last ten years, an armed constabulary, which at first had been formed by Ingrams, was increased and took over the whole of that area. The Bedouin Legion, which had been increased to 1,200 and equipped with armoured cars and with light car patrols, transferred their dealings to the northern forts. They spread their tentacles right out to the Muscat border, and at every one of those forts we had control over the valley water supplies in the areas. The reason for the forts being built on the water was to prevent raiding tribes from taking the water and thus being able to return to their base. If they raided, there was no water for them. Should it be a year when plenty of rain fell in pools in the desert, the mobile patrols would deal with them. This method proved extremely successful. This holding of the northern forts had a great influence on the tribes themselves and resulted also in civilizing the northern Bedouin of the Rub al Khali.

I now come to the administration. The country was divided into provinces in the normal way of a dependency—say, Kenya or elsewhere—with province governors and district commissioners, who were Arabs. During my ten years there, one of the problems was to set up an administration and to pacify the area of Irma. This was carried out by the security forces, which supported the Bedouin Legion.

The Mukalla regular army was a regular striking force of Bedouin and Yaffai soldiers with British training officers to assist in training them, but *not* to command them. No forces in the E.A.P. were commanded by the British at all, whether the Mukalla regular army or the armed constabulary. The Mukalla regular army would go in and deal with a big tribal revolt if it arose. When they had established peace in the area an administration would be set up and the Mukalla regular army would be replaced by the armed constabulary, who had taken over the role of the Bedouin Legion in the interior.

There was no question ever of going in and withdrawing. If the Government went in with force to a previously unadministered area they stayed there and set up an ordered government. At the head of the States' Governments were two State Councils, in the Qaiti and the Kathiri States. Later, in the last year, we had also a State Council in the Wahidi State.

During a recent lecture, General Glubb referred to help to the Arabs. During the last nine years of which I am now speaking, we set up local governments in the towns and rural areas of the Qaiti and Kathiri States, which were not Bedouin areas. The people are extremely intelligent, very alive and alert, and they reacted favourably. It was a matter of self-help and I would say that they certainly appreciated it and expressed their appreciation of this local government. They took on the sanitation in the main towns and in the villages, progress in agriculture and irrigation, and so on. Having an extremely literate community, with always a literate head and secretaries ready for use, made a great difference.

In order to carry this out I took with me an administrator who had been my own Assistant District Commissioner from the Sudan, who taught the Hadhramis local government and then went back to the Sudan and, unfortunately, was killed as a District Commissioner in the southern revolt in the Sudan. He was a fine man who made himself much loved by all.

Education was started by Ingrams, and by 1949 there was at Gheil ba Wazir, an educational institute, with a junior secondary school, an intermediate school, two or three primary schools, a religious school and a teacher-training school, together with a network of schools throughout the State. The Hadhramis reacted, like all these people do, terrifically to education and are always continuously asking for more. It is a matter of money. To them it meant a very great deal, because the Hadhrami boy is really the invisible export of the Hadhramaut. It is the passage of the Hadhrami boy to Indonesia, Singapore, the east coast of Africa and all its towns, Kuwait, Bahrain and Addis Ababa, which brings in the amount of money which enables the boys' parents to pay for such luxuries and food-stuffs as they have and to provide revenue, through the Customs, for the Government.

Over and above that, the results of this education were that the States were able during these periods to have trained a very large number of lads who were capable of being taken on in the Government.

At the same time, we ran an administrative school in Mukalla for the training of administrators, police and army officers. That has been running for a number of years and has turned out a large number of officers and officials. They reacted keenly to this. All this, of course, has helped to solidify the Government.

The finance of the State has had a background of annually increasing revenue largely as a result of this. They have been able increasingly to pay for more and more services until, in 1955, the British Government were forced to raise the pay of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion, a British-paid force for the frontier. To bring the State forces into line, the Quaiti Government were similarly compelled to put up the State salaries much against their will as they were proud to run the show on their own without H.M.G. assistance, which now became necessary.

There is no more time to deal with the Quaiti, but I must touch upon the Mahra. About 300 miles south of Mukalla is the Island of Socotra, where the Sultan of Socotra lives and from where he is alleged to rule over the Mahra. I say "alleged" because he is, and has been proved to be, a most reluctant visitor to the mainland. I once took him there in a frigate. He did not like it at all. After staying for ten days, he called for an aeroplane, had a landing ground built and went back to the island. His control over the tribes is very small.

The tribes on the coast proved unwilling to have any form of government along the coast and the Sultan bowed to the necessity. It would have required tough action to have enabled any sort of government to be established, but he agreed that we could continue with the oil companies, supported by the Bedouin Legion, building forts in the interior and gradually spreading the web among the Bedouin tribes to the north of the

Mahra and thereby enabling the oil companies to do their stuff which they have been doing now for a number of years. Land Rover patrols from the Bedouin Legion go out with them.

That was the situation there. The British officers and my own assistant advisers would go out in the desert and become friends with the tribes there. It was what might be called something of a direct administration.

There is time to touch on only one more point : and that is in regard to oil. Not long ago Colonel van der Meulen, an old friend of mine, came and stayed in Muscat. How he got there nobody knows, because it is a difficult place to get into. He gave a speech to what is called the Exiles Club and he discussed Saudi Arabia in the light of his recent book on Ibn Saud, which, I suppose, a number of you have read, and, in particular, in regard to the destruction of character and the lack of progress among a people that has resulted from finding oil in a country without an administration and without a government of integrity to back it.

I would like to end this talk by saying that all this reference to development, education, the training of government officials there and the training of army and police officers, has been with the idea of endeavouring to ensure that if oil comes, we should have men who were capable of dealing with it and with the money that accrues from the oil, and men of integrity, and that the money should be divided between the States as far as possible and with their agreement.

On that note I end this talk so that you may have an opportunity to see some of these places on the slides.

(The lecturer then gave a most interesting and amusing commentary on his quite excellent coloured slides.)

The CHAIRMAN : On behalf of the Council and everyone here, I should like to thank Colonel Boustead for the trouble he has taken in getting this talk together and bringing you these colourful pictures which we have been able to see. It has been a great pleasure to us.

I believe that Colonel Boustead is shortly returning to Muscat. To come here and do this for us when he is on leave just before he goes back is a particularly gracious act to us, and we thank him very much for it.

I am sure you would all like me to wish him God speed and happy landings on his return.

*(The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation, and the meeting then ended.)*



# MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

This is the fourth in a series of periodical reviews of new Soviet literature on the six Muslim republics of the U.S.S.R. and the countries bordering on them. The present article deals with books received between June and October, 1959. It is contributed by the Central Asian Research Centre in collaboration with the Soviet Affairs Study Group of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

## I. AZERBAJDZHAN

AT the time of the Revolution the Azerbaydzhanis, with the Tatars, were the most developed—politically, culturally and economically—of all the Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire. Northern, or what is now Soviet, Azerbaydzhani was conquered by Russia from Persia in the first decade of the last century (the khanate of Nakhichevan being added in 1828) and thus came under Russian rule some sixty or seventy years before the khanates of Central Asia. The name Azerbaydzhani was not used by the Tsarist administration, the Azerbaydzhanis being located mainly in the Baku and Elizavetpol guberniyas and referred to as Caucasian Tatars or simply as Muslims. But they were the first of Russia's Turkic peoples to be opened to western economic and cultural influence. Moreover, their close proximity to, and affinity with Turkey brought the Azerbaydzhanis the enlightening ideas of the Turkish reformists long before they penetrated to the more isolated inhabitants of Russian Central Asia. Of vital significance to Azerbaydzhani's development was the Baku oil industry which began to be intensively exploited in the eighties of the last century. Baku became an international economic centre and a forcing house for revolutionary ideas.

Surprisingly few books have been received on Azerbaydzhani since this series of reviews started. In the last months, however, five books have been received which cover the whole course of the history of Azerbaydzhani. There is the first volume of a three-volume *History of Azerbaydzhani* (Istoriya Azerbaydzhana. By I. A. Guseynov and others. Azerbaydzhani Academy of Sciences, Baku, 1958. 423 pp.) which describes the history of the country from the earliest times until the end of the eighteenth century, that is, until just before the Russian conquest. It is a well produced and profusely illustrated work with a chronology and very full bibliography at the end. A fault, common to many Soviet histories, is that it has no index, but the chapters are clearly sub-divided into sections; it is to be regretted also that all maps are to be published only with the third volume of the work. The work is written from a strictly Marxist approach, the characteristics of each epoch being defined by the social and economic order obtaining rather than by dynastic or political factors. Each chapter is divided into sections describing the political events of the period, the economic and social order, and cultural developments. Great emphasis is naturally laid on relations between Azerbayd-

zhan and Russia. The book is a history of the whole of Azerbaydzhan, that is, of both what is now Soviet Azerbaydzhan and southern or Persian, Azerbaydzhan. Since for most of its history the area was part of Persia, the history described as that of Azerbaydzhan is in fact also that of the Persian state. But efforts are made to stress the individuality of Azerbaydzhan and as the Introduction says, "the heroic and stubborn struggle of the people against foreign conquerors runs like a red thread throughout the whole history of Azerbaydzhan. . . ."

The first chapter describes archæological finds which shed light on the earliest inhabitants; these include some remarkable Bronze Age cave drawings from Kobystan near Baku. In ancient historical times Azerbaydzhan coincided approximately with the kingdoms of Manna, and later Media. In the Roman period what is now northern Azerbaydzhan was covered by the kingdom of Albania and southern Azerbaydzhan by Media Atropatene. In the third century Albania and Atropatene were conquered by the Sassanids, and from the fourth century Albania was repeatedly invaded by nomad barbarians from the north. Christianity was introduced to Albania in the fourth century; it did not take root but certain aspects of Christian dogma became embodied in Manicheism. Sections of the third chapter are devoted to the Manichee and Mazdakite movements and to other risings against the Sassanids. In the seventh century Azerbaydzhan was conquered by the Arabs and became part of the caliphate; the significance of Arab rule was, in the words of the History, the fact that "the whole of Azerbaydzhan became part of one state and this fact objectively favoured both the merging of all the population of the land into a whole and the economic and cultural unification of the southern and northern regions. Moreover, the forced imposition of Islam, the suppression of Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and heathen cults created a religious community among the different ethnic elements of the country. The long struggle for independence against the yoke of the Sassanids and the Arabs hastened . . . the consolidation of the Azerbaydzhanis and their ethnic unification." A particularly brilliant episode in this struggle was the Hurramite movement against the Abbasides in the ninth century, whose outstanding leader was the Azerbaydzhani hero, Babek. By the end of the ninth century, the Abbasid empire had declined and numerous small kingdoms arose in Azerbaydzhan; but these existed only until the invasion of the Seljuk Turks in the early years of the eleventh century. At this period Azerbaydzhan had her first contacts with Russians who, in alliance with the Khazars, made several pirate raids on the western shore of the Caspian. The first of these raids was in the remarkable early year of 880, that is before the foundation of Kiev. The raids continued throughout the tenth century.

Until the Mongol invasions, Azerbaydzhan benefited from the cultural influence of her successive overlords and made some outstanding contributions to art and literature; poets such as the great Nizami, who usually are considered to be Persian, are claimed by the History as Azerbaydzhani. "Like other Azerbaydzhani poets of his time Nizami had to write his works in Persian. Because of this certain bourgeois writers have tried to tear Nizami away from his own people. . . ."

For more than a hundred years until the middle of the fourteenth century Azerbaydzhnan was under the Mongols, and at the end of the same century it was invaded by Timur. Early in the fifteenth century Azerbaydzhnan became the centre of the Safavid state which welded the numerous smaller principalities together. By 1510 Safavid rule stretched from the Amu-Dar'ya to the Euphrates, but its centre was Azerbaydzhnan and most of its leading officials and officers were Azerbaydzhnani. Russian trade greatly increased from this time. Turkish invasions and temporary Turkish rule roused the opposition of the inhabitants, notably the popular hero Keroglu. In 1668 the Russian peasant rebel, Stenka Razin, raided the shores of the Caspian. He was followed in 1720 by no less a person than Peter the Great who invaded Transcaucasia to forestall Turkish expansion and to protect Russian trading interests. But Russian rule lasted only until 1732 and Azerbaydzhnan returned to the dominions of Nadir Shah. On his death in 1747 Azerbaydzhnan reverted to numerous small principalities, the more important of which were the Khanates of Sheki, Karabakh, and Kuba; they turned increasingly to Russia for defence against Turkey and Persia.

The Russian orientation of the Kuba khanate in particular is the theme of a study by G. B. Abdullayev called *From the History of North-East Azerbaydzhnan in the 60's-80's of the Eighteenth Century* (Iz istorii severo-vostochnogo Azerbaydzhnana v 60-80 gg. XVIII veka. Azerbaydzhnan Academy of Sciences, Baku, 1958. 210 pp.). This serious piece of research is a political history of the khanates of northern Azerbaydzhnan and describes their formation, and their unification around the Khanate of Kuba. Fath Ali Khan, the skilful and ambitious ruler of Kuba from 1758-89, carried out a consistently pro-Russian policy throughout his reign and more than once requested that his kingdom should be taken under the protection of Russia. Abdullayev includes in his book some fifty pages of documents from the Russian State Archives which consist of correspondence between Fath Ali Khan and the Russian Government and consular and military reports on conditions in Kuba.

A somewhat different picture of the khanates of northern Azerbaydzhnan on the eve of the Russian conquest is given in a badly written propagandist work—*The Union of Azerbaydzhnan to Russia and its Progressive Consequences in the Fields of Economy and Culture (XIXth-Early XXth Centuries)* (Prisoyedineniye Azerbaydzhnanak Rossii i yego progressivnyye posledstviya v oblasti ekonomiki i kul'tury. XIX-nach. XX vv. Edited by A. N. Guliyev and V. D. Mochalov. Azerbaydzhnan Academy of Sciences, Baku, 1955). In order to point the contrast between independent Azerbaydzhnan and Azerbaydzhnan after the Russian conquest, the authors paint a lurid picture of the country devastated by Persian and Turkish invasions and by bloody internecine wars. Little emphasis is given to Fath Ali Khan's pro-Russian tendencies, perhaps because the documents produced by Abdullayev had not yet come to light. The book describes the history of the annexation, and the course of the Russo-Persian wars which were concluded by the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) and which confirmed Russian possession of the northern khanates of Azerbaydzhnan. The historical benefits which

accrued to Azerbaydzhan by this annexation were according to the book: protection from foreign invasion and from feudal strife; and the gradual abolition of the khanates, which unified the country and brought it into the economy of Russia. The authors do not deny the oppressions and injustices of Tsarist rule, but they point out that Russia, although backward, was yet more advanced than either Persia or Turkey, and that, above all, union with Russia enabled the Azerbaydzhanis to share in the great benefits of the October Revolution.

The bulk of the book is a long section on "the economic consequences of the union of Azerbaydzhan with Russia" and shows how, largely in accordance with the demands of the Russian market, silk growing, cotton growing and the fish industry were developed. It is evidently galling to the authors that the great oil industry of Baku was the child of foreign capital: in a brief chapter on the oil industry, the achievements of the brothers Nobel and of the Rothschilds are reduced to a minimum. It is admitted that intensive capital investment was "progressive" in the early years of the industry, but the rapid growth of the industry in the period 1880-90 is shown as part of the rapid growth of capitalism in Russia as a whole at that time rather than as the result of foreign effort. A large part of the chapter is taken up with accounts of the inventions of Russian engineers who are shown to be more advanced than the Americans.

The concluding section of the book describes Russian influence on the cultural life of Azerbaydzhan. Writers and enlighteners such as Akhundov and Zardabi are shown to have flourished under the direct influence of Russian writers and thinkers. There is no mention at all of Turkish influence or the pro-Turk sympathies which were an outstanding feature of Azerbaydzhani cultural life especially from the eighties of the last century when Baku, after the opening of the railway linking it to Batum, became an international centre. Still less is there any mention of the influence of Tatar enlighteners such as Gasprinskiy or of such Azerbaydzhani pan-Turkists as Hosain Zadeh Ali or Ahmad Agha.

The father of modern Azerbaydzhani literature was Mirza Fatali Akhundov (1812-78). His anti-clericalism, his call for enlightenment and his intense love for his native language are reflected in numerous plays and political articles. Moreover, his orientation towards Russia and Russian culture as the gateway to Western thought rather than to Turkey or Persia make him wholly acceptable to the Soviet régime. A new popular version of his life and work, designed for young people, is M. Rafili's *Akhundov* (Akhundov. "Molodaya Gvardiya," Moscow, 1959. 191 pp. No. 2 (268) in the series "The lives of famous men").

The influence of such men as Akhundov and his spiritual descendants created an educated westernized class in Azerbaydzhan who were sufficiently politically conscious to form, in 1911, an Azerbaydzhani nationalist party, the *Musavat*. Its immediate founder was Emin Bey Rasul Zadeh, a former member of the Communist *Gummet* (Hemmat) group—a fact which Soviet historians seem apt to forget. The Musavat Party increased its influence in the confused period following the 1917 Revolution and eventually formed the independent Azerbaydzhani government



which existed from the summer of 1918 to April, 1920. It seems that the Party sought independence but not complete separation from Russia; its programme included social reform to a degree which varied between its left and right wing supporters. Its short reign was complicated by successive Turkish and British occupations, but it seems, nonetheless, to have had genuine popular support. A version of the history of the stormy years of 1917-20 is given by M. S. Iskenderov in his *History of the Struggle of the Communist Party of Azerbaydzhan for the Victory of Soviet Power* (Iz istorii bor'by kommunisticheskoy partii Azerbaydzhana za pobedu sovetской vlasti. Baku, 1958. 538 pp.). This is a long-winded piece of propaganda giving an almost unrecognizable picture of events through the distorting mirror of official Soviet historiography. The Musavat, when it is mentioned at all, is dismissed as "bourgeois nationalist" and "reactionary" and the close relations between the Musavat and the Baku Soviet are totally ignored. (Rasul Zadeh even once said that the Musavat stood in principle for the handing over of power to the Soviets). The chief interest of the book lies in its interpretation of the history of the Bolsheviks during those years; thus the late Nariman Narimanov, a leading Azerbaydzhani communist and the first President of Azerbaydzhan after the establishment of communist rule in 1920, is reinstated to his rightful place after many years of disgrace; his name does not appear, for instance, in the second edition of the Soviet Encyclopædia. Conversely Stalin, who during his lifetime was always described as the founder of Gummet, is now shown to have joined it only in 1907.

Iskenderov's book has recently been strongly criticized both in the Azerbaydzhan Party organ *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* and in the Moscow *Kommunist*. The principal cause for complaint is that the author, while praising Narimanov more than his due, does not do justice to such eminent Georgian and Armenian Bolsheviks as Stalin, Shaumian, Orzhonikidze and Knunyants, all of whom, it is claimed, served the revolutionary cause of Azerbaydzhan.

It is an interesting feature of the books described above that all their authors appear to be Azerbaydzhanis; of the five authors responsible for the "History of Azerbaydzhan" only one has a Slav name. The five authors of the "Union of Azerbaydzhan to Russia . . ." seem all to be Azerbaydzhanis, as are the authors of the other books reviewed. Of books on the Central Asian republics a much higher proportion of the authors seem to be Russians; this is indicative partly perhaps of the higher cultural status of the Azerbaydzhanis over their Central Asian cousins, but also of the stronger nationalist feeling in Azerbaydzhan resulting from its proximity to Georgia and Armenia, two republics of quite different race and culture.

## II. SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

### *Ancient Turġic inscriptions*

Of exceptional interest to scholars is S. E. Malov's *Monuments of Ancient Turġic Writing from Mongolia and Kirgizia* (Pamyatniki drevneturġskoy pis'mennosti Mongolii i Kirgizii. Institute of Linguistics,

U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow/Leningrad, 1959. III pp.). There is a brief introduction by Professor Malov followed by detailed descriptions of the inscriptions: the original text is reproduced and this is followed by a transcription into Cyrillic and a translation. Variants offered by other Turkologists are included. Some sixteen monuments from Mongolia with runic inscriptions are given first; these date from the seventh and eighth centuries. Eleven monuments from the Talass valley in Kirgizia date from the fifth to eighth centuries; these too have runic inscriptions. The third section of the book describes some thirteen monuments with Syriac inscriptions dating from the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries which have been found in the Semirech'ye area. These are burial stones of Nestorian Christians who flourished in the region at that period. The book is concluded with a ten-page glossary.

### *Marriage ceremonies and family customs among the Tadzhiks*

N. A. Kislyakov has written a serious ethnographical study of the traditional ceremonies accompanying marriage and other events of family life among the Tadzhiks before the Revolution—*Family and Marriage Among the Tadzhiks* (Sem'ya i brak u Tadzhikov. Institute of Ethnography, New Series, Vol. XLIV, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow/Leningrad, 1959. 268 pp.). A long introductory chapter describes the social life and habits of the Tadzhiks; it is divided into sections on eastern Bukhara and Russian Turkestan. The first chapter describes family relationships and family ceremonies: Kislyakov finds traces of the patriarchal family and of ancestor-worship; he describes the customs associated with child-birth. The second chapter describes marriages, ceremonies and customs; the third—kalym (bride-purchase) and the dowry; the fourth consists of an analysis of the marriage ceremonies and an attempt to explain them. The fifth draws parallels between Tadzhik customs and those of neighbouring peoples. The final conclusion describes family life and ceremonies among the Tadzhiks of today; from this it appears that most of the old customs are dying out or if they are preserved it is for the sake of formality only. Women are emancipated and have equality with men under the law of the land. Western dress, furniture, and attitudes are gradually taking the place of traditional forms.

### *Communists in Turkestan*

Thanks to the international importance of Baku, Azerbaydzhani had an organized Social-Democratic group in 1901: this was the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.R.P. Its members seem mostly to have been of many nationalities, but the Gummet which was founded three years later seems to have been a truly Azerbaydzhani Bolshevik organization. In Turkestan the situation was quite different; even at the beginning of 1917 "there were no independent Bolshevik organizations capable of leading the revolutionary struggle of the masses." Such is the verdict of *An Outline History of the Communist Party in Turkestan* (1903-March, 1917) (Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana. Edited by I. K. Dodonov and others. Uzbek and Turkmen affiliated branches of the

Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Tashkent, 1958. 181 pp.). This work struggles manfully to demonstrate the growth of Bolshevik activity in Turkestan, but in the absence of evidence has to content itself with detailed descriptions of labour unrest, predominantly among Russian workers on the railways and in the larger centres. Great attention is given to the careers of individual Bolsheviks who were either exiled to Turkestan or who penetrated there from Baku (such as Fioletov). It is true that small Bolshevik groups did emerge periodically in Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, Kyzyl-Arvat and other industrial centres, but they were all short-lived and seem to have had little influence on the course of events. The Tsarist police and left-wing rivals such as the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks respectively suppressed or submerged them.

“ *The building of socialism* ”

Three new books deal with the measures to develop the economy of Central Asia in the early years of the Soviet regime. The first volume of *An Outline History of the Economy of the Kazakh S.S.R.* (Ocherki istorii narodnogo khozyaystva Kazakhskoy S.S.R. Tom I. By G. Ch. Chulanov and others. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 200 pp.) deals with the period 1917-28, that is until the eve of the first Five-Year Plan. It is extremely badly printed but contains useful information. S. A. Tatybekov's *An Outline of the Socialist Transformation of the Economy of Kirgizia* (Ocherki sotsialisticheskogo preobrazovaniya ekonomiki Kirgizii. Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1959. 161 pp.) covers the period 1917-40. Neither of these two books contain bibliographies or indexes. A far better produced and more valuable work is Part I of *Soviet Construction in the Auls and Villages of Semirech'ye, 1921-25. A Collection of Documents.* (Sovetskoye stroitel'stvo v aulakh i selakh Semirech'ya, 1921-25 gg. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov. Part I. Alma-Ata, 1957. Edited by G. F. Dakhshleyger and others. 282 pp.). Part I deals with the years 1921-22; the subjects dealt with—and this is not clear from the title—include the return of lands to the Kirgiz refugees who had fled to Sinkiang in 1916; the settlement of nomads; the introduction of land and water reforms; and the efforts to build up the “Koshchi” unions of poor peasants. The work contains extremely valuable information on the land question in Semirech'ye—an area which had a long history of strife between the native population and the Russian settlers, and which suffered extreme hardship during the Civil War period. The book contains a chronology, a bibliography, a list of abbreviations (extremely valuable in view of the Soviet predilection for portmanteau words) and an index.

*The Basmachi resistance movement*

In the first years of the Soviet regime a large part of Central Asia became the scene of a spontaneous native resistance movement; it centred firstly on the Fergana Valley, and later, after the fall of Bukhara, in the mountainous areas of eastern Bukhara. A certain amount was written on the subject before the war, but practically nothing has appeared in

recent years, and indeed the very name was scarcely mentioned except as a term of abuse. It is therefore particularly interesting to find that A. Makashov's *The Consolidation of Soviet Rule in Central and Southern Tadzhikistan* (Utverzhdeniye sovetской vlasti v tseñtral'nom i yuzhnom Tadzhikistane. Stalinabad, 1957. 146 pp.) is in fact the background to, and history of, the Basmachi movement in eastern Bukhara. An introductory chapter describes in standard terms the backwardness of Bukhara in the years before the Revolution, but adds an interesting account of the activity of the Young Bukharan reformist party and of the effect of the Emir's manifesto on reforms (April 7, 1917) which was delivered at the instigation of the Russian Provisional Government and under pressure from the Young Bukharans. The second chapter covers the period October, 1917, to February, 1922, in Bukhara; although entitled "The growth of the revolutionary crisis, the victory of the people's rising, and the establishment of Soviet power in Bukhara," it describes in fact the attitude of the Tashkent Bolsheviks to Bukhara—and ascribes Kolesov's abortive attack on Bukhara to ill-informed advice from the Young Bukharans—and the Emir's relations with anti-Bolshevik forces; the revolutionary coup of 1920 when the Young Bukharans with the help of the Red Army came to power in Bukhara; and the failure of both the Young Bukharans and of the Red Army to suppress the armed resistance of the Emir's supporters in eastern Bukhara, resistance that became known as the Basmachi movement. Considerable space is also devoted to the rise of the Bukharan Communist Party and to V. V. Kuybyshev's management of it. Makashov gives a straightforward account of the Gissar Expedition, a detachment of the Red Army which was dispatched to eastern Bukhara in pursuit of the Emir in February, 1921. Its spring offensive forced the Emir to retire to Afghanistan and most of the Red Army troops were then withdrawn, leaving only small units to guard the more important towns with the assistance of Bukharan troops. But in the autumn of 1921 the Basmachis gathered new strength which was further increased by the defection of several prominent Young Bukharans to their side and still more by the arrival of Enver Pasha who took command of them in December. Early in 1922 the last remnants of the Red Army garrisons were driven out and the whole of eastern Bukhara was in the hands of the Basmachis.

The third and final chapter is entitled "The liquidation of the Basmachi counter-revolution and the establishment of Soviet rule in Central and southern Tadzhikistan" and deals with the period 1922-26. Makashov gives a fairly accurate picture of Enver Pasha's career and not unfairly characterizes him as "an international adventurer," but he makes the absurd statement that Enver came to Bukhara "in order to deceive the people and rouse it to a struggle against Soviet rule in the interests of Britain." One thing certain about Enver's remarkable and much disputed life is that he was a consistently bitter opponent of Britain whom he saw as the enslaver of the Muslim peoples. Makashov naturally makes no mention of the probability that Enver was in fact sent by the Soviet Government to Bukhara to win support among the Muslims for the Soviet Government, and then treacherously defected. Makashov gives



a good account of the military operations of 1922 but omits one very important factor: namely that the Basmachis, far from being a solidly united opposition, were in fact, even under Enver's generalship, torn into factions. Ibrahim Bek, one of the most powerful of their leaders, never wholly accepted Enver whom he saw as a dangerous reformist because of his association with the Young Turk movement. Indeed on more than one occasion Ibrahim Bek's Lokays fought with the Red Army and against Enver and his successors. It was this fact as much as any other that gave the Soviets their ultimate victory; but Makashov ignores it.

Makashov is remarkably frank in admitting the seriousness of the situation early in 1922. "In January [the Government of Bukhara] carried out general mobilization, declared eastern Bukhara to be in a state of war, and . . . set up the Extraordinary Dictatorial Commission for Eastern Bukhara . . . The situation in Bukhara was extremely tense. Soviet authority in Bukhara lived through critical days. The people's revolution and its achievements were in mortal danger." Makashov mentions that Enver demanded that the Soviet Government should withdraw its troops from Central Asia, and describes his final defeat and death in August, 1922. With the death of Enver and the greatly reinforced Soviet troops, the Basmachis began to lose ground and to splinter into small local bands. In the spring of 1923 there were still 2,800 Basmachis in east Bukhara, but by the middle of 1924 the Dictatorial Commission was disbanded and civilian democratic organs were set up to replace it. Early in February, 1925, there were still, according to Makashov, 1,460 Basmachis whose activities were effective enough to make the new Tadzhik government place the Dyushambe (Stalinabad), Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube areas under military rule in May, 1925. By the end of 1925 there were only 431 Basmachis. But the impoverishment of the peasants and the famine of 1926 caused a new recrudescence; in the final campaign of the summer of 1926, "200 Basmachis were caught or killed, 11 machine guns, 95 rifles, 31 revolvers and 125 swords were taken. Moreover, 25 Basmachi leaders and 237 men with 17 machine guns, 127 rifles, 28 revolvers, and 50 swords voluntarily gave themselves up" and by the end of 1926 the Basmachis were no more. Makashov does not mention this, but there is no doubt that Basmachi raids from Afghanistan into Tadzhikistan continued sporadically for several years afterwards. It is a feature of this book that the author admits that the resistance continued for so long; other Soviet works on the Basmachis, such as there are, usually describe 1923 as the final year of their activity.

### III. THE BORDERLANDS

#### *A new geography*

V. M. Sinitsyn's *Central Asia* (Tsentral'naya Aziya. Moscow, 1959. 456 pp.) describes the geography and geology of Sinkiang, Tibet, Kansu and Mongolia, and area which the Russians denote as *tsentral'naya* (central) Asia to distinguish it from their own Central Asia territories which are known as *srednyaya* (middle) Asia. The work, in the words

of the author, is "a résumé of the latest geographical and geological data." He points out that such information is still extremely scanty and that only one quarter of the area has been properly mapped. The first section of the book gives a general description of the natural phenomena of the whole area. The second section gives a more detailed account of eleven main regions: the eastern Tien Shan; the Tarim massif; the Gashun Gobi, Beyshan and the Kansu corridor; Alashan and Ordos; Dzungaria; the Mongolian and Gobi Altai; the lakes of western Mongolia and the southern slopes of Khangay; the eastern Gobi and Inshan; Nanshan, Altyn-tag and Tsaidam; western Kunlun, the eastern Pamirs and the northern slopes of the Karakorum; Chantan and eastern Kunlun. There is a bibliography which, surprisingly, contains only two Chinese works, the other titles being mostly Russian.

### *Persia and Afghanistan in the eighteenth century*

M. R. Arunova's and K. Z. Ashrafyan's *The Kingdom of Nadir Shah. An Outline of Social Relationships in Iran in the 30's and 40's of the Eighteenth Century* (Gosudarstov Nadir-Shakha Afshara. Ocherki obshchestvennykh otnosheniy v Irane 30-40 godov XVIII veka. Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958. 283 pp.) is an attempt to write the social history of Persia under Nadir Shah. The authoresses point out that works on Nadir Shah such as those by Lockhart or Minorsky deal only with the military and political history of his reign. This is a well-produced work which uses some new source material. There is a bibliography and an index.

Yu. V. Garkovsky's *The Durrani Empire. An Outline of the Administrative and Military System* (Imperiya Durrani. Ocherki administrativnoy i voyennoy sistemy. Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958. 172 pp.) is a general study of the first Afghan state which lasted from 1747-1819—a subject which seems to have been attempted by no modern western orientalist. The work, though brief, is extremely well documented and includes chapters on the territory and frontiers of the Durrani state, its government and administration, the court and the capital, taxes and revenue, and the army. There is a genealogical tree of the Durrani dynasty.

### *Travellers' tales*

In the very years that Marco Polo was journeying to China, two Uygur monks of Christian faith made the journey from Peking to the West. *The History of Mar Jabalaha III and Rabban Saum* (Istoriya Mar Yabalakhi III i Rabban Saumy. Translated from Syriac with a study and notes by N. V. Pigulevskaya. Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958. 162 pp.) tells the story of their journey from China to the Near East, where they eventually settled. Saum, however, journeyed still further westwards to Constantinople, Rome and Paris. In 1728 he met King Edward I of England in Bordeaux. This remarkable story has now been translated into Russian with a long and scholarly introduction, copious notes and an index.

Chokan Valikhanov was one of the first Kazakhs to come to prominence under Russian rule. Born in 1835, he was educated in the Russian cadet school in Omsk and entered Russian service. In the course of his career he journeyed over most of Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, to Kulja, Kashgar, and Altysnar in Sinkiang. He was probably the first traveller to study the literature, customs and history of the people he visited. Some of his diaries and notes are now published in *Chokan Valikhanov. Selected Writings* (Chokan Valikhanov. Izbrannyye proizvedeniya. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1958. 642 pp.). The volume also includes some of his correspondence, including several letters to Dostoyevskiy.

In *A Forgotten Traveller* (Zabytyy puteshestvennik. Moscow, 1958. 111 pp.), Ye. I. Gnevusheva tells of the life and journeys of Petr Ivanovich Pashino (1836-91), a man of no means but great determination who travelled extensively in Asia on government service or at the instigation of the Russian Geographical Society. He made two journeys to Persia, and three to India—on one of which, in 1873-4, he reached beyond Gilgit in an attempt to return to Russia through the Pamirs. He also visited Ethiopia and Turkestan. His book *Turkistan in 1866* (Turkestanskiy kray v 1866 g) is a valuable source of information. Pashino was an excellent linguist and studied oriental languages at Petersburg University, but in spite of his remarkable talents and achievements he ended his life in penury.

ANN SHUKMAN.

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# TIBET, THE END OF AN ERA

By SIR OLAF CAROE, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

A meeting held at Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1, on October 14, 1959.

Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair. The Chairman: Ladies and Gentlemen, first of all, I have an apology to make for Mr. Hugh Richardson who was going to deliver his talk. At very short notice indeed he was invited by the Tibetans to represent their case at the United Nations. He is at this moment in New York. But we are fortunate in having a member who does so much for this Society, Sir Olaf Caroe, who, at very short notice indeed has stepped into the breach who not only has Mr. Richardson's notes but can also speak from his own personal knowledge of the area. We are very grateful indeed to Sir Olaf. The Society will always be a healthy one so long as we have someone of the calibre of Sir Olaf to ensure that our members will not be disappointed—and no one will be disappointed today.

**SIR OLAF CAROE:** I am greatly indebted to the Chairman and, first, I must ask you to forgive me if my talk is scrappy. I have Mr. Hugh Richardson's notes and what I propose to do is to try to tell you something of what he was going to say—I think I shall have to read some passages, which I do not usually do when speaking, but it is difficult to give somebody else's points except in his own words—and also to fill in from what I know of the situation myself. You may be thinking, "What on earth does he know?" I know about the North-West Frontier from the posters scattered about London, where one has to go to learn about the North-West Frontier; and for ten years I dealt with the North-East Frontier before 1947, as well as the North-West, from Delhi, both as Deputy Secretary and as Foreign Secretary to the Viceroy.

I have tried to keep up to date since then and have had many talks with the Tibetan Delegation, which recently passed through London on their way to New York. That is my warrant. I may say that I have not been into Tibet beyond Yatung, five or ten miles across the frontier. The map I am using today is a Russian map. I have been on the Kashmir border, to the United Provinces, Nepal, Sikkim, and the North-East Frontier. I can claim to have been all along the frontiers of Tibet and to have known intimately men like Basil Gould and Hugh Richardson who have actually lived for many years in Lhasa.

I think any talk on Tibet must start with some historical background. What I want to emphasise more than anything else is that Tibet has an excellent claim in history to be an entity, a diplomatic entity as well as an historical entity. The first Dalai Lama lived, I believe, in either the 15th or early 16th century. It was not until the time of the fifth Dalai Lama in 1641 that temporal and ecclesiastical power, spiritual power, was vested in the same man. It was that Dalai Lama who built the great acropolis of Lhasa.

The sixth Dalai Lama was equally famous in his way. He was a great poet and even a love poet. His subjects did not deny him the afflatus of a Byron or a Shelley and he is still greatly respected. It was the thirteenth Dalai Lama who really came for the first time into close relations with the British Government in India. Going back some time, it was not until the Manchu dynasty that China got any authority in Tibet. The Manchus came to power at the time of Charles II.

In 1720 the Manchus conquered Tibet, but they never made it a province of China. It was always a kind of autonomous dominion on the outskirts of China, and they never interfered with the Tibetan way of life. From time to time the Manchus had more or less authority in Lhasa. When Warren Hastings was Governor-General of India he tried very hard to get in touch with the Lhasa Government, both directly and through the Chinese, and he failed utterly. Though when he wrote to the Chinese they sent nice but unhelpful answers, when he wrote to the Tibetans he never received an answer at all. Things went on like that for over a century and the British Government in India had very little dealings, even over border disputes, with the Tibetan Government in Lhasa, or with the Chinese Government who were supposed to be their suzerains.

When it came to Curzon, he thought something should be done about it, because there were then signs that the Tsars were trying to get in first in Tibet working through Mongolia. He tried to do the same as Warren Hastings had tried to do. He wrote to the Chinese Government—the Chinese claimed they could speak for Tibet—but Curzon found, as Warren Hastings had, that nothing happened and he never got an answer when he wrote to the Dalai Lama, which showed what the Chinese authority really was in Tibet.

Owing to the fear of Russian encroachment, he decided, very much against the wish of the then Government in London, to take the bull by the horns and go to Lhasa. That was the origin of the 1904 Younghusband expedition to Lhasa which for the first time opened up Lhasa to the Western world. That was in the time of the thirteenth Dalai Lama.

I will pass over rather quickly the next ten years, from 1904 onwards, and will say only that in 1911, as all of you know, the Manchu dynasty fell and was succeeded by the Chinese Republic. Just before the fall of the Manchus, in a kind of expiring effort, they decided once more to extend their authority to Lhasa, encouraged by the 1907 agreement of Sir Edward Grey, made with the Russians, in which we both acknowledged we had no real position in Tibet and it was in some sense a part of China. Encouraged by that, Chao-er-Feng, who has been known as "the Butcher," occupied Lhasa again and established Chinese authority just before the fall of the Manchu Empire.

When the Manchus fell they had a garrison in Lhasa. I see Colonel Bailey is here and he knows as much about Tibet in those days as anyone, so I shall have to be careful what I say. The Chinese garrison was isolated in Lhasa and in the following year it had to be evacuated—this was in Charles Bell's time—*via* India. That was the end of the Manchus. That is at about the time Colonel Bailey was there and no doubt he will tell us more about it later.

Then the first thing the Chinese Republic did, or almost the first thing, was to decide they would try to occupy Tibet. The British Government of the time acted through the Viceroy, largely under the influence of men like Charles Bell, and the result was a convention which met in Simla in 1913-1914. The parties were the British Government, represented by McMahon, the Chinese Government and the Tibetan Government. The Chinese agreed to the Tibetans attending as a third party, which is very good evidence concerning the diplomatic entity of Tibet.

The Simla convention resulted in agreement on various things. I will mention what they were. One was that Tibet was divided into two parts. Inner Tibet was acknowledged as an integral part of China; Outer Tibet—*i.e.* the part round Lhasa—was under a vague kind of Chinese suzerainty; and the Chinese undertook that they would not do anything to interfere with the local autonomy of the Dalai Lama. They would not have troops in Lhasa or control the Government in any way. The only troops they were allowed were a small contingent of 300 to accompany the Chinese Envoy in Lhasa.

Then, among other things, this agreement laid down the frontier between Inner and Outer Tibet, and also the frontier between Tibet and India, and particularly this frontier here (illustrating), which stretches right along until it reaches a watershed at a pass here. The important part for the purpose of our talk today is the part from the North-Eastern corner of Bhutan, which follows the line of the Himalayas and then turns a little more southwards and goes across the mountains. This is what is now known as the McMahon Line.

The point is that that frontier as then designated was nearly 100 miles north of the foothills where the map I am now using shows the frontier, along the Assam Valley, and it will be seen that this Russian map shows the frontier of China right down in the plains of India. There were various negotiations before that line was laid down. It was never demarcated on the ground, only delineated on a map. There were certain areas inhabited by Tibetans which were incorporated in India. The Tibetan Government agreed at the time.

It looked very nice. They had signed this convention in Simla on July 4, 1914; but the Chinese Government repudiated their plenipotentiary's signature. The ground they gave for repudiating it was merely that they could not agree to the frontier as laid down between Inner and Outer Tibet. They said nothing about the frontier towards India and they made it quite clear, orally and in writing, that the only ground on which they objected to this convention was the frontier referred to.

As a result a separate agreement was made between the British Government and Tibet only, which was very nearly on the same lines as the Simla convention and laid down the frontiers towards India. That is the origin of the McMahon Line. I should like to say here that owing to preoccupation with World War I, and the fact that McMahon himself went to Egypt, nothing effective was done at the time by the Government of India to establish that line as a fact or to occupy the whole territory, or even to ensure that the maps were altered. It was not until 1936 that the alteration was made on British maps. If you look at British maps prior

to that period you will find that the frontier of India is as shown on this Russian map. The fact is that none of this territory was handled by Tibet or India in the way of administration. It was very much like the North-West frontier. British maps originally did not show anything beyond the administrative line as part of India. The parts beyond, where there was a loose political control, were very often not shown. The Afghans did not take much advantage, but the Chinese were cleverer and they have continued to show their frontiers on the line, which is the limit of the administration of Assam.

I must go on to say something about the system of Government in Tibet. In doing that I must say something about the Dalai Lama himself, about Mahayana Buddhism and about Church and State in Tibet. As you all know, Buddhism is an offshoot of Hinduism, which started about 500 B.C. There are two main forms of Buddhism, Mahayana and Hinayana. Mahayana is the form which is prevalent in Tibet and Nepal and in Mongolia and which has also spread in China. Hinayana is the form which is prevalent in Burma and Ceylon among other places. Mahayana, as one might expect, being so close to India, has had a more continuing influence of Hinduism upon it than has the other; and one finds the Buddha used as a central figure. It is rather like the difference between the Christians who favour images and those who do not and think images are wrong.

The idea of reincarnation, which is central to Buddhism in the Tibetan form, is briefly this. When a man becomes good enough he is absorbed in Nirvana, but if he is even better than that (if one can put it that way) he agrees to be born again to help his fellow beings. According to the Tibetan belief he is born again and again to help his fellow human beings. He comes back to this world with an essence of the divine and is regarded as the incarnation of a god. The Dalai Lama is the incarnation of the God of Mercy. The God of Mercy, I think you will agree, is a very suitable god to preside over a country.

That is the background of the position of the Dalai Lama. He is a high priest, a king and a god, and that should never be forgotten. He is in his person divine.

Anybody who has met the present Dalai Lama—I have not myself—from when he was a child has been deeply impressed by him. Basil Gould, a friend of mine, who went to Lhasa for the inauguration of the present Dalai Lama, has often spoken to me and has also written in his book about the impression that this child made on him. Basil Gould was a very normal Englishman of Winchester, New College and the I.C.S. vintage—I am not quite all those things myself but very nearly! He wrote of the sense of blessing one felt flowing from the two small, cool, firm hands—this child was four and a half—which lay upon his head. He says: "I noticed the steadiness of the child's gaze, the beauty of his hands, and the devotion and love of the abbots who attended him. . . . I sensed an atmosphere and almost the music of 'Unto us a son is born and the Government shall be upon his shoulders'." Many of you will have read that book? Those who have also read Heinrich Harrer's "Seven Years in Tibet" will realize that the author, who knew the Dalai Lama when

he was older, was just as much impressed by the youth as Basil Gould had been by the child. This is what is written by Hugh Richardson, who spent the best part of fourteen years in Lhasa :

“ The Dalai Lama has an unusually clear and penetrating intellect, but his uniqueness lies in his natural and therefore entirely unpriggish and unselfconscious sanctity. This unusual combination produces his great qualities of dedication, fearlessness, modesty, gaiety and a serene self-possession and courtesy.”

I think anyone who read the statement of the Dalai Lama, who is only twenty-four years of age now, when he reached the end of his flight from Tibet at the beginning of this year will admit that even the drafting of it is quite worthy of any Foreign Office and that it is a very remarkable and extraordinary document.

Some people say, “ We are quite ready to admit the sanctity and religious authority of the Dalai Lama, but we cannot admit his temporal authority.” That is what we might call in Christian phraseology a Pauline dichotomy between flesh and spirit. There is no division between Church and State in Tibet: it is the same thing. I suppose it is really rather like the time of the Judges in Israel, something of that kind. There is no division of Church and of State. They call it religious government, and every act of the State is designed to preserve the religion. And it is impossible, I think, for a Tibetan to think otherwise than “ Where the Dalai Lama is, there is the Government of Tibet.” I think Mr. Nehru and everybody else in India, whatever they may say in Public, are very well aware of that. I think every Hindu is well aware of this fact in his heart; and I do not think that any Hindu, however he may profess to be agnostic, is proof against the aura of holiness.

There seems to be no doubt whatever that the reason why Indian sympathy has been shown in the plight of Tibet is that the Indian mind is more than attracted—is moved deeply—by holiness when it thinks it sees it, and I think there is no doubt the Indian mind sees evidence of what it regards as holiness in the Dalai Lama and the set-up in Tibet. I have a feeling that that will grow and will not decline at all.

I must resume the historical thread. As a result of the question of the Chinese signature at the Simla convention the Tibetans have always held that they were not bound by it *vis-à-vis* China, and in fact from then onwards until 1950 the Tibetans enjoyed not only autonomy but *de facto* independence and they themselves considered they had *de jure* independence also because their position has been, “ We owed an allegiance to the Manchu Empire but none to the Chinese Government that succeeded it.” We can see that the Manchus, who were themselves Buddhist in origin, had a kind of religious veneration for the seat of Buddhism in Lhasa very much as it exists in India today. I think there is a lot to be said for that point of view, because, after all, the Chinese troops had been turned out of Lhasa; the Chinese had come to negotiate a treaty to which Tibet was a full party; the Chinese had refused to make that treaty, and the Tibetans say, “ We are not bound in any way; we are now independent.”

It is fair to say here that the British Government have never admitted



that claim. They have always taken the line that they are *prepared*—note the word—to admit the suzerainty (rather a vague term) of China over Tibet provided the Chinese admit a real autonomy in Tibet. That is perhaps a very typical British pronouncement.

All through this period to 1950, up to and beyond the time of the demission of British power in India, the Tibetans were factually independent. The Chinese sent occasional missions there—they sent a mission there when the present Dalai Lama was inaugurated—but the Chinese Republican Government, and the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek who succeeded it, were never able to assert a real authority in Tibet.

They did produce what was called the Five Nations Principle as a kind of doctrine; that is, the Chinese Nationalists. They designated for inclusion Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Muslims—the five steeds of the five-yoked chariot which was the greater China. They tried to pretend the Tibetans were Chinese. The Communists have not tried to do that. They have followed much more the lines of the U.S.S.R. in admitting cultural autonomy and nationality, rather like the case of Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union.

I now come to 1950 when the Communist invasion of China took place and the announcement that the Chinese made was that they had come “to free three million Tibetans from imperialist oppression and to consolidate the national defences of Chinese western frontier.” Their radio said they had come to “sweep the imperialist powers out of Tibet and eliminate reactionary elements.” Those are very typical announcements, are they not? Meanwhile, they invaded Tibet.

As a result of that the Dalai Lama went to Yatung, close to Sikkim, so as not to be too much under duress, but he was persuaded by various influences, including Indian influences, to go back to make an agreement. There then resulted the 1951 agreement between China and Tibet which, on the face of it, seemed to preserve a certain amount of Tibetan autonomy. The main points of the 1951 agreement were that China assumed responsibility for defence and control over Tibet's foreign relations; and was allowed to move troops about as much as she liked and make a Chinese military headquarters in Lhasa. On the other side, the agreement stated that the Dalai Lama's authority would be maintained and the Tibetan people would be allowed to exercise a national-regional autonomy under the unified control of the Chinese People's Government; and the last point was that there was to be a religious and political action committee in Tibet to ensure its implementation. That agreement was made, as the Dalai Lama has said, under duress because Chinese troops were then within reach of Lhasa and as a result of it they occupied Lhasa.

At this point I think the best thing I can do is to read some of Hugh Richardson's draft on what happened after the Chinese had occupied Lhasa:

“From the start it was obvious that the Chinese meant to force the pace and had no intention of keeping their side of the agreement. They saw clearly enough that the real obstacle to making Tibet part of their own system was the ultra-conservative hold of the monks and of religion. The Chinese themselves had the passionate belief

of recent converts in the advantages of material progress and they began their campaign against conservatism by practical benefits, which they thought would certainly be welcome. I think they really had quite a large measure of benevolence in their introducing such things as hospitals, rudimentary medical training, improvements in agriculture and stock breeding, new seeds, farm implements, agricultural loans and, above all, schools. Not all these things were in fact innovations. Magnificent medical work had been done by the British and Indian mission hospitals for many years, and tentative experiments had been made in agricultural and stock improvement and in schools.

“ But the spirit and the scale of the Chinese activities were unmistakably an attack on the position and influence of the monks, who were opposed to change of any sort. You might say that this was the opening skirmish against monastic control of ideas and social and economic life. The Church also dominated the administration of Tibet and that position, too, came under fire.

“ The symbol and the apex of religious rule was, of course, the Dalai Lama. His temporal authority was complete and absolute, because it was accepted as the rule of a divine being. So in much the same way as the Americans tried to dispel the aura surrounding the Japanese Emperor, the Chinese tried to bring the Dalai Lama down to earth. Instead of being unique and supreme, he was to be made to appear as a colleague of the Chinese military administrator. He was to take part in committees and to be more accessible.

“ His actual authority was attacked in detail by a proposal to divide Tibet into three areas, of which he could administer one. In that way his territorial influence would be reduced and he would be made to appear on the same footing as the Governors of other Regions. In addition, it was proposed to take from his personal control the body of monks (civil servants), and put it under the lay council which could be more easily dominated by the Chinese administrator.

“ If the Communists expected quick results, they were soon disappointed. The material gifts which they offered were accepted without gratitude. Their schools were attended largely by compulsion and in reply there was a tremendous increase in traditional Tibetan education. Their attempts to be sociable were too patronizing, artificial and regimented and were coldly received.

“ The Chinese were also greatly mistaken if they thought that the Dalai Lama was merely a figurehead or that he could be cheapened by anything they could do to him. There had been great and remarkable figures produced by the system, but none has been more remarkable than the present Dalai Lama.

“ When the agreement with the Chinese was signed he was only sixteen but had already become a mature and able leader. . . . From his early youth he had been genuinely and very intelligently anxious to bring about changes in Tibet, and so he could and did welcome in principle many of the practical activities of the Chinese. But he wanted changes to come in a Tibetan way and at a Tibetan pace and

he continued to remind the Chinese of their promise to introduce reforms only to the extent that the Tibetans asked for them. He met attacks on his own position in much the same way, quietly assuming the good faith and good intentions of the Chinese, and quietly pointing out where they were infringing the terms of the agreement.

“By open and courageous but firm behaviour he succeeded in holding the Chinese in check.

“So far as the Dalai Lama’s accessibility was concerned the Chinese miscalculated. He was never in the least aloof and was pleased to appear in public. The more he was seen the greater was public devotion and affection for him. His sermons, without ever preaching against the Chinese, were an inspiration to unity and resistance.

“Dislike of the Chinese and all foreign interference was the natural and traditional attitude of the Tibetan people. After the invasion in 1950 there had been confusion and despair, but as soon as Chinese troops and officials appeared in Lhasa there was vigorous revival of the old Tibetan spirit, made all the sharper by scarcity of supplies and huge prices due to the presence of so many foreign troops. And so it was among the ordinary people, the proletariat of Lhasa, a resistance movement began.

“That is just the opposite of the picture the Chinese now want to present. They speak of a rising by the serf-owning aristocrats. In fact, the nobles did what they had done in previous periods of Chinese pressure. They remained in their official posts and bowed before the storm. Some of them, not very many, were actively co-operative. The majority just “dragged their feet” and blunted Chinese efforts as much as they dared. A few spoke out openly against proposals and actions which went counter to the agreement of 1951. They were removed from office, and that increased the resentment of the ordinary people. In this way a sullen non-co-operation originating in Lhasa spread through Tibet. It was probably something of a surprise to the Chinese to find themselves not welcome as liberators of the people but regarded as a hostile and unwanted foreign army of occupation. The benevolent smiles gradually vanished.”

Mr. Richardson then goes on to say that at the same time they went on very speedily building communications and establishing troop posts all over the place. He continues :

“The campaign against the monks also went on by constant derogatory criticism and by economic measures, and so did the efforts to win the minds of the people, especially the young. Several thousand were taken to China for education and many others, old and young, went for instructive sightseeing tours. All that indoctrination was bound to have some effect. Some of the younger men, both monk and lay, became ardent supporters of the regime, but when the test of loyalty came in the rising this year the Communists found some of their prize pupils among the leaders of the resistance.”

There was, if you remember, the 1954 agreement between India and China which was in the context of Tibet being a unified part of China.

In 1951 the Indian Government was obviously against the Chinese invasion of Tibet and sent two notes in which they emphasized Tibet's autonomy and that they were a separate people. But they did no more than send notes and eventually Indian influence persuaded the Dalai Lama to go back and make the 1951 agreement.

In 1954 Mr. Nehru made what has come to be known as the Panch Shila agreement. The subject of the agreement is unimportant and relates to holy places, Indian pilgrims going to Tibet and Tibetan traders going to India. But it is important in that it enshrines five principles, and you might like to know what they are; they were the basis of the Bandung Conference. The first is mutual respect for each other's integrity and sovereignty; secondly, mutual non-aggression; thirdly, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; fourthly, equality and mutual benefit; and, fifthly, peaceful co-existence. Those are very rosy and nebulous generalities on which to found an international agreement, I think you will agree. They are extraordinarily removed, are they not, into abstraction?

The importance of the whole thing is that under this agreement Mr. Nehru for the first time admitted Tibet to be an integral part of China and, therefore, that anything that happened in Tibet was the domestic concern of China. That had never been admitted by the British Government, and India had succeeded to the British Government's position in 1947. They had tried to maintain it in 1950 and 1951 when the Chinese occupied Tibet, but here in 1954 the pass was sold.

From 1954 things went on in Tibet very much as I have explained in the extracts I read you from Hugh Richardson's paper, but getting more and more difficult for the representatives of the local regime at Lhasa. In 1956 the Dalai Lama was allowed to go to India for the 2,500 anniversary of Buddha's birth—I think that was the occasion—and he consulted Mr. Nehru about whether he should remain there because he felt he could not do anything; there were such pressures from the Chinese that he could not carry out his divinely appointed task. Mr. Nehru persuaded him to go back, after extracting from Chou En-lai an assurance that the Chinese would go slow in altering the social pattern in Tibet.

That looked as if, on the surface, it was perhaps rather a triumph for the Tibetan point of view; but in the light of after events I feel—and perhaps you will agree—the Chinese objective in making an apparent concession was to get the Dalai Lama back to Lhasa and to put off India and make India feel that she was of some weight in this matter. When the Dalai Lama got back to Lhasa, the practical pressures were not relaxed in any way.

Here I think I ought to say something about the Tibetan social system. There are many in this country and elsewhere who condemn it as the merest mediævalism and so on, and they do not think that unchanging regimes such as that in Tibet can be expected to survive and that there may even be something good in the long run in what has happened. The real state of Tibetan society, as I have it from those who really know, is very different. It is of course to some extent feudal, but the relationship between landowners and peasants has been, on the whole, extremely

kindly. We ourselves have to go back only 150 years or so, to Cobbett's time, to see what was the position of the English agricultural labourer when Cobbett wrote his *Rural Rides*; and what was the position of the children in England before the Factories' Act of 1833; what was the position in English law when a man stole a sheep, not much more than 100 years ago? It is really an extraordinary thing the way so many people among us in the West accept our own system at this day as the yardstick by which progress should come to countries like Tibet. After all, the main question is surely, "Is it ever in this age justifiable for another country to invade a territory in order to impose a different regime?" I think it was Mahatma Gandhi who said "Self-government is always better than good government."

Here I should like to come to the Chinese theme that the recent revolt, which I shall refer to shortly, was the last fling of the nobility. That is not the case at all as I have gathered it from the Tibetan delegation. This is from people like Hugh Richardson, Marco Pallis and friends who know a lot about these parts and have recently been on a tour of Assam and have met Tibetan refugees.

The reason was in a sense accidental. The Dalai Lama was asked to go, almost ordered to go, to Peking after he came back in 1956. He believed that if he went he would be kept there and there would be an end of the Tibetan system altogether. So, not unnaturally, he was evasive. That was the first step. Then came an order, or almost an order, that the Dalai Lama should attend a celebration in the Chinese barracks in Lhasa and should not bring with him his bodyguard. This was an obvious move. His advisers thought the Chinese intended to kidnap him and take him off to China, or at any rate hold him under duress and make it impossible for him to carry out his function, and that sparked off the revolt.

But it would not have been sparked off but for what the Chinese had been doing to the Khambas. They are people like the Highlanders of Scotland 200 years ago and the Pathans of today, or at any rate of my time. They are touchy and tough; picaresque and very tribal in their outlook; they are fierce fighters and resist all change. Even in the greatest Chinese days the Chinese never really and properly controlled the Khambas. Nor were they properly controlled by Lhasa. They have earned their political independence, but they owe their spiritual allegiance to Lhasa.

If the Chinese were going to get to Outer Tibet they had to control Inner Tibet and the Khambas, and they made efforts to do so. They poured an immense quantity of troops into the country and had a tribal war on a large scale, in which they lost heavily. But monasteries were razed, and a great many Khambas fled from this Chinese invasion to Lhasa to seek the protection of the Dalai Lama; and their presence was certainly an element in the rising which took place in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama and the Cabinet and the nobles generally of the hierarchy of Tibet had been stalling and trying to keep the Chinese in check by diplomatic methods and the last thing they wanted was to have an open fight, because they knew what the result of that would be. So the revolt really was a thing that sparked itself off. It was partly due to the Khambas and it was the outcome of popular tumult. It was not a rebellion of the nobles, as the Chinese claim.

Perhaps I ought to say something about the frontiers. If Tibet was free, they might not particularly like these frontiers because they would think there was something to be said on their side about why there are Tibetans on the other side, and about only making an agreement in order to get an agreement with China at the time, and so on. But as things stand, it is not a question at all between India and Tibet; it is a question between India and China. I think I said enough at the outset about the points on which the agreement rests and what is the foundation for the claim of the McMahon Line.

The Chinese have built a road which cuts across this corner (illustrating) and infringes the Ladakh frontier that is shown on the Indian maps. None of this frontier has ever been formally demarcated. The Kashmir frontier was drawn between Kashmir and China before Kashmir came under British suzerainty, at the end of the Sikh regime. It has never been demarcated on the ground. The Russians and the Chinese show the frontier along here. The same with the United Provinces frontier. Some of that has never been demarcated on the ground, and I think the Chinese claim comes very close to the holy places at the source of the Ganges.

I have seen it suggested in letters to *The Times* and elsewhere that the fact that people of Tibetan race live south on the Indian side is an argument for ceding an area to China. That would be a good argument for ceding Liverpool and Glasgow to the Irish! Of course it is an impossible argument in the international conception that frontiers should be drawn according to ethnic origins.

I have not time to talk much about tortures. The most appalling stories are coming through, and these are confirmed by Marco Pallis, whom I mentioned earlier and who has been amongst the refugees—stories of beatings and torture to women and children, sterilisation, removal of masses of people, and everything that could be done to exterminate a race. That has happened before in Chinese history and I am afraid there is very little reason to hope it is not happening again. The Chinese have exterminated a race before.

What in the conclusion can be the object of China in doing this? Possibly it is merely a ruthless Chinese determination to possess every bit of territory their people have had at any time, however vaguely acknowledged was Chinese suzerainty. It is the crudest form of imperialism and nothing else. It is even worse than the old physical domination, because it now sets out to dominate the mind. I believe the nearest parallel is the capture of Jerusalem by Titus in A.D. 70. The only defence is superior force or the arousing of worldwide conscience to the tragedy, which is in every way as great and horrible as what took place in Hungary.

Therefore, we who have spent so many years in India and in dealing with Tibetans, and have always liked them and done our best to support their autonomy in the past, have a moral duty—our Government and our people have—to do what we can to ensure that the world knows the facts. Also a practical way in which help can be given is giving money to the refugees. There is a Tibet Society recently formed in this country—its address is 58, Eccleston Square, S.W. 1—and its main object is to do those things: to ensure that the world does not forget the facts and to

help the refugees. Anyone who feels moved by what I have tried to describe of this tragedy might do well to see whether they cannot give some practical aid in this way. (Applause.)

#### DISCUSSION

MRS. SWIFT : I have seen the letters from the Dalai Lama to the Chinese Commander-in-Chief published in India. Would you say they were genuine or not? The Dalai Lama has signed an agreement and he was very definitely anxious for social improvements in Tibet. In those letters he agrees to attend the ceremonies. When he was unable to do so he said he had been withheld by a reactionary clique whom he had great difficulty in controlling, and he realized the future of Tibet rested on friendly co-operation, and he himself was anxious that that should continue. The letters were published in India and signed by the Dalai Lama. Do you think they were genuine?

SIR OLAF CAROE : I do not know Tibetan, but Hugh Richardson tells me they have been translated into Communist jargon. You say "reactionary clique." If one translated into non-Communist language, it would be very different. Letters of some sort were written but they have been edited. The Dalai Lama said things had gone beyond his powers, and that was a fact because this was a popular upsurge of feeling that he could not control and he was playing for time. I should like to see a correct English translation before answering your question in detail.

MR. C. G. HANCOCK : Could our speaker say something about the future? Supposing the United Nations say human rights in Tibet have to be respected. Does he think China would be persuaded to that view because she wants to join United Nations herself?

SIR OLAF CAROE : I doubt whether a solution will come out of United Nations in a practical form, but something might come to help the world to know what is happening. If some of the things I have said today can be said in New York about the Tibetan position on the world stage, perhaps those people will alter their views. I doubt whether a bargain could be struck between China and Tibet alone. I do not see that as a kind of psychological reaction which any Communist would have.

A VISITOR from KALIMPONE : I know some of the people who have been referred to, Younghusband and Basil Gould, whom I have met and listened to. I am interested in the position of Mr. Nehru. He is in a very invidious position, because the Chinese cannot be accommodated any more than the Russians were. We must not point our finger unduly at Mr. Nehru. I agree that the whole thing is disastrous, to say the least of it, and Mr. Nehru in continuing as a politician cannot remain a puritan like Mahatma Gandhi because he must move with the times. Of course we hope this question can be sorted out to mutual benefit.

SIR OLAF CAROE : I agree that Mr. Nehru is in an extremely difficult position. He made an agreement with China, which is a kind of foundation of his whole foreign policy. Realism is breaking in. Of course, in point of fact, India and China have practically nothing in common. The fact that they are both in Asia does not make them any more capable of

understanding one another than are, say, Portugal and Russia because they are both in Europe. In history I cannot imagine two cultures or civilizations more different than India and China. I would say, having spent over 30 years in India and having met a lot of Chinese, that India is far closer to Europe.

I think India and Mr. Nehru are in a terribly difficult position. But I also think India will more and more feel that something has to be done. They are at the moment holding back in the United Nations, but I think the Indian conscience has been roused because they hate to see good and simple men being oppressed. And Mr. Nehru is very great-hearted. I feel that our Government cannot do very much except be behind the Indian chariot wheels, because it is India which is chiefly concerned with what is happening in Tibet. We can do little more than help refugees and so on but we must try to follow India and I think India will more and more take a leading part in this business.

COLONEL F. M. BAILEY: I do not believe that the Chinese will ever be able to colonize Tibet. They want to fill it with Chinese people. I have travelled a little on the Chinese-Tibet borders and there I found a place where the Chinese had deliberately tried to colonize, and the things that sent the colonizers back to China were the food and the climate. The Chinese from Taiwan lived on pork and rice; and others lived on yak meat and barley. The Chinese could not eat these other things and they went back.

There is a large amount of feeling in China about the fifth bar in the Flag; that is the bar that refers to Tibet. They are always very anxious to get that put right. That flag was all wrong by them, and although it is not a very serious point it may have a great influence on the Chinese in this matter. We talk about taxes and the people there complaining, but I believe they say more about taxes here than they do there, although the Tibetans are badly taxed. It is regarded as just something that happens, like an earthquake, and I do not think they mind so much about it. If they have a nice landlord or agent, he is kind to them and they will all get on very well together.

The CHAIRMAN: We have now gone past the time for concluding the meeting. I am sure all of you would wish me to express more adequately than I can our great appreciation of Sir Olaf Caroe's talk today. It would almost be impertinent for me to say how clear and how interesting it was, because he is such an experienced speaker. But, nevertheless, I am sure you would all like to thank him for what he has done for us today and I ask you to do so in the appropriate way. (Applause.)



# SOME UNFAMILIAR ASPECTS OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

By NEVILL BARBOUR

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, November 11, 1959, Group Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen—I have to apologize on behalf of Sir Philip Southwell who would have been taking the chair now had he not been called to Spain. He regrets very much that he is unable to be present. His absence gives me the opportunity to introduce the lecturer, Mr. Nevill Barbour, who has been a member of our Society for nearly a quarter of a century; he has served as a member of Council and as a Vice-President, so that he is already well known to members. I had the privilege of serving with a brother of his in the old Bengal Lancer days, so that I have a little family interest in him.

Mr. Barbour has spent thirteen years in Arab countries. He speaks and reads Arabic. He joined the B.B.C. at the end of 1939 in order to produce for them a broadcasting paper in Arabic, corresponding to *The Listener*, for circulation in Arab countries. Mr. Barbour wrote a book entitled *Nisi Dominus*, a survey of the Palestine problem. He lived in Egypt from 1929-1933 and there wrote a study of the Arabic Theatre in Cairo. He has been to Egypt on several occasions since the war so that he is not only a past-master of his subject but up to date in it.

LADIES and gentlemen, two reasons led me to include the word “unfamiliar” in the title of this talk. The first is personal: on the only other occasion on which I had the honour of addressing our Society in this hall, I spoke on “Unfamiliar aspects of the Palestine problem” as we then called it. That was almost exactly twenty-one years ago; and it was a memorable day, not on account of my talk but because it was the actual day on which Mr. Neville Chamberlain flew to Munich and made the agreement with Herr Hitler.

If we now turn our thoughts from Europe to the Middle East and consider Egypt at that epoch, we shall recall that 1938 was the honeymoon period of Anglo-Egyptian relations which followed the signing of the 1936 Treaty. That Treaty was perfectly suited to the conditions of the time and it served its purpose as the basis of Anglo-Egyptian relations during the Second World War. But if we look at the issue in the largest possible terms, remembering that the East, which once used to be called unchanging, is now changing as or more rapidly than anywhere else, then, looked at in that way, it can perhaps be said that our troubles since the last war have stemmed from the fact that we tried, during 1946-56, to come to the sort of arrangement with Egypt which would have been suitable ten years earlier but could no longer be so in view of the new circumstances. In fact, conditions are now changing so rapidly that this talk, based on a visit to Egypt six months ago, may well be already to some extent out of date.

The second reason for using the word “unfamiliar” is that Egypt,

unfortunately, owing to the troubles, has become a much less familiar country to English people, particularly I suppose to the members of this audience, than it used to be. This position has been made worse by the attitude of our Press. This has often seemed, for some reason, to consider that because Egyptian political actions were not satisfactory from the British point of view, it was therefore their duty to describe everything that happened in Egypt in the most unfavourable light. The most notorious example of this was the propaganda which assured us that the moment the Egyptians tried to run the Canal themselves there would be a complete breakdown in traffic. In fact there are now, I believe, 25 per cent. more ships passing through the Canal than before, thanks to the work of a staff which has been reduced by 28 per cent. and of which new members are being engaged at salaries lower than the inflated figures paid by the former company.

In saying that many things are unfamiliar and changed in the Valley of the Nile I do not want to imply that Egypt is no longer Egypt. It is still very much Egypt. Making allowances for the changes which have occurred in this country also, I suppose that a new comer from England would still receive first impressions very similar to those which others of us received twenty or thirty or forty years ago. Perhaps I may illustrate this with a couple of anecdotes. My first visit in the spring of this year coincided with the first anniversary of the formation of the United Arab Republic and with the visit of Marshal Tito. By the good offices of the Information Services of the U.A.R. I was able to watch the Marshal's reception at Suez. It was interesting to note that on stepping ashore he greeted his host in English, with the words: "How are you?" to which the President replied, also in English, "Thank you, very fine." A very typical Egyptian touch occurred when the President stepped from the presidential train; the moment before he emerged, a Berberine attendant, appearing from the carriage, carefully dusted the handrail so that the distinguished person descending should get no dust on his fingers. The chief event of the anniversary, however, was a speech by President Nasser. The Information Services, wishing to spare foreign journalists a long wait, arranged to take us themselves in buses to the Abdin Square, where the speech was to be given, just in time for the beginning of the ceremony. Unfortunately, owing to inadequate co-ordination with the other authorities we had to descend outside the enclosure, just as the police were driving back a crowd of some hundreds or thousands of Egyptians who had failed to gain admittance. In consequence, we became involved with the crowd. One German journalist received a hefty blow on the leg from a rifle butt, while I was nearly knocked over by a mounted policeman. In fact, we spent a bad five minutes before we finally reached the excellent places intended for us. This, I think, shows that good intentions in Egypt are still sometimes frustrated by a lapse in organization. But the important thing is that such lapses are much less frequent than in the past. The scene at the speech was impressive. The ceremony was held in one of those tents with highly coloured geometric designs which are used on such occasions in Egypt. This was so vast that it practically filled the Abdin Square and contained, I was told, between 100,000 and 150,000 people, all

of whom were seated, that is, as far as I could see, because from just below the presidential dais the faces stretched away so far that they faded into the dim distance.

My second anecdote refers to the end of my second fortnight's visit to Cairo at the beginning of May. I had been told that there was a marionette show which was worth seeing. On my last evening but one I went to the theatre, arriving just as the show was about to begin. I was told by the young man in the box office that there was not a single ticket or seat left. I explained that I was sorry to hear this; that I was an English writer who had lived in Egypt formerly, and make a study of the Egyptian theatre. He said he supposed that I could come some other night. I explained that this was my last night but one; that the next day I had another engagement. He said he was sorry, and went on turning other applicants away because the house was full. Knowing Egypt, I did not let myself be discouraged, but stood there, looking as disconsolate as I could. Sure enough, after about three minutes, another young man appeared and said: "Come in." When I offered to pay he refused to take anything. I was then shown in and given one of the few empty seats at the back of the hall. Soon after the performance had begun, someone else came along and said: "I am sorry, we did not know you were coming tonight. This is a bad seat, we will put you where you can see better." From behind the scenes an armchair was produced and put for my benefit just under the stage. At the end of the performance I was taken on the stage to see how the marionettes work.

The origin of this puppet show is interesting. It is not a development from the old shadow plays, but the result of an initiative of the new Ministry of Culture. This invited two Roumanian lady experts in marionettes to Cairo. In the course of three months they taught the art to a number of Egyptians who now run the puppets; today, the show is purely Egyptian and one of the best of its kind that I have ever seen, giving amusing sketches of local life. The performance had been running to full houses, twice daily, for the five months during which the theatre had been in existence.

Of major changes which strike the visitor on arriving in Cairo, the first is the excellent way in which the traffic is now organized, due mainly to the provision of very fine avenues through the city, with the result that the present  $2\frac{1}{2}$  million inhabitants can move with remarkable ease. From Heliopolis to the centre of Cairo there is a fine dual carriageway, with flowering trees and a number of open green spaces at intervals. The latter are much appreciated by Egyptian families, who eat their sandwiches there in the luncheon interval and, indeed, at other hours of the day. The road out to the Pyramids, which was always good for most of the way, has been further improved; the Pyramids can now be reached in a comfortable 'bus in twenty minutes to half-an-hour instead of the hour taken by the former ramshackle trams. Looking back from the Pyramids, the skyline of Cairo begins to have an American look, the tallest block of flats yet built having forty storeys. There are a number of other buildings of considerable height, so that there is quite a suggestion of New York or Rio de Janeiro. The best known of the new roads is the Corniche along

the Nile; this I followed from Bulaq to Maadi, but it goes, I believe, all the way from the Barrage to Helwan. It is not merely monumental and scenic; on holidays and in the evenings the embankment beside the Nile is much appreciated as a strolling place. Another road leads up from behind the Citadel to the Muqattam, the plans for the development of which as a residential area are just beginning to bear fruit. Originally built for the personal pleasure of King Faruq, the road has now been turned to public use. Scenically, it is immensely effective, as it goes through the vast disused quarries. On my journey up I asked the driver of my taxi how things were; he replied that they were not bad at all, adding politely: "But of course they would be better if the financial agreement with the English"—which was then under discussion—"was signed and we could renew diplomatic relations; that would bring more business and also more visitors." Learning that he had eight children, I asked if it was not difficult to support such a large family, "Well, it isn't easy," he said, "but we don't do too badly. I have one of the new workers' flats at a rent of £3 weekly; we get free schooling and some sort of medical insurance, and we get on all right."

In fact, slum clearance is making rapid progress and from the Muqattam (whence the view is much to be recommended) one can look back over Cairo and note light coloured patches which denote the blocks of new workers' flats, of which there are a large number.

Typical of the change in spirit is the way in which the thousandth year of the foundation of al Azhar is being celebrated. As originally planned under the Faruq régime, it had been proposed to make a special issue of postage stamps and to have a monster banquet for 10,000 Azhari students at which the King would be present. Finally this never came off, because it was feared that it might turn into a hostile political demonstration. The present Government took up the idea of a celebration but decided to mark the occasion by building residential quarters for 5,000 foreign students at al Azhar. The site is about a mile north of the Mosque. Some fifty buildings have been erected, most of which have the appearance of modern apartment houses and are designed to lodge the students. Each two students share a bedroom. There are reading rooms, a dining room, modern sanitation and cooking facilities. The remaining buildings consist of a mosque, a hospice for visitors, and administrative offices; and arrangements have also been made for playing fields. With the exception of the mosque, there is nothing of any great beauty about the buildings; they are utilitarian but adapted to the times. Obviously the new atmosphere must bring about a complete revolution in the minds of foreign students at al Azhar.

The effects of the spread of literacy can be seen from the Continental Hotel, which has been rearranged and is, I believe, very comfortable. Looking from it onto the Opera Square, one can see that one whole side of the Ezbekiah Gardens is now lined by a row of second-hand book-stalls, rather in the style of Paris. Most of the books on sale are in Arabic and although some of them are rubbishy magazines, others are serious works. The output of Arabic literature has in fact enormously increased in all branches. Much translation is going on of English and French classics

and other works. I noticed Louisa Alcock's *Little Women* in four volumes, and Edward Lane's *The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*; *Dr. Zhivago* went into a second Arabic edition between my two visits. In addition there is now a fair quantity of original Egyptian literature which is worth reading. In particular I would mention Naguib Mahfouz' trilogy, a sort of Forsyte Saga in three volumes, relating the life history of three generations of a bourgeois family living near Khan al Khalili and, incidentally, mirroring Egyptian history from the year 1920 onwards. Another outstanding work is the novel of village life, *la Ard* or *The Soil*, by Abdurrahan al-Sharqawi, a book giving an excellent picture of the circumstances of the fellahin. It is interesting that both these authors, and a number of others, are Government officials, employed in the Ministry of Culture or some related department. The fact that they are officials does not seem to have impeded their creative talents; one hopes that it has not affected their official duties either.

I had no time to visit any provincial town, and visits to the countryside were confined to two day-outings from Cairo and a day near Luxor. At first sight the villages look much as they always did, but differences are to be noticed. Many are now approached by good roads, some of which fulfil Lord Kitchener's aspiration that they should be asphalted. The provision of drinking water is also making progress. Such small signs do denote a change. Where land reform has been carried out it has certainly helped, if only because the annual contributions paid by the peasants towards becoming eventual freeholders are equivalent to only half the rent which they formerly paid and they are thus directly better off financially. I was unable to judge of the claims that the land is producing more. At Inchos, efforts were being made to get the peasants out of the village into cottages built among the fields but the people, being naturally gregarious, preferred to remain together in their hovels rather than go into superior but isolated dwellings.

A main factor of progress affecting country life is the establishment of Combined Units, of which I believe 250 have now been built and are actually functioning. It is intended that there shall be one Combined Unit for every 16,000 peasants during the course of the next few years. These Combined Units, many of which can be seen from the train, consist of centres containing a school for boys and girls; a clinic, with a resident doctor, who is also a surgeon; these are equipped for performing simple operations, and provided with nurses and beds for a few patients; a chicken farm; an agricultural experimental plot; bees; instruction in arts and crafts; and classes for sewing and embroidery for women, with instruction for adults in reading and writing. Obviously the value of all this must vary according to the staff available; and that is a difficult problem when dealing with so large a number of institutions.

I visited two of these Combined Units, one near Cairo and one near Luxor. That near Cairo was one of the earlier Units and, no doubt, one regularly shown to visitors. It certainly made a favourable impression on me. The school seemed well run; the arts and crafts were good. I was particularly impressed by the young and enthusiastic doctor who felt

some progress was being made in reducing diseases such as Bilharzia. He also gave instruction in family regulation. This is addressed principally to the women who, he said, learn quickly and are successful in applying their knowledge. The contraceptives used, both medical and mechanical, are now of Egyptian manufacture. Now that the death rate among children has dropped, the peasants are less anxious for their wives to be constantly bearing children. Whereas, in the past, in view of the fact that the peasant's wealth was in his children, it was necessary to keep on replacing those who died, it is now no longer so, and this is a factor in making birth-control more acceptable. The Luxor centre I was only able to visit in the early afternoon when activity is at a minimum; but it appeared to be well maintained.

Now a word as to the greatest project of all—the High Dam. The traveller who is lucky enough to travel south to the Sudan by steamer will see on the rocks, soon after leaving Shellal, certain marks indicating where the High Dam is to be built. Twenty-four hours later, after going nearly 200 miles, he reaches the 100-foot high façade of Abu Simbal with the colossal 66-foot statues of Rameses IV. It is a staggering thought that the raising of the Nile by nearly 200 feet at Assuan is going to result in covering the whole of this façade and much of the cliff above it. When the High Dam is completed this portion of the Nubian Valley will become a lake 320 miles long, of which 80 miles will be in Sudanese territory, while in places the lake will be 10 miles wide. This really is one of the greatest projects of all time. Of course, Egypt has, from antiquity, gone in for grandiose schemes. Revisiting the Great Pyramid it is just as astonishing as ever to see the tremendous mass of material which was put up with the means available several thousand years ago. Then there is the stupendous Temple of Karnak, again absolutely immense; probably the biggest religious building ever erected in the world. Clearly Egyptians do like vast schemes. I was told, without official confirmation, that another remarkable project being planned is the extension of the Corniche road the whole way along the Nile from Cairo to Assuan, 800 miles. In antiquity these big schemes sometimes succeeded and, so far as one can gather from the engineers, there is every probability of the High Dam being built.

These large ideas make themselves felt not only in internal, but also in foreign affairs. In internal affairs there are so many schemes, most of them excellent in themselves but so ambitious and requiring so much money to carry out, that one wonders whether the economy must not be overstrained. This applies also in foreign affairs; Egyptian foreign policy has been remarkably ambitious. Just prior to the time of my visit, Egyptian relations were strained not only with the West and with Israel, but with half a dozen Arab governments—Iraq, the Sudan, Tunis, Jordan and the Lebanon—in some cases, perhaps, with their government rather than their people. But in the case of Tunis and the Sudan the governments had strong popular support in their objection to Egyptian ideas. Then just before I arrived in Cairo, President Nasser had spoken strongly against communism—not specifically against the Soviet, it is true; but it is difficult to attack communism without provoking Soviet government reaction. In fact, at the speech made by the President which I mentioned earlier, he

had obviously been immensely relieved that Mr. Khrushchev had replied courteously to the letter which he had sent him in explanation of his position, and that he was able to read out a friendly reply.

The régime is, of course, authoritarian; there is no freedom of speech in the sense in which that is understood in England or France. One has to be careful what one says, and that is resented by many intellectuals who have had English or French training. Lack of freedom also adversely affects the radio and press because they become simply agents for putting the government point of view. This is often done with considerable skill; the official case, however, becomes terribly monotonous. Meanwhile world events of importance do not get proper treatment, and other points of view are not heard. The general effect so far as I was concerned was to make it all so monotonous that I could not read the papers; and I am sure that is the effect on many Egyptians also.

Another difficulty in connection with authoritarian government in Egypt, as elsewhere, is that it is apt to go in for very sudden reversals of foreign policy, and this certainly upsets public opinion. People become accustomed to thinking of some aspect of foreign policy as settled, and then when there is a sudden switch and they have to believe the opposite, public opinion is confused. On the other hand, of course, an authoritarian government can switch back again equally suddenly and this has certain advantages. I mentioned the hostility between the Egyptian government and many other governments at the time of my visit, but there has already been a change in that regard. You will have noticed during the last day or two that a satisfactory arrangement has been reached with the Sudan over the Nile waters; and as regards other Arab countries there has been a great improvement, except in the case of Iraq. With the Lebanon, Egyptian relations are again friendly and they are better even with Jordan.

You may by now be thinking that in describing what is now the southern region of the United Arab Republic I have said remarkably little, in fact nothing, about the U.A.R. as such. Egypt is, of course, the major partner in the Union, having eight times as many inhabitants as Syria and being correspondingly richer. In fact one does not in Egypt see any great evidence that it is now the southern region of a United Republic. Chiefly noticeable is the new flag flying everywhere; and if you are somebody who liked going to the Heliopolis Palace Hotel, you will find that is no longer accessible to the public because the building has become the offices of the new central government.

It is only just eighteen months since the union of Egypt and Syria was brought about; and the initiative came from Syria, not from Egypt. It is untrue to suggest that Egypt annexed Syria or that Syria is a colony of Egypt. Syria was in a weak position in 1957-58. It never was a strong State. From the beginning there was a constant state of hostility with Israel. In 1957-58, there was, moreover, an economic crisis in Syria because of the failure of the rain, and because Syria was in course of changing over to take equipment and economic aid from the communist countries. This had aroused considerable alarm in Turkey, Iraq, and the West. The Turkish Army was massed on the northern frontier; the Iraqis were ready, as has been clearly shown by the Baghdad trials, to

march into Syria and make it a province of the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq. Internally there was a possibility that the country might be swept into putting itself wholeheartedly on the communist side and becoming a satellite. The Syrian government did not wish that. Moreover, Syria had been the birthplace of the movement for Arab unity. It was from Syria that the idea passed to Egypt, where it has since become the policy of the present Egyptian régime.

The Syrian Constitution, drawn up after the war, stated in so many words that the Syrian people were part of the Arab nation. Union was the obvious alternative to the possibility of going communist, which only a small minority wanted. The Syrian government therefore, with, I am sure, the approval of most people in Syria, asked the Egyptian government for union. The Egyptian government on the other hand were not anxious in the first place to accept, because they saw the difficulties which would arise; but they finally did accept, and the Constitution as drawn up reflects the conditions in which the Union came into being.

For day-to-day purposes, both countries are administered by their respective governments, known as the Executives, there being an Egyptian and a Syrian Executive. Each Executive carries on local administration more or less as previously. In addition, there is the central government, located in the Heliopolis Palace Hotel. This includes the Presidency, which is all-important, because the U.A.R. is a presidential State in which the President exercises supreme authority. It includes also the central finance minister; and he is responsible for the allocation of any surplus funds after the budgets of each region have been drawn up. This, in fact, means making money available from Egypt for schemes in Syria. In other respects, the functions of the central government are mainly planning. It does not interfere directly with day-to-day administration; that is the function of the Executives in Cairo or Damascus. Each State continues to retain its own educational and legal systems just as do England and Scotland within the Union of Great Britain, which in many respects, though not all, is analogous to the case of the U.A.R. Thus both Syria and Egypt carry on more or less as before, though by degrees their procedures are to be harmonized. For example, it is intended that there shall be Customs tariffs common to the two regions, and a common currency. This is not at all easy to bring about, because the two economies have hitherto been totally different. The Syrian economy is relatively free; the Egyptian economy severely controlled. Apart from this, the standard of living and salaries in Syria are nearly double what they are in Egypt. Change in this connection cannot be brought about overnight, as it were, without considerable dislocation. There have been many discussions as to how best to proceed; whether it would be better to take a lengthy period in gradual adjustment, or to do everything in one fell swoop. The obvious answer is to make now what adjustments are possible, though there must come a time when it is necessary to take the plunge. The same problem troubled the Moroccan government when it became independent and had to unite the southern or French, with the northern or Spanish, zone. It is not a difficulty created by maladministration; it is something natural which has to be faced.



Naturally business people in Syria are anxious to achieve the most favourable conditions that they can, when the common currency is introduced. The relation has to be fixed between the new and the two previous currencies; importers are naturally worried when import restrictions are introduced, as they have already been in Egypt, in order to encourage local industry. Hence among business men of this type there is much anxiety and even hostility. But so far as I could see amongst the mass of the people the idea of the union is extremely welcome; President Nasser himself appears to enjoy high popularity with the majority of the people of Syria. What did give rise to popular grumbling was the fact that as a result of the union all political parties in Syria were officially abolished while, in fact, most of the jobs, both political and administrative, went to members or friends of the Ba'ath party, which stands for Arab union. It was probably inevitable in the circumstances, since they were the people who supported the union. But at the same time it always causes displeasure to others when one party monopolizes jobs. This was clearly shown when elections were held, during the summer of 1959, for the National Assembly, which comprises both Egyptian and Syrian members, and the Ba'ath party did very badly. That seems undoubtedly to be one of the reasons why President Nasser has sent the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief, Hakim Amir, who is also Egyptian Vice-President, to Syria. It is true that there is a Syrian Vice-President, Akram Hourani, who represents sovereignty in Syria on normal occasions and lives in a palace in Damascus; but he is himself closely connected with the Ba'ath party so that it might be difficult for him to bring about changes by reducing the Ba'ath influence. This, I think, is one reason why President Nasser sent Marshal Amir to Syria, not as Egyptian Vice-President, but as his personal representative, in which capacity he can hope to profit from the popularity of the leader whom he represents. He has to try to tranquillize the business people and others who are nervous about the introduction of new Customs dues and the new currency; he has also to reduce the Ba'ath influence, which it would be difficult for the Syrian Vice-President to do. The second reason for his mission is, no doubt, the situation in Iraq. If civil war should break out there, President Nasser would naturally wish to have the highest military authority in close touch with the situation, that is, in Syria, rather than in Egypt.

In the Northern Region the results of the union are considerably more noticeable than in Egypt. In the first place, Damascus is no longer the capital of a separate State and there are therefore no longer any ambassadors or ministers, only consuls-general and consuls. On the other hand, Syria has retained its own government and frequent visits are paid by important personages from Cairo. President Nasser himself has paid prolonged visits, and the resultant animation means that Damascus has retained the aspect of a capital. Something new, brought about by the union, has been the impulse given to various plans drawn up by previous governments; some of these were already being put into operation but are now being operated with more vigour. This is seen particularly in two spheres, industry and agriculture, for which two new ministries have been created. Previously there was a Department of Industry in the Syrian government,

but its function was chiefly to issue, or not issue, licences; it thus acted as a brake rather than anything else. The new Ministry of Industry—there has not yet been time to judge whether it will be successful or not—has the duty of promoting industry, as well as regulating it. A five-year plan has been drawn up. This has few or no new projects, but they have now been put together in a definite plan and co-ordinated with the corresponding plan in Egypt. The project involves expenditure of £56,000,000 which it is hoped will double the national income in twenty years' time. It envisages the creation of certain light industries; together with a certain expansion of mining, irrigation and pipe lines.

The other new ministry, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, resulted from the decision of the government of the Union to carry out a major land reform, a thing which had been talked about for years, but about which no decision had previously been taken. In order to implement the reform, a new Ministry was created in October, 1958, with a sum of £10,000,000 provided by the central government, which I imagine means, in fact, provided by Egypt. I was able, thanks to the kindness of the Ministry, to see something of the work which is being done in its office at Hama. This is an important office because it covers the whole of the Hama and Homs area.

In Syria there are in fact two different types of agriculture, one in the west and the other in the north-east. West of Homs and Hama, the land has been under cultivation for generations past and was worked by peasants for landlords. Agriculture in the east, towards the Turkish and Iraqi frontiers, is largely a post-war creation of a quite different type. It was the work of rich merchants in Damascus or Aleppo who brought into cultivation large areas of land previously scantily cultivated, or not cultivated at all, using mechanical means. This mechanized agriculture was successful in growing big crops of cotton and wheat; but it did not involve a large agricultural population. As I had not time to visit that area, I can tell you no more about it. Obviously land reform presents special problems in those conditions.

On the other hand I was able to visit two western villages with the director of the office in Hama; these were far off the road, in the Alawite mountains. There it seemed that reform should be possible without any great drop in production. The lands of the first village which we visited had been the property of three landlords. Two of these were giving up their land there altogether, while the third was keeping his as his permitted area. For the moment the peasants were continuing to cultivate ground as they had in the past, probably on the same land. No survey exists and there are no trained officials, or very few, to carry out the reform. The peasants, however, know the land and how to work it. Where it is still owned by the landlords, the only difference is that there must be a tendency for wages to rise, because other workers, on the land which is being distributed, will get the produce instead of only a certain percentage of it. Provided therefore that the co-operatives which are to consist of a certain number of villagers—one of the objects of our journey was to select these—directed by an official of the Ministry, are able to provide the necessary seeds and so on in the first place, I cannot see why the reform should

not work. It was very clear that reform was long overdue. One has only to visit the villages and see conditions to realize how little has been done for the labourers or tenants by the landlords in the past. As I said, however, I think the reform will largely make itself.

What I mean by this can be illustrated by the Ghab project. This is primarily the draining of a tremendous marsh area. The scheme has three aspects: deepening the river and draining the marshes; secondly, the construction of irrigation canals; and, thirdly, the use of the regulated river for a hydroelectric scheme. The work is being done on an international basis, like everything in the Middle East at present. One canal is being built by West German contractors; the other by Italian contractors; the hydroelectric works are being carried out by Bulgarian contractors. The draining is in fact now complete, but not the hydroelectric work, nor are the dams yet ready to supply the water for irrigation.

When the Ministry of Agrarian Reform took this area over a year ago in October, 1958, it became their business to settle peasants on this land. They found, however, that it had been already largely occupied. Peasants from neighbouring hill villages, where the land was poor, had come down and squatted; and I was told—although I had no chance to verify this myself—they had pulled up most of the scrub, for clearing which the government had allowed a sum of £2,000,000; having cleared the land they had started cultivating. That seems to show that there is land hunger in West Syria; incidentally, this makes nonsense of the theory that it would be easy to settle hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees there. Once land is available it is snatched by the local peasants, who consider that they have the first claim. The Ministry, finding the peasants on the land, decided it would be best, in so far as investigation shows that they are genuine cultivators, to leave them there; each case is investigated and where they are satisfied that the man concerned is genuinely in need of land and working it—and they feel they can estimate correctly in 90 per cent. of cases—then he will be left on the land on a temporary basis and given permanent rights when the survey is made and proper title deeds can be issued.

Ladies and gentlemen, I see that my time is up. I hope that I have been able to convey to you something of the impressions which I received—often quite different from those which are formed from reading the press. There is much more which I should be glad to tell you, but I think it is better to leave you time to ask your own questions and to help me to complete the picture, if I can, on those points on which I have not made myself clear.

Mr. LANGE: May I ask the lecturer whether the Syrian Embassy would readily grant visas to the ordinary business man? Nine months ago my firm wanted me to go to Syria. I went to the Syrian Embassy in London and they told me they had no representative, but knowing that I was travelling round by Africa, they asked me to call at Accra where I could get a visa. As soon as I reached Accra I presented myself at the Syrian Embassy, was well received, and my British passport taken. Next morning when I called I received the United Arab Republic visa to go Syria. My company had received many letters from dealers in Damascus who

wished a representative to go out there. I had the visa in my pocket. I was remaining for another five days at Accra; three days after calling at the Embassy I was asked to go there again. I saw the Consul-General again; he received me very well indeed but regretted that he would have to cancel the visa because since he saw me he had referred the case to Cairo. He hinted that the visa would be granted immediately if I passed through Cairo or Beirut where they also have an embassy. I saw trouble, having my doubts. Now the company again want me this time to go to Cairo and I ask the lecturer whether a visa is readily granted to the ordinary business man?

Mr. NEVILL BARBOUR : I am not a business man so that I am not quite sure what happens in his case; I can only say what happened to myself. I did not find things easy. On the other hand, my questioner's experience was nine months ago, and things have certainly become easier since the signing of the financial agreement in February, 1959; that is to say, easier in Cairo. I imagine that now it should be possible to obtain a visa for Cairo without great difficulty. But the union is still incomplete between Egypt and Syria, and the Syrian authorities are extremely independent. One can have terrible difficulties in getting into Syria. I obtained a United Arab Republic visa after long delay in Beirut; when I did get it, it was endorsed for the northern as well as for the southern region. But when I reached the Syrian frontier, coming from Beirut, I was told that I must go back because the authorities in Damascus had not given their permission. I thought therefore it might be easier to get into Syria from Cairo, so when the time came I went to the Ministry of the Interior in Cairo. They told me there that there was nothing to stop me going; English subjects now required no special permit, though French still did. All the same, I consulted someone a little higher up and he confirmed his subordinate's statement. I then asked the Information Service (seeing that I was a journalist) to cable their representative in Damascus; a reply came back saying that there was no objection to me at all. Nevertheless, at the airport I was told I must return to Cairo by the next plane; it was only after much arguing that I was finally admitted. It may be that I was mistaken for somebody else. But there is no doubt that the Syrian security authorities can be very difficult.

Mr. W. YATES, M.P. : There have been unofficial reports in the press to the effect that the United Arab Republic does not wish for diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Would the lecturer say whether he thinks that is so? Secondly, could he tell us a little more about Communist China embassies in the East; how much more trade they are doing in the area?

Mr. NEVILL BARBOUR : As to diplomatic relations, the position is that Great Britain is anxious to resume them, but so far the Egyptian government has not been willing. I think the basis of the refusal has nothing to do with popular feeling; most Egyptians would welcome them—provided their government thought it politically desirable. But it has to be remembered that we did attack Egypt. There seems to be the idea in high political circles that we still disapprove of the United Arab Republic in general and are anxious to obstruct its policies in every way we can. They

think that a British Embassy in Cairo would tend to try to influence other Arab countries against them, and therefore think it to their advantage not to have a British Embassy in Cairo at the moment. Personally, I think they are mistaken, but that is what they feel, right or wrong. As for Chinese, I saw no evidence of their activities in the U.A.R. There are, however, Chinese building a road in the Yemen from Sana'a to Hodeida. There is certainly a certain appeal in China; China is further away for one thing and Arabs feel the Chinese as a people emancipating themselves from Western rule to be more like themselves than the Russians. There is much Chinese propaganda in evidence in Baghdad—pamphlets on the book-stalls and so on. I was astonished, too, in Wadi Halfa in the Sudan. The one little Arab shop which had any books in it contained entirely Chinese propaganda in Arabic. Of course Eastern Europeans are much in evidence in Syria as well as Western Europeans. In Aleppo I visited the new waterworks and was asked to enter my name in the visitors' book. It was the first English name; there were Jugoslavs, Bulgarians, Chinese, Japanese, East Germans, West Germans, and Italians.

Col. KEIGHLEY-BELL: May I ask the lecturer whether he thinks the title "United Arab Republic" is a misnomer? The Egyptians themselves are not Arabs and the Syrians are a very poor type of Arab. Based on that, does the lecturer consider that the Egyptians, that is to say, Nasser, live in the hope of getting the Arab bloc, the Arab communities such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Hejaz and all the rest of them into the so-called United Arab Republic?

Mr. NEVILL BARBOUR: I do not know. Nasser has never made any statement as to what form the united Arab world will take. I do not think Nasser hopes to rule a united empire in the way in which Hitler ruled Germany; that is certainly not Nasser's idea. An association has been formed with the Yemen, called the Union of Arab States, but in fact it amounts to little more than a name. Certainly Egypt stands for a closer union that would express itself in some political form, but not necessarily in the form it has taken with Syria. As more countries come in, Egyptian preponderance will, of course, be reduced. Syria and Iraq *vis-à-vis* Egypt would be a different proposition for Syria *vis-à-vis* Egypt. I should say that President Nasser is prepared to go slowly and let any State come in more or less on any terms it likes. Whether Egyptians should be called Arabs or not is a complicated question—too long to go into now. However, I am writing a book on the subject and if Colonel Keighley-Bell can wait until that is finished, he will find the answer to his question at some length! Egypt is, of course, the centre of Arabic culture and civilization. In his *Modern Egyptians*, written about 1840, Edward Lane specifically says that if one wants to study Arab civilization one should go to Cairo. The idea of Egypt as a State distinct from the Arab world is in part the result of its isolation from it during the period of the British occupation. The Arabs by race—if there is such a thing as an Arab race—are confined to the Arabian peninsula; otherwise they are all Arabized people.

Sir NEVILL BUTLER: Was the lecturer conscious of Russians in Egypt on constructional work there or in Syria?

Mr. NEVILL BARBOUR: I personally did not come across Russians. In

Baghdad I was told that there was a hotel at which Russians were staying. Bulgarians and Czechs are building the oil refinery at Homs.

MISS MARY ROWLATT: I only follow one Egyptian paper, *Al Ahram*, which during the last four or five weeks has had bold anti-communist statements; also Egyptians out of their country have spoken very forthrightly about communism. Has the lecturer heard any expressions of opinion by Egyptians in their own country?

MR. NEVILL BARBOUR: I did not find that communism had any appeal at all in Egypt; certain people definitely dislike it very much. One Egyptian I know who had lived for some time in England had recently been on a trip to Bulgaria, and he hated what he had seen of communism there. In Syria in the Ministry of Agrarian Reform there was a young man with whom I had a vigorous argument; he was a very ardent Nationalist who at some point mentioned that he had been in a communist country. I asked what he thought about it and he replied: "There is progress and much which I admire, but there is absolutely no individual liberty whatsoever—and there are occasions when that outweighs everything else." In nearly all Arab countries I found that those who sided with Nasser against Kassem—and they were the great majority—did so because they thought there was danger of communism in Iraq. But there are small communist minorities.

THE CHAIRMAN: It now only remains for me to thank the lecturer for coming, and for his brilliant dissertation. It is not often the Society has the privilege of a lecturer who has not only had a long and deep background of the subject but one so recently in the country and therefore so up to date. For that we have every reason to be most grateful to you, Mr. Barbour. (*Applause.*)

# KHUSHHAL KHAN—THE NATIONAL POET OF THE AFGHANS

By GEORG MORGENSTIERNE

EDITOR'S NOTE.—The article which follows was originally written in Norwegian by Professor Morgenstierne, the well-known orientalist of Oslo University. The English translation is the work of Mr. Athelstan Carøe, Danish Consul in Liverpool, and carries the full approval of the distinguished author.

Khushhal Khan was an almost exact contemporary of Milton.

PERSIAN, both as a written language and literature, has in Moham-  
medan times taken so dominating a position in Iran, both through  
its internal richness and from political and cultural conditions, that  
only tiny, scattered voices from other Iranian peoples have had a hearing.  
Strongest probably is the voice of the East-Iranian Afghans. Pashto, the  
language of the Afghans or Pathans, is very different from Persian—more  
so, for example, than Norwegian from English. And the Afghans have  
a highly developed proper pride and sensitivity, which to a great extent  
is attached to their mother tongue *Pashto*; the same word denotes  
also their special code of honour and morals. The numerous Afghan  
tribes have never formed a political unit. Even now a large part of the  
inhabitants of Afghanistan speak Persian, Turkish or other non-Afghan  
languages, whilst on the other hand there is a considerable Pashto-speak-  
ing Pathan population within the boundaries of Pakistan. Language and  
common traditions have nevertheless always bound Afghans together,  
despite all internal quarrels. Contact with India has also given them  
special characteristics, and it became natural for them to assert their own  
national individuality by writing in their native language.

The authenticity of Pashto poems recently published, and said to go  
back to early medieval times, cannot be regarded as proved. A tribal  
history dating from 1417 has so far been considered to be the oldest work  
in Pashto. This contains a sort of record of rights ("Domesday Book")  
for the tribe's occupation of land, so the practical objective is clear, and it  
was reasonable it should be written in the popular language. Unfortu-  
nately, although there is record of its having been written, it appears that  
the manuscript has disappeared.

The most ancient work, of which a manuscript was recently dis-  
covered,\* is attributable to the strong religious movement emanating from  
the arch heretic Bayazid Ansari (died 1585), called "the Saint of Light"  
by his followers, "the Saint of Darkness" by his embittered orthodox  
opponent Akhun Darweza, who has compiled a book of fierce polemic  
against him and other heretics.

\* While this English translation was being set up, the MS. has turned up in the  
University library of Tübingen.

Not before the beginning of the 17th century do we know for certain of a real poem in Pashto. One poet left a "Divan," and others are named. Otherwise the series of Afghan poets opens with the indubitably most notable and important of them all, Khushhal Khan Khatak. What is more, he is one of the most remarkable characters in all Indian and Iranian literature.

Khushhal Khan was born in 1613. (Khushhal means "happy," and he often makes play on the name, sometimes ironically.) He was the son of a chieftain of the Khatak tribe, and for seven generations, his ancestors, he says, had fallen by sword or arrow. During the Afghan expansion in the late Middle Ages the Khataks had settled between the Indus and Peshawar. They occupied a strategic key position because they commanded the Indus crossings and the approach to the Khyber Pass, as important for trade as for the communications between the great Mogul's possessions in India and in what is now Afghanistan. The Khataks could put 30,000 warriors into the field, and were a military factor to reckon with. They were also one of the Afghan tribes who had come in closest touch with the Mogul Empire's mixed Islamic-Hindu culture.

Early on Khushhal got involved in quarrels with neighbouring tribes, and when his father fell in battle in 1640, the Khataks chose him as chieftain. The election was confirmed by his overlord the Great Mogul Shah Jahan, who entrusted to him the guarding of the route from the Indus to Peshawar. He stood generally high in favour with Shah Jahan—the man who built the Taj Mahal in Agra—and received a high title from him. But when the bigoted Aurangzeb gaoled his own father Shah Jahan in 1659 and ascended the throne, he looked on his father's friends with suspicion, and also he wanted to take from the Afghans the relative independence they enjoyed. Khushhal was caught by a ruse of his enemies, sent to Aurangzeb's court and stayed several years in India, partly in prison, partly in enforced exile. Many of his poems give lively pictures of his experiences at this time. When, at last, he returned home, he had lost his royal fiefs and titles, but Aurangzeb did not dare take his title of chief from him. Gradually he came more and more in conflict with the Moguls, and he spent much of his time trying to get the Afghan tribes to fight the Mogul Empire. Not till the 18th century did Ahmad Shah succeed in founding an Afghan state, when both the Mogul Empire and Persia were much weakened. But a century earlier an Afghan patriotism wider than tribal made its appeal, and many tribes joined Khushhal. Aurangzeb, who himself took the field against them, suffered serious defeats. But the gold of the Moguls caused the defection of many Afghans, even of some of the Khataks, and more than one of Khushhal's own sons, headed by Bahram, failed him. (Khushhal himself in one of his poems admits to 30 sons—a later tradition even credits him with 57. Some of them were little good, and he complains of them. But four were poets and the literary tradition persisted in the family for several generations.) At last Khushhal gave up the honour of chieftaincy to his eldest son. He wished to devote himself to his studies and writing. But he never got the peace he hoped for, and he was always quarrelling afresh with Bahram. When he was 77 years old, Bahram sent one of his own sons to kill his



grandfather. But when the old warrior advanced before the army and challenged to single combat, nobody dared to take him on. This happened twice. In the end Khushhal had to flee to the hills to his allies the Afridis, and he died with them aged 78. He was buried in his beloved homeland, but as long as Mogul power lasted his grave was kept secret. "Let not the dust of Mogul horses' hooves sully my tomb," were Khushhal's last words.

So ended a troubled and active life, full of great expectations and deep disappointments. We must not picture Khushhal only as a wild tribal chief and warrior. Even if as a boy, according to himself, he spent one hour at school and twenty hunting, we see clearly from his writings that he was, if not a learned man, at least all round well taught, with good knowledge of the learning and art of his time. The educational programme he himself cites includes booklearning, handwriting, poetry, bow-shooting, swimming, riding and hunting, family life, bringing up of children, teaching servants, housekeeping, farming, trade, genealogy, music, chess and painting.

The court of the Great Moguls, where he spent much of his time voluntarily and involuntarily, was one of the age's great centres of culture, where at least in Shah Jahan's time Mohammedans, Hindus, Christians and others met. Khushhal may well have met the learned French doctor Bernier who stayed there for a long time. Anyhow, the wide range of his comprehensive interests are due not only to his natural talents, but also to the circles he came to know in Delhi, Agra and Lahore. The nearest parallel we can draw in Europe is of a contemporary chieftain from a wild Highland clan who learnt "artes et mores" at the courts of Paris and Edinburgh.

Khushhal's all round abilities and capacity for work in difficult surroundings are clear from his extensive production. It is unlikely he wrote 350 works, as his descendants claim, but we know he wrote manuals on statecraft and war, on medicine, divination and falconry. Housebuilding, bringing up infants, and not least erotica, occupied him as well as theology and ethics. He wrote an autobiography (of which we have fragments), a description of his visit to the mountain valley of Swat, and many other treatises which have been lost. He also invented a sort of shorthand for Pashto, and it is possible that he improved the alphabet. Several of these works have been traced by a learned Pakistani lady of Afghan descent, Dr. Khadijah Ferozuddin, who has written a thesis for the University of Lahore on Khushhal. It contains a good deal of new and interesting information on Khushhal and his works.

Khushhal's chief work is his collection of poems, his Divan, which has been published several times. On the Divan rests Khushhal's reputation, both among his countrymen and among the handful of Europeans who know anything of him. The contents cover all the subjects which occupied Khushhal at one time or other during his life. He puts forward his thoughts and most intimate opinions about every possible question and experience. All his changes of mood, all human frailties are exposed. He sings of the sublime and the all too human, of asceticism and indulgence, of religious devotion, national hopes, ambitions and disappointments, of

erotic entanglements and everyday's small observations, joys and sorrows. All too often he can flop into the dull and commonplace; sometimes he shows the peasant wisdom of a Hesiod. But always the personal element breaks through. His brain throbbed with ideas all through his life, and whatever he writes bears the mark of what he has seen and experienced. We seem to hear himself speaking. It is this live and rich picture we get of his own vital, virile and passionate personality which first captivates the reader and makes his Divan a human document close to life, the like of which is not often found in Oriental literature. Generally speaking there is something impersonal about even the greatest Eastern poets. We usually know little of their intimate lives, and it is very rarely possible to follow their development through their poetry. Khushhal's development, year by year, it is possible to follow, so rich are his works in historical and autobiographical data. It is no disparagement to add that it would need a great philological effort to separate what is certainly due to his own genius from what might then have been regarded as traditional commonplaces, although expressed in a personal manner. To do that one would have to possess a deep knowledge of the literary environment of the Mogul court.

Khushhal *had to write* :

“No, I am not happy (khushhal) with the effort of writing poetry,  
 But God has laid it like a yoke on my neck to sing.  
 And never am I pleased myself with expression or thought,  
 But suddenly it bursts forth in words, like showers in the rainy  
 season.  
 There is no worse labour for man than to write verse,  
 Would that God would free every honest man from such a plague!”

And :

“I am not always pleased at my own verse, yet what can I do?  
 My heart drives me against my will, at times I am impelled to it.  
 For twenty years the cauldron of my poetry has been seething,  
 Not till now it is fit for use, now that my life has passed sixty years.”

A real Afghan is he in his strong proper pride and self assertion. It is perhaps characteristic that he was never tempted to try his hand at impersonal subjects like the well-known Iranian legends, which so many later Persian and Afghan poets again and again rang the changes on. And when he plays on mystic-religious strings, it never occurs to him, as so often happens with Persian sufi-poets, to wish himself freed from the bonds of Self. His own Self, with its experiences and thoughts, is too interesting for that, however bitter they may be. And he thanks Allah for two things : that he is an Afghan, and that he is Khushhal Khan!

Altogether he fits very little with the pattern of a lazy and dreaming “Oriental.” He is a fatalist, but for this very reason a man of action : What is going to become of one, will happen, so one can just as well put in a full contribution of life and energy. This is a subject he constantly returns to. “Every task to which a man bends his effort from the heart becomes a rose, even if it is a thorn bush.” And “every hour spent in

idleness is worse than slave labour." It is often a pure Kipling sahib ideal he praises: "Few are his words, his deeds many and accomplished in silence," says he about the chieftain—even if he is somewhat of too expansive a nature to be properly called a strong *silent* man—"His word's his word, his face his very face. Let him take the burdens of others upon him, but not lay his burdens on others."

Above all he hates pettiness, avarice and careful calculation. He wishes to die poor—as he did—after having spent his worldly goods on liberality and hospitality :

"He who plays with the World am I.

I am wearing it (as a dress), I take (my due) out of it, but I am not bound by it.

I am as a stone against my enemies, but like wax to my friends,  
In the rougs and smooths of life, such am I.

Against misfortunes I battle with the sword of my will in hand,  
But I bow like the dead before the harsh biddings of Fate.

And if my pure heart is like the gentle spring rain,  
Yet it can thunder when it must in my spirit.

Call me by any name it pleases you,

Human being, angel, demon, beast of prey, I am all things.

Fate raises and dashes me as time marches on,

I, Khushhal, understand not myself what I am."

As with most Persian and Afghan poets sensual love has a broad place in Khushhal. At times his imagery and attitudes are conventional and stereotyped, but here too he is more fresh and personal than most others. The proud Afghan never throws himself prostrate and humble in the dust before his beloved, as his Persian prototypes often do. We find no trace of the aberrations which are so common in Persian poetry. Pashto, with its distinction of grammatical gender, does not lend itself like Persian to camouflage the difference between "him" and "her." Even in his most direct speech he appears sound and not vitiated, and in his rules for moral conduct he disapproves of all sorts of excesses. Nor can he have been a degenerate harem-pasha, active and energetic as he was even in his old age.

But it is scarcely credible that earthly love was for him mainly a stepping stone to spiritual love, as Miss Ferozuddin thinks. He had clearly an easily captivated heart and up to a ripe age a wide awake eye for feminine beauty. He himself jokes about his white beard, which no longer charms the girls, and which it does not help to dye.

It is only occasionally that we find traces of an inner eye that saw more than physical beauty in women, and he pours out all the familiar complaints of all time against them, to Miss Ferozuddin's great chagrin. After all, he had the light of Islam to lead him in better ways! One of his wives has written a poem to him, while he lay in prison in India, and perhaps he stood closer to her.

Nor was the wine he drank only the wine of mystical ecstasy. At times he certainly fled from abstemiousness to the "wine from Portugal" and other strong drink. "As an elephant labours in chains, when Hindustan

appears in its dreams, so do I tear myself from piety and abstention when I remember my drinking companions.”

In spite of this he could be a good Moslem and thank Allah for his true faith. But he is tolerant of Hindus and Christians, and he can also use the common language of Islamic mysticism. The dull orthodoxy of Akhun Darweza’s fanatical followers in Swat was too severe for him :

“ If Plato came to life and settled in Swat, and set forth for the  
Akozais\* in Pashto his Laws and his State,  
They would only say : ‘ What is this?  
The Akhun’s book of sermons is good enough for us.’  
What will a bullock make of sweet sugar-cane?  
It feeds only on grass.”

In his ethics Khushhal is naturally bound by his environment and headstrong as he is, he is not sparing of scorn and prayers for vengeance on his enemies. He had had bitter experiences and his political principles are simple and not unknown, even in our time :

“ Until a chieftain has cut off many heads,  
How will the plains and mountains of his land rest in peace?  
Brother and son are slain in a chieftain’s cause,  
And to all who remain his commands go out.  
Beside the water of the sword, no other streams are there  
Which cool the fevered blood of him who seeks for war.  
The tree of a Chief’s domain well watered  
By the blood of his enemies bears fair fruit.  
Either like a man loosen the turban bravely o’er thy forehead,  
Or wear in its place a woman’s veil.  
Ah God! for whom do I write? Who will heed me?  
Yet so have I spoken verse by verse in this book.”

“ Lord, deliver me from blood-guiltiness : even now am I upon the sword to bring the innocent to the grave.

Verily, my lust maketh evil that which is good and the good evil : as for me I am always helpless before the bidding.

No infidel, no Hindu or Jew is so vile in that he doeth : no man so miserable as I know myself in the inward parts.”

Often we hear such tones from him, and they ring true, because sincerity—anyhow of the moment—seems to mark all his writings. His religious poetry often bears witness to a profound feeling and is not merely filled with the set clichés of Moslem piety. We hear an echo of the Psalms of David.

He is himself aware of his special temptations—lust for power, riches and honour, favour of princes, love, hunting, beautiful houses and gardens, fine clothes and carpets, poetry and music. But highest he places indepen-

\* Free and abridged translation !

dence of all external blessings. Time and again he declares himself happy to have been freed from Mogul titles of honour and gold, and all the responsibilities which were placed on him. "I am at heart happy like a clear star. Every hour is now a festival of freedom. For an Afghan his cloak and straw-mat are enough, I have no use for cushions and couches. I have freedom even if my clothes are simple. I am freed from the load of velvet and brocade."

Life in the open air, especially hunting, is his joy and delight, and he never gets tired of telling how wonderful it is to hunt on horseback over the plains with falcon or hound. There is a freshness breathing over many of these poems, and his pictures of nature often reveal a keen perception, even if one also comes across much that is trite. It seems characteristic of him that many of his poems begin with "When I saw . . .," and that altogether the verb "to see" is exceptionally frequent, while we seldom hear of "hearing." But such a subject would need a special study.

Above all his heart is tied to his poor homeland up by the Indus, and from prison in India he sends greeting with the morning breeze to Khairabad and Sarai and all the dear, familiar places :

"The trees of my homeland are sandal and aloe,  
Its dust is all musk and ambergris.  
If to others Sarai is a heap of stones,  
To me its every stone is the purest gold."

To his love for his narrower home district is added a fellow feeling with all the Afghan tribes which he tries to unite for the common fight. He is consciously a national poet, such as it is difficult to find a parallel to in the East, before the influence of European nationalism set in the 19th century. Obviously his national feeling does not contain the same elements as our modern one. His definite objective is liberation from the Moguls, and he uses his poetry as a weapon in the political fighting. "This is not my tongue, it is a blaze. It fires off gun shots." True enough, he often chastises his own people and feels that he stands alone. "We talk the same language, we both talk Pashto, but we understand not in the least what we say to one another," he says to the people of Swat, and "I am the only one who thinks of my people's honour." But he never gives up appealing to his countrymen's longing for independence and to the memories, rich in honour, of the times when they ruled large parts of India.

He himself for long felt himself bound by loyalty and family traditions to the Moguls. But Aurangzeb's attacks, not only against him personally, but against the autonomy of the Afghan tribes as a whole, compelled him to break with them. "I tried to be a Mogul by drawing my sword for them, but I never succeeded. I remained the same Afghan I was."

When he made up his mind, he did so completely, and devoted the rest of his life to the fight. It is not surprising that he became the great national poet of the Afghans and Pathans in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But at other times, less original poets were more popular, because they were more accessible and followed better the regular patterns. Khushhal

is often rugged and scant in style, thoughts wrestle with expression in a little cultivated language.

His proper pride does not deny itself in him as a poet. He often praises himself, with some exaggeration, for having virtually created Pashto poetry, and he has little good to say of his predecessors :

“ When in Pakkhto Poetry I my standard rais’d,  
The World of Words did I on my war-steed subdue.  
The glow-worm was the hero of black night,  
But like the morning-star did I eclipse his feeble light.”

Of the art of poetry he says in a poem which is rather more loaded with metaphor than usual :

“ As for the arrow a bowman is at need,  
So for Poesy a Magician is required.  
In his heart’s hand continuous the scales of metre held.  
A stern informer he, if it be a foot too short or long.  
The Bride of Truth should he mount upon her black palfrey,  
O’er her unsullied face the veil of Trope held down.  
Anklets should he place of Alliteration on her feet,  
Rhythm’s neck-let on her neck, a mystery long drawn out.”

Khushhal’s metre is built on ancient Afghan traditions. It is in accordance with the very nature of the Pashto language, accentuating like ours, not quantitative like Arabic and Persian. Strangely enough, this peculiarity of Pashto metre has never been drawn attention to.\* The rhythm is obvious to our ear, if rather hard and monotonous. There is a wealth of rhyming words in literary Pashto, so that formally it is easy to put into verses. Khushhal, too, can descend to fairly prosaic pedestrian rhyming. But the language itself in its uncultivated raciness is very expressive.

Khushhal cannot match the great Persian poets in refined harmony and picturesque imagery, nor yet in depth of thought. On the other hand he usually avoids the overloaded metaphors and the artificiality they, according to our taste, are so full of. Comparatively seldom do we meet with the empty jingle which bores us in much Persian second-rate poetry. Khushhal’s metaphors are usually definite and to the point, even if they can be naive, and one feels he is writing of living realities. One breathes in him neither the thinned stratosphere air of mysticism, nor heavy and sultry vapours of the jungle.

All in all, we can accept Miss Ferozuddin’s final verdict : “ Worn out metaphors and clichés, old faded flowers have no place in Khushhal’s fresh and flowering garden. There one hears the wind blow sough in the green foliage of a living language, and one draws in the sweet fragrance of the sweetness-laden flowers of natural sentiment.”

Of great importance to Khushhal’s development have been the rich experiences of a varied life, his acquaintance with various surroundings,

\* Since this article was originally written, Dr. D. N. MacKenzie has published, in the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXI, a detailed analysis of Pashto metre.

his position as a tribal chieftain and as a courtier, as warrior, refugee and serious student. But the basis must mostly be found in his own strong personality. Perhaps the effect of the contrast with most other oriental poets makes him loom larger than he actually deserves. Anyway, he is worthy of deeper study as the most important representative of a people which surely has many unused possibilities.

\* It is not without reason that Major Raverty in his "Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans" from 1867—unfortunately as unpoetical as C. E. Biddulph's "Afghan Poetry of the Seventeenth Century" (1890)—has taken as a motto the well-known words of Gray's *Elegy* "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen and waste its sweetness on the desert air."

To which may perhaps be added, as an echo, the popular Pashto verselet: †

"I hold a po'sy in my h'and here,  
Let who'd enjo'y the flowers' fra'grance come then to me."

\* In spite of this, some of them have had to be resorted to here. In the original article the selection of poems quoted was largely determined by the author's ability to produce readable, versified Norwegian translations.

† Quoted from Dr. MacKenzie's translation, which renders the Pashto rhythm.

# THE PERSIAN GULF PRELUDE TO THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM

By C. J. EDMONDS

## I

THE town of Bushire is situated at the northern point of a cigar-shaped peninsula, about twelve miles long and four broad, lying parallel to the mainland of Persia and joined to it in the middle by some nine miles of mud flat called Mashila. The successor of the more ancient Reshire six miles to the south, Bushire owed its rise to importance in the nineteenth century to its position at the terminus of the great caravan route running northwards from the sea through the middle of Persia by way of Shiraz and Isfahan to Tehran, and is the seat of the Persian Governor of the Gulf Ports.

There was, however, when I knew it (and perhaps there still is), nothing resembling a harbour; ships used to lie at one of two anchorages according to the amount of cargo to be discharged or taken on board, the outer about seven and the inner about three miles from the shore in an open and unprotected roadstead, a special type of native sailing-boat called *mashuwa* being used for communication and lightering. There was an anchorage rather nearer in off Reshire, which was favoured by visiting sloops of the Royal Navy and vessels of the Royal Indian Marine but was not used by mercantile shipping.

The quite considerable bazaars had none of the attractiveness of those in other Persian cities. They were reached by narrow and tortuous passages winding in and out among overhanging houses of mud-brick revealing only a thread of blue sky to the bewildered pedestrian. Immemorial usage had sanctioned the throwing of the foulest garbage into these ill-ventilated thoroughfares. To describe the climate there is a Persian saying: Hell is the summer health resort of Bushire. In addition to one considerable village called Sangi a mile or two to the south there were scattered about the peninsula various small settlements, some of them just collections of huts of matting occupied by fishermen and shrimpers, for the dried shrimps of Bushire were esteemed a great delicacy in all parts of the Gulf.

In December, 1912, when I first set foot there, the European official community consisted of the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (who also had the rank of Consul-General) with his staff, the Russian, German and Turkish Consuls, the Belgian Director of Persian Customs, a British doctor of the Indian Medical Service in charge of Persian quarantine arrangements, and a French military doctor who, for some reason, was attached to the Russian Consulate. There had been more consulates at one time or another; but these had disappeared and the protection of



French, Dutch, Norwegian and other foreign interests was now entrusted to the Resident, who punctiliously maintained their protocol files, inviting himself separately in each of his several capacities to pay himself calls of congratulation on the appropriate national days. The non-officials included the staffs of the Imperial Bank of Persia (now British Bank of the Middle East) and of the cable station maintained by the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Reshire, the representatives of three or four British business houses, a Russian merchant, and the German branch-manager of the firm of Wönckhaus, agents for the Hamburg-Amerika shipping line. Almost without exception the Europeans, like the Governor and leading Persian officials and merchants, lived away from the town in country houses, riding on horse back or driving in carriage and pair, trap or dog-cart, to their places of business and on their social occasions. A battalion of Indian Infantry, the 2nd Rajputs, and a squadron of the Central India Horse (the rest of the regiment being at Shiraz) were billeted at a large mansion known as Malik's House, and the presence of their officers added considerably to the general gaiety and the success of gymkhanas and other similar functions.

For my present purpose only the Governor, the staff of the British Residency, and the Germans require some further introduction.

Ali Muhammad, Muvaqqar-ud-Daula, was a typical grandee of those times but, having been to preparatory school in England, spoke English unusually well. A jealous custodian of Persian rights and dignity he was at the same time an eminently practical man and, in the somewhat anomalous circumstances, had established a good working relationship with the Resident; a private telephone wire connected their two offices and houses.

The Resident, Sir Percy Cox, together with his Second Assistant, Captain A. T. (later Sir Arnold) Wilson, lived and had their offices at Sabzabad, about seven miles out. The First Assistant, Captain R. L. Birdwood, with the Vice-Consul, H. G. Chick, and the Consular Assistant, myself, both of the Levant Consular Service, worked at the old Residency on the sea-front in the town. Chick, in addition to his ordinary consular duties, conducted the Residency's relations with the tribal chiefs of the neighbouring mainland.

The most important of these chiefs was Haidar Khan of Bandar Rig, on the coast 35 miles north of Bushire, in the district of Hayat Daud. Shrewd and full of wordly wisdom, he not only wielded absolute authority over his own Hayat Daud and the historic island of Kharg but was accepted as their leader and political mentor by the chiefs of Liravi, with its port of Bandar Dilam, to his north, and of Shabankareh and Rudhilleh to his south, which made a sphere of influence along the coast of about 70 miles. He was by nature always on the side of law and order (an important British commercial interest) and had co-operated in the suppression of piracy. The Residency, in return, was accustomed to give him such support as it properly could in the protection of his legitimate concerns. One of these is of sufficient historical interest to deserve special mention: From the days of the Honble. East India Company the Shatt-al-Arab pilots had been drawn from a single family of Kharg, the Khan of Hayat Daud receiving a small royalty on each ship that crossed the bar; it was

owing to the good offices of Chick that this arrangement, with minor changes, continued for some time after the British occupation of Basra and the progressive organization of the port on modern lines. In contrast to Haidar Khan, the Tangistanis on the coast to the south with their long record of piracy and smuggling, as well as several of the chiefs on the main road who made their living out of blackmail levied on caravans, notably the Khan of Burazjan, were more or less permanently in disfavour with the Persian authorities and the Residency alike.

The German Consulate was a large rented building perhaps two miles from the town and with its two square towers presented quite an imposing appearance to ships lying out in the roadstead. On the landward side it faced a broad sandy plain, a perfect place for a good long gallop. The Consul, Dr. Helmuth Listemann, was a dapper little man with a small "Kaiser" moustache, a not untypical member of his country's Foreign Service. He gave the impression of being overwhelmed by the great prestige of the representative of the nation whose position and influence it was part of the purpose of the *Drang nach Osten* to undermine, and was in consequence inclined to stand on his dignity and to take offence very easily. On the other hand, as will be seen later, he was not entirely without a sense of humour.

## II

Between December, 1912, and the beginning of March, 1915, when the events about to be chronicled took place, there had been a number of changes. Sir Percy Cox, after a spell as Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, had returned to the Gulf as Chief Political Officer with Indian Expeditionary Force "D" and was established at Basra with Wilson, just back from his work as British representative on the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission, as his principal assistant. (Birdwood had originally accompanied Cox from India but had been killed at his side by a stray shrapnel bullet during the advance from Fao.) Lieut-Colonel S. G. Knox, the Deputy Resident at Bushire, so styled because Cox had resumed the title of Resident, and Chick were temporarily absent in India or at Basra. The Residency staff was thus down to three: Captain W. G. (now Sir Gordon) Neale, First Assistant, in charge; Captain E. W. Noel, Second Assistant, and myself, Acting Vice-Consul. The 2nd Rajputs had been relieved by the 102nd Bombay Grenadiers, but the Central India Horse had long since been withdrawn.

Some time early in 1914 Listemann had gone on leave and had been replaced by a colleague named Wassmuss, who had acted for him on previous occasions and so knew Bushire well. Hail-fellow-well-met in manner, with a young-looking, rubicund face set off by prematurely greyish hair, Wassmuss was a keen horseman, and his afternoon polo parties at the Consulate that summer were quite a feature of the always lively social round. He was generally popular, though we of the Residency thought he was a little too fond of asking the younger officers of the battalion seemingly innocent questions. Listemann had come back towards

the end of July, and some time later we heard reports that Wassmuss was passing through Cairo on his way home when war was declared but had evaded arrest. The Wönckhaus agent was now Karl Eisenhut, who had served at Bushire some years previously and had recently returned with a young bride; he lived in a large two-storeyed building known as Old Bank House about half a mile south of the Consulate.

From August 4 onwards all social contacts with the Germans had automatically ceased, but one incident must be mentioned for its bearing on what follows. One dark night a subaltern of the 102nd, Leslie Hastings, who was something of a madcap, climbed up on to the flat roof of the Consulate tower with the flagstaff, and hoisted the Union Jack. When he went along again in the morning to view his handiwork he was horrified to find the Union Jack still there indeed, but the red, white and black flag of Germany, with its imperial eagle, flying over it. There was only one thing to be done, to climb up again and retrieve the emblem of British prestige. This was safely accomplished; but in the meantime Listemann had come out and was waiting for him at the bottom. They had quite a pleasant chat and parted with expressions of mutual personal esteem.\*

When the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of the Central Powers it was the obvious cue for the German High Command to seek to stir up *jihād*, the fight for the faith, in the Muslim lands of Western Asia, with Afghanistan and the Indian frontier as the ultimate objectives. Before the end of January, 1915, a special mission of experts from Berlin had assembled in Baghdad, and shortly afterwards the systematic infiltration of small parties into Persia began. The most southerly of these, consisting of Wassmuss as leader, Theodore Linders, a doctor, and two Indian revolutionaries reached Shushtar about the middle of February and had some success in stirring up the fanatical population. On the 22nd they started out for Ram Hurmuz and Behbahan, making for Shiraz. (A third German, Bohnstorff, seems to have left Shushtar a day or two earlier to visit Huwaiza before returning to Baghdad.)

On March 6, Neale received an urgent telegram from Basra saying that the party had left Behbahan on the 2nd, and instructing him to send Noel to Bandar Rig to ask Haidar Khan to arrest them as they passed through Hayat Daud and bring them down to the sea. The mission was successful, and the whole caravan was surrounded and captured some miles inland by a contingent of tribesmen under the Khan's brother.

Neale and I were now spending much of our time at Sabzabad, and on the morning of the 8th we sat down to decypher a telegram from Noel supplementing his first laconic message giving news of the capture. But our jubilation quickly turned to dismay, for it reported that, although the rest of the party were safely in custody, Wassmuss himself had slipped unobserved out of his tent and "disappeared into the night." What had happened, as we learned later, was this. The commander of the riflemen had sent a message asking whether the prisoners were to be put in irons; but the war was still in its early days and Noel, while emphasizing the need for the utmost vigilance, had hesitated to authorize so extreme an

\* Hastings was later killed on the Tigris while gallantly leading a bayonet charge against the Turkish trenches.

indignity. Wassmuss had not settled down when his companions had turned in for the night, but had kept going in and out of his tent, on one pretext or another, until the guards ceased to pay much attention to the sound of his movements. Finally he had slid down into a small ravine behind the tent and set off, in his bare feet until he met a villager with a donkey, in the direction of Burazjan, where he could count on the protection of the Khan, well known for his hostility to the British. Having made sure that there should be no hitch about the others and the baggage (which was found to contain a supply of gold sovereigns and several thousand violently inflammatory pamphlets in English and five or six Indian languages) Noel set out in pursuit; but Wassmuss already had too



good a start, and Noel was lucky to get out of Burazjan territory without misadventure to himself. Wassmuss remained at large in Southern Persia throughout the war and was a constant source of embarrassment.

As we finished decyphering Noel's telegram the same thought occurred to us simultaneously: we must arrest both Listemann and Eisenhut before they could hear of the attempt on Wassmuss and escape to join him in the hinterland. We therefore telegraphed clear-the-line to Basra for authority and then went down to Malik's House to concert plans with the military. We were thus ready with our answer to Cox's first reaction asking how we

proposed to proceed, and then kept ourselves awake with strong coffee brewed by Mrs. Neale (for these exchanges had taken the whole day), awaiting the "carry on." This arrived clear-the-line at about eleven o'clock; so we turned in to try to snatch a little sleep, not very successfully.

Shortly after 1 a.m. on March 9, accordingly, we drove down to the pre-arranged rendezvous, Neale in the Resident's carriage and I in another hired from the town, the driver, who was generously compensated afterwards, having been lodged with the Residency guard and replaced by Neale's own coachman. We then separated to march to our respective objectives: Neale, who thought it would be more suitable for a married man to disturb the Eisenhuts, with a detachment of sepoy's under Captain T. T. Oakes to surround the Old Bank House, and I with Lieutenant E. C. Withers (Royal Indian Marine, Intelligence Officer) and a similar detachment under Captain C. P. F. Warton and Hastings to the Consulate.

Arrived within striking distance we gave Hastings a start of five minutes to get a party between the Consulate buildings and an adjacent fishing village of mat huts. But as he moved into position all the dogs of Asia began to bark, and the Persian watchmen, alarmed by the din and our flitting shadows, began to fire wildly in all directions. The clang of shattered glass on the stone verandah told us that he had decided, wisely, to go in himself without waiting; and when Warton and I arrived we found a rather dazed Listemann already out of bed, and Hastings with a broad grin on his face looking for all the world like a kitten showing off his first mouse. On the bedside table I noticed several empty bottles of beer and a bottle of grenadine syrup. For some years I continued to be puzzled by the seeming incongruity of this combination until I learned, on high academic authority, that grenadine is an antidote for alcoholic remorse as effective as any prairie oyster.

Listemann, whose first observation on being roused had been, "Oh! it's you again, Hastings, is it?" now turned stiffly to Warton, whom he did not know, and, bringing his bare heels together, introduced himself; rather self-consciously Warton returned the compliment. He then turned to me: "Mr. Edmonds, you are a member of the regular Consular Service and you must know that what you are doing this night is strictly contrary to international law." I replied that we were sorry to inconvenience him, I was not there to discuss international law but to carry out my orders, and I must ask him to come along quietly.

In the meantime we had heard one of the Persian watchmen galloping away in the darkness. The Governor, as soon as he heard what was happening, might be expected to come down himself to intervene, an embarrassment it was most important to avoid. The carriage which was to have followed us after an interval to the Consulate had not arrived, so we could only give the prisoner time to put on his shoes and his dressing-gown before marching him off to join the others at the Old Bank House, leaving Withers to send his clothes after us. But first I asked him for his keys. "Keys! keys!" he shouted; "that (pulling a handkerchief and a box of matches out of the dressing-gown pocket and throwing them down on the floor), that is all you are allowing me to take, and you ask me for keys!"

Most of the way we marched in silence, but there was one short conversation :

*Warton*: Will you walk a little faster, Mr. Listemann?

*Listemann* (nettled at being addressed as Mr. and not Dr.): No, I will not.

*Warton*: Then I'm afraid you'll have to be pushed.

*Edmonds* (hearing the padding feet of a running sepoy coming up from behind): Here are your clothes, Dr. Listemann; perhaps you would like to put your trousers on.

*Listemann*: No, I will not put my trousers on.

*Edmonds*: As you wish. But I must urge you to walk faster if we are to avoid unpleasantness.

*Listemann*: Very well. . . And now, Gentlemen (this a few minutes later as we reached the Old Bank House), as I understand that there is a *lady* coming perhaps I *had* better put my trousers on.

While we were still at the Consulate we had heard the sounds of a brisk fusillade from across the plain; but now all was silent and hurricane lamps were moving briskly about the verandahs upstairs. I went into the compound and hailed Neale, who asked if I had "got my man," thanked God fervently, and promised to be down in a couple of minutes with his. It transpired later that he had had the narrowest of escapes, for one of the shots fired into the darkness by the watchmen had passed between the two flaps of his shirt, missing his throat by not more than a quarter of an inch.

The Eisenhuts, fully dressed, now came down. Listemann was not amused by Neale's cheerful "Sorry to disturb you, Dr. Listemann, but war is war you know" and turned his back; for the Germans made a point of refusing to recognize the international status of the Indian Political Service. We then got into the carriages and, with Oakes, Warton and their orderlies as mounted escort, drove to Dastak, a cove near Reshire, where the prisoners were to be put on board R.I.M.S. *Nearchus*.

Listemann had manifested considerable annoyance at the attentions of the sepoys who had kept a close watch on him as he turned discreetly away to pull on his trousers, and again when one took his place on the box beside the coachman. But as we drove along he soon calmed down, I gave him a cigarette, and we had a friendly conversation. A few days before he had seen me take a heavy fall when galloping over the plain in front of the Consulate, had watched through his telescope for a few moments as I lay stunned, and had been on the point of coming out when I had risen and staggered away; he hoped that I was none the worse. (I had been passing a flock of goats when one of them darted back and got entangled in my pony's fore-legs.) In reply to my enquiries (he, like Eisenhut, was newly married but had not brought his wife out with him) he said that he had indeed been very lonely, but the company of the Eisenhuts had been a comfort and he had been filled with admiration for the young bride's pluck. He then asked me to see that his horses and dogs were cared for, to send him some clothes, and to take special care of two rings to which he attached great sentimental value.

When we reached Dastak the sea was shrouded in thick mist, visibility was down to a few feet, and there was no sign of any boat from *Nearchus*. We sat on the rocks to wait, racked by anxiety lest the Governor, alerted by the escaped watchmen, might even now come down and make a scene. But before very long we heard the unmistakable rattle of oars in rowlocks (never was music sweeter to my ears) and had hardly distinguished the shape of the cutter before she ran up on to the sand and Lieutenant Taylor jumped ashore.

Having seen the prisoners safely off we returned to the Consulate and were met on the verandah by an exultant Withers. In a chest of drawers in Listemann's bedroom, kept here no doubt to be handier for hurried destruction in case of emergency at night than they would have been away in the office safe, and wrapped up in several pairs of long woollen underpants, he had found two "dictionary" cyphers.

We each appropriated one of the Consulate flags (I still have mine among my most treasured possessions) and then, after a quick look round, Neale went back for what was bound to be a most embarrassing and painful interview with the Governor, leaving me to pack Listemann's clothes, photographs and other personal effects (to my great distress there was no trace of the two rings), to seal most of the rooms, and to search the archives. These contained ample corroboration of the reports we had received of German plans and intrigues to sabotage the submarine cable at Reshire and to bring in Tangistani tribesmen to attack the houses of the scattered British and allied community.

The next morning, March 10, I left with Listemann's effects in a sea-going steam tender of the British India Company to rendezvous with *Nearchus* off Kharg and arrived in time for dinner on board with the officers, the Bushire prisoners, Linders, and the inevitable Hastings appropriately dressed in his "blues" and looking quite the policeman. After dinner *Nearchus* sailed, and the tender anchored where she was for the night. I do not know how long I had been asleep when I found myself suddenly rolled out of my camp bed on to the deck; the tide having gone out we had touched bottom and heeled over to a sharp angle. We left at dawn for Bandar Rig to put ashore three of Haidar Khan's men who had accompanied Noel on his chase, and then returned to Bushire.

### III

The story of the *Zimmermann Telegram*, first recorded in the *Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page* (edited by B. J. Hendrick, New York, 1923-6) and there called "a document that in its influence on American policy proved to be the most sensational that the European war had so far brought forth," has been retold many times, and the main facts are familiar.

Towards the end of 1916 the war seemed to have reached a condition of stalemate. In the United States, in spite of mounting indignation at German "frightfulness," of which American citizens had been the victims, and evidence of wide-spread sabotage carried out by German agents, President Wilson was still "too proud to fight" and wedded to the idea of bringing the belligerents together for a negotiated peace. The German

High Command, for their part, had decided that their best hope of victory lay in unrestricted submarine warfare directed against allied and neutral shipping alike and had fixed February 1, 1917, for the inauguration of this policy. They realized, of course, that this might bring the United States into the war, but banked on being able to beat the Allies to their knees, before American intervention could become effective, by the speed and thoroughness of their operations supported by political steps to divert the American effort. It was in these circumstances that Zimmermann, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent his historic telegram instructing the German Minister in Mexico to invite President Carranza to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers, the reward to be recovery of the former Mexican states of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona, lost after the war of 1846; it was also suggested that the Mexican Government might prevail upon Japan to change sides. The message was intercepted and decyphered by Admiral Sir Reginald Hall's famous "Room 40 O.B." at the Admiralty. It was communicated to the United States Government and, it is generally agreed, contributed powerfully to "kick President Wilson into declaring war" that April.

The authoritative history of "Room 40" is Admiral Sir William James's *The Eyes of the Navy* (London, 1955). Admiral Hall's primary concern was of course with naval intelligence, but "in April (1915, . . . there came into Hall's hands a copy of the German diplomatic code-book—treasure-trove from Persia," the code-book used for messages between Berlin and Madrid (whence they were sent on to the German diplomatic representatives in North and South America) and between Berlin and Constantinople (for the Middle East). He thereupon created a separate political department inside his organization and was thus able to keep touch with German subversive activities in all parts of the world.

The generally accepted story is that the cypher book was found almost by accident when Hall, prompted by some sixth sense, caused a search to be made in Wassmuss's baggage, which had been sent home and which the India Office "with characteristic ineptitude" had left unexamined in its cellars.

I cannot help thinking that the book, the capture of which had such far-reaching consequences, must have been one of those discovered in Listemann's long woolly underpants in the circumstances described in the first part of this paper, and not anything found in Wassmuss's baggage. Apart from any positive authority that may be considered to attach to this, I think the only first-hand record hitherto made public of the capture of a German diplomatic cypher in the Persian Gulf in early 1915, several other considerations of a more negative kind seem to point in the same direction.

1. The interception of Wassmuss and the raid on Listemann were, as my story shows, for all practical purposes a single operation in two parts: the first was given publicity, the second, for obvious reasons, was not; it is thus not surprising that some confusion between the two parts should have arisen in the minds of persons not directly involved. (In *The Eyes of the Navy* the name is given as Wassmann, but otherwise it is the Wassmuss story.)



2. It is most unlikely that the very secret cypher, used for communications between Berlin and the principal capitals of the world would have been entrusted to Wassmuss on his hazardous mission; on the other hand there was almost bound to be a copy at the important Consulate at Bushire.

3. Wassmuss, who escaped, was in a position to report the loss of any cypher he might have been carrying, whereas Listemann never had the opportunity.\*

4. There were at this time no aircraft in those parts and communication between the Gulf and the United Kingdom was by sea. With shipping space restricted it seems unlikely that anything but specially selected articles from Wassmuss's captured caravan would have been sent home at all. On the other hand we at Bushire were all very cypher-minded and fully appreciated the value of our find (though we never dreamt that the Germans would continue to use it for very long after learning of the raid and the possibility of its having been compromised); nor would it have been lost on the keen intelligences of Cox and Arnold Wilson at Basra. As a very junior person I was not myself concerned with the onward transmission and cannot speak on this point from my own knowledge, but since the cypher was in Admiral Hall's hands by April there was clearly no undue delay in getting it home by safe means.

If my supposition is correct, then the India-Office-cellar part of the story must be a piece of "corroborative detail" that, at some stage in the course of frequent oral repetition, attached itself to the record of an achievement by "Room 40" already sufficiently momentous and spectacular to need no such embellishment.

\* Christopher Sykes, in his *Wassmuss: The German Lawrence* (London, 1936), describes his hero's distress and anger at the seizure of his subversive literature but nowhere suggests that he lost a cypher. The first attribution of its ownership to Wassmuss which I have traced occurs in *The Enemy Within* by Captain H. Landau (New York, 1937), a book devoted to American post-war efforts, for which Hall's help was invoked, to fix responsibility for sabotage in the United States; according to Landau his British captors (the escape is not mentioned) "were delighted and surprised to discover an important German code in the possession of Wassmuss; . . . the code was promptly forwarded to Admiral Sir Reginald Hall." The story of the chain of events that eventually brought the United States into the war, including the hitherto accepted version of the Persian Gulf link, has been told with great dramatic skill in a recent book, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, by Barbara W. Tuchman (London, 1959).

## REVIEWS

**Auchinleck.** By John Connell. 1959. 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ " x 8 $\frac{1}{4}$ ". Pp. xxv + 975. Maps, index, illustrations. 35s. net.

This comprehensive biography of a very outstanding general has already been widely discussed. It seems agreed that with the possible exception of Lord Birdwood, Auchinleck was the best C.-in-C. India has ever had. His place among the great generals of this and other ages has yet to be assessed by history. That place will be very high, both administratively and in the field. Possibly with Alanbrooke and Churchill he contributed in making 1942 the decisive year of the war. Some commanders, like Moltke, had a genius for administration and planning. But most before this century depended for their results mainly on personal prowess in the battle, but this, though still necessary, is no longer sufficient in modern war. To Churchill it remained the dominating factor and it was left to Alanbrooke to adjust the balance by the more modern relations of Montgomery and Alexander. Auchinleck could have succeeded in either role, but under a Churchill no man could have done both as he was expected.

The Americans give their commander a free hand to get on with the job. British Prime Ministers insist on a measure of control which may satisfy Parliament but bedevils strategy and harasses commanders. Alanbrooke regards McArthur as the best general in this war. If his responsibility for the Far Eastern campaigns had been to Churchill—well, your guess is as good as mine. No British general has ever suffered from such meticulous control as Auchinleck, nor at the same time had the advantage of such efficient technical guidance as received from the Churchill-Alanbrooke executive in London. But seldom have any generals been so harassed in matters hitherto depending on the initiative, intuition and local knowledge of the man on the spot. Wavell countered by silence. The Auck, a master in expressing the facts, gave his masters the information they needed, but in so doing gave them undue powers to criticize. The right answer is not easy, Africa was the Auck's testing period; on it depends his historical future. In studying this record, classified as it is by the author's correcting and explanatory interpolations, several factors emerge.

The successful soldier, says Lord Montgomery, should be a bit of a cad. Possibly if Auchinleck had more claims to this alleged necessary qualification, his life might have been easier. He might have sacked, as Monty did, certain generals of doubtful standard, following Field-Marshal Sir John Dill's dictum heading this Book. III: "I maintain that in war you must either trust your generals or sack them." But Auchinleck was a very loyal friend, as *The Observer* puts it courteous, intelligent, and unshakably courageous." He preferred to help out the weaker vessel when he could, by adding his own magic touch on the battlefield. Choosing subordinates, even were the right men available, was not his strong point.

The disasters of those days were not directly due to him, but he was generally responsible for the campaign and suffered unjustly as many a good man before him. Undoubtedly he stopped Rommel at Alamein by some masterly strokes of superior generalship, although this has hardly yet been adequately appreciated by the nation. He prepared a springboard for Monty, with all his extra divisions, tanks and guns, and further support by London, now forced into a more realistic view of the problems. It is now probably realized that with these assets, Monty was not the only man who could have delivered the goods. His methods were certainly spectacular but not necessarily the only ones leading to decisive results over a now gravely weakened German Army. Time will show that Auchinleck, and to a less extent, Wavell, suffered from Britain's relative inexperience in tank warfare, in which the Germans had specialized. They had more training, heavier guns and a very able commander, and had not our general been an abler and more outstanding fighter, there might well have been a slaughter of the innocents.

Both Sir Arthur Bryant and John Connell bring out that Churchill was unfair to his commanders. He asked them to do the impossible. To win battles with troops untrained, like the Germans, in tank warfare, often with inferior guns, equipment and numbers, with men inexperienced and just off their ships. Auckinleck had the character to stand up to him. If he had not, this book shows that the whole war might have been lost in Africa and the Near East. Yet all agree that Churchill was such a vital factor in survival that even if many of those under him fell by the wayside, he had to be given the support he got, tempered fortunately by the advice of Alanbrooke and Dill and the chiefs of staff.

Mr. Connell's volume is divided into four books, as follows :

Book I. 75 pages. 1884 to 1940.

These pages contain a penetrating background of the Indian scene during the period. To one with detailed memories of these same years, this analysis gives a more accurate and realistic summary of cause and effect and the interlocking problems of the time than any writings he has yet studied. It must have involved a great deal of study. Connell was chief Press Censor in Simla in 1944-5, and knows what he treats.

Book II. 153 pages. January, 1940, to May, 1941.

Commander-in-Chief in India, and a clear representation of Indian and Middle East problems leading up to relief of Lord Wavell in the key command of North Africa by the most eminent practical soldier in the Empire.

Book III. 450 pages. June, 1941, to August, 1942.

*Your Great Command.* This book is self explanatory. The narrative depends largely on copies of letters between the various responsible persons. Since they were all unusually able to express themselves, we are presented with a series of authoritative and revealing sketches of the relevant problems during these fourteen months as seen from London, Cairo and the Western Desert from British and German sources. In any case here is the complete record for all to see and for the verdict of history. Rommel did not have to spend many hours satisfying Hitler. He too had to make bricks without straw. On the other side, had Dill and Alanbrooke not been in London to temper the Churchill breeze for the shorn lamb, the results might have passed the limits of human endurance.

Looking back it seems that the margin between success and failure was not large, and that Britain was lucky in finding the right first-class brains in the right places at the right time.

Book. IV. 254 pages. June, 1943, to December, 1947.

Commander-in-Chief in India, during by far the most difficult period in its history, including the transfer of power in 1947.

After ten months' unemployment because Auckinleck did not agree with the need for an independent Iran-Iraq command, he replaced Wavell and C.-in-C. India on his fifty-ninth birthday in June, 1943.

India was his lovechild. He was at home with a people who meant more to him than any others, and more than to any others. He embodied that sympathetic understanding between dissimilar races as seldom in the past. India was menaced by the Japanese by land, sea and air; and it fell to an enthusiast to co-ordinate the defence, build up the whole defensive structure, and, in the process, to rehabilitate the Indian Army. It could be shown that during his four years of control he produced no less than two million volunteers, which, in the then shortage of Allied manpower might well be regarded as a decisive contribution. (C.E.P. 771).

In September, 1943, Lord Mountbatten, then 43, took over supreme Allied commands, South-East Asia. His letter to C.-in-C. India (on pp. 749-751) is a revealing tribute to one whose personality had already been impressed on him. During certain responsible co-operation conferences in England, the two big men agreed, and that liaison was to prove of real value in the troublous years to come.

The author (p. 764) writes "Auchinleck's life assumed a pattern of strenuous regularity. His energy and zest were unquenchable. The conversion of his com-

mand into a huge base and training area for S.E.A.C. was not for him a negative or frustrating experience. Whatever disappointments he had felt in not exercising command in battle was swiftly swallowed up in the absorbing interest of the job in hand." Wavell was then the Viceroy, and here again the personal factor produced dividends. The C-in-C.'s plate must have been at least overcrowded in those strenuous days. Whatever the difficulties of his predecessors, it is hard to believe that their immediate vital problems bore any comparison to those now facing General Auchinleck. He was not the kind to have a nervous breakdown, as so many in the past. If he had, it is hard to see who could have taken his place without disaster. He was later offered, and refused, a Barony, perhaps justifiable later, when his services in those, and other days, can be reviewed in perspective. It may well be that the country may press for some such adequate recognition of services not yet generally or adequately appreciated by the nation. There were an unusual number of first-class brains at work during that "Transfer of Power"—Auchinleck, Ismay, Mountbatten, and Wavell, in that order. It would be only logical to interpret and express their unique services while memory serves, in anticipating the verdict of history.

One of the more urgent questions of those days was (p. 790) the future of the Indian Army, and the role of the British "stiffening." We now know the answer. It is just possible that had commonsense and Churchill been able to influence events, there might have been "A," no partition, and "B," a British influenced Indian Army, not snipable by Chinese scallywags. But Nationalism prevailed and it may well be that South-East Asia may live to regret the complete cutting adrift Indians regarded at the time as so vital.

To those who know India pages 820 to 935 will arouse nostalgic memories of the India that was, and what many millions of Indians happily remember today. The brightest jewel of the British Empire has gone for ever. Without Auchinleck its passing could have well been even more macabre than its actual fact.

So much for the man. In his biographer he chose an outstanding journalist who presented his case factually and objectively and, important in a long book, readably. The facts are there. The documentary evidence is unassailable. We have a portrait of a born leader of men with all the evidence eloquently marshalled for the future.

It is the view of the present writer that this record and presentation of the facts by a trained journalist is so human and readable that readers with no particular technical qualifications can be prepared to enjoy themselves, but they would not be wise to read it in bed without a good bookrest.

G. M. ROUTH.

**India and Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1947.** By Chattar Singh Samra, M.A., Ph.D. Asia Publishing House, London. 26s. 6d.

This little volume of 186 pages is peculiarly interesting. And for two reasons. So far as Britain is concerned the relations with which it deals have now largely been taken over by independent India and it provides for this new stage an elaborate documentary background. Then, its author, as his name indicates, is a native of the Punjab, where he was born in 1924, but after being educated there till he became M.A. of the Punjab University, he went to the United States, took the Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and has since 1954 been a member of the staff of that university's Centre for South Asia Studies and its lecturer on India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The bibliography at the end of the book occupies twelve pages. Of all that material Dr. Samra's references and comments show his study to have been profound. But to your reviewer, who lived in the midst of public affairs in India for more than 30 of the first 50 years of this century, it seems that he quotes apparently weighty excerpts of judgments and opinions without due regard for the contexts of circumstances and debate in which they were originally uttered, a tendency arising, perhaps, from his long American environment.

Thus, in the period the book covers, the unique feature of Anglo-Soviet relations with respect to India was, he tells us, "that they were primarily ideological in char-

acter rather than economic or territorial." But up to a few years ago, within that period, certainly, there hung, as there probably still hangs, upon a wall in the Kremlin a map designed for Peter the Great, to show plans he devised for Russian expansion, and included upon it, for acquisition, was Karachi. Early in this century, Russian engineers were in Persia preparing surveys for railways across the country to its southern coasts and for port construction at their seaward ends. Their activities were halted when they and others of the kind had nearly precipitated war. Lately, the newspapers have told us that the Russians are now building transport routes across Persia and Afghanistan towards the warm water and the Indian border. A surprising error in Dr. Samra's report is his repeated description of *The Times* as a Conservative newspaper or leader of the Conservative Press in Britain. Then again, he tells us that Indian nationalists were years ago happy to have Russian assistance for their revolutionary agitation to compel Britain immediately to implement her promise of full self government for India, whereas, of course, that was true of only a small minority of misled extremists.

The book should be useful for references by people acquainted with India and its modern history, who wish to refresh or amplify their memories.

A. H. B.

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**Handbook to India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon.** Edited by Sir Arthur Lothan, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. John Murray, 1959. 18th Edition. 5" x 7½". Pp. cii + 632. 50s. net.

The 17th edition was reviewed in the *R.C.A.S. Journal* in April, 1956, being a complete recast of earlier editions and the editor has wisely left well alone. The layout and construction of this 18th edition follow the same plan. Beyond a bibliography of available literature on the Indian Peninsula on page cii, there are few alterations other than revision of the text to meet recent changes, especially in Burma.

To this writer, with records of his pre-war Guides covering these countries, it seems that we have now in condensed form all the requirements of an adequate guide book in concise but readable form.

Whatever the traveller's interest—industry, religion, history, administration, archaeology—probably sufficient details are available for others than specialists in the wide range of information provided. There are over 60 maps and plans showing roads, air and 47 rail routes, glossary and place names. Even so, it would help those visiting particular areas to obtain particulars of maps on various scales from the High Commissioners in London detailing the very adequate cartography completed by the British during the last 50 years. This hardly yet applies to the more less unpopulated frontier areas now claimed by China, but it may well be that these will soon not be topical. The general map in the back pocket may probably be useful in this connection.

Although this volume is obviously not meant to deal with politics, a short chapter on political subjects by some independent authority would certainly add interest to this very adequate and complete handbook.

G. M. ROUTH.

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**Economic Developments in India—1946-56: A Personal Retrospect.** By C. D. Deshmukh. Asia Publishing House. Pp. 167.

In 1956 the Trustees of the Dadabhai Naoroji Memorial Prize decided that instead of making awards for scholars' theses they would give fellowships every other year to persons distinguished in various spheres of activity. Their first recipient was Shri C. D. Deshmukh whom they honoured for his share in the advancement of the Indian Union's economic interests during the five years which ended with 1955. This little book reproduces five lectures on economic developments of the decade 1946-56 delivered by Shri Deshmukh in accordance with the terms of the new fellowship at Bombay University in February, 1957.

The man the Trustees chose and the period he chose for his lectures epitomize the Indian sub-continent's transition from Empire to Commonwealth. Like his Prime

Minister, Chintaman Dwarkanath Deshmukh is a Cambridge man: he stood first in the Civil Service examination of 1918. In 1924 he was an Under Secretary in the Government of the Central Provinces, in 1941 Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India. It speaks well for the Indo-British connection that an Indian official of the British *Raj*, under which many of India's leaders were imprisoned, should have served on after independence in posts of high, and higher, responsibility and of international importance. Shri Deshmukh declares in so many words the tragedy and triumph of 1947. He remained in the I.C.S. till 1949.

Of like significance is the story given in the first lecture and the author's introduction of economic policy under Lord Wavell's Interim Government. Shri Deshmukh was with the delegation it sent to the Savannah Conference. They worked there "in effortless accord" with Lord Keynes's team from London; but "could and did take an independent line." Independence was not yet assured; but India was preparing for Commonwealth status. Perhaps because he was India's Governor on the Boards of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Shri Deshmukh tells us disappointingly little of Bretton Woods and Lord Keynes's battle for "Bancor" and a saner system than the dollar straitjacket there imposed. It would also have been interesting to have had some constructive criticism of the World Bank from the point of view of underdeveloped India.

Not that he was afraid of standing on principle. He and Shri Nehru decided, against popular clamour, that Pakistan's just financial claims arising from partition must be met. Anything less would have made relations between these two Commonwealth successor states even worse than they have been. Shri Deshmukh understands and appreciates the value to India of the Commonwealth-Sterling Area association. He mentions in his introduction the suggestion that the sterling balances accumulated in war-time price inflation should be "scaled down." That could only have destroyed confidence in the sterling system and harmed British enterprise in India.

We are reminded in the first lecture that ambitious central planning preceded the transfer of power. Even in its heyday *laissez-faire* was not practical politics in India. The Bombay Plan of 1944 embraced British India and the Princely States alike and aimed at doubling *per capita* income in fifteen years. The Provincial Governments prepared their own plans too. The second lecture deals with the years 1950-52, the period of Korean War inflation; the third with the somewhat more normal years 1953-56. If the book is again reprinted, an epilogue could well be devoted to the prospects of the third Five Year Plan and the economic problems which attracted universal attention at the time of President Eisenhower's visit and the proposed bankers' mission.

As it is, it provides acute and lucid reflections on some of the economic aspects of the transition from dependence to sovereignty—foodgrains and finance, controls and currency. It is a good advertisement for the I.C.S.—old style and new!

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

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**Leadership and Political Institutions in India.** Edited by Richard L. Park and Irene Tinker. Published by the Princeton University Press, U.S.A., 1959. Pp. 469. Index.

A seminar on "Leadership and Political Institutions in India" was held at the University of California, Berkeley, from August 12 to 17, 1956. It was sponsored by the Modern India Project at Berkeley and the Committee on South Asia of the Association for Asian Studies. Sixty-three participants attended, of whom eleven had Indian names. The papers in this volume are a selected group, edited and revised, of those originally presented at the seminar, which was made possible by a generous grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, funds being also made available by the Modern India Project supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation. The editors state that the University of California and the above Foundations are not to be held responsible for the views of the authors and editors.

There is no description of the scope and purposes of the Modern India Project

or the sources of its funds. The "programme" of the Ford Foundation is described as being (or including) to support publication, through university presses, of works in the humanities and social sciences.

The book is divided into eight parts. 1. Traditions of Leadership; 2. Personality and Leadership; 3. Political Institutions; 4. Political Parties; 5. Influence Groups; 6. Public Administration; 7. Rural Development and Administration; 8. Leadership and Change in the Villages. There are twenty-nine papers, five by Indians and the rest apparently by Americans. Some, if not all, of the Americans have visited or worked in India. Some have lived for a period in an Indian village and written a "case study" of what they observed and learned. The approach is, in general, highly academic and the observation of facts in a village is tinged with the theoretical bases of the "social sciences." The layman may feel that the personality of a human being and, *eo fortiori*, the relations of people in a village community, or as constituting a nation, are so varied and so complex as to defy scientific analysis; but the authors of these studies seem to be emotionally committed to the "social sciences," involving the use of words with specialized meanings, such as "charismatic leadership," "pattern" of behaviour and many others. These expressions sometimes degenerate into clichés and seem to be useful to cover loose and vague thinking. Some of the contributors are conscious that the facts available to them are inadequate for a scientific statement. Thus Robert J. Crane (at p. 169): "Some of the kinds of data (regarding the Congress Party) that would be required for precise judgments have not been collected, while the pertinent questions may not yet have been formulated." He, therefore, suggests that some of his conclusions are little more than hypotheses. This theme recurs frequently. Some of the papers give evidence of a great deal of careful and laborious, if very theoretical study; and many of them will be of interest to those now responsible for the government and administration of India. They are intimately connected with the development of India's Five Year Plans and the policies of the Government of India, who are said to have sponsored social science research on a large and systematic scale from 1951 onwards; and to have sought to relate research findings to administrative purposes. (For a summary of this aspect of the subject, see p. 328.)

It is obviously impossible to discuss all these immensely detailed papers in a brief review.

Some significant points are: Reading between the lines, it may be presumed that Mr. Nehru's policies and certain trends towards socialism, combined with the need for making out and driving home the case for American financial aid, are ultimately responsible for the labours of these Americans and the production of this book.

It is none the less astonishing that so much time, money and serious study should be devoted to these theoretical exercises in an American university.

Some of the papers by Indians and Americans exhibit unfair prejudice against the work of the British in India (the term "British colonialism" is used by both) though in some cases tribute is paid in passing to the British régime, e.g., by A. D. Ghorwala (whose paper is, perhaps, the most knowledgeable in the book). The papers dealing with the four most important leaders, Gandhi, Nehru, Vallabhai Patel and Subhas Chandra Bose are strongly infected with emotional nationalism and anti-British bias. This part of the book discusses Indian leadership of the nationalist movement from Tilak in the 1890's and the Bengal terrorists up to 1947, without reference to the framework in which their movement developed. This framework may be briefly described by saying that the British, invited and encouraged to do so by the Indian trading communities, gave India internal peace and the Rule of Law in place of constant internecine warfare and tyrannies little, if any, less ruthless than those of Hitler and the Nazis. They further took steps to develop an orderly administration leading to local self-government; the Morley-Minto and the Montague-Chelmsford plans for giving Indians opportunities to learn the requirements and pressures of government on modern lines in the Provinces and in the Government of India; and further progressive measures.

The American workers have found, still existing in 1956 in the villages, many of the circumstances and problems with which British civil servants sought to cope—and coped efficiently and well—well in the sense of the broadest humanity.

Thus the question suggests itself that, if the British empire in India was essen-

tially an empire of the mind, are a few academic American exponents of the "social sciences," in a limited sense, succeeding to it? If so, it is surprising and disquieting that they discuss their vast range of subjects without mentioning the framework outlined above. It is still more disquieting that there seems to be little appreciation, even among the American editors and writers of these papers, of essential features in the foundations of Western democracy; the Rule of Law, the part played by an independent judiciary and the true requirements of good leadership such as wisdom and knowledge, judgment and restraint.

By these standards of leadership, as it seems to many, Gandhi and other Congress leaders have fallen short in that they were carried away by a surge of emotion, which they helped to swell while they sought to hasten the premature development of self-government without due regard to the need for great numbers of Indians to acquire experience in the working of parliamentary democracy.

If the editors and contributors to this book are capable of exercising a critical faculty in regard to these aspects of Indian leadership they have held it in suspense. This consideration brings us back to questions as to the ultimate responsibility for the expenditure of so much labour and money and their purposes? Pure science? Genuine scholarship? Politics? If so, whose politics? Will the results be exactly what all the originators intended? No doubt it is very well-meaning; but the conclusion is inescapable that the Foundations which sanctioned the considerable grants involved carry responsibilities in the international sphere which are not easily measurable.

J. C. CURRY.

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**Arabian Sands.** By Wilfred Thesiger. Longmans, 1959. Pp. 326. Ill., index, excellent maps. 35s.

Wilfred Thesiger is the third British explorer to have crossed the Rub al Khali (the Empty Quarter) in Southern Arabia, which is recognized as the most difficult achievement in desert travel. "For years," he writes, "the Empty Quarter had represented to me the final, unattainable challenge which the desert offered. Now I had crossed it. The reward had been a drink of clean, nearly tasteless water. I was content with that."

This last sentence gives the keynote of Thesiger's travels in Africa, Arabia and Asia to which he has dedicated his life since he was 20 or so, as this book records. Not for fame or glory (since Thesiger shuns these things) but because in training himself like the Spartans of old in the overcoming of bodily weakness and desire and attaining the highest degree of physical and mental control he finds the ultimate satisfaction which he cannot obtain in Western civilized life.

"In the desert," he says, "I had found a freedom unattainable in civilization; a life unhampered by possessions since everything that was not a necessity was an encumbrance. I had found too a comradeship inherent in the circumstances and the belief that tranquility was to be found there. I had learnt the satisfaction which comes from hardship and the pleasure which comes from abstinence; the contentment of a full belly; the richness of meat; the taste of clean water; the ecstasy of surrender when the craving for sleep becomes a torment; the warmth of a fire in the chill of dawn."

Those who know Thesiger know that he is completely sincere in these sentiments. He likes simple things and genuinely prefers the freedom and abstinence of Bedu life to the attractions of civilization. His style is modest and matter of fact and completely free from conceit and it is left to the reader to deduce the immense courage, self-control, physical fitness and danger involved in these journeys.

Unlike Bertram Thomas and Harold Philby, who also crossed the Rub al Khali, but by different routes, Thesiger owned nothing to Government support or any influence with the authorities. He depended entirely on his personal experience of desert travel, his knowledge of Arabs and their language and his ability to match their powers of endurance and abstinence.

To those who know these countries the most fascinating part of this absorbing



book is the record of his first crossing of the Empty Quarter from Mughsin across the dreaded Uruq al Shaibu, a huge barrier of wind-blown sand, almost unscalable with knife-edge crests rising over six hundred feet above the surrounding plain. To cover this stretch of 250 miles of waterless sand dunes, mostly too soft and sloping for camel riding, on a meagre ration of flour, with practically no water, was an epic feat of courage and perseverance.

The book reveals the lawless conditions prevailing in Southern Arabia in the period 1945-50—camel raiding, killing and slave-trading sound commonplace occurrences and presumably still go on. This could be understood in the undefined hinterland of Oman and the Hadramaut where the dominion of the coastal rulers has never been fully accepted, but more surprising in the Rub al Khali area where one would have expected Ibn Saud to provide better protection against forays from the Yemen.

The descriptions of Arab life and character are among the most valuable things in the book. Thesiger reveals a great liking and respect for the Bedu who still lead the nomadic life because they scorn the easier life of this materialistic age, for sake of personal freedom. He deplures the economic forces which are driving them to settle in the towns and round the oil fields. It is easy for those who spend a comparatively short time under nomad conditions to deplore change among the Bedu but after reading this book with its many descriptions of the rigours and savagery of desert life one feels sympathy for those Beduin who seek a less primitive way of life for themselves and their children.

This does not in any way detract from the merits of this outstanding book with its excellent maps and photographs, which deserves to rank among the greatest books of exploration. Perhaps it will inspire some of the rising generation to seek the adventure and spiritual rewards which can be found in the hardships of desert travel and the company of desert people.

E. A. V. de C.

**The Antiquities of Jordan.** By Gerald Lankester Harding. Published by Lutterworth Press. 25s.

*The Antiquities of Jordan* written by Gerald Harding and published by the Lutterworth Press does justice to the vast wealth of archæological material which is present in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Mr. Harding spent many years in charge of the Department of Antiquities of the Jordan Government and it is apparent from his book that he entertained a personal affection for the country, its people and his work. The field which he covers is virtually a history of mankind; commencing with the paleolithic handaxes which litter the eastern desert; to neolithic Jericho where the oldest known township was excavated only a few years ago; then through the biblical ages of Amman, Gilead, Moab, and Edom, until the coming of the Hellenistic culture which was the foundation on which the Romans built their Empire. Greek and Roman remains are common in the countries which surround the Mediterranean, but in Jordan they are combined with a unique Arab civilization brought from the Arabian peninsula by the people known as the Nabateans. The ruined town of Petra, where the natural colours of the towering sandstone cliffs are skilfully adapted by the Nabatean workmen in such a way that the façades of the rockcut temples, tombs and dwellings look as though they were freshly painted by vivid pigments.

The Romans changed their name to Byzantines and then the empire which had ruled Jordan for nearly seven hundred years was overthrown by the Arab armies which a new prophet and a new faith had raised and sent out to conquer the known world. The castles, palaces and baths which the desert-loving caliphs of Damascus, the Umayyads, built in and on the edges of the land of the nomads, still stand today in a surprisingly good state of preservation.

The next series of monuments was that of the fortresses which were built during the time of the crusades. These were immensely strong but their strength seemed to fail to resist the will to conquer of their besiegers, although it did ensure that the edifices should stand almost intact seven hundred years later. These castles were

the last monuments of any interest to be built in Jordan before the long period of stagnation under the rule of the Ottoman Turks commenced.

Mr. Harding played a major part in rescuing from loss and destruction many of the ancient scrolls which were discovered in caves near the shore of the Dead Sea just as the British Mandate over Palestine was coming to an end. His contacts with the local beduin tribes and their trust in his character enabled him to trace and acquire at reasonable prices fragments and sections of the precious writings which were in danger of destruction in the hands of unskilled antique peddlars. He also co-operated with the Dominican fathers in excavating the remains of Khirbet Qumran, near to which the scrolls were discovered, and which is assumed generally to be an Essene settlement.

The book is well illustrated by numerous photographs.

A. S. KIRKBRIDE.

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**The Persian Gulf States.** By Sir Rupert Hay, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., C.S.I. Pp. 154. Published by the Middle East Institute, Washington. 16 illustrations, end paper maps, and index. Foreword by Rear-Admiral E. M. Eller, U.S.N.

This is a book of great use and interest to those who have dealings with the Persian Gulf but it will not be a very popular book for it contains no excitements and is factual and not sensational. Indeed, to write an exciting book on the Persian Gulf today would mean trespassing on fiction.

The area is with few exceptions inhospitable from a climatic point of view and, apart from oil, there are few natural resources. The author's view of all this bleakness is surprisingly unjaundiced, and undoubtedly the spread of good communications and medicine and the growth of creature comforts have improved the Gulf, but it still remains hard. Sir Rupert gives a good account of the relations of Britain with states that have evolved from piracy and fishing; the charge of "imperialism" would need far more forceful rebuttal to convince a bigot that here is another area where we have helped others rather than ourselves, but it is good to see the United States publishing a book that implicitly justifies us to a man who thinks.

One chapter details the functions of the Residency and another shows how the patriarchal rulers conduct their business. The fragile flower democracy blooms badly in the desert and those who would call for more modern systems do not know the land and people as well as Sir Rupert. There is as yet a dearth of indigenous administrative ability and the rulers employ many foreign Arabs who are mostly inimical to Britain and many of them of poor calibre. But the Gulf Arab will progress to this stage, especially as soon as the first signs appear of an educated middle class.

Some may regret the passing of the old Arab under the physical advantages that have come from oil, and, though the ordinary man is still poor, he has hospitals that are first class and schools are growing. But there remains a gap between this material advancement and mental and spiritual progress; in filling this gap, the oil companies have a great interest if no responsibility and until it closes, their position is not secured.

The author takes each individual state and gives us the facts without too many indigestible statistics. Bahrein's position as an entrepôt is a potential weakness but it remains a state with more movement than most and "haraka baraka." Kuwait's great wealth has been invested shrewdly to the credit of the ruler and his advisers but there is little sign in the Gulf of money from oil being used to store up potential assets that will bring in income when oil does not. The desolation of Qatar is covered by an illusion to Browning's "starved ignoble nature" which does not apply to the Qatari who loves his land. The Trucial Shaikhdoms are of more interest than importance—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and Fujairah. Muscat and Oman have seen more independence than their neighbours and, if oil were found in Muscat, one feels that its revenues would be wisely applied. The conflict over Buraimi is not covered very fully in this book and this may be out of deference to its place of publication the only other sign of which is the spelling "center."

There is no doubt that this area stands in danger (and not only from the Western

point of view) of influence by agitators and intellectuals from outside and Britain has not done much to counteract that; perhaps there is little that we can do and there is no criticism of the author in that he has not a great deal to suggest in this direction. This is a book to be commended for it contains many facts that would be very hard to find anywhere else.

JOHN COOK.

**Avicenna's De Anima** (Arabic text). Being the psychological part of *Kitāb al-Shifā'*.

By F. Rahman. Published for the University of Durham by Oxford University Press, 1959. Pp. ii + 299. 63s.

Avicenna wrote two big books, the *Qānūn* on medicine and the *Shifā'* a compendium of knowledge; the former was published in Rome in 1593 but the second has never been published in full, though a substantial part was lithographed in Persia. The introductory section on logic was published in Egypt in 1952 and now, almost at the same time, two editions of the chapters on psychology have been issued. Much of the subject matter is more physiology than psychology. For the present edition eight Arabic manuscripts have been collated and two Latin versions which are so literal as to be almost equal to Arabic originals. The Persian lithograph has also been used. The text is carefully printed and the *apparatus criticus* is as full as anyone can desire. The analytical index, a combination of index, glossary and commentary is most useful, giving Greek and Latin equivalents of the Arabic terms. The reviewer must be allowed two grumbles; the table of contents has a heading "text" but the beginnings of the five chapters and their sub-divisions are not shown; the words "as we have shown elsewhere" often occur in the text but no attempt has been made to locate these "elsewheres." (Of course, some may be in an unpublished part of the work.)

Avicenna moved in the realm of classical ideas, four elements, substance and accident, form and matter, three souls, vegetal, animal and rational. The world soul in the order of being came immediately after the primal intellect and each sphere had its soul. The book begins at the beginning, arguing that there is something more than body in man, a something which is called soul. Avicenna enumerates the theories which had been held about it, dismissing some as unbelief (*kufur*); you may regard this as natural condemnation by a Muslim or as a sop to orthodoxy. Connection between soul and body is maintained by spirit which is a subtle body; this connection is through the heart. From it impulses go to the brain to start sensation, thought and action and to the liver to start digestion. Activity is reciprocal; the liver starts the stomach working and this feeds both the liver and the heart. Soul is a substance (*jawhar*, a word which may also mean atom); it does not exist as an individual before union with the body but does not perish with it. The possibility of the transmigration of souls is dismissed in a few lines.

Old is mixed with new. A quarter of the whole book is about sight. Several theories are mentioned; that it is due to rays going out from the eye, by rays emanating from things seen and by a combination of these rays with air. It seems to be assumed that light can travel on a curve, something distinct from refraction. In treating of sound the term "waves" is used and the question raised whether there is sound where there is no hearing. In places the argument is hard to follow as it is in general terms with no concrete examples to help the understanding. Avicenna gives examples of the influence of the soul (we should say the mind) on the body; the body may grow hot from no physical heat and, in the same way, grow cold. A man can walk along a narrow plank if it is only a few inches above the ground but cannot if it crosses a deep pit for the fear of falling prevents him. A strong soul works on its own body and on others outside it; the soul of the universe influences the whole so a particular soul can influence individuals. Soul, in the form of imagination, can make a man ill and sometimes can cure a sick man better than any doctor. This power to affect others and inanimate objects is in saints in a higher degree and in prophets in the highest degree.

Avicenna's medicine influenced Europe for centuries; this book is equally important historically; parts of it are hard going and none of it is a bedside book.

A. S. TRITTON.

**The Hashemite Kings.** By James Morris. Faber and Faber, London, 1959. Pp. 231. 28 illustrations, map, bibliography, index. 21s.

Here is a sad, tragic story and James Morris, enthusiastically steeped in his subject, has told it brilliantly, dispassionately and with some sardonic humour. The story of the rise and fall of the Hashemite Kings and the outcome of their decision to throw in their lot with England is well enough known but Mr. Morris loses nothing in the telling of it in a new and lively way. The sometimes dreary chronicles of violence, revolution and murder which continue to characterize the contemporary Middle Eastern scene are turned into light and pleasant reading.

Out of this history of British-Hashemite relations Kirkbride emerges as the hero, stolid, loyal and patient behind the Jordanian ruling house. Here we see young Arab kings from Harrow and Sandhurst, the towering, autocratic Nuri, the playboy princes, an embittered regent and a prince, living peacefully in England. And now one remains, uneasy on his throne, a courageous young monarch, his country surrounded by sabre-rattling neighbours.

Mr. Morris has previously demonstrated how enthusiasm combined with a sense of perspective can enable a journalist to write books of quality. We may hope that he will retain his interest in the Arab lands.

ERIC MACRO.

**Back to Bokhara.** By Sir Fitzroy Maclean. Jonathan Cape. Pp. 156. Illustrated. 18s.

What a mercy it is that somebody with an unbiased outlook, with much previous experience, and with a keen sense of humour takes a second look at Russia after 20 years absence. And when the somebody is an acute observer, without any language barrier, one is the more inclined to accept all his generalizations. I, for myself, accept more and learn more, in little ways, of what has been going on behind the scenes in Russia than I have done from all the ponderous propaganda productions, pamphlets, reports, and books on the same eternal subject which I have perused.

*Back to Bokhara* is the title, but its three sections cover "back to Russia" after 20 years absence, on to Turkestan De Luxe, and south to the Georgian Arcady.

From these it is pleasant to find that the Trilby has not yet supplanted the Turban, that the girls of Tiflis have aspired to nylons, that a semblance of a religious revival is arising in old Muscovy, and that there is a reappearance of an Aristocracy, which is almost Cast rather than Class. These fundamentals may save the Communist Paradise from death through boredom.

A short but convincing book, crammed with penetrating glimpses of Russian home-life, of official bureaucracy just as it was, and as maddening as it was, half a century ago, and of the Asiatic reaction to it all.

DOUGLAS CARRUTHERS.

**Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?** By Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Pp. 314. End paper maps. Michigan State University Press. 1958. 35s.

Moscow-Pekin: Pekin-Moscow: The pendulum swings over remote mediæval Sinkiang in the heart of a continent. One wonders in whose pocket that vast and vital area would be today had Hitler not marched east in 1942.

A glance at any orographical map of Asia will demonstrate at once the importance of Sinkiang both to Russia and to China. The frontier between the two runs for over a thousand miles, three-quarters of which is an unbroken mountain barrier; there is, however, one gap in the wall which allows easy communication between the two, and someday, not too far off, trains will run through the Dzungarian Gate, connecting Western China with the Turk-Siberian railway.

Sinkiang is too remote, and so little in the news that its position in world affairs is overshadowed by recent events in Tibet. But Tibet is a dead-end compared with Sinkiang, which is a communications nexus of great strategic importance.

In spite of revolutions to east of it and revolutions to west of it, Sinkiang retained its peaceful, if backward, seclusion when the rest of Asia was in turmoil and tumult.

It was not until the third decade of the present century that this antique land, which some of us knew as such and loved so well, was caught up in the vortex, and became the scene of confusion, revolts and civil wars lasting over a period of 30 years or more.

After the revolution of 1911, and the last Manchu had departed, there was a more or less peaceful period of some 17 years. Then followed five years of chaos; a situation as complex and as explosive as could be imagined; four or more parties grappling for power, forming a rabble of rebels, at times each against each other and at times allied. White Russians, Red Russians, Chinese, Tungan Moslems, and Moslem Turki, Kirghiz and Kazaks.

Of this period of disruption up to and covering 1933, we have Mr. Peter Fleming's graphic account in *News from Tartary* and it is well worth reading it in conjunction with this more documented record.

But in 1933 the strong man emerged; Sheng Shih-ts'ai, who ran Sinkiang with Russian aid, as a Police State on Soviet pattern—an Asiatic-Russian satellite. It is this period, from 1933-44, which Mr. Whiting describes, to the best of his ability, for it has not been too easy an enigma to unravel: but the fact remains Sheng held power of his own ability, unbacked by Nationalist China, for 11 years and succeeded in playing a double game. He "went to Moscow," and collaborated with Russia. Hell followed: Russians arrived in force, and took control. Foreign elements were eliminated, traders turned out, missionaries tortured, Islam was taboo, Foreign Consuls were insulted and evicted, some escaping, others not so fortunate. *Pivot for Russia*: and as good a lesson in the gentle art of interfering in the domestic affairs of your neighbour as there ever was.

But no autonomous republic emerged. Uighur, Kazak, Kirghiz, and Turki did not have a word to say as to their countries' destiny.

Stalin's obsession for establishing a satellite buffer-state, and a big one, firmly fixed across the land-bridge to China evaporated the moment the Germans attacked him. Sinkiang was evacuated, and the country drifted back to local rebellions.

Eventually the pendulum swung back again to China, Communist by now, and Sinkiang became firmly in the grip of the Peking government, which means to hold it, and Tibet, two slices of Asia as big as half Europe.

As for the General Sheng, who handed over his beloved Sinkiang "of exceptional beauty" to the Russian Communists, when it suited him, and switched over to Nationalist China, when it suited him, *miraculous to relate he is still alive*—residing in his own Communist homeland.

Mr. Whiting's account is fully documented, even to Japanese sources, for strange as it may seem the Japanese did not omit even Sinkiang from their programme of trouble-making for the Chinese during their undeclared wars.

Sheng's narrative of events is purely personal, and not supported in any way. But both shed some light on the shady side of Communist rivalry for control of backward people and their homelands.

#### Postscript

Just 45 years ago I wrote the following words—"Dzungaria (the northern and most important half of Sinkiang) gave me the impression of a vast land awaiting development, but cursed by the blight of unrest, continual insurrection and rebellion. Without a strong government these potentially wealthy lands must long remain vacant. Dzungaria represents the neutral zone between vast China and vaster Russia.

Will the Dragon arouse herself, and send her surplus millions to make this land a garden, or will Dzungaria be swept up by a greater Russian Empire?" (See "Unknown Mongolia," Vol. II, p. 396.)

**Tragic Destiny.** By George N. Patterson. Faber and Faber, 1959. Pp. 224. Index, 18s.

Here is the moving story of the Tibetan revolt. It is an extremely important and timely work, very well written by its courageous and dedicated author. Like Cromwell and many of his followers, George Patterson believes himself to be the instrument of God, divinely directed in the pursuit of a great matter. His task thus given to him, as he explains, is to aid the Tibetans in their hour of peril and threatened extermination and to warn the world about the meaning of this new Chinese aggression. That he is in a special category has apparently been quite clear to the Tibetans, who have confided in him deeply.

He reveals with appropriate detail the aims attendant on the Chinese invasion of Tibet, the means by which it was carried out, and the progress of the campaign of atrocious crimes, which have been committed against an inoffensive people. He is a witness to the great bravery and the fighting spirit of the resistance which these events have provoked, and does not spare criticism of the Tibetan Government, when he feels this is merited, for failing to back this up.

As a result of the intrusion of 500,000 or more Chinese troops and five million settlers into Tibet, India now finds herself confronted with a military threat of portentous gravity. Those who wish better to understand the nature of this problem and the events which have been leading up to it would do well to study this book closely. It has two useful appendices. The first is an extremely condensed short history of the country from the earliest times up to the present, and the second is the manifesto sent by the Tibetan Chul-Ka-Sum (the organized resistance of the country on August 5, 1958).

There is a depressing air of inevitability about the events which he describes. An expansive dynamism has met in High Asia a passive and unchanging system which in spite of Khamba heroism could not survive in its traditional form. It is to be wondered what obstacles other than the Himalayas this dynamism will meet before its course is checked.

A. H. S. C.

**Princes of the Black Bone, Life in the Tibetan Borderland.** By Peter Goullard. John Murray, London, 1959. Pp. x, 221. 14 illustrations, 1 map. 21s. net.

We are told, on p. vi, that an American edition of this book is entitled *Land of the Lamas*, which is surprising, considering that a well-known book on Tibet with the same title already exists, by W. W. Rockhill, published by Longmans Green, London, 1895.

In *Princes of the Black Bone*, the white Russian author of the earlier *Forgotten Kingdom* (John Murray, 1955), enlarges on his visit to the country of the independent Lolos already described by him in pages 115 to 128 of the previous volume.

Once again, the reader is treated to a vivid, faithful and exceptionally detailed account of the author's intensely-lived, personal experience of the tribal area of south-west China. What is particularly striking, I think, is how true everything we read rings, how much we are made to feel that all that we are told is no idle tale but the facts such as the author observed them.

Comparisons of Lolos travelling on the roads, especially of the women of the aristocracy, with scenes from the European Middle Ages do, however, tend to obscure the picture at times, in my opinion, because the resemblance is concerned rather with what the author imagines mediæval scenes to have been than with what they actually were. But this is a detail in the whole narrative which does not spoil the general, very real fascination of the description.

It is unfortunate that the map does not show the Yangtse river, as it would help give it more orientation. The itinerary of the author's trip to the passes and to Minya Konkka (*Me-nya-Gang-kar*), described in chapter 7, is likewise missing from the sketch map.

There are some errors in Tibetan spelling to be noted, the most conspicuous being *Kanbar* for dried yak meat, when it should be *Kam-po* (*sKam-po*) from *Sha Kam-po*,

"dried meat." And the author's account of lamaist sects is very superficial, betraying little knowledge of their complexity, as was already the case in *Forgotten Kingdom*.

But this does not detract from the excellence of the story, and we sympathize thoroughly with the author in his chagrin at having to leave these enchanting mountain people, the fate of whom, under the Chinese Communists today, must be as tragic and as lamentable as that of their Tibetan neighbours further to the north.

P. P. of G. & D.

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**The Soul of China.** By Amaury de Riencourt. Published by Jonathan Cape at 21s. Indexed.

One's first reaction on handling this book is to look for the name of the translator, but apparently the author with a French name is bilingual; naturally the book gains in value by appearing in the its original tongue.

This book, which first appeared in the U.S.A., presumably owes its being to the Foreign Policy Research Institute and to the University of Pennsylvania, as the author suitably gives thanks to those two bodies. Students of China and the Chinese also owe their gratitude, as indeed to the author, who has made an outstanding contribution to the study of the Chinese mind and understanding.

He points out that China's civilization is not mysterious but geographical. China was, and is, a self-enclosed area, isolated by her sheer "uneasiness" rendering her invulnerable to foreign influences.

It was as early as in the days of Shang that Chinese art was at an advanced stage. Sericulture had started in the Dark Ages of Europe; the advance of silk being followed by the Silk Road to Europe. Eight hundred years before Christ calligraphy became the ancestor of painting, an advanced art in the later days of the Middle Kingdom.

It is perhaps discouraging to reflect that even before the days of the Warring States era tremendous efforts were made in 546 B.C. to create "leagues of states and alliances for the preservation of peace, attempts to foster collective security"; "how to reconcile the experiences of a multitude of sovereign states with world peace." How very like our efforts to create Leagues of Nations, United Nations and Summit Conferences.

A nationalization experiment was begun under one of the early Han monarchs, the Emperor Wu Ti (140-86 B.C.). Under his ægis state ownership was established for all natural resources to protect the lower classes against the greed of the wealthy. Protection of salt, iron and the manufacture of fermented drinks were state monopolies. For a time the system worked until, as the author says, "it came to the same end as most socialistic experiments." A second attempt was made in the reign of Wang Mang and a third a thousand years later, but again the experiment failed and the Emperor removed the Chancellor responsible, Wang An-Shih, and cancelled all his "reforms."

The author points out that the Chinese have never been a deeply religious people. Buddhism certainly had its periods of popularity, but etiquette and behaviour largely took the place of religion. Confucianism has always had great influence on the Chinese mind than any religion.

About half way through the book the author introduces us to what he calls the Moonlight Civilizations fostered by China in the case of Japan and Korea, as India fostered the Ottoman and Moghul. Perhaps the Christian movement during the days of the Tai-ping rebellion could be described as a "starlight" civilization.

The description of the 12,000 miles of plain as a waterless ocean is an apt one and well defines that area stretching from Manchuria and Mongolia to Poland. Though sometimes a vacuum, it was sometimes a threat to the "civilized rimland of Asia" and the extremities of Western Europe.

In part three of the book entitled *China and Europe* we begin to see the impact of the latter on the former. The work of the Jesuits, the coming of missionaries from the West paved the way of Western Christianity, but their success was due to the Chinese wishing to absorb their scientific knowledge rather than their religious belief. In the words of the Emperor K'ang Hsi, "as to the Western doctrine which exalts the Lord of Heaven, it is opposed to our traditional teaching."

The Jesuit Matheo Ricco used his knowledge of geography to further Jesuit influence. He drew a map of the two hemispheres which was centred round the Middle Kingdom and not round Western Europe, which naturally appealed to the Emperor.

Chapter ten is devoted to the collapse of Chinese civilization. It covers the period of the growth of foreign influences and does not add much to the credit of the Western world.

I cannot too strongly recommend this fascinating book. To the students of Chinese history it will be invaluable. It is easy to see from the bibliography at the end of the book how carefully the author has checked his references. A book not to read and return to the library, but to read and retain for reference.

H. St. C. S.

**Approaches to the Oriental Classics.** Edited by Ivan Theadore de Bary. Columbia University Press. Pp. 262. Bib.

In spite of the distinguished gathering which lies behind it this is a very partial book. It is described as the proceedings of a conference held at Columbia University on September 12 and 13 called the Conference on Oriental Classics.

This seems to have been held under a subsidy provided by the Carnegie Corporation—the Asia Society and the U.N.E.S.C.O. appear also to have been involved.

While some subjects, particularly those in the scientific or engineering fields, lend themselves to reasonably adequate treatment at congresses of this kind, the results of Orientalists conventions seems to produce a much more diffused effect when an attempt is made to produce, as it has been here to present, in an easily assimilable form short studies of "Great Books of the East."

It can, however, be said that some very able and gifted contributors have done their best. They have discoursed learnedly about the Quran and Ibn Knaldum. Philosophical and ethical comments are offered on the Upmishads and Shakuntala. Buddhism is discussed in terms of the Lotus Sutra and respect is paid to the Confucian analects. Then there is an ingenious comparison between the social anthropologies shown—the Hindu and the Greek epics.

There are undercurrents from time to time in this work which subscribe to the unnecessarily apologetic viewpoint that eternal and universal values common to both Western culture are being undermined by scientism which is evidently regarded as an unworthy product of Western culture, and that there has been in the past some fatal lack of appreciation on the part of the West which has failed to grasp the perfections of Oriental thought. While to an extent this may be true as a generalization it is far from being a just appreciation of the position.

What is nowhere really indicated is the unfortunate failures of oriental philosophies to provide the dynamism necessary to bring Asia unaided into the modern world. When the need for rapid advance has been appreciated it is regrettably true that many of the Asiatics themselves have been the first to abandon their own values to too great an extent without apprehending others to take their place. If this book reminds the real inheritors of these rich heritages of Asia of this danger it is a useful work.

A. H. S. C.

**The Secret Name.** (Forty Years of Soviet Rule). By Lin Yutang. Heinemann, 1958. Pp. 234. Index. 18s.

This is a rather different sort of book to the ones which we have been accustomed to see written by this distinguished Chinese author. It is yet another digest on Kremlinology or a beginner's guide to the cold war.

It is elaborately documented and factual and even contains charts and graphs. However, like most "eight legged essays" built to satisfy an exacting demand, it only adds further well-arranged commentary to a well-worn subject. It has been said that the essence of this most successful propaganda is repetition. If so, the book should be successful but it is likely to appeal only to a limited audience.

A. H. S. C.



**The Red Mandarins: Travels in Red China.** By Karl Eskelund. Alvin Redman, London. Pp. 171. Illustrated; map; index. 25s. net.

Mr. Eskelund is chiefly known by successful travel books. But those who once lived and worked in China will remember him best perhaps by his first book—*My Chinese Wife*. They will not be disappointed in *The Red Mandarins* which is a comparative study resulting from a visit to China after 15 years by himself and his wife, whom he had first met in Peking as a fellow student at Yenching University.

The book moves quickly and reads easily. Pleasant touches recall familiar scenes contrasting the old Chinese world with the new.

A feature of the book, without anything in the nature of over-emphasis, is the evidence of the never ending pressure of indoctrination. In a prison which they visited, two-thirds of the prisoners being held for political offences, the warden informed Mr. and Mrs. Eskelund that they were released as soon as the political education they were receiving brought the realization "that the Communist programme was the only right thing for China."

"And if they are not convinced?" asked Mr. Eskelund.

The warden smiled. "They are always convinced sooner or later. It is only a question of time."

Among other enlightening things is the account of pre-Communist conditions in the country-side, the drastic treatment by the Communists of the rich landlords, and the kaleidoscopic changes in the peasant's lot. This has a peculiarly human interest as it is written round the individual experience of a countryman. Not less illuminating are the experiences of a Yenching friend who was a victim of his own honesty in the course of the reduction of business life in Shanghai to Government control.

A visit paid by the author and his wife to the Yellow River produced a brief and moving story of China's sorrow and the impressive effort now being made to control her vast waters.

Shortly before the end of his visit Mr. Eskelund was asked by a Yenching friend what he thought of the new China. This was his reply:

"One moment I am full of enthusiasm for everything the Communists have done—the beggars have disappeared, the workers are better off, there is no more corruption, and the industrial progress is incredible. But the next moment I think that too high a price has been paid for this progress. China has been placed in a straight-jacket of fear—nobody speaks freely any more, people hardly dare to think. No place has ever depressed me so much—though I suppose people coming from western Europe are bound to think that way. I am longing to get away, and so is my wife."

Though only an extract from a long conversation it may be said, broadly speaking, to be Mr. Eskelund's considered conclusion reinforced by the effect of all they had seen on his Chinese wife. But the book must be read to appreciate a picture which is full of detail without being prolix: which gives the impression of intimacy and is entirely free from harsh and unfair conclusions.

Fine illustrations, many in colour, bring visual reminders of the past while reflecting something though not very much of the Communist age.

P. H. B. KENT.

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**Journey to the Beginning.** By Edgar Snow. Gollancz, 1959. Pp. 434. Index. 21s.

The book is as vivid as a film. Its remarkable and justly famous author re-creates for post-war readers some of the sensations of the actual stresses of the political struggles, revolutions and wars with which his career has been linked.

It is a genuine "tour de force" to be able to present the events of the past with such freshness and the constant maintenance of such a compelling style. The scene shifts from pre-war China, the communists in Yen-an, and the Sino-Japanese war. Then there is his account of the situation which brought the U.S. into the

war and which took the author to India. There are interesting accounts of his conversation with the Congress leaders at the time of the Cripp's offer and some revealing disclosures of the opinions of President Roosevelt about British rule in India which will surprise some but not all.

Edgar Snow is best known for his virtual discovery and exposition to the world of the hitherto obscure hermit state of the Chinese communists in Yen-an. By the publication of his remarkable *Red Star over China* in a rather special way he was the interpreter of the views of the architects of the new China to the world press and more than most he must bear the brunt of having persuaded many, including some that these dangerous power seekers were "just a bunch of agrarian reformers."

On p. 416 he delivers himself of the truest observation on China which he has ever made but which is neither typical of his attitude nor in line with his assessment of Red China.

"The new Peking Communist régime has been established by a revolution which satisfied some urgent needs of the peasantry combined with the energy aroused by the anti-foreign slogans of a national movement. It can succeed only by redeeming the most important promises of material progress, popular reform and true national independence. It would be destroyed if it surrendered the true interests of the Chinese people to any Russian demands which might make of China a colonial instrument.

Unfortunately, the tale comes to a rather abrupt end as though the film was broken, and there is a sense that this outstanding reporter who was once so closely in touch with the current of events is now remote from them. Also one must remember a film may be a newsreel taken from actual events or a "documentary" presenting them in a certain way.

A. H. S. C.

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**Japanese Politics.** By Nobutaka Ike. Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958. Pp. 300. Index. 25s.

This is a concise and striking study of contemporary Japan written by an associate professor and curator of Japanese collections at the Hoover Institute and Library for War Revolution and Peace at Liland Stanyrd University. What seems a little strange at first sight is that the work is based on first-hand study in Japan principally when the author was there as a Ford Fellow in 1954-55.

The comment is, however, necessary because the writer, a graduate in Political Science from John Hopkins University, was born in Seattle. Therefore, the result is an interesting blend of native insight combined with the methods of exposition and scholarship which the author acquired in the U.S.

He reviews the rapid evolution of a modern system of government in Japan and the way in which it was grafted on to the original feudal framework, the social system of the country, and its basic political doctrines and myths, writing, in particular, with great objectivity about the throne. There is one particularly interesting quotation which he makes when he cites the late Prince Konoye as having said:

"During the past few decades there has been present leftish ideology in one section of the army. At present some have made connections with the armed forces, the bureaucracy and the people and are planning a leftish revolution. This is of greater danger than defeat in war. I personally fear a leftish revolution more than defeat. This is because the imperial household and the "Kokutai" can be preserved in defeat but not so in case of war." This was certainly political realism of a high order.

There is an illuminating account of the governmental structure and an admirable analysis of business, labour and agricultural affairs. Much material is included on the political parties and their characteristics with an assessment of the habits and attitudes of the electorate.

This is treated in such a way as to take particular account of "mass media" and public opinion and there is an unusually perceptive and informed account of violence in politics which has been such a constant and characteristic feature in the

past. It is not quite so well known that while assassination in the traditional manner has been absent since the war there have been some quite lively manifestations in the Diet which are described with restraint. He draws the important conclusion that violence and organizations whose stock in trade is the use of violence are an integral part of Japanese political life—a fact which it is as well to remember in the light of Prince Konoye's remark.

This book has an extensive bibliography largely, as might be expected, of writings in Japanese, is well furnished with statistics, tables and diagrams where these are necessary. It is also extensively referenced, and should prove to be an admirable text for university classes in political science, in Far Eastern affairs or alternatively it might be read with advantage by business men desirous of increasing their knowledge of an important customer—and competitor.

A. H. S. C.

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**Window on Nepal.** By Tibor Sekelj. Translated by Marjorie Boulton. Published by Robert Hale, 1959. Pp. 486. Illustrated, index, sketch map. 18s. net.

The translation reads so well that, except for one or two apparent slips of no importance, it suggests an original work in English. It gives a light, pleasantly written account of a country which until very recently was practically inaccessible to foreigners. The geography, history, religion, arts and the economy of Nepal are skilfully described in a clear and simple manner. This is particularly true of the chapter dealing with the Hindu religious ideas and practices, which are generally similar to those of India, except that they have been to a certain extent influenced by Buddhism. Buddhism, now virtually extinct in India, is still flourishing in Nepal, but here it has been considerably influenced by Hinduism. The devotees of these two religions in Nepal sometimes adore or worship the same images at the same shrine under different names.

The author is described as a Yugoslav explorer and anthropologist and his enthusiasms are given to the arts of the Newari, the earliest inhabitants of the country of Tibeto-Burmese (Mongol) origin who are Buddhists. He is less attracted by the princely families who came from Rajasthan in India and established their rule over the other inhabitants. His account of the feuds of the Ranas, attended at times by frequent slaughtering of rival claimants to power and their supporters, makes—perhaps inevitably—a somewhat confusing story. He has a high regard, as have most people who know them, for the Gurkha soldiery, and the Sherpa climbers of the Himalayas. Two Nepalese are noticed at length, Siddharta Gautama, the Buddha, and Tensing Norgay of Everest fame.

The book is in the fashionable form of a travel story skilfully interlarded with much carefully recorded scientific observation. We are told that the economy is still primitive with cottage industries and cultivation by hand, even wooden ploughs being very rare.

India, China and the U.S.A. are competing to help, "if not from a wish to control the country, at least to make sure that the others do not control it." The U.S.A. easily lead in this. About sixty American families are now working in Nepal, in connection with health, education and agriculture, as advisers or as co-directors with Nepalese partners—with the duty of seeing that the millions of dollars are being well used.

It is impossible for anyone who has known sympathy and admiration for such ancient civilizations not to feel some apprehension about the possible effects of this rapid modernization of a people who, until now, have been something of a "museum piece," representing the age-old kingdoms of India as they have existed for many hundred of years, ruled or dominated by Brahmins and Kshatriyas, the priests and warriors of Hinduism.

The author describes them as a smiling, happy people—not wretched or very poor. "Objectively, their poverty is a fact. But they do not feel it—gaiety is much more a part of their lives than among other peoples, who objectively live much better. However, among the educated youth I saw melancholy and disillusionment."

J. C. CURRY.

**The Forgotten Valley. Travels in Nepal.** By Karl Eskelund. Alvin Redman. Pp. 181. Maps, coloured plates and index. 25s.

This is an account of life in the Valley of Nepal as it was lived two years ago, not an exhaustive study but a piece of very readable, interesting and sympathetic reporting on some aspects of its social, religious, industrial and economic life, by an experienced and observant Danish journalist and his wife. The pair started with the unusual advantage of a close personal acquaintance with "the other side of the hill"—China.

It is the sort of book that a visitor should take with him to Nepal, always bearing in mind that it closely confines itself to the Valley and to the Newar people, with only a brief excursion into the Sherpa country. With his Nepali friend, Mohan, the author visited the homes of high and low caste people, temples and priests and a living goddess, talked with archaeologists and with men of the 1950 Revolution and with still influential Ranas against whom the rebels had risen. We see that caste is still restrictive and compelling in the Valley, that democracy has not penetrated and cannot penetrate so long as wealth and possessions are with so few and exert such a disproportionate influence, and that administration still leaves much to be desired. We learn of the difficulties facing those who are trying to direct foreign aid towards the development of the country and to the improvement of the lot of its inhabitants.

The historian will probably be most interested in the latter part of the book which tends to confirm from men on the spot other accounts of the role played by Delhi in the uprising of 1950, and to lend colour to Mr. Nehru's speech of late December of that year.

The plates are excellent.

F. S. T.

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Responsibility for opinions expressed in articles published and for the accuracy of statements contained in them rests solely with the individual contributor.

## CORRESPONDENCE

HEGG HILL,  
SMARDEN,  
KENT.

### BULBS AND PLANTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

*To the Editor.*

DEAR SIR,

Many interesting and beautiful bulbs and plants grow in the Middle East which have never been successfully introduced into Britain, or which were grown before 1939, but which died of enforced neglect during the war years. Since the war there have been few botanical expeditions to

the area between the Mediterranean and Afghanistan, and no longer are the Dutch firms able to arrange for collections as of old. Thus it has not been possible to enrich and replenish our gardens and botanical collections.

The mountain areas of Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Persia are particularly rich in bulbs which we badly want, and I wonder whether there may be people in the area who are interested and who might be able to send material home?

Two particularly interesting families are TULIPA and FRITILLARIA, both of which grow throughout the area in great variety. Tulips are too well known to need any description here, but Fritillaries are more inconspicuous and localized and are not too well known; they are mostly small plants with nodding flowers of brown, purple, green, yellow, or dingy pink, though some are large and showy such as the Crown Imperial which grows in many British gardens. Each species of both Tulips and Fritillaries is usually rather variable, so that full knowledge can only be gained by getting specimens from as many localities as possible and then comparing them. This variation can occur between the plants in any group, and still more between the plants from different mountains or valleys: it is of great interest in the study of genetics, and indeed Fritillaries are being used intensively at the John Innes Horticultural Institute in such work, and the results are contributing towards cancer research.

Collecting bulbs or seeds is not a difficult job and needs no expertise; it is not necessary to know the name of what you collect, nor to collect in large quantity; some will of course turn out to be comparatively well known, but all will be welcome and unusual in British gardens, and random collection will quite often produce variant forms of great interest and sometimes even species hitherto unknown.

There are many ways of helping; best of all, bulbs can be dug up and sent by air; seeds are equally welcome but take longer to prove themselves over here. Pressed specimens are valuable, so are photos, drawings, or descriptive notes. For plants other than bulbs the same methods apply, except that it may be difficult to dig or send live plants.

If anyone who reads this letter is interested, perhaps they would write to me for further particulars; their efforts would be sincerely appreciated.

Yours sincerely,  
PAUL FURSE

Sept. 19, 1959.

## NOTICES

The Council acknowledges with gratitude the following :

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PART II

## CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL	90
NOTICES	91
IN MEMORIAM	92
RACE RELATIONS IN SOVIET MUSLIM ASIA	93
THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.	106
BAHRAIN, PEARL OF THE GULF	117
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	126
MONGOLIA RE-VISITED	127
A LAND-ROVER PILGRIMAGE TO WESTERN PERSIA	141
THE VALLEY OF THE ASSASSINS	147
CORRESPONDENCE	151

REVIEWS:

Mizh—A Monograph, 152	Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868, 163
The Culture and Art of India, 153	Sun and Shadow at Aswan, 163
Sources of Indian Tradition, 154	Bankers and Pashas, 164
Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism, 155	The Tales of Marzuban, 165
The Revolt in Tibet, 156	Human Relations Area Files In- corporated, 167
The Naked Hills, 157	The Foundation of Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1638-1658, 168
Riding to the Tigris, 157	Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1658-1687, 168
Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555, 158	The Junkman Smiles, 170
The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 159	Chinese Art and Culture, 170
A Political Study of the Arab- Jewish Conflict. The Arab Refu- gee Problem, 160	An Early Victorian Family in Bombay, 171
History and Tribes of Jordan, 162	

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# NOTICES

## ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

The Annual General Meeting of the Society will be held on Tuesday, June 28, 1960, in the rooms of the Royal Society, commencing with tea at 4.15 p.m., and will be followed by the Anniversary lecture.

## ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner will be held on Wednesday, July 13, 1960, at Claridges, London, W.1. Notices will be sent to all members. The charge will be £2, exclusive of wine.

## AFTERNOON PARTY, 1961

It is proposed to hold an AFTERNOON PARTY, as an experiment, during the summer of 1961. If the event proves popular it will be repeated annually.

The time and place proposed are mid-July, 1961, at Hurlingham Club, Fulham, S.W.6. The price for afternoon tea, and strawberries and cream, will be 10s. per head.

Members will be asked to vote on this proposal at the Annual General Meeting.

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It is desired to improve the amenities in the Society's offices and Library at 2, Hinde Street. If members have small tables, carpets, rugs or bookcases they would be willing to present, or to lend, to the Society, they would be most gratefully received.

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## IN MEMORIAM

SIR EDWARD CROWE, K.C.M.G.

THESE will be many members of the R.C.A.S. who will sadly miss the genial companionship of Edward Crowe. He died while on a visit to his son Colin, H.B.M. chargé d'affaires in Cairo, who is also a member of this Society. Sir Edward's pride in his son's appointment—a very difficult one—was apparent, and one feels that his visit to his son in his own Embassy must have been one of the rewarding and happy episodes in a long period of service to his country.

His father was British Consul in Zante in the Ionian Isles. Edward Crowe entered the Japan Consular Service as a student interpreter in 1897. After various appointments, at Yokohama and Kobe notably, he was appointed Commercial Counsellor at the Embassy in Tokyo. He succeeded Sir William Clark as Controller of the Department of Overseas Trade in 1928, where he did yeoman service to commercial relations with the Far East. In his retirement he was President of the Royal Society of Arts, of the Japan Association, and combined many public appointments with some important directorships.

Everyone felt the better for meeting Edward Crowe, his great charm of manner and distinguished appearance will long be missed in public life.

H. St. C. S.

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The following back numbers of the Society's Journal are urgently wanted :

1914 Part 3.	1940 Part 3.
1919 Part 4.	1942 Parts 2, 3 & 4.
1925 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1944 Parts 2, 3/4.
1926 Part 4.	1945 Part 1.
1932 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1946 Parts 3/4.
1933 Part 4.	1947 Parts 1, 3/4.
1934 Parts 1 & 3.	1950 Part 1.
1935 Parts 1 & 3.	1951 Parts 2/3.
1936 Part 3.	1952 Part 2.
1938 Part 4.	1957 Part 1.

# RACE RELATIONS IN SOVIET MUSLIM ASIA

By LT.-COL. GEOFFREY WHEELER, C.I.E., C.B.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, February 3, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is unnecessary for me to do more than express a welcome to Colonel Wheeler on this platform because he is so well known to us all and has done so much for our Society as a member of Council. We are therefore very glad to have this opportunity of hearing him speak today on the fascinating subject of "Race Relations in Soviet Muslim Asia," a particularly topical subject at the present time. Without further delay I call on Colonel Wheeler to address us.

IT is perhaps significant that really the only word in use in Russian for race is the word "rasa," which is not a word of Russian origin. In fact even this word is now very seldom used, for the Soviet authorities do not admit the existence of any racial tension or even of any racial problems in the Soviet Union. They say that this is due to Article 123 of the Constitution, which stipulates that "any kind of direct or indirect privileges for citizens on account of their racial or national characteristics, and similarly any encouragement of racial or national exclusiveness or of hatred or neglect are punishable by law." But, as in other countries whose Constitutions include or imply the same liberal principles, and where there is in fact no discriminatory legislation, it does not necessarily follow that people of all nationalities are treated equally or uniformly even in the Soviet Union.

I am going to deal mainly with race relations in the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union—Azerbaijan in Transcaucasia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan in Soviet Central Asia, and Kazakhstan. I shall also deal, although to a somewhat smaller extent, with the Muslim communities in the North Caucasus, for, as you probably know, the present Soviet conception of Asia includes the whole of the Caucasus instead of only part of it as formerly.

This problem of race relations in Soviet Asia has a great many different aspects—historical, political, cultural, economic, social, and demographic. It is clearly impossible to deal with all these aspects in a short lecture, and I therefore propose, after giving you a short historical background, to concentrate on the nationalities policy as devised by Lenin and Stalin, and on the demographic and social impacts of the Russians on the Muslim nationalities of the Soviet Union. I shall not deal with the cultural aspect not because it is unimportant—it is very important indeed—but because I dealt with it in considerable detail in a lecture delivered before the Society in April, 1954, which was published in the Journal of July-October. 1954.

Before I go any further I should like to draw your attention to two circumstances which sharply distinguish Soviet Asia from other colonial empires, but which are often lost sight of. The first is that although originally inhabited by peoples racially and culturally quite distinct from the Russians, Soviet Asia is geographically contiguous to European Russia and is not separated from it by any abrupt physical or climatic barriers. Secondly, in the Russian Empire and in the U.S.S.R. the Russians have always enormously outnumbered the Asians: taken together, that is, Great Russians, White Russians, and Little Russians or Ukrainians, they make up nearly 80 per cent. of the total population of the Soviet Union, and they now constitute nearly one-third of the total population of the six Muslim republics. As there is still some misunderstanding on this subject, may I remind you that the Russians are not themselves of Asian origin. Their presence in Asia is the result of conquest, annexation, and colonization.

The circumstance of geographical contiguity was calculated to produce a relationship between conquerors and conquered, settlers and natives, quite different from that found in overseas' empires. There were other exceptional circumstances in the Russian Asian Empire; the Russians and the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus were not such strangers to each other as, for instance, the British and the peoples of India; the 250-year domination of Russia by the Mongols and the fact that the Tatars of the Volga region had been an integral part of Russia since the sixteenth century, meant that there were never those feelings of biological or social superiority and inferiority which existed elsewhere; finally, the people of Central Asia never experienced the sensation of signal military defeat, for they never offered the Russians any organized military resistance.

The history of the Russian Tsarist conquests of the Caucasus and Central Asia is fairly well known, and I need not recapitulate it here. But in attempting to assess Russia's progress in handling racial problems up to the time of the Revolution it is important to bear certain facts in mind. In 1917 more than one-third of the total area of Asia was under Russian rule. It is quite untrue to say, as *The Times* did in a leading article on December 5, 1955, that "the Russians never spread across Asia in the past as traders or administrators."

In 1917 the total population of the area now occupied by the six Muslim republics was about fourteen million, of whom about two and a half million were Russian settlers. It is difficult to describe the relationship between the Russian settlers and the indigenous Muslim peoples on the eve of the Revolution with any degree of precision. For the historical and geographical reasons which I have mentioned, this relationship was different from that found in other colonial empires at that time; the attitude of the Russians was less aloof, less consciously superior in material matters; Russian settlers, for instance, did not and do not today, insist on a standard of living far higher than that of the local population. Culturally, however, the Russians considered themselves immeasurably superior to the Muslim peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus, particularly in matters of religion. They feared Islam as a sinister and secret force, and the fact that it seemed to elude their control

engendered a distrust of the subject races which coloured the whole system of administration. They did little or nothing to increase literacy, which in Central Asia stood at under 3 per cent. in 1917, and in consequence, clerical and official posts were mostly held by Russians. There were no national military formations which could have brought the people into close contact with Russian officers and the number of Russian civil or military officers with any knowledge of local languages seems to have been very small.

The inheritance of the Tsarist Asian Empire was, in some ways, an embarrassment to the Soviet régime for the whole idea of empire ran counter to communism. Lenin may have originally envisaged genuine self-determination for the Muslim nationalities—a kind of loose Muslim federation which would be closely associated with communist Russia and would eventually embrace neighbouring Muslim countries. Several circumstances made this impracticable: the attitude of the Russian colonists who regarded Central Asia and the Caucasus as an integral part of Russia which they had no intention of handing over to the backward native population; the Muslim opposition to the régime which developed as a result of this attitude; the presence in the Muslim borderlands of the main sources of Russian oil and cotton supplies; and, finally, what the Soviet leaders regarded as British and Japanese designs on Russia's eastern and southern frontiers.

In 1917, immediately after the March Revolution, various all-union Muslim organizations were formed; but they were gradually whittled away. There was the Commissariat of Muslim Affairs, designed to co-ordinate local organizations. The first chairman of this, Mulla Nur Vahid, formed a so-called Russian Party of Muslim Communists, which apparently had Stalin's blessing. On his death in Kazan in 1918, however, it was dissolved and its functions taken over by a Central Bureau of Muslim Organizations of the Russian Communist Party. In March, 1919, the words "Muslim Organizations" were changed to "Organizations of the Peoples of the East." Shortly afterwards the Commissariat of Muslim Affairs itself disappeared and the whole concept of Islam was thus removed from the Soviet political fabric, never to return.

With the passing of the all-Russian Muslim movement and the new talk of nationalities and self-determination, political as distinct from cultural nationalism grew apace among the Russian Muslims. But it was what in communist parlance is called "bourgeois nationalism," that is to say, it was less interested in the class war and socialism than in getting rid of foreign influence, and particularly of foreign settlers. This resulted in intense and unprecedented friction between the Muslims and the Russian colonists, especially in Central Asia, and by the end of 1919 the government of Turkestan, except for the Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara, was virtually in the hands of the colonists, with only nominal Muslim participation. The purely Muslim government of Kokand had been liquidated by Russian military force in January, 1918.

Sporadic resistance to Soviet power in the shape of the Basmachi movement continued until 1924 or even later. Alarmed by the growth of "Greater Russian Chauvinism" and Muslim reaction to it, Lenin dis-

patched the Turkestan Commission which instituted reforms designed to curb the power of the Russian colonists.

In 1924 a fundamental delimitation of the administrative divisions of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was carried out and this with some minor modifications remains in force today. The year 1924 marks the putting into practice of the nationalities policy.

The pre-1917 communist conception of self-determination corresponded more or less with nationalist aspirations in all colonial dominions. It included, among other things, the right of non-Russian nationalities to secede from Russia and it was confirmed at the VIIth All-Russian Party Congress held in April, 1917. The matter of secession was, to some extent, qualified by Stalin when he said, "The question of the *right* of nations freely to secede must not be confused with the notion that a nation must *necessarily* secede at any given moment . . . thus we are at liberty to agitate for or against secession, according to the interests of the proletarian Revolution." As the revolution developed, the new régime was faced with the serious prospect of the disintegration of the Russian state as a result of a strong tendency towards decentralization which appeared—Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States, detaching themselves completely. In addition, nationalist movements had begun in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Some redefinition of the principle of free self-determination of nations therefore became necessary. In November, 1918, Stalin explained in *Pravda* that "the old bourgeois-democratic interpretation of the principle of self-determination has become a fiction and lost its revolutionary significance." Trotsky stated the matter even more clearly: "We do not only recognize, but we also give full support to the principle of self-determination, whenever it is directed against feudal, capitalist and imperialist states. But whenever the fiction of self-determination in the hands of the bourgeoisie becomes a weapon directed against the proletarian revolution, we have no occasion to treat this fiction differently from the other 'principles' of democracy perverted by capitalism." In fact, self-determination was now to be regarded as an instrument of counter-revolution when it was directed against Soviet power.

There is evidence that Lenin was disturbed by this redefinition of principles as likely to lead towards Greater Russian chauvinism. But like other Soviet leaders he probably felt that the urgent need to reconsolidate the Russian state outweighed all other considerations. In the event, the new principles led to the rapid suppression of genuine nationalism in the Muslim borderlands, where the bourgeoisie were identifiable with the local population and the proletariat with the Russian settlers. Quite apart from the obvious danger of bourgeois nationalism among the Muslim nationalities, there were other more subtle but not less menacing possibilities. For instance, Sultan Galiyev, a Tatar Muslim communist holding a high position in the Commissariat of Nationality Affairs, developed a movement which centred round the conviction that the exclusively German or Russian interpretation of marxism was unsuited to the Muslim world, and that it would eventually become obscured by Russian chauvinism. He aimed at modifying marxism as conceived by the industrial West, in order to render it applicable to the fundamentally agrarian society of Asia. This

movement was stigmatized as counter-revolutionary and Sultan Galiyev was denounced, arrested, and dismissed from the Party. He ultimately disappeared and is believed to have been executed in 1930.

The declared aim of the nationalities policy was what was called "the liquidation of actual inequality" and its essence was material. It was believed that once material inequality had been eliminated, all bourgeois nationalist and separatist tendencies would disappear. Some writers maintain that this policy was "conceived in honesty"; be that as it may, it quickly encountered realities which showed that it could not be made to correspond to the will of the people, however much it might contribute to their ultimate material good. This problem, with which we in the British Commonwealth are perfectly familiar, presented particular complications in the Muslim borderlands of Russia. There was no nucleus of a trained native Civil Service and the minute native intelligentsia, which alone had the necessary education and political consciousness to qualify for administrative and political activity, was regarded as "feudal" and "exploiting" and therefore excluded from politics. Again, the Soviet tendency to prefer the proletariat to the peasantry, while it had little significance for the nationalities policy in Western Russia, had unfortunate results in the Muslim areas, where the politically conscious industrial proletarian minority was mainly Russian and Ukrainian, that is European, and the peasant majority Asian. Lenin apparently believed that education and administrative training would eventually result in complete "korenizatsiya," a new word whose literal rendering is "nativization"; but by 1930, when only 26 per cent. of all the clerical posts in Kazakhstan, for example, were held by Kazakhs, Soviet Russian standards and procedures had been adopted and the whole administration so Russianized that it could not be "nativized" merely by introducing more and more Russian-trained indigenous personnel.

There were other circumstances which inevitably made for Russianization: the predominantly Russian Red Army; various planning, construction and youth organizations; and most of all the Party which, after the first outburst of internationalism, was to become more and more susceptible to the mystique of Russian traditionalism and nationalism, which had never really disappeared from Russian life.

Viewed dispassionately and without regard to the high-sounding moral and ethical claims for and denunciations of it made by supporters and opponents of the Soviet régime, the Soviet nationalities policy appears simply as a new and materially more efficient form of colonialism. It is the outcome not so much of communist theory and practice as of the reaction of certain elemental forces to a given situation. The origins of these forces lie deep in Russian history and geography; the given situation was the sudden inheritance of an empire acquired by force, whose abandonment seemed certain to involve the disintegration of the Russian state. As a practical means of avoiding such disintegration and as a temporary administrative expedient for preserving the Russian state and perpetuating central control, the policy has much to be said for it. As a temporary practical expedient it could, indeed, be regarded as the best one in the circumstances, for the sudden abdication of paramount power over back-

ward peoples unprepared for independence may prove a worse evil than its original imposition. Whether the Soviet nationalities policy can be said to constitute a permanent and ethical solution of the colonial problem and whether it has been applied with due regard to the will or spiritual requirements of the peoples concerned are entirely different but by no means less important questions.

Before going on to consider the social contacts between the white settlers and the local population in the Muslim republics, I want to draw your attention to the broad facts of the colonization of Central Asia in so far as they are known. Colonization on a large scale did not begin until 1905 before which the Muslims had continued to constitute over 90 per cent. of the population. Official statistics published in 1911 showed the population of what are now the four Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan as  $12\frac{1}{2}$  million of whom about 3 million were described as Russian settlers. The first Soviet census of 1926 showed the total population as about 14 million of whom 2 million were settlers. The 1939 census did not give a complete breakdown of the population by nationalities but the total was given as about  $16\frac{1}{2}$  million of whom about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  million were settlers. This showed an increase since 1926 of about 5 per cent. in the native population and of about 72 per cent. in the settler population. The findings of the 1959 census so far published give no breakdown by nationalities but show the total population as 23 million. As there has been a very large influx of Russians into Kazakhstan since 1953, not to speak of fairly steady immigration into other areas, the number of settlers is at present certainly not less than 7 million, a proportion of approximately one settler to every two Muslims. This is a far higher proportion of white settlers than can be found in any other Muslim country in the world, not excluding Algeria.

These figures should, in my opinion, be borne constantly in mind when considering the violent and steady Soviet condemnation of Western colonialism. They are, in fact, often ignored or obscured by such palpable mis-statements as that which appeared in an article in the *Guardian* of December 16, 1955, that "the Russians have, for historical reasons, no colonial past in Asia." It can, of course, be argued that the under-populated and climatically tolerable and geographically contiguous Muslim lands provide a reasonable *lebensraum* for over-populated Russia and that any other nation similarly situated would have done the same. These arguments are never, however, advanced by the Russians as far as I know. They say that the Tsarist conquests saved the Muslims of Central Asia and the Caucasus from the predatory designs of the Western imperialists; that the Russian people have always been the Muslims' best friends; that the Civil War was exacerbated by capitalist intervention and that collectivization, cultural reform, colonization, and the control of economy, defence and foreign policy from Moscow have been brought about by the will of the Muslim peoples themselves and only opposed by reactionaries working in the name of Islam or in the pay of foreign powers.

A far graver example of the Soviet attitude towards the Muslim peoples of the Union can be found in the treatment of the 800,000 Muslims of the North Caucasus and the Crimea in 1944. On the ground that they had



collaborated with the Germans, the entire Muslim population of three so-called autonomous republics and one autonomous province were deported to places over 1,000 miles from their homes. In 1956 this operation was officially described as a crime against humanity and attributed to Stalin. Repatriation was ordered, but in the meanwhile the areas had been populated by others, presumably Russians. In 1956, before repatriation had begun, the population of the oblast of Groznyy, formerly the Chechen A.S.S.R., was given as 565,000 while in 1958 the population of the reconstituted Autonomous Republic was given as 544,000. In neither case was any clue given to the national composition.\* Incidentally, the Crimean A.S.S.R. has never been reconstituted and the whereabouts of the 202,000 Muslim Tatars deported in 1944 remains unknown.

Soviet writers on sociological conditions in the eastern republics of the Union represent the relationship between the local population and the Russians as one of friendly equality. They speak of the love which the Muslims have felt for the Russian people ever since they first came into contact with them. In earlier writing a sharp distinction was drawn between the Russian people and the Tsarist Russian administration, but recently there has been progressively less emphasis on this, and the present tendency is to depict a state of mutual affection and confidence between Russians and Muslims and an age-long respect among the Muslims for everything Russian.

A careful examination of Soviet writing of all kinds, and of the personal enquiries made among refugees and during visits to the eastern republics by competent observers, suggests that the actual situation falls a good deal short of Soviet claims and wishes. In respect of intermarriage, education, work and leisure, fusion between the Russian settlers and officials and the local population can hardly be said to have taken place at all. Intermarriage is extremely rare and seems to involve only Muslim males. In the rare cases where Russian girls marry Muslim men, they may be accepted into Muslim society in the towns, but not in the villages. The children of such marriages are invariably brought up as Muslims. There is very little intermingling of the communities in the primary and middle schools except where Muslim children attend Russian schools. This attendance may be increasing owing to the professional advantage of a good knowledge of Russian. There must be considerable racial contact in the universities and technical colleges, where Russian is the main medium of instruction and where Russians are usually in the majority. For example, of 13,932 pupils in the technical and specialized secondary schools in Turkmenistan in 1957, only 4,867 were Turkmens.

In agriculture and industry there is very little contact. Ethnically mixed collective farms are a rarity and the many field studies carried out by Soviet ethnographers show that the tribal and clan systems remain at their most exclusive precisely where Russian colonization has been most extensive. Thus in 1950 a Kazakh kolkhoz in the Dzhabul oblast consisted of 116 families of which 100 all belonged to one tribal sub-division and only two families were Russian.

\* The preliminary report on the 1959 census shows the population of the Chechen A.S.S.R. as 711,000.

There is naturally some social contact between the communities in industry. Contrary to general belief, however, the native workers are often in a minority to the Russians, and in some instances this disparity seems to be increasing. Thus, in the old Kirgiz coal-mining district of Kyzyl Kiya founded in 1898, whereas in 1914 25 per cent. of the workers were Kirgiz, this percentage had fallen to 12 in 1954.

Except in some of the newer towns like Alma-Ata and Stalinabad where the Russian and Muslim quarters are intermingled, and in purely Muslim towns such as Kokand and Bukhara, most of the towns exist in a double form, Muslims and Russians living and spending their leisure separately. Western diet has made next to no progress, and "unclean" meat is still avoided. Although pig breeding is much encouraged, its progress is in strict relation to the extent of Russian settlement. Thus in 1956 the number of inhabitants per pig in Kazakhstan was 8.2, whereas in Turkmenistan it was 43.7.

This situation does not reflect any particular discredit on the Russians—the reluctance to intermingle is, indeed, on the native rather than on the Russian side; nor does it indicate any special distaste in the Muslim mind for Russian or Soviet civilization. It is simply the result of a clash of differing civilizations in a typically colonial society. The bitterness with which the Russians resent this suggestion and the lengths to which they go to repudiate it, strongly point to their consciousness of its truth.

Comparisons are odious and so far I have tried to avoid them. But in attempting to sum up the racial situation in Soviet Asia it is really impossible to avoid comparison, partly because it is the essence of the Soviet approach to the matter: the pæans of praise of their own attitude and achievements which they constantly pour forth are accompanied by a steady obligato of accusation and vilification of the West, and particularly of Britain. Even the colonialism of Imperial Russia—and this is now progressively played down—has for some time been attributed to the need to defend the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia from the predatory designs of the British.

As regards the motives which led to the acquisition of their empire and the method by which domination over the Asian races in it was achieved and was maintained up to 1917, there is not much to choose between the Russians and the Western imperial powers. Biologically the Russians may have been more tolerant towards Asians than, for instance, the British, but culturally they were less tolerant. It is after the Revolution that the real differences begin to emerge. Even then there is an essential point which must be borne in mind: the confines of Soviet Asia are today precisely the same as those of the Tsarist Asian Empire. Whatever new names may be given to it, the Russian Empire is still in being.

On the material side there has been much change. In the thirty-five years which have elapsed since the Revolution there has been a remarkable advance in general and technical education, public health, and industrial and agricultural productivity. The standard of living has been greatly raised and in essentials is little different from that of European Russia. In all these matters the Soviet régime—the Russians if you like—have, in

my opinion, shown themselves to be more dynamic, more imaginative, more successful—if more ruthless—than any other colonial power.

It is often said that in the U.S.S.R. there is more equality of opportunity for non-Europeans than in, for instance, the British Commonwealth. I am not sure if this is true. I think it is true that for the reasons I have given there is less colour prejudice among Russians, but the known facts of employment do not suggest equal treatment. For instance, in 1956 the total of Azerbaydzhanis, a relatively advanced people, employed as research workers (*nauchnyye rabotniki*) throughout the Union was given as 2,779, while the total number of research workers in Azerbaydzhane alone was 4,388. Much the same position obtains in the other republics. The Soviet argument may be that this is all part of the process of *sliyaniye* or merging of the peoples, but it is hardly convincing. This same process will eventually, it is sometimes said, produce the same sort of relationship as that between the Scots, or the Welsh and the English. But there is no real analogy here, for while there are virtually no English “settlers” in Scotland and Wales, the number of Scots and Welsh settled and employed in England is so enormous, that no one has attempted to determine it. There are said to be 300,000 Welsh in Greater London alone.

As regards human rights, self-determination and what may be called spiritual matters, the Soviet attitude and achievement are by Western standards much less satisfactory. By comparison with the independence enjoyed by such former colonial territories as Morocco, Ghana, India, Pakistan and Burma, the “full sovereignty” claimed for the Soviet Muslim republics is simply a myth. A much nearer parallel to the latter is the so-called self-governing provinces of British India before 1947, with their reserved subjects and ministries. Much worse than all this is the fact that while all, or very nearly all, the remaining colonial territories outside the U.S.S.R. have prospects of complete independence inside or, if they like, outside such organizations as the British Commonwealth, the Asian nationalities of the Soviet Union have only the prospect of *sliyaniye* or merging with the Russians. This, so far as can be seen at present, is the last thing they want to do.

#### DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Wheeler has expressed his willingness to answer questions.

Group-Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: When I was in Eastern Siberia in the autumn of 1958 I could not help seeing the immense thrust of Russians coming from the U.S.S.R. towards Siberia. I would like Colonel Wheeler's guidance as to whether that immense thrust of immigrants was due to the fact that by going farther east the Russians went through to the Muslim area, so to speak, and became more important people in Far East Siberia? Those colonists were obviously imbued with an almost crusading spirit; they were so enthusiastic that one felt there must be some real reason urging them on.

Colonel WHEELER: That is a difficult question to answer. I have heard similar statements. It is true, I believe, that the immigrants are

enthusiastic; at any rate when they arrive they are said to be, even if they become less enthusiastic after a time. The migration is, to some extent, spontaneous and not unnatural, the immigrants being mostly young people. Life in Russia is better than previously but it is still drab and uninteresting. If there is held out to young people anywhere in the world the prospect of something new—with rather less severe winters than they have been accustomed to—naturally their attention is attracted. Although so far as I know there has been no absolute compulsion in sending these people east, the migrations have been organized and they have been publicised in schools and universities all over the country. That there are any empire-building ideas behind them is, I think, unlikely.

Mr. M. PHILIPS-PRICE: Does Colonel Wheeler think that religious differences may play some rôle still between the Russians and the natives of Azerbaydzhan or other provinces? There is presumably a difference of religion between these natives and whatever one may say the religion of the Russians is today. In 1910 I crossed from the Chinese frontier to the Central Asia Railway and I noticed even then, as the lecturer has said, that the settlers from Russia and the natives kept strictly apart. The impression I gained was that that was due to religion. Prior to that I had been in South-west Siberia among the Abakan tribes of the Altai where there was very little religious difference because the people were Nature worshippers, and they were definitely intermarrying. The moment one went to where the Mohammedans were there was a difference. Does the old religion play any rôle now in the Azerbaidjan or Central Asian areas?

Colonel WHEELER: It is necessary to draw a distinction between religion and culture. Islamic culture took a strong grip on the whole of Central Asia and Transcaucasia; at any rate in the areas not previously Christian. But among the Kazakhs it took a less strong hold because they preserved their old beliefs. You may remember that Catherine the Great was so disturbed by the lack of mosques among the Kazakhs that she ordered them to be built for them. They were not themselves a religious people, and I do not believe they are today, but Islamic culture has taken a grip. In my view it is not so much a question of doctrinal belief; it is simply that the people have an established way of life, a way of diet, a way of behaviour in general, a different attitude to family, women and so on which keeps them apart from the Russians. I am sceptical about the rôle Islamic belief plays in those Muslim areas of the Soviet Union. The people are clinging to the past, sometimes to the less agreeable features of the past, because they want to remain aloof from the Russians with whom they have nothing in common. I would not say that there is a strong spiritual religious feeling.

Sir OLAF CAROE: Could Colonel Wheeler add anything in regard to the mass desertion by these people to the Germans during the Second World War? Was that significant as showing the feeling of so many of the people both of the Caucasus and of the Central Asian Republics towards Russia and Russian colonization? I believe there were 200,000 or 300,000 or even more people who were made use of in one way or another by the Germans. That has always seemed to me very significant.

Colonel WHEELER: It is significant, but one must remember that the Second World War came shortly after the 1937-38 purges when the Muslim peoples were very hardly and badly treated. Also up to that time their standard of living had not risen greatly. They deserted because they were discontented, because they disliked the Russians even more than they disliked them in the past at that particular juncture. We do not yet know what happened to the deserters, most of whom were handed back under the Potsdam Agreement; they do not appear to have been allowed to return to their own countries—perhaps because they were not considered to be very useful citizens from the Soviet point of view. Since the end of the war there has been a great advance in the development of the standard of living. The people still do not like the Russians and resent the mass colonization which is still continuing. But if there were another war tomorrow I rather doubt if the people would desert in such large numbers. They have experienced a long period of relative prosperity and one has to admit that there has been no repetition of the purges carried out in 1937 and 1938; that sort of thing seems to have disappeared with Stalin. It is an important factor.

Lord CORK: Is there any military organization throughout these Soviet Republics? Are Russian officers stationed in them with small garrisons of Russian troops? Is military control exercised over these people?

Colonel WHEELER: So far as I know there is a considerable security force and field army in Central Asia and in Transcaucasia. There are no national formations, the last of them having been abolished in 1938. I believe one or two units were created during the war on a so-called national basis, but they were abolished after the war. So far as I know now there are no purely national formations anywhere in Russia. I should say at a guess that in the Central Asian districts there might be something in the region of eight or nine Soviet army divisions. I should not say that there is now a military atmosphere; the troops are kept separate from the population. One no longer has the impression of a military government such as there was before the Revolution.

Mr. FOX-HOLMES: Is it not true that the people of the various races do actually work together in the mines, in factories and elsewhere and get on well with one another? Is it not true that among the Uzbeks and Kazakhs there is no differentiation? Do they not among themselves get on exceeding well?

Colonel WHEELER: Yes, so far as I know the various Muslim peoples get on quite well with each other. The Soviet attempt to emphasize the differences in the various languages seems to have no effect on the spoken tongues. In spite of existing differences the various Turkic peoples can still communicate with each other as well as they ever did. I have never heard of any friction among the Muslim races, who are, as a matter of fact, intermingled in most of the Republics.

Lord CORK: Actually there is peaceful penetration with military backing—is that, roughly, the policy?

Colonel WHEELER: I believe so. I do not think it can be said that the government is oppressive. The government in the past bulldozed the people into submission; if they had not done so the people would not be so

docile now. Every now and then steps are taken to remind people of what might happen. For instance, it was only in 1956 that the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan Communist Party was executed. The Russian practice in dealing with nationalism is based on the conviction that prevention is better than cure. There are no Nkrumahs or Gandhis and there have not been since 1937. One never hears of any national leader. There are no national names to conjure with; there are a few national writers who are well known, but on one would call them national leaders. That is the position. The atmosphere is peaceful and one could call it continued penetration made possible by very strict measures in the past.

Mr. PHILIPS-PRICE : I believe I am the only person present who happened to be in Russian Turkestan during Tsarist times in 1910, and I remember Tashkent, Kokand, and Samarkand during those years. The military were then very much in evidence; one could see officers everywhere and the garrisons were not hidden. But of course conditions were very different in those days. At that time Bukhara and Khiva were under native rule under Russian protection, and there was always a fear that there would be internal disturbances there. In fact, when I was there the Emir of Bukhara died and there was expected to be trouble as to the succession. However, there was not. As I say, conditions were different and the military were much more in evidence in those days. I imagine that the military are much less evident now. It is the same in Poland at the present time : one can go all through Poland and never see a Russian soldier; Russian soldiers are there, but very much in the background.

Major BURTON : Could the lecturer add something with regard to the encouragement given by the Russians to the Kurds?

Colonel WHEELER : Although it is off the subject, I recall that just after the *coup d'état* in Iraq I saw in an English newspaper something about Soviet Kurdistan. There has never been any such thing. There is a maximum of 60,000 Kurds in the Soviet Union, and they are widely scattered. That the Russians have seriously entertained the idea of supporting Kurdish independence I personally think most unlikely. But every now and then this rumour gains currency. I do not know of any evidence that the Russians have actually worked up the Kurds in Iraq since the *coup d'état*. One knows that communism is growing among the Kurds, but that is different. My reading of the Russian attitude towards Iraq is that they have been concentrating on keeping Iraqi communism under control, and particularly Kurdish communism. I do not believe the Russians are anxious for the Kurds in Iraq to make a nuisance of themselves.

Mr. C. J. EDMONDS : Owing to the close alliance between the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (the only vocal element at present) and the Iraqi Communist Party it is difficult to distinguish what is spontaneous and what may be Soviet-inspired. The present Party line is that the Kurds of Iraq are already liberated and are thus the natural nucleus for an independent Greater Kurdistan; and there is in the Kurdish press a continuous barrage of abuse of the "reactionary fascist" governments, as distinct from the people, of Turkey and Persia. These attacks on two original





MEMBERS OF THE R.C.A.S. ENTERTAIN AN EMINENT GEOLOGIST FROM UZBEKISTAN  
*Left to right*: Miss M. K. Marsh (*Secretary*); Sir Clairmont Shrine, O.B.E.; Lt.-Col. G. Fox Holmes; Russian Interpreter; Mr. K. M. Abdullaev;  
Lt.-Col. G. E. Wheeler, C.I.E., C.B.E.; Grp.-Capt. H. St. C. Smallwood, O.B.E.

*Photograph by Gerald Hammond & Co., Ltd.*





member-governments of the Baghdad Pact must obviously suit the Russian book, and the incompatibility of these irredentist ideas with the integrity of Iraq as part of the Arab world is conveniently ignored.

Colonel ROUTH: One notices that in all Western Power colonies there is a surge of nationalism, which has been growing gradually over the last forty or fifty years. In all that Colonel Wheeler has been saying there has been no mention of a surging nationalism in Siberia or other places mentioned. To what does Colonel Wheeler attribute that apparent lack of nationalism?

Colonel WHEELER: I attribute it to the fact that in areas where there are only two coloured people to every white colonist, which is roughly the proportion all over the area discussed, it is virtually impossible for the local people to have any active nationalist aspirations; passive aspirations, yes. The fact is that the Russians have, particularly since the Revolution, obtained such a strangle-hold on this Central Asian area that it is not reasonable to expect the people to do anything about it. The only course they can follow is to be passive and as quiet as possible. I do not think one can expect anything else. Why is it that there are nationalist movements in Africa and other parts of the world but not in the Soviet Union? The answer is that in the Soviet Union there are no leaders—no Nkrumahs, no Nehrus or Gandhis, nobody like that; they were all removed at a very early stage. In order to flourish, nationalism requires some kind of indulgence on the part of the ruling power. The people of Central Asia and Transcaucasia have not been shown any such indulgence in the past and it does not seem likely that it will be shown them in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: Colonel Wheeler is responsible for the Central Asian Research Centre. I know many here would like to continue for a longer spell, hearing what is happening in Iraq and elsewhere, but we have come to the end of our time now. I know you all wish to express the great pleasure we have had in listening to Colonel Wheeler's lecture and his replies to the questions.

The vote of thanks was accorded with acclamation.

# THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

This is the fifth in a series of reviews of new Soviet literature on the six Muslim republics of the U.S.S.R. and the countries bordering on them. The present article deals with books received between mid-October, 1959, and the end of January, 1960. It is contributed by the Central Asian Research Centre in collaboration with the Soviet Affairs Study Group of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

## I. CENTRAL ASIA

### *A new look at Soviet nationalities policy*

WHEN in 1924 the Soviet Government divided the territory of its Central Asian possessions into five republics, and announced that their inhabitants had achieved nationhood, it was, in fact, thrusting the outward trappings of independent statehood on to peoples who had little historical experience of independence and none of nationhood; whose allegiances were to tribe or clan and to the Islamic way of life; and whose previous political divisions had cut across those of race or language. The new republics were established according to ethnic origin and language, and these concepts have been vigorously and consistently developed throughout the period since 1924, while, at the same time, Islam and tribal loyalties have been persistently attacked by propaganda and administrative measures. Each republic now has its own Academy of Sciences, university, theatres, publishing houses and newspapers; there is universal education in the local language and an established vernacular literature. Each republic has its own Council of Ministers and administration and such other symbols of sovereignty as a national anthem, a capital, and indeed, the title of republic. Throughout their existence, however, these republics, like the rest of the Soviet Union, have been entirely controlled by the Communist Party, and their governments and literatures have dutifully echoed policies imposed from above.

No attempt is made to conceal this fact since it is not seen as a contradiction to the façade of nationhood: the Soviet republics are "socialist nations," that is, nations in which all power is vested in the working classes. The common aims and ideals of all working classes are embodied in the Communist Party. Therefore rule by the Communist Party cannot be in opposition to the aims and ideals of the socialist nation. In politics, as in art, the form may be national, but the content must be socialist.

A new popular edition of two of Stalin's works on the national question has recently appeared—*Marxism and the National Question* and *The National Question and Leninism* (Marksizm i natsional'nyy vopros. Natsional'nyy vopros i Leninizm. State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1959. 82 pp. 65,000 copies)—and a quotation from the latter work written in 1929 summarizes official Soviet policy as it has been until the present: ". . . the Party believes it essential to help the re-

born nations of our country, to stand them on their feet; to vitalize and develop their national culture; to develop the use of the native languages in schools, theatres and other cultural institutions; to nationalize, i.e. to staff with nationals, Party, trade union, co-operative, administrative, and economic organizations; to educate their own national Party and Soviet leaders; and to curb all those—in fact not very numerous—elements who are trying to hinder the Party's policy in this field. This means that the Party is helping and will help the development and flowering of the national cultures of the peoples of our land, that it will encourage the consolidation of our new socialist nations, that it is taking these affairs under its protection against each and every anti-Leninist element."

The 1924 demarcation provided an ingenious solution to the national problem in Central Asia. At one stroke it disposed of the "bourgeois nationalists" whose ideas, stemming broadly from pan-Turkism, had flourished with varying success in the period 1917-24, and at the same time it opened Central Asia to modernization and intensive economic development directed from the centre. In less than forty years in spite of the war and the losses suffered during collectivization, Central Asia has been transformed: large desert tracts have been irrigated, new industries are thriving, agriculture is mechanized and highly productive. But with this remarkable material progress and the Western way of life which is being imposed on the Muslim peoples of the U.S.S.R., certain other factors are emerging which could hardly have been foreseen by the architects of the nationalities policy, and which pose the question of how far this policy is proving successful from the Soviet point of view, or will even be workable in the future.

On the one hand, there are the results of the educational policy so vigorously pursued by the Soviet authorities. Illiteracy has been largely eradicated; local languages have been systematized and developed, printing and publishing in vernacular languages have been firmly established; and local technicians, teachers and specialists in many fields are being trained to hold important posts. The whole of this cultural development stems from Communist ideology and aims primarily at creating good and obedient citizens of the Soviet state as a whole. But education and the consequent creation of "national intelligentsias" may create for the regime as many problems as they solve. Because people have been educated and trained to think, it does not follow that they will continue to think on the same lines as their preceptors.

On the other hand, the Soviet-sponsored concept of nationality and the growth of possibly heterodox national intelligentsias are in direct conflict with the steady increase in non-Muslim immigration into the Muslim republics. The findings of the 1959 census just published show that in spite of considerable growth in the native population since 1939 in all the republics except Turkmenistan, the proportion of natives has dropped. In Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, the titular nationality is now less than half the total population of the republic. Total populations of the various republics are given below with percentages of the principal nationalities. 1939 census figures, where known, are given in brackets.

*Uzbekistan*

8,106,000 (6,282,000)  
 Uzbeks, 62% (65%)  
 Russians, 13.6% (11.6%)  
 Kazakhs, 4.1% (4.9%)  
 Tatars, 5.5% (2.3%)

*Tadzhikistan*

1,980,000 (1,485,000)  
 Tadzhiks, 53% (59.5%)  
 Uzbeks, 23% (23.8%)  
 Russians 13.3% (Russians and  
 Ukrainians 1.4% Ukrainians 10.3%)

*Turkmenistan*

1,516,000 (1,254,000)  
 Turkmen, 60.9% (59.2%)  
 Russians, 17.3% (Russians and  
 Ukrainians, 1.4% Ukrainians 18.7%)  
 Uzbeks, 8.3% (8.5%)

*Kirgizia*

2,066,000 (1,459,000)  
 Kirgiz, 40.5% (52%)  
 Russians, 30.2% (1939 percentages  
 Uzbeks, 10.0% are not  
 Ukrainians, 6.6% known)

*Kazakhstan*

9,310,000 (6,146,000)  
 Kazakhs 29.6% (38%)  
 Russians 43% (41%)  
 Ukrainians 8.2%

The census also announced a 19% increase in the Kazakh population of Kazakhstan; a 23% increase of Uzbeks in Uzbekistan; a 19% increase of Tadzhiks in Tadzhikistan; and a 11% increase of Kirgiz in Kirgizia—between 1939 and 1959.

The problem is not merely numerical. In the twenties some efforts were made at “nationalization”—in Stalin’s sense, or at least to ensure that the non-natives knew the local language, but pressure of immigration has caused the abandonment of such schemes. It can reasonably be assumed on the basis of the little available evidence (see, for instance, *Central Asian Review*, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 120-6) that today the majority of responsible posts in every field are held by non-natives. These facts receive little publicity and in Soviet propaganda works a deliberate attempt is made to create the opposite impression. For instance the pamphlet *The Science of Kirgizia in the Service of the Economy* (Nauka Kirgizii na sluzhbe narodnogo khozyaystva. Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1959. 21 pp. 3,000 copies) mentions by name eight Kirgiz academicians but only three Russian scientists at present in the republic.

Because of this situation it seems doubtful if the fiction of national sovereign states can be prolonged. In the case, for instance, of Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, it is difficult to see how the policy of encouraging local culture can be reconciled in republics with huge immigrant populations to whom the local culture is alien. Changes in the political and cultural fields can well be expected; it is interesting that as an ideological justification of the situation, Lenin’s theory of the ultimate merging and disappearance of nations seems to be coming back into fashion. On the other hand, there is evidence that the “national intelligentsia” of Kazakhstan, for instance, is increasingly loth to give up its national cultural achievements (see *Central Asian Review*, Vol. VII, No. 4, Vol. VI, No. 1), and a recent work by A. Altmyshbayev, entitled *Some Features of the Formation and Development of Socialist Culture Among Peoples of the Soviet East* (Nekotoryye osobennosti formirovaniya i razvitiya sotsialisticheskoy kul’tury narodov sovetskogo vostoka. Kirgiz Academy

of Sciences, Frunze, 1958. 82 pp. 500 copies), casts a certain diffuse light on the problem from the point of view of a Kirgiz intellectual. This curious booklet purports to be an examination of the place of "socialist," that is, all-union, and "nationalist" features in the life of the Central Asian republics. It appears to be one of the very few original essays in Marxist-Leninist theory by a Kirgiz. Written in standard Marxist-Leninist style, it offers no radical criticism to orthodoxy; but the writer's malaise is apparent in conscious or unconscious contradictions, ambiguities and lapses. Altmyshbayev gives the standard definition of a nation and its place in the Soviet community and goes on to consider Soviet culture which, in all its aspects, must be "nationalist in form and socialist in content." He comes to the conclusion that far from being associated only with form, the national element in Soviet culture is also essentially connected with content. This is a heretical, but not original idea. (Altmyshbayev himself quotes a certain Bocharov who came to the same conclusion and even condemns it as "revisionist" on the page before putting forward his own similar idea!) Altmyshbayev then defines "content" as the theme and idea of a work of art and the author's intention in it; he argues that while the author's intention must reflect Party spirit (*partiynost'*) and colour the whole work, the theme and idea may be "national." In the past Kirgiz literature has frequently been criticized for being too "nationalist" and this is certainly what Altmyshbayev has in mind. He is careful to support his argument by giving examples of the "Russianness" of such accepted writers as Gorkiy and N. Ostrovskiy. He dismisses as utopian the idea that in time all national differences will disappear: ". . . The process of [national] merging, and then fusion . . . should not be thought of as simple . . . If it were, then there would be no sense in the struggle of the Communist Party and Soviet state for cultural revolution in the country. This is the first point, and the second is that the process of merging national forms of culture is long and complex and will probably continue until the highest phase of Communist development."

Altmyshbayev then considers the relevance of national languages and the national way of life in Soviet society. While describing the differences between, for instance, the Kirgiz and Russian languages in phonetics, morphology and syntax, he is, in fact, in indirect terms, showing the richness and tenacity of the Kirgiz language. He makes formal acknowledgement of the debt owed by Kirgiz to Russian, but the general tone of his writing treats Kirgiz as the equal of Russian. Some small but telling points emerge as asides: for instance, because the Russians cannot pronounce certain Kirgiz sounds "there has arisen the incorrect and distorted pronunciation (which is accepted in literature) of the name of the Kirgiz people. The Kirgiz themselves do not say 'Kirgiz,' but 'Kyrgyz,' and this corresponds to the historical name of the people." Similarly the Kirgiz, at least the more ignorant of them, cannot pronounce correctly Frunze, the name of the capital of Kirgizia—(Frunze was a leading Russian general in the Civil War)—and say "Paronzo." When considering how the Kirgiz language has developed since the Revolution, Altmyshbayev makes the following remarkable statement: "Such mani-

festations as classes and the class war, society and social relationships, the philosophy of classes and of parties, enlightenment, science, technology, and many others which *in view of the backwardness of the country did not have such a strict meaning or significance in pre-revolutionary Kirgiz society* as they acquired in the course of the Great October Socialist Revolution and in subsequent years . . . have enlivened the inner stores of the Kirgiz language . . ." (reviewer's italics). It is, of course, a tenet of orthodox Marxism-Leninism that the concepts of class and class war, even in such a backward "feudal-nomadic" society as that of the Kirgiz, had just as much, and probably more, significance before the Revolution as after it.

Finally, Altmyshbayev discusses national character and the national way of life in generally acceptable orthodox terms: the good features from the past have been retained and developed, while the bad have been dropped. National life and character have been enriched with new socialist qualities. But in one section he considers the Russian national character, pointing out that before the Revolution there were two Russians—the one, reactionary and oppressive, and the other progressive and humanitarian (it is noticeable that he makes little attempt to apply this accepted theory to the Kirgiz), and discusses this manifestation in relation to the treatment of the minority peoples of the Russian Empire. ". . . The reactionary part in its attitude to the dependent peoples differed little in haughtiness and chauvinism from the modern enslavers of the peoples of Africa and Asia. But the question arises: was this chauvinism an innate quality of the colonizer section of the Russian people? Of course not. It was the natural consequence of the pre-revolutionary economic and political order of Russian society. Tsarism and capitalism have disappeared into the past. And with them has gone Russian chauvinism . . . We must ceaselessly thank the Bolshevik Party and its Leninist national policy which has led both the peoples formerly dependent on Tsarism, and the Russian people itself, away from their past shameful position." He then comments, perhaps ironically, "today, of course, there are no traces of this evil. In the most remote corners of Central Asia as in other parts of the land, a Russian is met with the deepest respect and honour on the part of the local inhabitants." He says nothing of the Russian attitude to the local inhabitants.

It is revealing to compare Altmyshbayev's views with those of a leading Kazakh Party member, N. Dzhandil'din, an abridged translation of whose article on Russo-Kazakh relations in Kazakhstan appears in *Central Asian Review*, Vol. VII, No. 4. Dzhandil'din attacks those Kazakh intellectuals who idealize Kazakh culture and traditions and oppose Russianization. He barely mentions Russian nationalism and emphasizes that the merging of nations is inevitable. The significance of Altmyshbayev's views, which may well be typical of Kirgiz and Kazakh intellectuals, and of Dzhandil'din's more orthodox ideas can be seen when they are related to the population figures for Kazakhstan and Kirgizia.

Although the intellectuals may be increasingly aware of the need to preserve their national cultures, it is not clear if this is true also of the native industrial workers and kolkhozniks. Volume II of the *Central*

*Asian Ethnographical Symposium* (Sredneaziatskiy etnograficheskiy sbornik. II. Institute of Ethnography, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1959. 409 pp. 2,000 copies) produces valuable material on this, and other, subjects. L. F. Monogarova devotes a ninety-page article to the remote mountain people of the Yazgulem valley in the Pamirs. The Yazgulemtsy, as they are known in Russia, or Zgamik as they call themselves, are a handsome people of Iranian stock, speaking their own language, who, because of their age-old isolation, have many unique features in their culture and way of life. "Material on the ethnography of the Yazgulemtsy" is an extremely thorough study, well documented and illustrated. The author considers their history, economy and material culture, social and family life, education, amusements, and oral art. Although administratively now part of the Tadzhik S.S.R. and organized into three collective farms which were established in 1938, the essentials of Yazgulem life seem unchanged. The people raise cattle according to their traditional customs and practise agriculture with primitive tools. They can now buy factory-made goods at the village store, but supplies seem to be variable. Some European-type clothes are increasingly used. There are two seven-year schools (ages seven to fourteen), and one ten-year (seven to seventeen) in which all instruction is in Tadzhik since the Yazgulem language has never been written. The inhabitants are thus bi-lingual and it seems certain that the Yazgulem language is dying out. The clan system is still in existence in spite of the imposition of the Soviet rule; the villages are divided into clan districts and the kolkhoz work teams are usually made up according to clan.

This account of life in one of the most remote corners of the Soviet Union is followed by K. L. Zadykhina's "Ethnographic Material on the Way of Life of Uzbek Workers in Tashkent and Andizhan" which gives a disappointingly inconclusive account of the living conditions and home life of some Uzbek workers in large factories. The author takes individual examples of Uzbek workers, gives their life history and describes their home. Of the Uzbek workers at the Tashkent textile works, some live in the modern flats built by the works, others have built their own new homes, usually on the outskirts of the city, while others still live in traditional Uzbek one-storey houses in the old town. There is no indication of how the majority live, and most of the examples the author has given are of skilled workers. In all three types of dwelling many Uzbek traditional features are to be found alongside modern factory-made furniture and crockery. Most Uzbek factory workers in Tashkent now wear European dress, but usually with the traditional skull cap; in Andizhan a higher proportion, especially of older men, still wear native dress. The author concludes with a very brief account of Uzbek marriage and family customs and attempts to show that although many traditions are still retained, Uzbek society has been radically changed by measures such as the emancipation of women and in general by the new Soviet order. Since she draws sweeping general conclusions from individual examples, her argument is not convincing.

Other articles in the Symposium include "National Dress of the

Tadzhiks of the Garm Oblast of the Tadzhik S.S.R." with many illustrations, some in colour, of the exquisite hand embroidery which is its feature; "Material Culture of the Uygurs of the Soviet Union," an article which is of interest since it describes the way of life of both the Uygurs settled in Kazakhstan and the smaller community in Fergana; and "Modern Distribution of Peoples and Ethnographic groups in the Fergana Valley"—which gives exact geographical locations of all the indigenous peoples including such minuscule communities as the Arabs, Kurama, Turks, Dungans, and Uygurs, together with notes on their history. A large-scale ethnographic map of the Fergana Valley is included. It is an interesting feature of national life in Central Asia, that while the larger nationalities tend to adopt Russian or European dress, furniture, to a certain extent food, and to a lesser extent customs, the smaller peoples tend rather to merge in language and customs with the kindred majority: thus the Yazgulemtsy with the Tadzhiks, or the Fergana minorities with the Uzbeks or Kirgiz.

### *The Bukharan revolution*

The titles of Soviet books are sometimes misleading. For instance both A. P. Fomchenko's *Russian Settlements in the Emirate of Bukhara* (Russkiye poseleniya v Bukharskom emirate. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1959. 77 pp. 5,000 copies) and the late Professor A. Aliev's *Great October and the Revolutionizing of the Peoples of Bukhara* (Velikiy Oktyabr' i revolyutsionizirovaniye narodov Bukhary. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1958. 46 pp. 5,000 copies) deal in fact with the history of the last two decades of the emirate's existence and the events leading to its overthrow in August, 1920. Fomchenko's is by far the more valuable study, through it contains a fair share of nonsense, particularly on the subject of British interference in Bukhara. He describes the gradual extension of Russian control over Bukhara in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the establishment of Russian settlements at Chardzhuy (now Chardzhou), Novaya Bukhara, Kerki, and Termez during the same period, the first two being originally for railway workers and garrison troops, and the latter two for frontier troops; but the towns soon grew into trading centres as well. There follow brief chapters on the influence of Russia, economic and otherwise, on Bukhara, and one on "The Influence of the First Russian Revolution on the Popular Masses of Bukhara" in which a standard attempt is made to relate sporadic peasant unrest in Bukhara to the strikes and mutinies of 1905-7 among Russian workers and troops. Chapter VI deals with the period February to October, 1917; it describes how the Provisional Government's representative in Bukhara urged the Emir to carry out reforms (the Emir's Manifesto of April, 1917); but such measures are ascribed to pressure from the newly-formed soviets in the Russian settlements. The final chapter covers the period October, 1917, to August, 1920, when the emirate, briefly independent of Russia, lived in uneasy proximity to the Tashkent Soviet Government. According to Fomchenko the features of this period are the growing discontent of the Bukharan population resulting in the formation of the Bukharan Communist Party in 1918 and the increasingly aggressive



intentions of the Emir, backed by counter-revolutionary elements and British aid, towards Tashkent—both of which necessitated the attack by Soviet troops under Frunze on Bukhara in August, 1920. The revolutionary activities of the Russian settlers are emphasized and those of the Young Bukharans practically ignored.

Aliyev's general interpretation is very similar to Fomchenko's, but he writes partly from personal experience as one of the first members of the Bukharan Communist Party and gives slightly greater emphasis than Fomchenko to native activities in Bukhara. The Young Bukharans, for instance, receive a little more space if no more credit, and Aliyev mentions the influence—for him reactionary—of Turkey, which Fomchenko totally ignores.

#### *Education in Tsarist times*

V. T. Kocharov has written an interesting booklet on *The History of Popular Education in the Turkestan Kray* (Iz istorii narodnogo obrazovaniya v Turkestanskom Kraye. Uzbek State Publishing House, Tashkent, 1959. 78 pp. 3,000 copies). He describes the traditional Muslim schools of Turkestan which continued under Russian rule and the missionary and lay schools established by the Russians. He concludes that the "Russo-native" schools, although founded by the Tsarist authorities with the object of russifying the local population, were "objectively" progressive in that they opened the perspectives of Russian humanist and progressive thought to some at least of the native population. He seems to ignore the Dzhadid movement altogether, but devotes the final section of his pamphlet to the successes of education in Soviet Uzbekistan. (See also *Central Asian Review*, Vol. VII, No. 4.)

#### *Pottery in Central Asia*

An exhaustive analysis of the traditional social and economic organization of Central Asian potters is to be found in Ye. M. Peshchereva's *Pottery in Central Asia* (Goncharnoye proizvodstvo Sredney Azii. Institute of Ethnography, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow/Leningrad, 1959. 395 pp. 2,000 copies). This interesting book deals with the techniques of pottery, the traditions associated with the craft, and with the guilds of potters which existed in Central Asian towns until the revolution. The book is divided into two parts: the first dealing with the potter's craft as still practised by women in the more remote country districts, and the second with urban craftsmen who, grouped into guilds, produced work of a higher technical quality. Peshchereva's study of the guilds contains valuable material for the social historian on traditional town life in Central Asia.

#### *Archæology in Kazakhstan*

Volume 7 of the Works of the Kazakh Academy's Institute of History, Archæology and Ethnography is devoted to archæology in Kazakhstan (Trudy Instituta Istorii, Arkheologii i etnografii. 7. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 307 pp. 820 copies) and contains expedition

reports and accounts of findings from sites in all parts of the republic. There is in addition a valuable bibliography of nearly 600 titles on the archæology and ancient history of the Syr-Dar'ya and Semirech'ye areas. The volume is illustrated with numerous line drawings.

### *Ancient Turĳic inscriptions*

The language of the Yenisey inscriptions which date from the fifth and sixth centuries, and which are the oldest examples of Turkic writing, are the subject of I. A. Batmanov's *The Language of the Yenisey Monuments of Ancient Turĳic Literacy* (Yazyk yeniseyskikh pamyatnikov drevnetyurkskoy pis'mennosti. Institute of Languages and Literature, Kirgiz Academy of Sciences, Frunze, 1959. 216 pp. 500 copies). The book is intended as a text-book for Turcologists and is confined to an analysis of the phonetics and morphology of the Yenisey language with comparisons with modern Kirgiz. This otherwise valuable study is marred by bad printing and many misprints.

### *A geography of the Alma-Ata region*

Zh. A. Aubakirov's *The Alma-Ata Oblast: an Economic and Geographical Outline* (Alma-Atinskaya oblast. Ekonomiko-geograficheskaya kharakteristika. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 133 pp. 2,000 copies) is an informative description of this rich and varied province, once part of Semirech'ye, which since the 1870s has been a favourite area for Russian settlement. The book contains chapters on the natural conditions, the history of settlement from the earliest times, the population, the economy (sections on industry, agriculture, and transport), and the characteristics—economic and geographical—of the different regions of the oblast. The bulk of the book is factual, but sensitive questions such as population are evaded by statements like "Kazakhs and Russians together make up 80% of the population" and by irrelevant propaganda. The book is illustrated by poorly-reproduced photographs.

### *Kazakh language and literature*

*Kambar-Batyr* (Kambar-Batyr. Institute of Language and Literature, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 426 pp. 1,300 copies) gives the various texts of this famous Kazakh epic, together with Russian translations and commentaries. The volume is edited by M. O. Auezov and N. S. Smirnov. *Popular Kazakh Soviet Songs* (Kazakhskkiye sovetskiye narodnyye pesni. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 454 pp. 5,000 copies) gives the text and music of 180 Kazakh songs composed between 1917 and 1953 which show "the huge transformations which have occurred during the Soviet period in the economic and social life of the Kazakh people." The songs are grouped under the following headings: "revolutionary songs," "songs about the equality of women and about culture," "songs about the Party and V. I. Lenin," "songs about socialist construction," "youth and children's songs," "songs about the defence of the fatherland during the Great Patriotic War," and "patriotic songs, songs about peace and friendship among

peoples." They include Kazakh versions of the Marseillaise and Red Flag, but the majority seem to have been written and composed by Kazakhs. The introduction, notes, and texts are given in both Kazakh and Russian.

M. O. Auezov has for many years been the leading Kazakh literary figure, and his sixtieth birthday in 1957 was honoured by the volume *To M. O. Auezov. A Symposium* (M. O. Auezovu. Sbornik statey k yego shestidesyatiletiiyu. Institute of Language and Literature, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 266 pp. 1,090 copies). The book contains a preliminary section of greetings from the Party, Government, and individual writers (including Louis Aragon), followed by sixteen articles, five of them in Kazakh, from Kazakh and Russian writers and philologists. Subjects discussed include the development of Kazakh language and literature in the Soviet period, the Kazakh epic, tradition, the Kazakh enlightener and reformer—Abay, and Auezov's own place in Kazakh literature.

## II. AZERBAIDZHAN

Abbas Kuli aga Bakikhanov, son of one of the last khans of Baku, was a prominent early nineteenth-century literary figure in Azerbaydzhani. He entered Russian service in 1820 and having mastered the Russian language turned his talents to a wide variety of subjects: history, archaeology, philosophy, and literature. As a believer in education and enlightenment through the medium of Russian, he is acceptable to Soviet historians. Academician Makovel'skiy, however, in a critical introduction to Guseynov's book mentioned below, believes that Bakikhanov was not (as Guseynov believes) "a fighter against feudalism, a defender of the interests of the depressed peasantry, or an opponent of Russian Tsarism" but rather that he was "a defender of the privileges of the nobility . . . an aristocratic enlightener, a serious scholar . . . who played a progressive role in the development of science and education." *Bakikhanov in the Eyes of His Contemporaries* (Sovremenniki o Bakikhanove. Institute of History, Azerbaydzhani Academy of Sciences, Baku, 1959. 66 pp. 1,500 copies) is an anthology of descriptions of Bakikhanov by Russian and Azerbaydzhani contemporaries including Griboyedov, General Paskevich, and the orientalist Berezin.

Geydar Guseynov's *History of Social and Philosophical Thought in Azerbaydzhani in the 19th Century* (Iz istorii obshchestvennoy i filosofskoy mysli v Azerbaydzhane XIX veka. Azerbaydzhani Academy of Sciences, Baku, 1959, 2nd edition. 430 pp. 7,000 copies) describes the lives and importance of five Azerbaydzhani thinkers: Bakikhanov, Mirza Shafi Vazekh, Kazem-Bek, Akhundov, and Gasan-bek Zardabi—all of whom can be shown to have had a Russian rather than Turkish orientation. The first edition appeared in 1949 and the present volume has been edited by Makovel'skiy who writes a stern preface criticizing the author for attempting to show his subjects as more "progressive" than in fact they were, for praising Shamil, and for paying tribute to the "cult of personality."

The work of the Azerbaydzhani Archaeological Expedition in 1953-5 is reported in *Works of the Azerbaydzhani (Oren-Kala) Expedition* (Trudy

Azerbaydzhanskoy (Orenkalinskoy) ekspeditsii. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow/Leningrad, 1959. 453 pp. 1,300 copies). The chief site explored in the period was the ancient city of Oren-Kala situated between the Araxes and Kura rivers. There are summaries in French after each article and numerous illustrations.

### III. THE BORDERLANDS

#### *Afghanistan*

The late Professor Reysner before his death in 1958, translated and edited the history of Ahmad Durrani Shah by the modern Afghan historian Mir Ghulam Muhammad Gubar. *Ahmad Shah, Founder of the Afghan State* (Akhmad-shakh. Osnovatel' afganskogo gosudarstva. Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1959. 386 pp.) contains the translation preceded by a long introductory article by Reysner which supplements Gubar's work by an account of the economic and social situation in Afghanistan in the eighteenth century, a subject to which Soviet orientalists have devoted considerable attention. The publication of the book is indicative of the attention paid by the Soviet Union to all fields of Afghan development at the present time. Reysner recommends the work to his Soviet readers for the factual material produced by Gubar and as an example of the modern Afghan attitude to the history of Afghanistan.

N. M. Gurevich's *Afghanistan's Foreign Trade* (Vneshnyaya torgovlya Afganistana. Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1959. 234 pp. 1,200 copies) describes the Afghan economy from the end of the last century until the start of the Second World War. The author's approach is angled but the book contains useful factual material.

ANN SHUKMAN.

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# BAHRAIN, PEARL OF THE GULF

By JAMES H. D. BELGRAVE

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, November 25, 1959, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, it gives me very great pleasure to introduce Mr. James Belgrave. The name is so well known in the Gulf that really there is no need for any introduction.

From the point of view of our Society it is most desirable and very nice to have this opportunity of listening to a young speaker, because no society can progress without the younger generation playing their part with their more modern outlook. So today we particularly welcome Mr. Belgrave, Junior, if I may call him so, to give us his lecture.

Twenty-five years ago I was in Bahrain and I remember well watching with Mr. Charles Belgrave, his father, the Ruler of Bahrain showing his Arab horses and his hawks to a neighbouring ruler, a most interesting and enjoyable afternoon. Since then I have been in Bahrain from time to time and so have had an opportunity of noting the great changes which have taken place, and now you are going to hear from Mr. James Belgrave what is happening in Bahrain today.

**A**T this moment the ruler of Bahrain is laying the foundation stone of the new Bahrain Airport Terminal, a building which will, when completed, provide all the comforts and facilities which passengers expect at an airport with as much traffic as that of Bahrain. The construction is being undertaken by a Bahraini contracting firm and is one of a number of ambitious projects which the Bahrain Government is undertaking in order to maintain the position of Bahrain as the traditional commercial, trading, and travel centre of the Arabian Gulf—as the Persian Gulf is now called by the people who live on its western and southern shores. Three and a half years ago, when the British Foreign Secretary visited Bahrain, there was a riot which delayed his departure for a number of hours. I hope in this talk to show that both the disturbances that occurred at that time and the developments that have taken place since, are part of a clearly-defined and explainable pattern.

After a varied and violent history, the present century, and particularly the second quarter of it, saw considerable material progress in Bahrain. This progress, in my opinion, made inevitable the political developments that followed and which lasted for two years. The momentum of the political movement then slackened, and, after a last desperate effort in the autumn of 1956, collapsed with the arrest of its leaders. Then followed a considerable increase in commercial and business activities with an attendant improvement in the general standard of living, coinciding with the current period of political apathy.

Firstly, some dull but necessary facts and figures about Bahrain. The State of Bahrain, whose ruler is His Highness Shaikh Sulman bin Hamed Al-Khalifa, consists of a group of islands, the majority of which are

inhabited, lying between the Qatar Peninsular and Saudi Arabia. The total area of the group is 231 square miles and the main island is about the size of the Isle of Wight. The population, according to this year's census, is 143,213. The majority of the inhabitants are Moslem Arabs and the Shia and Sunni sects of Islam are about equally represented. Although the greater part of Bahrain is uncultivated, there is, in the north of the state, a very fertile area with many flourishing gardens and farms, providing a pleasant contrast to the desert landscapes of the neighbouring states. Bahrain is the smallest of the oil-producing states in the Middle East and has a production currently running at  $2\frac{1}{4}$  million tons a year. The oil refinery, however, is of considerable size, depending for the greater part of its crude oil upon imports from abroad, principally from Saudi Arabia, whence oil is pumped through a submarine and land pipe. The government's revenues, which are expected to amount to £5½ million in the current year, are mainly derived from oil payments, but about £1 million is accounted for by customs' receipts.

The first traces of human activity in Bahrain date from the early Stone Age, and, if we accept the view of the Danish Archæological Expedition, which has worked in Bahrain each winter since 1953, Bahrain was the site of the Garden of Eden, or at least of the Babylonian and Sumerian versions of that place. Legend also had it that there was in Dilmun, which the Danes and others equate with Bahrain, a pool of everlasting life. There is still in Bahrain a large pool of considerable antiquity called Ain Adhari, the Virgin's Pool, but if it is the pool of the legends it seems to have lost its beneficial properties and now has the reputation of demanding one human life each year, a tradition which has usually been fulfilled, for every year someone is drowned in the pool. Apart from these mythical references to Dilmun, the island is frequently mentioned as a very real place and was particularly well known on two counts, as an important trading centre and as an exporter to Mesopotamia of what are called "fish eyes," thought to have been the Babylonian name for pearls. It is an amazing thought that, if we accept the Bahrain-Dilmun equation, Bahrain has been both a trading centre and the centre of a pearl industry for five thousand years. Whenever Bahrain was mentioned in the past it was in connection with either or both of these traditional occupations.

The Danish Archæological Expedition was first attracted to Bahrain by the famous graveyard, consisting of some 50,000 tumuli covering many square miles of desert, probably the largest graveyard in the world. The tumuli, however, although they have been investigated by numerous professional and amateur archæologists, have produced comparatively little except pottery, ostrich shells, skeletons and some alabaster and ivory objects. The Danish expedition's more imaginative approach, once it reached Bahrain, was to look for the dwelling places of the people of the tombs rather than confining its investigation to their burial places, and, aided by personal observations and by aerial photographs supplied by the government, it found three important sites. These were the three temples at Barbar, the town near the Portuguese fort and the well at Diraz.

The three temples at Barbar were built one on top of another,

apparently dating back to the third millenium B.C. These well-built temples contained numerous copper figures, tools and weapons, gold ornaments, pottery, and, the most spectacular find of all, a magnificent copper bull's head. One of my numerous duties in Bahrain was taking visitors around the islands and, of course, we used to visit the "digs." I always found it difficult, however, to explain to the visitor where "temple A" ended and "temple B" began, although this appeared to be very clear to the expert. I was reminded of a cartoon by Mr. Osbert Lancaster which, I believe, shows the attitude in this respect of certain archæologists. The cartoon depicted a statue consisting of a large group of figures, a man on horseback, maidens throwing flowers, etc. All the figures were shown in dotted lines with the exception of one small piece of the elbow of the horseman. This represented something actually found by an archæologist—the remainder was "reconstruction!"

At the Portuguese fort the archæologists found the remains of a vast palace-like building. This, some time after its original construction, had been used as a burial place. They also found beneath the floor a number of pottery bowls containing the vertebræ of snakes, apparently the remains of offerings. The well at Diraz contained pottery and two stone bulls.

The people of Bahrain who built these temples, palaces and tombs seem to have had a fairly advanced and distinctive way of life. One of the hall-marks of what has been called the "Dilmun Civilization" was a type of circular seal bearing figures of humans and animals. The people also appear to have enjoyed the benefits of modern plumbing to the extent of having had water-flushed lavatories. The discovery of these B.C. W.C.S. was almost the cause of considerable embarrassment to the expedition. A shaft was being dug in the centre of the Portuguese fort in order to study the strata at different levels. Suddenly the diggers came upon a large expanse of hewn stone with two holes at one side. The diggers found this very reminiscent of the roofs of some royal tombs found in Iraq and there was therefore much excitement amongst them. Plans were made for an opening ceremony to which a large number of distinguished guests could be invited. Fortunately, as it turned out, the leader of the expedition was suddenly called away from Bahrain and it was therefore decided that there would be no ceremonies, but that the "tomb" would be quietly opened. Further digging then revealed what are probably the oldest W.C.S. in the world!

Coming to more recent times, the people of Bahrain, before they submitted to the Prophet Muhammad and adopted Islam in the seventh century A.D., were apparently a mixture of Christians and Jews, the mainland tribesmen being pagans. There were Nestorian bishops in Bahrain and one of the villages on the island of Muharraq is still called Al-Dair, the Arabic for monastery. Bahrain remained under the rule of the Caliphs until early in the tenth century, when it fell under the domination of a heretical sect, the Carmathians, who established a state in eastern Arabia. They controlled Bahrain until 1056 when Bahrain began one of the most chequered periods of its never very peaceful history. Between 1056 and 1521 it was at times independent, under a variety of rulers, and at other times under the control of one of the neighbouring states. In 1521 the

Portuguese arrived in Bahrain, but their rule was by no means undisturbed and the number of revolts which took place, during which the Portuguese governors were liquidated, sometimes by being crucified, cannot have made the post a particularly popular one!

In 1602 the Bahrainis, aided by a Persian fleet, rebelled against the Portuguese and expelled them from the Islands. Persia was at this time in alliance with the East India Company against the Portuguese. Although at first a Persian garrison was stationed in Bahrain, it was subsequently withdrawn when the affairs of the Persian empire lapsed into chaos and Bahrain again enjoyed a measure of independence.

The Al-Khalifa, the family which rules Bahrain today, then made their appearance. They, together with two other families or clans, the Al-Sabah and the Al-Jalahma, moved from central Arabia to the site of present-day Kuwait early in the eighteenth century. The Al-Khalifa subsequently acquired an interest in the pearl trade, as a result of which they migrated down the coast to the Qatar Peninsular where they established themselves at a village called Zubara. Here they built a town, the ruined but still impressive remains of which are standing today. Zubara developed into such an important trading centre that it appeared to constitute a threat to the position of the Persians in Bahrain, who therefore launched an attack on it. This failed, and in 1783 the Al-Khalifa followed up the attack by invading and capturing Bahrain. Since 1783, except for a few years in the early nineteenth century, the Al-Khalifa have ruled Bahrain, and at one period in the century an Al-Khalifa Shaikh actually ruled over Bahrain, Qatar and the east coast of Arabia. His dreams of empire, however, were brought crashing by dynastic disputes within Bahrain which eventually resulted in his expulsion from the islands by his successful rival.

The nineteenth century saw the extension of British influence in the gulf, exercised first through the East India Company, and later through the Government of India. In 1820 the rulers of Bahrain subscribed to the General Treaty of Peace made in that year between the East India Company and the Trucial Shaikhs. There followed, in 1861 and 1880, two treaties which made closer the ties between Britain and the rulers of Bahrain. Bahrain's principal gain from this relationship was that Britain maintained the external independence of Bahrain against the claims of all comers, principally Persia and Turkey.

We come to the twentieth century. A contemporary observer at the end of the nineteenth century said that although Bahrain had recently ceded first place to Basra as the leading port of the Gulf, it was still the second most important trading centre in the area. As in the past, trading and pearls were the source of Bahrain's wealth and provided employment for its people. As one of the leading Gulf states, Bahrain was represented at the Peace Celebrations that were held in London in 1919, by Shaikh Abdulla bin Isa Al-Khalifa, son of the then ruler of Bahrain. Shaikh Abdulla was so impressed by what he saw and learnt in Britain that on his return to Bahrain he started the first modern school, which was supported by subscriptions from the ruler and the public, and also a municipality to manage the affairs of Manama, capital of Bahrain. These two steps were significant in that they represented the modest start of the



modernization of Bahrain, to be followed, in subsequent years, by the introduction of girls' schools, electricity and water supplies, medical services and similar benefits. In 1926 Mr. C. D. Belgrave, now Sir Charles Belgrave, was appointed Adviser to the Ruler of Bahrain.

Development requires money, however, and during the 1920s two events occurred that did considerable damage to the economy of Bahrain. These were the general depression in Europe and America, which reduced the demand for such luxury goods as pearls, and the invention by a Japanese of the cultured pearl. The situation became so desperate that all the members of the Bahrain Civil Service agreed to accept cuts in their pay during the period of the crisis, and you can visualize how serious a crisis must be for this to occur! The situation was saved by what has come to be called "black gold," a phrase as hackneyed, I'm afraid, as the sub-title of this talk. In 1922, Major Frank Holmes, a New Zealander, came to the Gulf on behalf of a British prospecting company, the Eastern and General Syndicate. After living in the Gulf for three years, during which time he drilled the first artesian wells in Bahrain, Major Holmes obtained for his firm a two-year prospecting lease in Bahrain as well as concessions in eastern Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone. When, however, he tried to persuade the British oil companies to take up the concession they said "No, thank you." The concession was then offered to American companies, and, to cut a long story short, the result was the formation, in 1930, of the Bahrain Petroleum Company, "BAPCO," as a fully-owned subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California. Today Bapco is a member of the Caltex Group of companies. This represented a lost opportunity for Britain but the people of Bahrain were not actively interested in the nationality of the oil company. What was needed in Bahrain was money, and money came, not suddenly, but in gradually increasing and easily digestible amounts, making it possible to ensure that it was put to good use.

The world war had little effect on Bahrain and although there was food rationing the problems of introducing a new diet involving a change-over from rice to wheat were soon overcome. British forces were stationed in Bahrain which ensured plenty of employment, though the wages were not very high. The refinery was considerably expanded to meet the war-time demands for petroleum products. After the war there was a renewed spurt in development, particularly in the fields of education and health, which gained in momentum as the oil royalties increased. At first the government received  $3\frac{1}{2}$  rupees a ton, then 10 rupees a ton, and finally, in line with agreements made in other Middle Eastern oil states, a 50/50 profit-sharing agreement was reached.

We now come to stage two in Bahrain's recent history, its political development. By the early 1950s the people of Bahrain, especially the younger generation, to use a current phrase, "never had it so good," particularly as far as material advantages were concerned. They enjoyed, without having to pay any taxes, free primary and secondary education with the possibility, in the case of brighter students, of government scholarships to foreign universities. They received free medical treatment and hospitalization. There were efficient and not too expensive public services,

including water and electricity. There was security, good roads and comparative liberty of the individual. There were opportunities for enterprising young men to make their fortunes—as many did. But, and this is a most important “but,” the administration of the country, decisions about government activities and the general control of the state were in the hands of the ruler and his senior officials. It was a system of most benevolent despotism. Now if you take any reasonably intelligent boy and send him to school for ten years, then to university perhaps, it is natural that when he comes home he will feel that he and others like him are fitted to play important parts in the administration of the country. It is important to remember that in under-developed countries education is considered to be a guarantee of success. This impression is helped by the emphasis which governments of such countries place on education. In Bahrain, in addition, the young men believed that there were certain important omissions in what even they regarded as a fairly modern system of government.

These deficiencies were in judicial and labour matters. It was generally felt that the judges, who were members of the ruling family, were not sufficiently educated or trained to deal with legal matters in modern Bahrain and that there should be criminal and civil codes. In labour affairs they saw that the workers were at a disadvantage owing to the lack of a labour law or trades unions. They were also concerned about the ill-feeling between Shia and Sunni, which had resulted in a certain amount of communal violence. The result was the appearance, late in 1954, of an organization calling itself the “Higher Executive Committee,” consisting of eight members, whose names were made public, and two other bodies, whose membership was theoretically secret, called “The Fifty” and “The Hundred.” The Committee published its demands, which included a legislative council, a labour law and legalized trade unions, a criminal and civil code and trained judges.

Following the submission of the Committee's demands, there were strikes and threats of strikes, accusations and counter-accusations. The government, however, despite its firm resistance to the Committee as an official organization, introduced certain measures, many of which had been planned before the advent of the Committee, which met some of the Committee's demands. Of particular importance was the establishment of the Labour Law Advisory Committee, whose membership included three elected workers' representatives, which was given the task of drafting a labour law and a workman's compensation law. The Labour Law Committee, with considerable help from a British labour expert whose services were lent by the Foreign Office, completed the draft law in 1957.

The Higher Executive Committee believed—and this belief was generally held in Bahrain at the time—that it was supported by the British authorities in Bahrain and was therefore disinclined to give way on any of its demands. In the autumn of 1955, however, after considerable urging from many notables in Bahrain, the committee and the ruler met together. They reached a compromise agreement, the main points of which included the establishment of two councils, one to supervise educational matters in Bahrain and the other for health, half of whose members would be elected by the public and half nominated by the government. A

criminal and civil code was to be drawn up by an Arab legal expert and then submitted to a representative committee in Bahrain for advice on local aspects of law. The elections for the municipalities, postponed because of political difficulties, were to be held shortly and the government also agreed to refrain from the large-scale recruitment of foreigners in the police, a subject about which there had been a number of rumours.

At first it seemed that the compromise would work and that both parties to the agreement would make a strong effort to carry out its terms. This was not to be so, however, and although the elections for the two councils were held and contacts were made with an Egyptian legal expert, ill-feeling again developed and came to a head in the spring of 1956, exhibiting itself first by the demonstration organized during the visit to Bahrain of the Foreign Secretary and subsequently by an outbreak of violence at the Manama Municipality which resulted in a number of fatalities. This crisis was again followed by discussions between the various parties concerned, as a result of which the ruler agreed to introduce a law legalising the formation of organizations "whose objects are to further the progress of Bahrain," a very vague definition which enabled the Higher Executive Committee to register itself, under the new name of "The Committee of National Union," as a legal and recognized organization. At the same time the ruler, of his own accord, set up an official body, "The Administrative Council," composed of a number of members of the ruling family, who held official positions in the government, and three other government officials.

Again, after a brief truce, verbal and written hostilities broke out between the Committee and the government, during which there were renewed threats of strikes. None in fact occurred, and it became obvious that the political emotions of the majority of the Committee's former supporters had cooled considerably. One of the remarks current at this time was that there could be no strike until after the water melons were harvested. This reason for inaction continued to be put forward long after the melons had been not only harvested but had been sold and eaten! It appeared that the intense political activity of the previous two years had served as a safety valve, enabling many of the people of Bahrain to blow off their frustrations and annoyances. The Committee could now no longer count upon the support of a large part of the population of the state, who now felt that there had been enough uncertainty and tension which was beginning to harm the economy of the country. They thought that it was now time to pause and digest the gains already made.

This was the state of affairs in the autumn of 1956 when the Suez crisis broke upon the Middle East. To the Committee members, despite their belief in the strength of British support, it appeared to be an opportunity to put themselves at the head of a great wave of national feeling. They were on very secure ground, for on the subject of foreign intervention in Egypt they had the support of the vast majority of the people of Bahrain, who, whether or not they were supporters of the Committee, were all most hostile towards the aggression against a sister Arab state.

The Committee obtained permission from the government to organize a peaceful procession which was to follow certain specified routes, as a

protest against the happenings in Egypt. The procession, however, failed to follow the route laid down, and, in addition, caused considerable damage to numerous buildings, including the complete destruction of a newspaper office. This was followed by a general strike as an additional demonstration of protest. The leaders of the Committee were subsequently arrested and, amongst other more serious counts, were charged with responsibility for the damage caused by the demonstration, whose orderliness they had guaranteed. Thus came to an end the first political party in the Gulf.

The Bahrain government, in the period that followed the arrest of the Committee, did not go back on anything which it had previously promised. The various councils and committees were established and the elections for the municipalities were held. It went ahead with a considerable number of projects, including the formation of Departments of Rural Affairs and Social Welfare, the promulgation of the labour laws, and the extension of educational and medical services and rural and urban electricity and water supplies. These measures were of considerable benefit to the public, but, despite the considerable publicity that was given to them, the public appeared to greet them with apathy. The government also introduced measures of more popular participation in government affairs through the medium of the councils and the organs of local government.

The prosperous state of the country's economy, the increase in local spending by the government and the oil company and the general improvement in the living standards of the people provided an alternative interest. Those who were previously in the forefront of political movement, the younger merchants and business men, the educated employees of the government and of commercial organizations and the teachers, still have considerable political interests and ambitions, but these are on a somewhat more ethereal plane than formerly and are more concerned with the future and eventual fate of the gulf states and the other Arab countries rather than with day-to-day events in Bahrain itself. This is partly because these people believe that because Britain is still the deciding factor in both internal developments in Bahrain and also in its eventual fate, they can have little influence on the future of their country.

The government and the people of Bahrain are agreed on one most important point, however, which is the need for Bahrain to maintain its commercial and trading position in the Gulf. For this reason the government declared a Free Transit Area in Bahrain last year and is also building a six-berth harbour which will be completed next year. Bahrain having, for the moment at least, had its fill of political tension, is now in a good position to concentrate upon more mundane but vital commercial developments.

#### DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: Mr. Belgrave is now ready to answer questions. I have one to ask which is a little outside the subject of the lecture. When I first came across the Danish Archæological Expedition working in the area I could not understand why the Danes were interested, as I had not heard of previous expeditions.

Mr. BELGRAVE: A certain employee of the I.P.C. interested in archæology worked in Bahrain and in the Middle East. He subsequently went to Denmark, from which country his wife came, and joined the Pre-historic Museum at Aarhus. He then interested others there in the archæological possibilities of Bahrain and later returned to Bahrain with Professor Glob, who is the head of the expedition. The University of Pennsylvania was also interested in Bahrain but the two organizations subsequently arranged things between themselves so that only one expedition came to Bahrain.

Sir NEVILLE BUTLER: The lecturer said that the Bahrainis now seemed less interested in day-to-day affairs in Bahrain than in the affairs in the Middle East. Did Mr. Belgrave form any general impression as to what the Bahraini was thinking as to Oman? Do they look more to Saudi Arabia or Egypt?

Mr. BELGRAVE: The Bahrainis are not particularly interested in either side. They think, I believe, that it is not true to say that the Imam's supporters are nationalists, they think that they would not know nationalism if they met it. The Bahrainis look upon what is happening in Oman as an equivalent of tribal wars. They have no strong feelings one way or the other.

Captain PERRYMAN: What improvements have recently been made to anchorage and the harbour. When I took my ship to Bahrain thirty years ago there was practically no harbour; there was a perilous shallow channel to the port; otherwise ships had to lie about a mile off shore.

Mr. BELGRAVE: A harbour is now being built which will be completed in 1960. The entrance to the harbour, which is situated to the south of the Residency at Jufair, has been dredged to a certain extent and a cruiser has actually been up it, but I believe they were at first not happy about doing so. As a result of further widening of the approach channel to the harbour, however, it is expected that it will be much simpler for ships to enter in 1960.

QUESTIONER: Certain political leaders made themselves unpopular. At the time of the 1956 trials was there any opportunity for appeal. Were they sentenced for life or what happened?

Mr. BELGRAVE: They had the right of appeal to the Ruler. Three of them were sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment and two of them to ten years. They are all still in prison as far as I know.

Sir JOHN TROUTBECK: Has the Shaikh of Bahrain composed his difficulties with the Shaikh of Qatar and if he has not, does it matter from any point of view? Does it effect off-shore oil?

Mr. BELGRAVE: There was never any dispute about oil. It was a question of family traditions and so on. I think that the ruler of Bahrain has said that if he got what he wanted from Qatar he was not interested in the possibilities of oil. So far as I know, the matter was not settled.

The CHAIRMAN: As to the exodus of labour from Bahrain to the mainland, what sort of numbers are involved and does it still take place?

Mr. BELGRAVE: The majority of workers going to Saudi Arabia from Bahrain leave their families at home. The number of Bahrainis working in Saudi Arabia, originally about 5,000, has recently fallen, however,

although Bahrainis in Saudi Arabia are treated in exactly the same way as Saudis.

Mr. NEVILL BARBOUR: Does the Persian claim receive any support in Bahrain?

Mr. BELGRAVE: Nobody pays any attention to it. The vast majority of the people of Bahrain are Arabs.

QUESTIONER: What about the Persians and the Shias?

Mr. BELGRAVE: About half the people of Bahrain are Shias, they are, however, as much Arabs as those of the Sunni Sect and neither are Persian, talk Persian or think Persian.

The CHAIRMAN: There being no further questions I would like, on behalf of all present, to thank Mr. Belgrave for his most interesting lecture and the admirable way in which he has answered the many questions; and I say again how pleased we all are to have a member of the younger school to come and lecture to us, and I know you will show your appreciation in the usual manner. (*Applause.*)

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*Chatham House Memoranda—China and Tibet, 1708-1959.* February, 1960. By Zahiruddin Ahmad.

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# MONGOLIA RE-VISITED

By DR. CHARLES BAWDEN

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, December 16, 1959, Group-Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: I really have an apology for being in the chair today, but there is a good reason for it. Your Chairman of Council has been so kind as to let me take this position because last year your lecturer and I travelled in Outer Mongolia together, and it seemed suitable for me to take the chair for him now. I will not describe ourselves as fellow travellers, the inference being rather a bad one, but we were certainly good companions.

It gives me the greatest pleasure to introduce Dr. Bawden on this occasion because he has now made his second trip to Outer Mongolia. Whether any of us will go back for a third time, I do not quite know. Judging from the trend of things at the moment, of which he has told me, it looks as if we should, perhaps, not be quite so welcome as we were previously.

I will not attempt to take any of the words out of Dr. Bawden's mouth but commend him to you as a serious student of Eastern matters. He is lecturer in Mongolian at the School of Oriental Studies in London and he is well fitted to address an audience such as this.

A YEAR ago I had the pleasure of attending a meeting of this society and listening to a lecture by Group-Captain Smallwood on the visit which he and I made to Mongolia in the summer of 1958. At that time I considered him a veteran of Central Asian travel because he was making his second trek to those distant parts, while I was only making my first. Now I am glad to say that I have caught up with him. I made another visit this year. But whereas he saw Mongolia at two very different stages of its history, I saw little this year which the two of us did not see last year. The modernization that we both observed is going ahead rapidly, and indeed in some parts of Ulan Bator, the capital, I was hard put to it to recognize where I was. But in essentials the land has not changed; it is still going in the same direction, politically and economically. And, moreover, I saw just the same sights as last year, the official tour seeming to embrace only a limited range of projects, with a few additions. So you must forgive me if my report duplicates what you heard from Group-Captain Smallwood last year. Then we were the guests of the Peace Committee. This year I was the guest of the Scientific Committee of Mongolia, an organization of scholars which controls research and higher education throughout the country and administers, among other things, the State Library. Our gathering was small, but I like to think it was significant. There were about twenty-eight foreign delegates, and perhaps the same number of Mongolian scholars, together with a large gathering of interested teachers, lamas, writers and others who were not officially accredited but who took part in the discussions. Naturally enough the majority of the delegates came from iron-curtain countries—five each from the Soviet Union and China, four from East

Germany, and so on. There were two Europeans, a professor from Finland and myself, three scholars from the U.S.A. and one from India. Twenty years ago this summer the Russian and Mongol armies, under the command of Marshal Zhukov, jointly defeated the Japanese who were pressing in from Manchuria, at the battle of Khalkhyn Gol, and this anniversary was being duly celebrated. But this did not prevent the Mongols from inviting and welcoming three Japanese scholars to the congress. That they arrived late, having been held up in Hong Kong for nine days before the Chinese government would grant them transit visas, was no fault of their hosts.

If this congress had been limited just to scholars from the communist countries and to Western fellow-travellers, it would hardly be necessary to notice it. But it was remarkable on two counts. First, it was exactly what it purported to be—an academic meeting at which learned papers were read and discussed by scholars from both sides of the iron curtain with the minimum of political bias. But in passing I must mention that the Chinese showed themselves very prickly on the subject of Tibet. They managed to find some hidden significance, which quite escaped the notice of the English-speaking delegates, in a paper on Tibetan civilization read by the Indian scholar Raghu Vira. A prepared statement read later by a member of the Chinese delegation, insisting that Tibet always had been and always would be a part of China, met with a marked lack of enthusiasm from all present, East and West alike.

Secondly, the congress demonstrated clearly enough the political maturity of the Mongolian authorities. Almost ever since the establishment of the Republic in 1924, Mongolia has been a closed country. An abortive attempt was made in the late twenties to link Mongolia's material and cultural progress with Western civilization, and trade and educational delegations were sent to Europe. In particular a large group of children came to Germany to receive a European education. But very soon leftist interests prevailed, the delegations were recalled, and hard conditions brought about by an obstinate insistence on impossible policies brought civil unrest, imprisonments, and executions, culminating in 1937 in the wholesale liquidation of the clergy and intellectuals. The country was quite isolated in those days. Only long after the end of the Second World War were foreign visitors re-admitted, and even then under strict police observation. But by now the government is able to operate with considerable self-assurance. I wouldn't like to say that we were free this year to wander round as we liked and talk to anybody we wished to. Far from it. The strict supervision was even more noticeable than before and it was impossible to get away from the official path without offending one's hosts' susceptibilities. I did manage to go on foot round some parts of Ulan Bator however, though accompanied, and will show you some less orthodox views of the city in due course. But at any rate the government feels sure enough of itself and of the material progress it has made to be able to invite specialists interested in the country's civilization to make the long journey from all over the world to Ulan Bator.

There is not much to tell you about the congress itself. It took place at the beginning of September, along with all the attendant jollifications



such as an official lunch with the president of the republic, visits to the state theatre, circus, sports stadium, Pioneers Palace, and so on, and then we made a grand tour in the steppe in three jeeps and a bus, visiting places which were, for the most part, familiar to me from last year's trip. Only this year more preparations had been made to greet us. As one of my colleagues said rather cynically: "The good Potemkin has been here too"—and we found that county centre buildings, for instance, had been so hastily whitewashed for our arrival that there had been no time to clean the spots off the windows. This may seem very much like looking a gift congress in the mouth, but in fact the excessive hospitality we received must have cost someone an awful lot of money, and we did tend to find it embarrassing. Still, we were thoroughly photographed for press and newsreel, so I suppose the organizers got their money's worth after all.

Most of my time, on both visits, was spent in the capital, Ulan Bator, perhaps better known under its old Russian name of Urga. My first tour showed that the old city of Urga has almost completely disappeared, and is being replaced by a planned but rather featureless modern town of white-walled concrete buildings. It lies in the wide valley of the Tola river, which here runs approximately east and west, and it stretches perhaps five miles or more in length and a mile or two from side to side. Encampments of yurts, the native round tent, sometimes enclosed in wooden stockades, are pitched right up to the city centre, and picturesque, though shabby, streets of low lath and plaster hovels, with grass growing on the roofs, will survive the town-planners' hands for a few more years. There are no really high buildings, so that it is, incongruously enough, the impressive square white tower of the Gandang monastery to the north which still dominates the view. South of the city is the former residence of the Living Buddha, and in the centre the former oracle-temple, now used as a museum of religion. These are, as far as I could tell, the only old religious buildings surviving; a few older secular buildings still stand, like the former Imperial Russian consulate. But none of these buildings, the remnants of the religious capital of Mongolia, is really very old anyway. Much was destroyed in the revolutionary years, and much has been torn down in more recent times still to make way for ferro-concrete. So, as we coasted down the slopes of the Sacred Mountain south of the city where we stayed in a beautiful but completely isolated valley, and crossed the Tola river, flowing low in its bed under a new concrete bridge just being completed by Chinese labourers, we came into a city for the most part not more than twelve years old. Considerable parts had been built by Japanese prisoners of war—for the Mongol army shared in the nine-days wonder of Soviet intervention in August, 1945, after the real war against Japan had been won. More recently thousands, perhaps 20,000, of Chinese labourers, found and paid for by the Chinese government, have been imported, and any construction project of any size is in their hands. The hub of the city is the huge Sukhbator square, round which are grouped some of the most important buildings—the main government offices, the state theatre, the post office, Foreign Office and Altai Hotel. Not far away are the University and the Scientific Committee with the State Library. For some reason the town planning authorities, now busy

installing a drainage system and central hot and cold water supply, have found it necessary to excavate practically every street in the capital at the same time! More interesting than the buildings are the people. One sees all sorts—school children in their red pioneer scarves, soldiers in plenty, both male and female, in smart uniforms, traffic police with a minute problem on their hands, and Chinese, Mongols, and a few Russians going about their business. The Mongols, in their long brightly coloured gowns, are quite often on horseback even in the middle of the town. Shops are numbered—shop No. 1, shop No. 2 and so on, and most of them seem to be general stores, not attractively stocked but with plenty of simple goods for sale—tinned food from Russia and China, Chinese cloth, native furs, tea, shoes and boots and so on. Prices seemed high. Thus a pair of indifferent-looking women's shoes would cost a week's pay for a factory worker, and a Swiss watch a month's pay for a miner working underground. But it is hard to judge these questions without knowing what perquisites people get—certainly the miners have cheap lodging and subsidized food—and without knowing just how far state shop prices are a substitute for other taxes. When I enquired about incomes of workers on state and co-operative farms, these seemed to be extremely good in real terms, permitting an average family to buy such luxuries as a sewing machine, radio and scooter in the same year. There are plenty of books on sale, in Mongol, Chinese and Russian. But the general impression of the shops is one of drabness, limited choice and high prices. The city of Ulan Bator itself is going to look different from year to year. Between my first and second visits impressive changes have taken place and the town plan envisages the complete elimination of yurts and of slums by 1965, and their replacement by geometrically aligned blocks of flats, interspersed with cinemas, hospitals, schools, and clubs, grouped around gardens.

Twice I have been able to make a fairly long tour in the countryside, though covering more or less the same ground on each occasion. Mongolia is not just a picturesque desert land crossed by romantic camel trails and dotted with nomad tents and lama-temples. In the north there is no desert at all, but steppe, mountain, and river predominate. As soon as we left the capital in our convoy of three Russian jeeps and a bus, we began to jolt over roughly-made tracks which often degenerated into mere ruts cut out of the prairie by lorry wheels. As soon as one part of the track becomes impassable a lorry will swing out past the obstruction, and soon a new loop will be formed till that in its turn is discarded as useless. Looking from the top of a rise at the way ahead one can sometimes see four, five, or six roads, all leading to the same destination, snaking towards or away from each other in the distance. The steppe is not a flat prairie. On one or both sides of the road we could always see mountains, first the Kentei in the north and then the Khangai as we approached Karakorum. As one reaches the top of a pass there may be an obo or cairn by the side of the road, a shrine to the gods of the locality. The cult of the obo was developed into a most elaborate ritual of construction and worship, but what we see here is a simple cairn to which pious travellers would add their pebble in passing to honour or pacify the deity of the mountain pass.

The superstition seems to be dead now, and as often as not the pass will be topped instead by an exhortation to fulfil the current production plan. The plateau itself is undulating, and though one's first sight of these great open spaces is exhilarating, a prolonged view from inside a car can get monotonous. The vegetation in summer is mainly of a dull sage green colour, herbs more than grass, with a characteristic smell compounded of lavender and thyme. This, with the chirping of hosts of huge grasshoppers, makes up one's first and most lasting impression of the Mongol countryside. There is plenty of wild life in Mongolia, enough to support a good many hunters and trappers, and some rivers abound in huge salmon-like fish, a yard or more long. On our course the commonest animal was a little steppe rat, which would pop up here and there from its hole and then disappear again. Now and again we could see a marmot hunter in his white clothes running and jumping across the grass with his gun. The marmot is a beast of an inquisitive nature which lives in a hole. Far from needing camouflage to approach him the hunter makes himself as conspicuous as possible, jumping up and down as he comes into range while the marmot stands upright to get a good view. Then he shoots before the beast has a chance to drop back into his burrow. On the lakes we passed there were hosts of wild duck, herons, cranes and so on, and very common was a large sparrow hawk which would sit upright on motionless watch as we drove by. There were immense flocks and herds of animals—sheep, goats, cattle, horses and camels, for Mongolia is primarily a herding country, living on its animal products. The mare furnishes milk which is usually dried into curds, beaten into butter or fermented into kumis, a mild drink, like a sour beer. The wool of sheep and goats is pounded into felt with which the Mongol covers his tent. There were never many people to be seen, but after all the population is pretty thin on the ground—about a million people spread over half a million square miles, and 150,000 of these live in Ulan Bator. But now and again we would come upon the ageless sights of Mongolia—a solitary herdsman in his bucket-like stirrups guarding a herd of cattle, a woman with a basket on her back and a wooden rake in her hand gathering argol, dried animal dung, for fuel, herdsman with their long horse-poles, a camel caravan, or a train of bullock carts. Every so often we could pass a group of yurts guarded by fierce dogs, the horses tethered to a sort of clothes line, and a thin curdy cheese drying on the roof felt. Or we would come across a group of riders who had encamped by the roadside and erected a small wickerwork shelter to protect themselves from sun or wind while they were resting. Of course, these things are romantic only because of their strangeness to us, and there were plenty of more familiar sights—a brass band at the sports meeting, a girl brewing up tea on a building site, a girl playing quoits and so on.

Much merchandise is still carried about the country by camel, but the lorry is replacing the camel. Strangely, they both use one common piece of equipment—an old inner tube to carry spare water in. Thousands of lorries from Russia and Czechoslovakia circulate in Ulan Bator and throughout the country. A new branch of the Trans-Siberian railway now crosses Mongolia from north to south, and air services link Ulan

Bator with Moscow and Peking as well as with all the main provincial centres.

Nomad life in Mongolia was never haphazard. Each family or group knew the pastures it was entitled to move to at different seasons. Nowadays even this limited amount of movement is being reduced as the government settles people in fixed localities. The yurt is slowly giving way to permanent dwellings of concrete or wood. The great advantage of the yurt is the ease with which its standard-sized trellis frame sections and roof beams can be assembled and covered with felt and canvas overlay or dismantled. The whole house can easily be packed on to a lorry or a couple of camels when the family has to move. More and more people are settling down nowadays round the new administrative centres, the hay-stations, co-operative farms and state farms. A state farm looks like a farm anywhere, and it is hard to work up any enthusiasm for a reaper-binder even if it is being worked by a Mongolian driver. But the people are really proud of what they are doing to develop agriculture with the help of big new irrigation schemes, constructed by Chinese labour. However, this grouping of people in urban and semi-urban centres is no new thing in Mongol life. From a country-centre where we spent the night, a group of wood and plaster buildings consisting of rest-houses, restaurant, administrative offices, medical point, school, shops, post office, and so on, we turned off our route to visit some of the ancient ruins which are dotted about Mongolia. The first, built of a pinkish stone, was attributed to the seventeenth-century prince Tsogtu Taiji, of whom not much certain is known, but who in recent years has been developed into a national hero. The architecture makes it safe to conclude that the present ruin has been built on top of other ruins dating back a thousand years or so to before the Mongols, as such, existed. Nearby we visited another ancient site known locally as Khara Baishing, the Black Building. The remains of what was once a strong fortress stand within an oval earth mound, undoubtedly once a city wall. The enclosed area, perhaps three-quarters of a mile long, is quite flat, as if a city, perhaps of tents, had stood there long ago. Nothing is to be picked up on the site. The main building of the ruins is used as a rough cattle pen, and the floor is feet thick in dried dung. Outside the circumvallation were a couple of stupa-like towers, one in ruins. Attempts to date this city vary widely, but it is probably at least a thousand years old, belonging to the Khitan empire. I shall show you also a view from the top of a nearby hill, where you may perhaps be able to see in the surface of the plain below the quadrilateral site of another city of which no buildings remain. The existence of strong cities such as these, not only in one place but in several, seems to me to cast new light on the question of the prevalence of a nomadic way of life in Mongolia in early times. It is evident that Karakorum, built in 1233 as the capital of the Mongol empire, was not the first example of urban culture, though being the latest it has preserved more detailed evidence of the sort of life lived there—iron wheel hubs, ploughshares, and so on. Karakorum is now the headquarters of a big state farm where a new irrigation scheme is intended to water some 20,000 hectares of arable land. The new workings partly cut through ancient ones long disused. This seems to indicate that

nomadic pastoralism may be only a modern phenomenon or perhaps a recurring pattern of life in Mongolia, not necessarily the basic pattern. At any rate, crops are now being grown—potatoes, maize and wheat especially, no easy job in the bitter and uncertain climate of Mongolia.

Herding co-operatives have won considerable popularity in recent years, partly, of course, because of the material inducements offered to animal owners—state purchasing schemes, veterinary help and so on. One afternoon I watched a dozen or so herdsmen, tending a flock of about a thousand horses, pick out and catch with their long poles those horses which they wanted to tame. They drove a group of perhaps a hundred horses away from the main herd and then let them run back in small flurries of ten or twenty, while other riders waited to intercept them. Horses seem to like to press closer together when upset, while a camel herd will open out instead. Carrying long poles with a rope noose at the end the riders would catch the chosen horse round the neck, subdue it in a few moments, saddle it while another helper held it back by the ears and then break it as it galloped and leaped across the steppe. I also saw dairy work on the same farm, and sat in a "red corner" or workers' club eating curd and drinking kumis, and discussing farming matters gravely with the head of the co-operative. I talked, too, with an old partisan from the days of the Revolution who turned up in full uniform and medals, and with a dairy maid heroine of labour with whom I had the pleasure of shaking hands. Her hands had squeezed 3,000 litres of milk out of one cow during the summer, which prompted me to the irreverent remark that perhaps the cow ought to have got the medal.

The countryside is not all up to date and workaday. Next to the state farm at Karakorum with its radio station, power house, machine repair shop and combine harvesters, all operated by Mongols, was the ruin of the ancient capital itself. Little remains above ground, recalling the legendary splendours of the Mongol empire, except for one huge stone tortoise which probably served as the base of some inscribed tablet or monument. The general alignment of the main streets can be made out in the vegetation, and a small amount of excavation has revealed houses, workshops, pottery, agricultural implements, and so on, pointing, as I have just said, to a developed agriculture and supporting handicraft industry in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The site of the royal palace, described by the pilgrim monk, William of Rubruck, has been ascertained. The surface of the site is thickly littered with broken tiles, pottery fragments and earthenware votive objects in the shape of tiny stupas. Much more impressive is the great monastery of Erdeni Joo a mile or two away, built partly with materials from Karakorum. Its construction was ordered by the Dalai Lama in 1586 and was carried out by Abdai Khan of the Khalkhas, the first prince to reintroduce lamaism into Outer Mongolia. The monastery buildings are surrounded by a huge quadrilateral wall surmounted by 108 stupas. Each side of the wall is about a third of a mile long. Inside the walls most of the buildings still lie in ruins after the destruction of 1937, in spite of some successful restoration. Piles of roof tiles have been collected and heaped up in case it should be possible to replace them. But most of the temples, including the main assembly hall,

were obliterated. Even the massive walls were breached, and stupas overthrown, a task which required artillery and high explosive. Fortunately, the three temples which were the first erected by Abdai Khan survive with their intricately carved and painted wooden beams, and have been turned into a religious museum containing innumerable precious objects, as well as some modern rubbish from Poland. Some smaller temples, and the tombs of the founder and his son, the father of the first Living Buddha of Urga, survive within the same courtyard. The building is in the charge of a solitary warden and his wife and little daughter. A brief and not entirely truthful guide to the monastery has been prepared in Russian only, not in the Mongol language, but perhaps the most interesting exhibit is an unpublished album of photographs. These illustrate in detail how the monastery looked before it was wrecked, together with shots of the sacred cham dance, how it looked immediately after the assaults, and how it looks after the recent restorations. Showing these photographs is only one of the ways in which the Mongols, without speaking openly, will indicate to the foreigner how they regard some recent happenings in which their neighbours to the north have had a hand.

Perhaps this is a convenient moment to look at one of the most controversial questions of recent Mongol history—the rôle of the Buddhist-lamaist church. Kublai Khan allowed lamaism, along with other religions, to spread in his empire, but with the collapse of the Mongol empire in the fourteenth century lamaism disappeared and was replaced by the ancient shamanist beliefs, the vigorous folk-religion of central and north Asiatic peoples which still persists. By the end of the sixteenth century when lamaism again rose to prominence, it was a complete innovation. From then on, for nearly 350 years, lamaism was perhaps the most effective force to shape Mongol history. But without going any deeper into the process, it is enough to say that by the beginning of this century a sort of organizational and economic paralysis had seized hold of the country, consequent on the growth of the lamaist church as a great landowner. On the credit side lamaism had, it is true, conferred many benefits on the Mongols. The church was a patron of art and craft, and, more important, was the great literary patron which furnished the opportunity and means for the Mongol language to develop in the eighteenth century from a group of dialects into a flexible literary instrument capable of expressing the subtle arguments of Buddhist theology. But undoubtedly in later years the church became a cancerous growth, consuming the body it lived in. The priesthood withdrew perhaps half the male population from productive labour and from the responsibilities of family life. The nominal celibacy of the clergy was often only a cover for actual profligacy, which caused disease to spread to an extent that the lama doctors were quite incapable of coping with. The lamaist scriptures certainly contain some very detailed books of medical lore, including, for example, texts on the taking of the pulse and examination of the urine, and descriptions of hundreds of drugs, but most so-called doctors were ignorant quacks who relied on divination and spells. Their handbooks survive as evidence against them in European libraries. Yet in spite of its inability to meet its responsibilities as the source of medical skill, of educa-

tion, and as the supplier of capital, the church was still a powerful and popular institution long after the revolution of 1921. For one thing, the revolutionaries were never able to attack the position of the last Living Buddha, who, in fact, was more of a patriot against the occupying Chinese than it is the fashion now to make out. He died as a constitutional monarch in 1924. By 1937 the Peoples' Government felt itself strong enough to proceed against the church. It is difficult to tell now, for lack of reliable sources, exactly what happened. Officially, certain high lamas are supposed to have been plotting rebellion against the central government, and Japanese weapons are said to have been discovered stored in many monasteries. This may well have been true in broad outline, but the details are not known and never likely to be. In any event the government, supported by Mongol and Russian troops, attacked the lamaseries in force, using tanks and aircraft. The figure of 30,000 lamas put to death was given me by one young official. Other estimates are very much higher. A particularly destructive assault was made on the monastery of Erdeni Joo which you have just seen, the St. Peters of Mongol lamaism. Even now, after much restoration, it can still be seen how a systematic attempt was made here to blot out one of the historic sites of Mongol history. From then on lamaism seems to have been completely suppressed, and according to my informants, it was not till 1945 that a group of former lamas, who had themselves earlier taken the government side, petitioned to be allowed to re-activate the church. As a result the Gandang monastery in Ulan Bator has been revived and in more recent years four provincial monasteries also have started work again. But though these functioning houses of religion offer a brilliant and picturesque show with daily services where red- and yellow-robed monks chant and play on fifes and trumpets and gongs, they are no more really than a show piece of the government. The high lamas are all members of the Peace Committee and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and echo all the familiar slogans. They cannot teach and they cannot practise medicine. The natural religiosity of the Mongols still keeps them attached to the church, however, and on feast days big congregations assemble. In the last year voluntary contributions have permitted the building of new statues. But lamaism, under the control of the government, has no function or future in Mongolia except, as far as one can see, as an official instrument of propaganda, designed to impress foreign visitors and especially those from south Asian Buddhist countries. The whole trend of life is away from Buddhism, and the way for a young man nowadays lies through the University, the Pedagogical Institute, the Veterinary College or the Higher Party School, followed perhaps by further training in Russia or China.

As I mentioned at the start, I went to Mongolia to attend an academic congress. The mere fact that such a congress could be envisaged would have astonished people who knew Mongolia some forty years ago. When in 1921 the country finally got rid of the Chinese, modernization had to start from scratch. The government had to overcome almost total illiteracy, complete lack of financial organization such as banks or even a national currency, and a complete lack of medical equipment, doctors, and nurses. Much was accomplished in the twenties, largely with the help of


foreign experts from western Europe, and much ground was lost in the thirties through doctrinaire insistence on impossible policies. But the peaceful conditions since 1945 have enabled Mongolia to build firmly if slowly on the rather doubtful foundations thus laid. There is a small and growing industry of which the people are extremely proud. It has been set up with a good deal of help from Russia and her satellites. Nowadays coal is mined, oil drilled for, and light industries are operated in the capital, in the city of Choibalsan in the east and the new city of Sukhbator in the north. Apart from the Chinese labourers I have mentioned and a number of foreign specialists, all the personnel of the factories and mines is Mongol. To keep this organism alive and to staff the government offices, the foreign service which represents Mongolia both in Iron Curtain countries and "neutral" countries such as India, and to staff hospitals, training colleges, schools, printing houses and so on, the government has accomplished a really heroic work of popular education. In this country where thirty-five years ago there was perhaps half of one per cent literacy there were, in 1958, 900 applications to enter the university. To feed the institutes of higher education there is a nation-wide system of primary and middle schools. When the republic was established in 1924 there was, as far as I am aware, one secular middle school with about eighty pupils. The present government can pride itself on a considerable achievement. All children in the range eight to twelve years go to school now, at least, and in the main centres of population seven years of school are compulsory. There are many middle schools offering a ten-year course for children of eight to eighteen years. We were able to visit such a ten-year school in Ulan Bator, a new and airy building holding 1,200 pupils, gathered in from far around the capital. Indeed, when we were out in the steppes in early September we saw lorry after lorry driving children in for the opening of the school year. Of the school itself little need be said. The curriculum was much the same as would be followed in a secondary school here, though of course Russian and Chinese are the foreign languages taught and not French and German. The pupils were well dressed and polite and alert. It seemed to me evident that the régime is doing its best for the coming generations and that Mongolia has bid farewell to its poverty-stricken past.

There is another side to the question of education though. Mongolia is incredibly isolated in space and sentiment from the rest of the world. Few Mongols can travel and practically none have seen a non-communist country. The state is totalitarian, and literature and instruction fit the Party-line. It is practically impossible for anyone in Mongolia, except the rare official, to have any conception of life and feeling abroad. The necessary political sentiments, at the moment anti-Americanism, are inculcated by slogans displayed in shops and clubs, by organized anti-American indignation meetings and by attacks in the press on those few American scholars who ever write anything about Mongolia. And people have no other way of learning about foreign countries except from the official handouts. Even in the university library the only books in English which I saw were products of the Foreign Language Publishing House in Moscow. The foreign visitor to the country is kept as much in isolation as possible. On both my





MODERN ULAN BATOR. A MINISTRY BUILDING




MODERN AND TRADITIONAL TRANSPORT IN THE CAPITAL

*To face p.136*



SOME OF THE CONGREGATION AT THE GANDANG TEMPLE ON THE 29TH OF THE MONTH



MONGOLIA'S WEALTH IS IN ITS ANIMALS. PART OF A HERD OF OVER ONE THOUSAND HORSES AT THE HERDING CO-OPERATIVE AT BAT SUMBER







MONKS AT SERVICE IN THE GANDANG TEMPLE AT ULAN BATOR



THREE SCHOLARS. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, RINCHEN (ULAN BATOR)  
CHINGGELTEI AND ERDENITOGTOKH (INNER MONGOLIA)



TWO KAZAKH FOLK - SINGERS FROM WESTERN MONGOLIA WHO PLAYED AND SANG FOR THE AMERICAN ENGINEERS



WATERFALL AT THE JUNCTION OF THE ORKHON AND ULAAN RIVERS

visits we were housed in a comfortable guest-house in a beautiful valley of the Sacred Mountain, but we were ten miles or more from the city and transport was available only to take us to and from official functions. Even taking an unaccompanied walk was discouraged. I think the officials are perhaps a little naïve and do not realize how much this suspicious policy outweighs the positive good-will which they create by their generosity, kindness, and cheerful acceptance of the stranger. Or perhaps they are a little out of date in their ideas. As you may have noticed, Stalin is still enthroned outside the State Library, and in one small county centre I found a local newspaper with the informative title *The Stalinist*. In some ways life is less easy for the foreigner in Ulan Bator than it is nowadays in Moscow where he may wander around at will and talk with anyone who is willing to talk back.

For the Mongols there is plenty of entertainment, at least in the capital. The ordinary Mongol is a natural musician and in every holiday camp or settlement it is possible to get together a capable concert party. In Ulan Bator the State Theatre reaches quite a high standard of production and I saw there a most attractive if unsophisticated Mongol opera based on folk-melodies. But the most colourful entertainment is the sports meeting or Naadam. This is built round the traditional three manly games of archery, wrestling, and horse-racing. Nowadays under Soviet influence some rather featureless modernization has taken place—massed gymnastics, football, and so on, which is not specifically Mongol. But the three games retain their charm. I should like to show you some slides first of an archery contest where you will see the competitors shooting at a little pile of targets. The umpires signal the hits or misses by a curious wailing chant. The jockeys in the horse-racing are all young children of six to twelve years. Here you see them riding round a pillar bearing in Russian letters that good Mongol word *START*. This race was a small one—but at the great Naadam on the national day anything up to a thousand children will race over a rough course of twenty miles into the city stadium. The victorious rider and horse have a little kumis poured over them, while at start and finish special songs are sung. The wrestlers are especially tough men, even for the usual strong Mongol physique, and as you see, they can't start young enough!

I hope the general impression I have given in this talk has been one of a young and vigorous nation making its way forward. In spite of all the drawbacks of its geographical and climatic situation and of its political imprisonment between Russia and China, which undoubtedly affects its policies, Mongolia is infused with a proud feeling of nationhood. The Mongol is first and foremost a Mongol, proud of his country and the obvious material progress he sees before his eyes. One would not say that the Mongols are yet keyed to a modern industrial life. They still retain the habits and values of a steppe-dwelling nomad race, in spite of some industrialization, and the government has to rely to an increasing extent on imported Chinese labour to do work which does not appeal to the natives or for which their numbers are inadequate. Previous travellers have described the Mongols as dirty and apathetic, lazy and superstitious. Such is, generally speaking, no longer the case. With its state-run in-

dustries, education and hospital services and transport system, its private and co-operative herding and state agriculture, Mongolia is a small, but viable modern state on the communist pattern. At the moment neither Russia nor China fear each other in this area, and for a moment Mongolia is not playing its old rôle of buffer state very actively. The Mongols are taking advantage of this situation to assert themselves as an independent nation and to make themselves known abroad. One significant straw in the wind is that they were sufficiently confident of themselves this year to invite foreign scholars to their country. This is, as far as I know, the first congress to be held in the country without a political theme and without the exertion of political compulsions upon the delegates.

I travelled to the congress by the Trans-Siberian railway, from Moscow to Ulan Bator without a change. My travelling companions were Mongols. In our five and a half day journey we managed to exchange a few words, though I found that the modern colloquial Mongol is a very different matter from the classical-written language I am more at home in. My companions were very enthusiastic to find first that I wasn't a Russian and secondly that I was going all the way to their country to a congress about their civilization. More than ever were they pleased when they discovered that I knew Professor Rinchen, their most famous and best-loved scholar. I became a sort of honorary Mongol. We crossed the frontier into Mongolia and stopped at the first station. All the local officials, employees, drivers, and hangers-on assembled to see the rare and curious traveller who had just arrived and the spokesman of our group, a young chemist called Sumiya, gave me a great build-up, finishing with "And he knows Professor Rinchen." I was taken into the station restaurant for free beer. Then the train started again. It was midnight but, said Sumiya, "There's going to be a Mongol restaurant car on the train and our girls will be there with Mongol food. You've got to come." And so it was. By two in the morning our girls had cooked soup with meat dumplings in it, which we ate with a bottle of arikhi, Mongol vodka. "Be sure and be back here at six for breakfast," said Sumiya, and back we were. Our girls had more soup and dumplings ready at six. At seven we reached Ulan Bator and said good-bye. A month later, on the way home, our hosts in Ulan Bator took the trouble to inform the frontier post of our arrival, and the same officials as had been there before came straight to my compartment, sat down with smiles and cigarettes and asked all about the congress. I passed through customs and emigration without any formality. These cheerful people are the inhabitants of the only independent state left in Central Asia. Their great concern nowadays is to escape from the toils of their earlier policy of isolationism, to make themselves known abroad and to establish diplomatic and commercial relations on a broader and more reliable basis. Their position compels them to act cautiously, and it is doubtful if they can maintain a truly independent foreign policy. But they would be very glad to extend their contacts westwards, to join the United Nations and to be accepted into the International Postal Union. In this connection I must say that they have a complete and efficient international postal and telegraph service anyway. They are very conscious of the fact that they are hemmed in by 200 million Russians on one side and 600,000 Chinese on



the other, and the Chinese are nearer and their country is already overpopulated. It is possible that the Chinese are already beginning to spill over into Mongolia, and the Mongols, careful though they have to be in what they say, may look on recognition by Western countries and acceptance into the United Nations as some sort of guarantee of their status.

## DISCUSSION

Sir JOHN TROUTBECK: Was the congress which Dr. Bawden attended organized entirely by Mongolians, or by the Russians or Chinese?

Dr. BAWDEN: The day-to-day organization was in the hands of the Mongolian Scientific Committee, but the Mongolian Foreign Office took a certain interest in it and I heard that the invitations had been vetted by the Russian Embassy.

Mrs. THRUPP: Did Dr. Bawden see much of their art? He has mentioned the theatre and the band.

Dr. BAWDEN: I did not hear the band. We went to several concerts, ranging from the State Theatre to the equivalent of the Women's Institute. The general impressions were of most attractive music. It was a five-tone scale, but it is more attractive to Western ears than Chinese music. Their visual arts are practically non-existent at the moment. They have propaganda painting of factory workers hurrying to their factories, but there is little real natural art left, as far as I could tell with my limited opportunities.

Mrs. THRUPP: What about the decoration on the tombs? Is it very much a Chinese influence?

Dr. BAWDEN: The historical art still survives on the buildings which still stand, and on the museums, but I am not sure to what extent the museums are open to Mongols. Some of the places that we saw were unlocked specially for us. We saw craft from the hands of craft co-operatives, who produce for consumption.

Dr. LINDGREN: Dr. Bawden mentioned that there is oil and that it amounts to about half their present needs, which, I suppose, are modest. I was wondering whether they expect it to amount to a good deal more. Did Dr. Bawden hear anything about the Mongol scholars who were in Japan at the same time as he was in Mongolia, and did he see the two who were in England last year?

Dr. BAWDEN: I was only told last year at a meeting that the oil supplies half their needs. It was not indicated what their needs were. I imagine they are mostly for transport; and judging from the amount of transport, their needs will increase rapidly.

I know that the scholars visited Japan. One of them was Prof. Damdinsuren, a member of the Committee of Sciences and a member of the Communist Party in Mongolia. I do not know who else went and I did not have any reactions of their tour.

Thirdly, I did not see either of the two officials. In fact, with some notable exceptions, I saw few officials this year whom I saw last year. There has been a considerable change in official appointments in Mongolia since the party crisis early this year, so that the ministers and secretaries one sees are different from those of a year ago. The interpreters and guides are different, probably a matter of chance.

Dr. LINDGREN: Did any people who were not on the programme approach you of their own accord?

Dr. BAWDEN: No, except that in the countryside people came out of their yurts to look at us and exchange a few words.

Brigadier GREENSLADE: We have heard a great deal about the development of the country, but what of the country pursuits? Are the fish caught with nets or with lines? Is there any hawking or any mounted sport?

Dr. BAWDEN: The only fishing I saw was done with rod and line. The catches were a sort of salmon, up to 3 or 4 ft. long, and it is very good to eat. I do not know about hawking, but I seem to remember seeing pictures of people doing it. I do not know about mountaineering, but there are the modern, more pedestrian sports like football. There is horse-racing, but not games on horses, such as polo.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no more questions, it falls to my pleasant lot to thank Dr. Bawden for his extremely informative and interesting talk. It was of peculiar interest to me, because we travelled before and we saw a good deal of what he has shown on slides today, but, in addition, he has produced some new things which I had not seen before and in which I was intensely interested.

I would like to refer to Brigadier Greenslade's remarks. Racing is one of the great interests of the country. The people are mad about it, but the length of a race is different from the custom here in that the race is usually twenty-five miles long and the number of starters, instead of being between six and twelve, may extend to several hundred. To see these people swooping across the plain is a wonderful sight. Some of you may have seen the moving picture that the Mongol Government gave me when we went there last time. It showed a horse-race in full blast. The people are madly interested in anything to do with horses, partly, perhaps, because it is one of their great sources of wealth.

I would like to tell Dr. Bawden how immensely interested we were, and I am glad to think that we are now level, having both paid two visits instead of my being in the lead by one.

May I ask you to signify your satisfaction in the usual way?

The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation and the meeting then ended.



# A LAND-ROVER PILGRIMAGE TO WESTERN PERSIA

By PETER REDDAWAY

The first of two Young Peoples' Lectures delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, January 13, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen—Permit me now to introduce Mr. Peter Reddaway and to say on behalf of all present and, indeed, of the whole Society, how pleased we are that not only has he visited Persia but, having returned safely, has been able to come to address us today. We, as a Society, like to make a real feature during the new year and school holiday season of travel and exploration in the countries in which the Society is particularly interested. Mr. Reddaway and his party travelled by Land-Rover into West and South-west Iran and he is now going to describe their experiences and show us slides depicting the scenery and interesting buildings.

WHEN it became known in Cambridge that the party of which I was a member had decided to go overland to Persia by Land-Rover, we were at once besieged by travel "pundits." Some of these clearly spoke from experience, while others were in varying degrees bogus, but whatever their qualifications none had any inhibitions about showering us with "advice." "Absolutely essential" were: a well-qualified medic, solid financial backing, a military-style organization, and a brilliant mechanic; "absolutely fatal" was the idea of taking a girl. Through circumstances, rather than deliberate perverseness, we totally ignored each one of these pearls of advice!

In the event, the party consisted of three modern linguists, Christina Ditchburn, Rodney Forwood and myself, and one historian, Patrick Brogan. We were all in our first year and the sum total of our mechanical, medical, financial, and organizational knowledge was, we soon found, nil. This was worrying, but not insuperable. Moreover, through the gloom of general incompetence there shone a few powerful rays of hope. First, we felt, the language situation would be satisfactory, our collective tally being distinctly impressive. Secondly, and much more important, we had from the start the vision-supplying and also very active encouragement of two Cambridge orientalists and members of this society, Dr. L. Lockhart and Mr. P. W. Avery. Between them it was they who made us realize why it was indeed Persia which we should visit before all else in the Middle East, and it was they who filled our imaginations with the pictures which made our departure a spiritual necessity quite capable of triumphing over the most extreme material incompetence.

We left England, then, at the beginning of August, 1959, and returned exactly two months later, having covered almost 11,000 miles.

Since this meant an average of 190 miles a day our policy was to press quickly through Europe in order to have the maximum amount of time in the Middle East. We did, however, make one detour, since we had managed to obtain visas for Hungary. On stopping for an hour in Budapest a crowd quickly formed round the Land-Rover, and we chatted in various languages to a few of them without incurring the suspicion of the police. We tried to admire this once fine city in the twilight, but could only notice how sadly it has been ravaged in the last two decades. As the melancholy Danube reflected the last rays of the sun, we set off to follow it to its next destination, Belgrade, and thence into Bulgaria, a land only spoilt for us by the appalling Soviet architecture of Sofia. Otherwise we were considerably impressed by the gay, friendly peasants, the intensive agriculture, and the lithe young Bulgar who leapt from his Russian car and changed our wheel for us with a jack which made ours seem mediæval. Fortunately, the route through Bulgaria is now becoming quite standard, and very welcome to the motorist as it avoids the tortuous roads of Northern Greece and also reduces the distance to Istanbul.

After a joyous bathe in the Sea of Marmara we were in a more presentable condition to pass, exactly a week after we set out, through the famous walls of Theodosius. Once amid the glories of Byzantium we were unable to tear ourselves away for five days. Our most unusual photograph was one taken from the roof of the Kuçuk Aya Sophia looking towards its more illustrious brother, and our most treasured moments those spent within the latter and also, of course, the Sultan Ahmet mosque.

Our route eastward took us to Ankara, and then up to the southern shores of the Black Sea. Here it rained, rained without ceasing. Only as we climbed on to the East Anatolian plateau were our damp memories of Trebizond dissolved by the magnificent valleys and spectacular views of this drive. We camped near Erzerum and spent an exceedingly cold night at an altitude of 5,000 feet. The next morning we stopped for a few moments to admire a perfect view of that noble mountain, Mt. Ararat, and then crossed the border into Persia. This we did without the delay encountered by many travellers, since we arrived at about 7 a.m., and the officials whose tactics usually supply the nearby hotel with custom, relented at the idea of holding us for a good twelve hours and somehow contrived to complete all the formalities within a single hour. From Bazorgan we then made all possible speed towards Tabriz. This speed, however, was not very high, because the road surface, rarely more than adequate in Persia, was here a real bone-shaker. For those who travelled east in the twenties and thirties it must seem pretty "soft" for me to carp about the roads. At least Middle East roads usually exist nowadays! But unfortunately, as in many things apart from roads, the gap between East and West has been widening rather than closing, so that to pass in a few days from a German autobahn to the roads round Tabriz is a greatly disillusioning experience!

Here, in the capital of Persian Azerbaijan, we sought permission to continue our journey to the Caspian Sea by way of Ardebil. The principal excitement of this detour was the steep descent to the coast at Astara, which we did at dusk in a downpour, stopping every mile or so to have

our papers checked by the Persian military because we were so near to the Soviet Russian border. Sometimes, when the road passed as near as fifty yards from the fence, we could see the Soviet guards scanning us through binoculars from the tops of their watchtowers. But the Caspian, like the Black Sea, greeted us with rain, and our night on the beach at Astara, watching the Russian searchlights flashing out over the angry waves, was not an enjoyable one.

At Resht it was still raining purposefully, apparently for the fourth consecutive day, and so with great reluctance we cancelled our plan to continue to Teheran via the reputedly incomparable Chalus valley, and took the more direct route through Kazvin. We had been warned that the sights of the capital would probably disappoint us, but we were amply recompensed by the privilege of staying with a charming Persian family, the daughter of which we had met in Cambridge. Thus we spent five wonderful days not in frenzied sight seeing, but in an old Persian house, eating real Persian food, sleeping in a row with all the members of the household on the terrace of their typical, and extremely beautiful walled garden, and absorbing something of the spirit and the essence and the greatness of Persia. Moreover, our stay was rounded off by a visit to the splendid archæological museum, which gave us a foretaste of the material glories of the past which we were to see *in situ* at Persepolis and Susa.

Next we directed our attentions towards Isfahan. Turning south, we passed through Qum and paused to buy some pottery, the local speciality, and to photograph, a manœuvre fraught with danger in this fanatically Muslim city, the impressive golden-domed mosque. Towards nightfall we arrived at Isfahan, in anticipation as well as in practice, the climax of our trip. It is impossible to exaggerate the enthusiasm aroused in us by this incomparable city of mosques, bridges and palaces. Most of these were built by the famous Safavi, Shah Abbas the Great, in the early seventeenth century, and it was the genius of this man which created the enormous and majestic Maidan-i-Shah, now sadly no longer a polo ground but a great garden, which gave Isfahan its spaciousness and its freshness, commented on notably by Chardin, and which built the impressive Chehar Bagh avenue as the main thoroughfare of the city. We rushed around for five days, where we should have lingered for five weeks, and then, with infinite regret, pressed on south, stopping first at Pasargadae, the place where Cyrus the Great was laid to rest in 529 B.C. It was here, at this simple, solitary tomb that, two centuries later, Alexander paid tribute to a man whom he greatly admired.

We were soon thinking again of our Herodotus when we arrived, a few miles further on, at Naqsh-i-Rustam, the burial place of four other Achaemenian kings, Darius I and II, Xerxes and Artaxerxes I. The tombs are impressively carved out of an enormous cliff face, on which, lower down, one also sees some well-preserved Sassanian reliefs. Opposite these we also admired the Achaemenian fire-temple, the place of worship for the then state religion of Zoroastrianism.

The stage was now set for our arrival at the great Achaemenian palace of Persepolis which was started by Darius I in 521 B.C. Here the scale and conception of the whole thing astonished us all. Our opinions about

the architecture, however, varied slightly. I found myself in reluctant agreement with Robert Browning and Wilfrid Blunt, of previous visitors, in that despite the fact that some of the architects came from Greece at the time of the golden age of Greek architecture, the doorways and columns seemed heavy and monolithic compared to the rhythm and proportion of the buildings of the Acropolis. Nevertheless, it was a moving experience to wander over that vast area, admiring the less repetitive reliefs and trying to imagine the scene when Alexander put fire to it only 190 years after it was built.


We departed as it grew dark and drove across the great plain towards Shiraz. Here we only had time for quick visits to the tombs of Hafiz and Sa'adi, before taking the road west which winds over two magnificent passes and through the lands of the Qashqais, and brings one to dusty, sub-tropical Kazerun. The route from here to Ahwaz was the least frequented stretch on our route, a fact we could well understand when the road petered out completely after Fahlian, and we had to make our way in the dark along a wide valley floor, deeply rutted by the winter traffic and now baked solid by the sun. For two hours we averaged seven miles an hour, until at last we reached the haven of the oil company rest-house at Do Gumbadan. After this the road across the desert to Ahwaz was comfort itself, and there we turned north in high spirits, aiming for Kermanshah. On the way a similar experience occurred to one we had had at Kazerun. On arriving in Khorramabad we asked the way to a suitable camping site, only to be told that we must, of course, stay at the best hotel if we were honouring them with a visit. We then explained that we could not really afford a hotel and were quite used to camping. But no, it was their duty to entertain us, and so arrangements were quickly made for the local military barracks to give us beds and feed us until we cared to leave. This was all done in the most friendly and generous spirit imaginable, and provided us with magnificent examples of traditional Persian hospitality.

On our way northward we had, of course, visited the famous old Achaemenian capital of Susa, which grew up under Cyrus and flowered under Darius the Great. We saw the huge fort of the French archaeologists from afar off, but were extremely disappointed, as we had been warned we should be, at how little there is to be seen of the old city. Nothing above ground remains intact, and the whole site has been thoroughly excavated, the finds having been removed to Teheran and elsewhere. As a consolation, however, we were entertained to a delicious breakfast by the mayor, and our Persian was tested to the utmost in a long conversation about a visit he had paid to England.


Turning west now, we branched off the Teheran road and enjoyed an unforgettable late afternoon drive along the high valley, bathed in warm, extraordinarily vivid oranges and mauves, between Nehavend and Bisetun, where, as the sun went down, we admired the famous Achaemenian inscriptions in three languages, the deciphering of which by Rawlinson was a major advance in the study of old Mesopotamia. On arrival at Kermanshah our now slightly more conscious technique went into operation. This time, however, the civic and the military authorities




THE TOMB OF CYRUS THE GREAT AT  
PASARGADAE (PERSIA)



THE KAZERUN BAZAAR



THE SASSANIAN PALACE AT  
CTESIPHON, IRAQ



KRAK DES CHEVALIERS, SYRIA



competed for the honour of entertaining us, and it was fully two hours before the former eventually triumphed and bore us off to the Town Hall, formerly, in pre-Mossadeq days, the British Residence. The following morning we were distressed to find that Patrick was quite seriously ill. As the various clerks and councillors arrived for work, they too were concerned and crowded round his bed. Suddenly they disappeared, and it was only an hour or two later that we discovered the reason why. They had been holding a Town Council meeting, at which the topic, it transpired, had been none other than we four. We were to become state visitors. At once a huge, carpeted room was put at our disposal for as long as we cared to stay, the most revered of the servants became our round-the-clock attendant and feeder, and, most embarrassing of all, we were presented with the equivalent of £10 in cash, because they felt we must be penniless if we could not afford a hotel. Quite unable to refuse this present, we disposed of it as best we could by lavish tipping.

Unfortunately our Iraqi visas were not awaiting us, as we had hoped, at the Iraq Consulate in Kermanshah, and furthermore we learnt that communication with Baghdad was impossible, since the telephone wires had been disconnected at the frontier due to strained relations. So, leaving Patrick behind in hospital, whence, with a multiplicity of doctors, he had been removed on the order of the Governor General, we determined to drive the 130 miles to the border, leave Persia without Iraqi visas, and persuade the Iraqis to telephone Baghdad for permission to grant us some. This worked remarkably well until it became evident that neither set of frontier guards had understood our necessity to return to Kermanshah and pick up Patrick. First we thought we would never be let out of Iraq, and when feminine charm had cleared that hurdle, we then thought we should never be allowed back into Persia. Once again, however, the advantage of having a girl manifested itself, and in a couple of days we were safely in Baghdad, with Patrick more or less recovered.

Here we spent two days, re-equipping the car and visiting Ctesiphon to see the remains of the mighty, sixth-century Sassanian palace, before striking out across the great Syrian desert to Ramadi and then Rutba. Now we turned south into Jordan along the pipeline, paid quick visits to Amman, Jerusalem and Damascus, and then drove through the beauty of the Lebanese mountains to come down to the gentle shores of the Mediterranean at Beirut. We were greatly amused at the carefree attitude of the Lebanese after the more restrained and inhibited behaviour we had been used to in other Arab countries. We also heard a lovely story about the 1958 civil war in the Lebanon from a friend who, at the time, lived in a house on the edge of Beirut, midway between the two lines of firing. One evening he was giving a cocktail party when the rebels opened up with shelling, which, though not really intended to kill anyone, was too dangerous for his guests to go home. Fortunately, however, it stopped suddenly and everyone departed safely. The next morning he had a telephone call from the rebel-leader, a friend of his, saying he was awfully sorry to have disturbed the party, but if in future my friend would give him a ring before lunch time when he was throwing a party, he'd warn

the boys not to shell that day! This gave us a charming insight into the character of the Lebanese.

We now turned homewards, but still there were buildings of fame and beauty in our path which helped us to grasp further the history of the Middle East. First we visited the ruins of the striking Roman temples at Ba'albeck, built in the first two centuries A.D. Then, returning to the coast and swinging north, we halted at reputedly the oldest city in the world, usually known as Biblos, and climbed up the ancient castle which has been many times rebuilt, most recently by the Crusaders. Gazing westwards, our eyes sank down from the powerful, compelling blue of the Mediterranean to burrow among the many excavated walls at the foot of the castle, trying to distinguish Phœnician from Persian, Greek from Roman, Arab from Crusader. On a highway such as the Mediterranean coast it was indeed scarcely surprising that so many civilizations should have come and gone, and all have left their mark in such close proximity to one another.

We parted from the coast at Tripoli, and making for Homs we stopped on the way at the prince of all Crusader castles, Krak des Chevaliers, just inside Syria. Immensely solid and brilliantly restored by the French in 1936, we spent the night securely within its 25-foot-thick walls. The next morning we marvelled at how little effect 850 years have had on this vast and unforgettably imposing structure. Accompanied by magnificent memories such as this one, and many others, some of which I have described, we now sped north-west for home, and passing through the spectacular Cilician gates, rejoined our outward route at Ankara and in just over a week were back in Cambridge.

In conclusion, I should like to mention especially Persia, the spiritual focus of our expedition. We were impressed throughout by the generosity, the kindness, the hospitality, the remarkable sense of duty, of the Persian people. We travelled from place to place with the utmost co-operation of the authorities, visiting, as I have suggested, one of the most beautiful cities in the world and also some of the most interesting archæological sites. In a land of so much kindness we even forgave the Persians their roads! Finally, I shall try to recapture the beauty of one of our most exquisite moments in Persia, in this shot of Persepolis at dusk, taken looking across the plain towards Shiraz, with the columns rising eerily from the great platform and the sun sinking slowly beneath the horizon in the south-west.

The CHAIRMAN: You have, ladies and gentlemen, already expressed your appreciation of Mr. Reddaway's talk by your applause. I think we should also show how pleased we are not only with what we have seen, but the most excellent manner in which Mr. Reddaway took us through the whole journey, balancing it all so nicely so as to complete his talk within the time allotted, and that is no easy task when describing such an expedition. I feel sure you all wish to show your further appreciation. (*Applause.*)



# THE VALLEY OF THE ASSASSINS

By P. R. E. WILLEY

The second of two Young Peoples' Lectures delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, January 13, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: We now come to the second lecture of this series and I introduce Mr. Willey, a Housemaster at Wellington, and Commanding Officer of the Wellington Combined Cadet Force. He has come to tell us of the expedition he led to the Valley of the Assassins, illustrated by lantern slides, following which Mr. Richard Mordaunt will show the film taken during the expedition. There were six Oxford undergraduates with the expedition which went to the Elburz mountains in order to examine the fortresses in the Valley of the Assassins and, if possible, to establish the site of the castle of Maymun Diz. I now ask Mr. Willey to be good enough to address you.

LADIES and gentlemen, I was hoping to be able to say after Mr. Peter Reddaway's talk that his expedition, true to the tradition of Cambridge, dealt with the modern side of Persia, while our Oxford expedition delved into the country's remote past. This, however, is not strictly true, because both expeditions were looking into the past while not forgetting the present.

The official title of our expedition was the "Oxford Expedition to the Elburz Mountains," but despite our high-sounding title we were really a party of adventurous amateurs. The expedition consisted of five Oxford undergraduates and two old Wellingtonians who had recently left school, so that altogether we were a party of eight, although two of our number explored the ruins of Persepolis and other places in the south and did not actually come into the valley with us. We had with us an interpreter and medical officer, who was, in fact, a first-year medical student. He did a magnificent job in protecting us from the more serious diseases, although we were all afflicted by dysentery and one or two members by jaundice. The interpreter was also an Oxford undergraduate who seemed to be able to cope very well with the native dialect of the valley. Our patron was Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck.

We left England at the beginning of August, 1959, and came back at different times, I in the middle of September, and most of the other members of the party three weeks or so later. We had originally intended to travel out and back in a 1942 converted Commer bus which had been kindly lent to us by an Oxford firm. All went well until we arrived at Châlons-sur-Marne when the bus came to a halt and investigation revealed that six big ends had gone. We were told that the damage would take two weeks to repair. After an urgent council of war we decided we could not wait for this length of time and that we must continue our journey by train. We transferred our essential kit from the bus, which we left behind to be repaired and picked up on our return, into kit bags kindly provided by

the French Army and entrained for Paris, where we caught the Orient Express to Istanbul. At first this seemed an unpromising start but was in reality a blessing in disguise as we were able to spend so much longer in the Valley of the Assassins and to carry out all our objectives.

I trust you will now bear with me while I give a brief historical and geographical survey of the area traversed by the expedition.


The Valley of the Assassins or, more prosaically, the Alamut Valley, lies in the Elburz mountains in the north of Persia about half way between Teheran and the Caspian Sea. (Population 20,000.) This was where the infamous Isma'ili branch of the Shi'ite sect, founded by Hasan-i-Sabbah at the end of the eleventh century, flourished and spread until it was destroyed by the Mongol invaders under the "World Conqueror" Hulugu Khan in 1256. Another branch which existed at the same time in Syria lasted a few years longer until it, too, was practically exterminated by the Sultan of Egypt. The word "assassin" is derived from Hashishin or eater of hashish, but secret assassination of their political opponents, a practice introduced by Hasan, always formed one of their most powerful weapons. The religious doctrines of the sect were identical to those of the Isma'ili.

Hasan-i-Sabbah, the Grand Master of the Assassins and Old Man of the Mountains, established himself by trickery in the castle of Alamut in 1090, after a chequered career which had taken him from Ray, where he was born, to Egypt, Bagdad, and back to Gazwin. Here in Alamut he converted many people, who were attracted by his extreme asceticism, to the new faith. The castle itself had first been constructed in the year 860-1, as Juvaini, who accompanied the Mongol armies, tells us in his account of Hulugu's campaign entitled "The History of the World Conqueror." It was already a fairly formidable fortress, but Hasan set about making it impregnable. Store rooms were hewn out of the solid rock, a stream was diverted and the approaches were strengthened "by plastered walls and lead-covered ramparts." Hasan died in 1124 and the assassins, under their subsequent hereditary leaders, continued to prosper, despite frequent defeats in battle and their evil renown in no way diminished. Gradually, however, the line became enfeebled, until their last ruler, Rukn-ad-Din, was unable to put up more than a token resistance to the advancing Mongol hordes and surrendered his fortress of Maymun Diz. He and about 12,000 of his followers were put to death in a particularly barbaric way and Juvaini relates that "of him and his stock no trace was left, and he and his kindred became but a tale on men's lips and a tradition in the world."


Although there have been many famous explorers in Persia and the name of the Valley of the Assassins is fairly familiar to the Western world, it is strange that so few people have visited it. In the last century Col. Monteith and Lt.-Col. Sheil published in the *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society* of 1833 and 1838 an account of their visits to the valley and other places along the Caspian, and in recent times the names most associated with this part of the world are those of Miss Freya Stark, who published her impressions in the *Valleys of the Assassins* in 1934, Professor Hertzfield and Professor Ivanow. They have given excellent pic-



A GENERAL VIEW OF THE VALLEY  
AND THE ALAMUT RUD




THE ENTRANCE TO THE ALAMUT  
RUD




THE ENTRANCE TO THE VALLEY



SOME INHABITANTS OF THE  
VALLEY



TEA-HOUSE AT BADASHT



MAYMUN DIZ



tures of the customs and people of the valley but for us its principal interest lay in its past history and its castles. Altogether there are over fifty of them, some quite small, and we know that the three principal ones at the time of the Assassins were Lammasar, Alamut, and Maymun Diz. There has never been any doubt as to the site of Alamut, and Lammasar was discovered by Miss Stark, but so far it has not been possible to give any exact location of Maymun Diz where the final defeat of the assassins took place. Professor Ivanow in his article in *Islamic Culture*, of October, 1938, entitled "Some Isma'ili Strongholds in Persia," discusses the theory tentatively advanced by Miss Stark that Maymun Diz is the same as Alamut. He comes to the conclusion that this is unlikely. Juvaini has given a very full description of the siege and surrender of Maymun Diz and by comparing his description with the topography itself, it is possible to reach certain conclusions.

Having read all available sources and inspired by these authorities, we decided to make our objectives the following :

1. To carry out a thorough investigation of the rock of Alamut.
2. To find, if this were possible, the site of Maymun Diz.
3. To investigate the castle of Lammasar.
4. To investigate any other castles we came across; and
5. To bring back with us samples of any pottery or other interesting items that we found on the castle sites.

We accomplished all our objectives and succeeded in discovering another castle at Shir Kuh which, as far as we know, has not been looked at before.

After the break-down of the Commer I have said the expedition entrained for Paris and Istanbul, and from thence made the journey by train to Erzerum. The only way to go on now was to take a long-distance bus which, after negotiating seemingly impossible hairpin bends at high speed, carried us to Teheran, where we spent three days in the British Embassy compound, receiving every possible assistance from H.E. the British Ambassador and his staff in obtaining the necessary security passes from S.A.V.A.K. Preparations completed, an Embassy Land-Rover carried us on along the route to Qazvin and then northwards to the small village of Wars, after which the Land-Rover could go no further, and the expedition camped for the night in an extremely draughty wadi. Next day a team of mules and donkeys carried our baggage over the magnificent but cruel Chala Pass (8,500 ft.), and down to the junction of the Taliqan and Alamut rivers at Shir Kuh. As time was short we decided to visit the castle of Shir Kuh later, and so we pressed on to our first objective, the rock of Alamut, rising high above the village of Shutur Khan, which we reached two days later. This village was not marked on any of our maps, and the inhabitants of the valley were even less reliable than the information on the maps. These seemed to take a fiendish delight in placing villages about twenty miles from where they actually were.

It is not until one gets close to the rock of Alamut, which Juvaini likens to a "kneeling camel with its neck stretched out," that it is possible to appreciate its fine strategic position. The rock is set against the

background of the towering Hadekhan range and rises about 800 ft. above the foot of the valley, the castle itself being built on a sheer bluff another 80 ft. or so high. We scrambled around the castle, sometimes at great risk to ourselves, exploring especially the southern slope, where we clambered down about 50 ft. to inspect a water cistern cut deep into the rock, and which was supposed to be bottomless. We threw a stone in but had no means of measuring its depth. There was evidence of extensive underground rooms which had been bricked up but which, if they could be excavated, would certainly yield extremely interesting finds. Legend relates that the vines clustered on the barren rock face near the cistern we inspected are those which Hasan-i-Sabbah himself planted. For keepsake we brought back one or two leaves.

Our attention was drawn to the stables in the rock, where the assassins were supposed to have kept their horses. These stables were again hollowed out of the rock itself. There was also an intricate system of sentry-boxes all round the castle, perched precariously like swallows' nests; the assassin brickwork was well built from natural lava and some of it is still in good condition. Altogether their defensive system was extremely good.

We spent four days examining the castle and it became evident to us as a result of having read Juvaini's description that Alamut could not be Maymun Diz. The local inhabitants then told us that there was a castle above the village of Mu'allim Kilaya, so we decided to go and have a look at this castle which, we were told, had not been visited by Miss Freya Stark or Professor Ivanow. Having once more gone through the tedious performance of bargaining for mules, we moved off through the village of Andij and on to Mu'allim Kilaya, about sixteen hours' march towards the mouth of the Alamut Rud but by no means easy on account of the steep ridges we had to cross. About a mile above Mu'allim Kilaya we came to the castle, and saw at once that the rock out of which it is hollowed was far, far more imposing than that of Alamut. The rock of Maymun Diz was almost cathedral-like with its towers and buttresses, although much of it is conglomerate rock. Actually at times it was difficult to distinguish between man-made and natural defences. The approach was extremely precipitous and dangerous; the main entrance had been destroyed and as we had no climbing equipment, we were hauled up on ropes by the local guides. Two or three of these fine and agile men helped us to get inside the castle so that we were able to explore two separate gallery systems, inside which we found definite traces of brick walls and a well-preserved arch; also pottery similar to that found at Alamut. We investigated the whole site as fully as we could and came to the conclusion that this was, in fact, the site of Maymun Diz as described by Juvaini. Our feeling of elation was, of course, tremendous. We hope to return in the summer of 1960 to complete our investigation of this rock.

We wanted to visit the rest of the valley, and we decided to split so as to accomplish the last of our objectives. With Richard Mordaunt and the interpreter, I went to look at Lammasar, and three other members left the valley going *via* Garmarud into the valley of the Shah Rud and on over the mountains to Teheran, arriving there exhausted three days later. At

Lammasar we explored the castle thoroughly and again made maps and photographs. We picked up a lot of pottery which the British Museum has identified as Isma'ili pottery of the eleventh to thirteenth century. This castle is, in fact, the largest and best preserved of all the assassin castles and from a distance looks almost like the ruins of a typical Norman stronghold. On our way to Lammasar we called in at Shir Kuh, where we found the site of a large castle which guarded the approach to the valley. This, too, we photographed and mapped.

From Teheran the expedition gradually made its way back to England, all the members carrying with them a pleasant memory of the kindness they had always experienced from these incredibly primitive and naïve folk. They seemed open, frank and sincere, but completely ignorant about the past history of the valley.

Mr. Richard Mordaunt then showed and commented on the film taken during the course of the expedition.

Group-Captain St. Clair SMALLWOOD: Sir Philip Southwell has had to leave to catch a train, so please accept me as his deputy. We have all enjoyed ourselves so much this afternoon that I hope we shall be able to induce these undefeated teams to come back to talk to the Society again when they have made another journey in Persia. I congratulate Mr. Willey on a very successful combined operation, and feel that as long as he is in charge of the Corps at Wellington they are in very good hands. We thank both our lecturers very much indeed for coming to describe their experiences and assure them that we have much enjoyed the whole afternoon. (*Applause.*)

## CORRESPONDENCE

The following extracts are taken from a letter from Mr. G. A. Calver, now in Teheran.

“ . . . you mentioned the need for the Society to look to commerce for its members in the future. This is very clear.

“ If you have the meetings in the evening, people of middle seniority in commerce in London can come. If some propaganda is done they will then bring their trainees. Let the trainees join for 10s. a year and let them pay full rates at 21. Thus you will get young men who are going to the East. They will remain members while they are in the East, and when they finally come home.

“ Let a lot of the meetings be specifically directed at young men going to the East—how they will live, what they will see, etc.

“ Then something must be done (other than receipt of the Journal) for members who are in the East.

“ Local branches must be formed, and if already formed, must have activities—meetings and dinners. When the Society knows of some eminent man going to a certain place in the East on a visit, arrangements should be made for him to meet and address the local branch.”

## REVIEWS

**Mizh—A Monograph.** By Sir Evelyn Howell, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. Published by Government of India Press, Simla, 1931.

Written thirty years ago, Evelyn Howell's monograph on the Mahsuds remains the most vivid and penetrating study every made of a Pathan tribe, and the most entertaining. It is a dossier of the doings and misdoings of that remarkable tribe from the first arrival of British authority on the scene, illumined by a shrewd, humorous, and sympathetic insight into the Mahsud mind.

Nothing can excuse much that the Mahsuds did. The tale of their outrages against harmless villagers in the plains, Hindu and Muslim alike, of their looting, kidnapping and murdering, was a grisly record. The vicious circle of raids, arrests, blockade, fines, submission (followed more than once by an increase in emoluments) and then before long more outrages again, never seemed to end. And yet, if there were not something fine in them, they would not have won, as they undoubtedly did, the admiration and liking of some who knew them best. Of these was Evelyn Howell.

Of their courage and intelligence there can be no question. Their native wit was patent both in individuals and in the joint ingenuity shown by the tribe, or sections of it, in their diplomatic dealings with Government. Mizh has many entertaining accounts of the contest of wits that had been going on for sixty years between the tribe and a series of Political Agents. Which of the two in the end won this battle it would be difficult to say. The game ended in a draw. Sometimes it was not quite clear whether it was the Government or the tribe that was dictating policy. And when a settlement of some disturbance had been made and the tribesmen had dispersed to their lawful avocations in their remote hills, one might have a feeling that, like Waring's Italian shipmates,

“—the thieves  
are laughing at us in their sleeves.”

Howell suggests some of the reasons why Government to the end found the Mahsud “too hard a nut to crack”—“the proximity of sanctuary in Afghanistan, or the difficult nature of this country and its lack of resources, or his own strong right arm and virile qualities.” Without saying so Mizh implies a further reason. It tells us a lot of the internal quarrels of the tribesmen, of personal and sectional jealousies, of blood feuds, and of disputes as to who represented the tribe or section and over the distribution of allowances or khassadari. This very disunity may have been their strength, for it meant that if action had to be taken against them it was difficult to find a definite vital objective to hit at. The tribe had no solar plexus. They were, too, our own subjects with whom it was our object, if possible, to live in amity.

The whole of this absorbing problem, with a wealth of interesting detail, is set forth in Mizh. There is the long story of the Mullah Powindah's activities, for twenty years the leader of the tribe. There is the event which probably more than any other had a lasting effect on Government's relations with the Mahsuds—the failure of Bruce's courageous attempt to introduce something like the Sandeman system into Waziristan. There finally Howell's far-seeing (he was writing in 1929) conclusion that the only worthy end to which our officers should address themselves was to train the Mahsud to take his place in the federation of India. The solution of the Mahsud problem was never the economic development of that barren land itself, but the encouragement of the young Mahsud to find an outlet for his energy and ability elsewhere. Pakistan has addressed herself to this task and seems to be well on the way to success.

G. C.



**The Culture and Art of India.** By Radhakamal Mukerjee. Published by George Allen and Unwin. 1959. Pp. 447. 55 illustrations. 50s.

This book is primarily designed for the Indian middle class upon whom the future of the republic largely depends. On the face of it, Professor Mukerjee has written a comprehensive factual account of the development of Indian culture to the present day, but the European reader who expects scholarly detachment from such a distinguished pedagogue will discover that India's past has been interpreted by him in the light of the nation's present-day needs. He is, in fact, attempting to supply an ideological background that will have a cohesive effect on a nation that has often demonstrated its capacity for political disintegration. The key words of his approach are unity and *dharma*, the latter being the moral order by which the social structure is knit together and sustained. It is the persistence of these two elements in Indian civilization that forms his central theme. The result is an optimistic view of history pointing to India's destiny as envisaged by the leaders of Congress. The dominant note of Indian culture is seen as being metaphysical rather than theological and the ideal of a secular welfare state freed from sacerdotalism and caste is one for which he finds ample precedent in a past that boasts of Aśoka's *dharmaviyaya* and the democratic tendencies of religious reform movements associated with the cult of *bhakti*.

The author's experience stands him in good stead in the task of organizing a large body of material so that it forms a readable whole. This he achieves by visualizing India's past in terms of a series of reformations, each leading to a renaissance of art and culture. His command of English does not yield to the criticisms that can be levelled against some Indian writers, for although prone to floridity in some passages where he is stirred by strongly patriotic sentiments, one can only admire the precision with which he elucidates difficult philosophical concepts and the aptness of expression with which he discusses works of art. There are, however, traces of the tendency to enumerate and classify that is so characteristic of traditional Indian scholasticism. This, coupled with the extensive use of Sanskrit terms, may discourage the occasional European reader.

Leaving aside Professor Mukerjee's method as an historian, which, although partial, can be justified by his country's present-day dilemma and the fact that his own development took place in a period when Indian scholars found it necessary to contest the assumption of cultural superiority made on behalf of the West by unthinking compatriots and Europeans alike, it is, unfortunately, possible to find a number of contradictions and doubtful or incorrect facts in the book. It is, of course, impossible for any single writer to cover this immense field without error, especially since many issues are still controversial. Perhaps in view of the scope of the work it is uncharitable to point out what are after all only details. Yet even the uninitiated reader will be surprised to learn that the influence of the Pallava school of sculpture and architecture is quite traceable in South-east Asia from the second to the fifth century A.D., when he has just read in the preceding sentence that the school itself existed from the sixth to the eighth century. Actually, the terminus A.D. 750 is over a century too early, as is that given for the Pāla period (A.D. 900). The reference on the same page to a school of Tai sculpture in North Siam during the ninth century is founded on a misconception corrected in one of the books cited in the author's own bibliography.

Other points of chronology over which he is uncertain are the limits for the Indus civilization and Aryan invasion, contradictory dates for the Sātavāhanas (controversial it is true, but neither 218-73 B.C. nor 73 B.C.-A.D. 318), and muddle over the *Bhāgavata Purāna*, which in one place is mentioned as already in existence by the Gupta period and elsewhere described with something approaching the truth as probably composed in the tenth century.

In the field of art history, it is not true that the Natarāja type originated in northern and eastern India rather than the south (p. 443)—a point that he contradicts himself on page 307. Sudāmā is not a shepherd as suggested in the description to plate 51, the "aerial visions" that he sees in plate 50 are, in fact, the creatures of the ocean bordering Krishna's city of Dwārakā, and the influence of European painting did not reach India from Iran as we are told on the following page. The Gandharan relief of the Buddha in a goat cart does not symbolize the *Hinayāna*,

but shows him on his way to school as described in the *Lalitavistara*, and the gold tablet excavated by Bloch at Lauriya Nandangarh should not be attributed to the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., since Majumdar's excavations demonstrated over twenty years ago that the site is of late Mauryan or Śuṅga date.

Coming to more recent times, the emphasis which the author places on Aurangzeb's adoption of the title *ghāzī* as an indication of religious intolerance is scarcely justified when we remember that it was adopted as a matter of course by the Emperor's predecessors, including Akbar, whom he contrasts with Aurangzeb on this very issue. Another small point is that Clive left India in 1767, not 1774, which is the date of his death.

With few exceptions, the plates have been chosen with a discriminating eye for æsthetic quality, but it is a pity that the location of objects is not given in many cases. The apparatus for easing the reader's task of assimilation comprises five maps, a time chart, bibliography and reliable index.

ROBERT SKELTON.

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**Sources of Indian Tradition.** Compiled by Wm. Theodore de Bary, Stephen Hay, Royal Weiler, Andrew Yarrow. Columbia University Press, New York, and Oxford University Press, London. Pp. 961. Indexed. U.K. price 55s.

In the days of the British raj in India, British people whose lives were cast there, amid its nearly 400,000,000 inhabitants, used to note how little interest stay-at-home Britons took in that part of the world. The Britons in India in those days enjoyed good fellowship with their Indian neighbours. Even the present Premier of India, Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, assures us in his autobiography, written twelve years before India became independent and while he was serving a term of imprisonment for revolutionary activity, that ". . . As I sit here and look deep into my mind and heart, I do not feel anger against England or the English people . . . I owe too much to England in my mental make up ever to feel wholly alien to her." Since independence, cordial friendship has continued between British and Indians in India, and there are more British people in India than ever before. The ending of the former official link has been followed by even less British public interest in India than there used to be, though the importance of India to Britain and to the world, both East and West, has enormously increased and despite the continuing efforts by the distinguished East India Association and Royal India and Pakistan Society, in London, to assist and encourage mutual intercourse and understanding.

The American volume now before us is primarily interesting in this country because it illustrates the American contrast. In the U.S.A., in the past few years, more and more attention has been directed to India. This is partly due to, and partly responsible for, a great deal of organized and profound research, the results of which have appeared in publicity through books and otherwise. This new volume, large octavo in size, contains 987 pages of closely-printed letterpress! In addition to the four compilers already mentioned, six other special contributors have written for it. They include three members of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, and Messrs. R. N. Dandekar of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute at Poona; V. Raghavan of the University of Madras; and I. H. Qureshi of the Centre for Pakistan Studies, Columbia University. The whole undertaking forms part of the Columbia College General Education Programme in Oriental Studies, supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Professor W. T. de Bary, as editor, further tells us that "for whatever value it may have to the general reader or college student seeking a liberal education that embraces both East and West, a great debt is owed to Dean Emeritus Harry J. Carman, Dr. Taraknath Das, and Dean Lawrence H. Chamberlain of Columbia College, who contributed much to the initiation and furtherance of this program."

All these details indicate a very big concentration of effort and also signalize the American viewpoint from which the material collated for the book was selected and utilized. An illuminating note in the Preface tells us that while "compilation of this volume was originally undertaken by Dr. Andrew Yarrow in connection with the general education programme in Columbia College . . . in their present form

these readings have been substantially revised by the general editor, with the assistance of Dr. Stephen N. Hay of the University of Chicago" and that thanks are due to the contributors for "the patience and forbearance they have shown in regard to adjustments which the general editor has had to undertake in order to achieve uniformity and balance in the volume as a whole," so that "the editor must bear responsibility for the selection and presentation of materials contained here."

There can be no doubt about the immense and painstaking labour over the origins of Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Islam and so on, in India, and of the movements of thought and teaching connected with them, which the book represents. Nor can one fail to appreciate the high reference value of the mountain of information about affairs and people which it contains. But what each contributor to the volume sent in for it is not shown, nor is there any indication that those who effected the compilation and its "adjustments" and "substantial revision" had any personal acquaintance of India. Slabs of extracts from speeches and writings are given without due reference to the climate and circumstances in which they were uttered. There are, in the pages concerning modern India, extensive quotations from politicians whose activities were less calculated to speed than to delay India's acquirement of her own imperium from Britain and no mention is made of numerous outstanding Indian personalities whose contributions to the ideal were of tremendous and vital importance. This fault seemingly arose from the erroneous impression that India obtained self-government by a nationalist agitation that compelled Britain to surrender it, whereas, in fact, English education inspired the Indian mind to reach for it, conformably, stage by stage, promoted the ability to handle it and finally yielded it in the spirit in which the British Parliament in A.D. 1833 acclaimed the pronouncement that

"It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system . . . , that they may . . . demand European institutions. . . . Whenever such a day comes it will be the proudest day in English history."

To quote His Majesty King George V's proclamation to India over forty years ago :

" . . . We have endeavoured to give to her people the many blessings which Providence has bestowed upon ourselves. But there is one Gift which yet remains and without which the progress of a country cannot be consummated—the right of her people to direct her own affairs and safeguard her interests. . . . With the same sympathy and with redoubled interest I shall progress along this road."

That Gift of democratic responsible self-government, that imperium, or independence in the management of her own affairs and freedom from unwelcome outside interference, now enjoyed by India, was not wrung from Britain by force or compulsion, but is a blessing which goes with the British flag, and, as soon as practicable, becomes a gladly-given endowment wherever that flag is flown.

A. H. B.

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**Foundations of Tibetan Mysticism.** By Lama anagarika Govinda. Published by Rider and Co., 1959. Pp. 310. Index, bibliography. 30s.

This is an exposition by a Western initiate of the teachings of the Kargyutpa, one of the principal Unreformed or Red-hat Tibetan monastic Orders. Owing chiefly to the labours of Grünwedel (whom the German author surprisingly ignores in his otherwise comprehensive bibliography) and Evans-Wentz, these have long been available to the West. In fact, the serious student who has digested their translations of the essential texts, with their lucid and detailed introductions, is familiar with Woodroffe's books on the Tantra and has a knowledge of the Abhidharma, is bound to find little novelty here and to consider the author's chief contribution that he has provided a synthesis of these interrelated sources within a reasonable compass.

Like all Tantra the Kargyutpa tradition perpetuates a highly complicated method of progressive psychic training, in which pranayama, mantra, mudra and mandala all play their part, to culminate in the attainment of Buddhahood. But the mantras

remain incomprehensible; the mudras, ineffective; and the deities of the mandalas, lifeless until the conferment of power by the teacher awakens the consciousness of the disciple, who, by subsequent prolonged meditation, enters into the states that are thus symbolized. And since the Buddhist view is that subjective and objective are twin aspects of consciousness, for him these experiences are not only psychically real but objectively valid, and the criticism that they may be hallucinations falls wide of the mark.

Such a system of psychic ascent, with all its intricate imagery, is the natural reflex of the subtle oriental mind when turned upon itself, but is hardly likely to attract many followers in the pragmatic West. However, the few to whom this path appeals, cannot do better than to take this absorbing book as guide to what they will encounter upon it. Their only problem, then, will be to find a teacher and submit themselves to the necessary discipline.

H. O. C.

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**The Revolt in Tibet.** By Frank Moraes. Macmillan Co. of New York. 1960. Pp. 223. (Price not given.)

Lest the name mislead, it should be remarked that Mr. Moraes is an Indian. He has compressed into a short book the story of Tibet's occupation by China, the flight of the Dalai Lama, a summary of the history of Tibet's relations with China from the Tang to the Ching dynasty and after, and a picture of the Tibetan religious, social, and political structure. The whole is animated with a lively sense of condemnation and alarm, more pronounced than that of Mr. Nehru but shared by countless Indians.

Although the effect on the Sino-Indian frontiers of China's suppression of Tibet is ably forecast in Mr. Moraes' narrative, he wrote before the Chinese hand had been fully disclosed in Ladakh and elsewhere, before Tibet's case had gone to the United Nations, and before Premier Chou's later notes had established that Communist China does not accept the McMahon Line or the Ladakh border and has designs south of the Himalaya. On this issue the author has much that is pertinent to say about the importance of the 500 miles of Nepal's frontier with Tibet.

The book includes an illuminating account of the Lamaist variety of Mahayan Buddhism. Mr. Moraes increases our confidence by declining to idealize its working in practice. The weaknesses and occasional corruption of certain fossilized ideas and institutions are set against the undoubted Tibetan sincerity and cheerfulness which, whatever its shortcomings, Lamaism has produced in its disciples. There is no traveller from the West who has failed to be impressed by this aspect of Tibetan character; "I am put to shame," remarked Ippolito Desideri many centuries ago, "when I compare these men's devotion to their idols with my own to Jesus." In the language of his day the Jesuit was seeking to convey what most sensitive people who have lived on India's border know, that there are more ways to the light than one.

In common with so many who have been privileged to meet the present Dalai Lama, Mr. Moraes confesses himself overcome by "the mixture of boyishness and maturity, of melancholy combined with an intrinsic gaiety of spirit and charm." He concludes on a moving note: "If in dying it has taught a lesson that will save Asia from the monstrous fate which befell it, Tibet, with Asia's awakening to the real character of Communist cruelty and tyranny, may yet live again." Indians will remember that the Dalai Lama has faith that Tibet will live; Tibetans would probably hold that, while there is a Dalai Lama, it cannot die.

The author does not spare Mr. Nehru, and quoting Fouché about the Duc d'Enghien, charges the Indian Government with having at first aided Peking to obliterate Tibet, however unconsciously. "It was worse than a crime, it was a blunder." Most people here will probably think Mr. Nehru's difficulties are underrated, and Mr. Moraes admits that the light is dawning.

The maps are inadequate as illustrations to the text. Though the McMahon Line is correctly shown, the confines of Tibet in his map follow the latest Communist

drawing in placing the frontier towards China only a few miles east of Lhasa. A book with so much unfamiliar nomenclature needs an index.

All in all, a notable performance as a *coup d'œil* over a vast panorama in space and time.

OLAF CAROE.

**The Naked Hills.** Tales of Afghanistan by Charles Beardsley. Peter Davies. Pp. 275. 16s.

The American author of this book tells us on the dust cover that he has found "overseas contracts the ideal method of combining travel and work." In consequence he has worked in and written about many lands, among them Afghanistan, where he appears to have spent some time as an employee of the American contractors engaged in the great irrigation works of the Helmand river system.

The book begins with a "Letter from Afghanistan" of twenty-one pages, which is a concise survey of the Afghan position in the world today. It is almost too concise, for it is evident that the author has taken the measure of the Afghans and their problems. He sums up the situation admirably, and he might well have devoted a few more pages to developing some of the subjects on which he touches.

He gives more space to a criticism of the *purdah* system, which he rightly condemns as being a principal cause of Afghanistan's slow development, from which, however, he sees no immediate prospect of escape. But he wrote before the present struggle developed. It would appear from recent reports of returned travellers that a relaxation of the order, condemning women to life imprisonment from the age of puberty, has been sanctioned, or at any rate connived in, by the Central Government. It seems likely that recent unrest among the Mangals of Khost, a lawless and fanatical section of the Pathans, and in the priest-ridden city of Kandahar is connected with this second attempt to substitute commonsense for bigotry.

On the international situation the author is guarded, contrasting the spectacular but less solid Russian "aid," with the substantial bid made by the Americans to fill the vacuum left by the British withdrawal from India. He is not prepared to indicate which of the two great competitors is in the lead, and while he suggests that the poverty of Afghanistan makes her a "sitting duck" for communism, he comforts himself, and us, with the vital point—"the dogged national desire to remain independent at all costs."

The remainder of the book consists of seven short stories, depicting various facets of American life in their beautifully-equipped compound outside Kandahar city. The description of the country is vivid and true to life, though the reader is inclined to get the impression that all Afghanistan resembles in climate and scenery the sun-baked hills and deserts of the south, which is not the case. As for the characters in the stories, with one or two exceptions they are sordid and unpleasant. Your reviewer has many happy memories of Americans both in their own country and abroad; he is reluctant to believe that they would not stand up better to the strain of two years exile even in so unattractive a country as the southern region of Afghanistan. If, however, the picture the author draws is true to life, it does help to explain the rather melancholy impression which is frequently forced on one, that while American ideals and American dollars are very welcome abroad, the individual American citizen so frequently is not!

W. K. F.-T.

**Riding to the Tigris.** By Freya Stark. John Murray. 21s.

Some of Freya Stark's numerous readers will feel a little disappointed at the exiguous fare she provides in her latest book of Turkish travel. After the more massive repasts offered by *Ionia* and *Alexander's Path*, *Riding to the Tigris* will seem more of a snack than a meal, though the book does not cost less. Her short narrative of a journey from Van to Jizré on the Tigris, through the Hakkari mountains, was worthwhile in itself and would doubtless have been difficult to fit

into a travel book of larger dimensions. The need to expand the account of her fortnight's trek through this wild, forbidding but beautiful corner of Kurdistan into a full-size volume has, perhaps, induced Miss Stark, a keen and retentive observer, to record more details than some of her readers may find rewarding. Her vivid descriptions of scenery would serve as a lesson to the young writer, but they certainly slow down the tempo of her progress. Nothing, however, could be better than the sketches of the Turkish officials, officers, and soldiers with whom she comes into contact and, while giving her full credit for the favourable impression she must have made on them, one cannot but feel that she was lucky to have such friendly and helpful people to deal with.

The Turkish authorities dislike foreign photographers who, they fear, may portray old-fashioned and undignified scenes unworthy of modern Turkey. It was here that Miss Stark had her one great disappointment for, after the Vali of Hakkari had, apparently, given her grudging permission to take suitable photographs for the book in which she proposed to describe her journey, her films were taken away from her, politely, but inexorably, by an officer sent by the Kaimaram of Ulu Deré. I was wondering how she had managed to illustrate the book so magnificently when I read on p. 87, "by one of those chances that are possibly fostered by experience in Asia the best of my photographs had found themselves tucked away" and the handsome officer had missed a few rolls of films. The book actually includes three pictures of very attractive-looking Yezidis—devil-worshippers, whose affiliation to Satan is due to their belief that God will one day pardon that recalcitrant angel, and then it may prove to be good policy to have treated him with respect. The censor of photographs might have jibbed at the portrayal of these primitive sectarians.

The title of this book is slightly misleading, as a good deal of the "riding" was done in cars and jeeps. However, the latter part of her route, when the roads had petered out, took her along vertiginous mountain paths with just room for a single rider, and she had one narrow escape from death when her horse slipped a hindleg over the edge of the precipitous slope that flanked the path. Having myself ridden to the Tigris from Aleppo in 1906 through the safe monotony of the endless steppe, I appreciate the more keenly the adventurous spirit of any traveller riding westward through the mountains of Kurdistan.

Miss Stark's reflections on the Kurds must be conditioned by the fact that she speaks no Kurdish and only found a very few Kurds speaking sufficient Turkish to converse with her. She seems, nevertheless, to be convinced that the Turks, who have, after all, subdued without excessive violence a lawless region and a recalcitrant people, will gradually absorb them as good citizens into the state. She has nothing but praise for the uncomplaining patience of the Turkish officials, who are carrying on the local government in the almost inaccessible uplands of Eastern Anatolia. It should be unnecessary to add that Freya Stark's addiction to classical history causes her to evoke scenes from *The Anabasis* as she struggles up and down the steeps of the Hakkari.

It is greatly to be hoped that some influential members of the Turkish Government will read this informative and diverting book and will take to heart the author's good-natured reflections on the difference between nationalism and patriotism, and her well-founded comments on the incompetence of the Turk as an hotelier.

R. M. GRAVES.

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**Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism, 1521-1555.** By Stephen A. Fischer-Galati. O.U.P. for Harvard University Press, 1959. Pp. viii + 140. 32s.

This is a revised doctoral dissertation, the most recent in an impressive list of forty-three of Harvard Historical Monographs. The author has chosen a significant phase in the early history of Protestantism, and by careful examination of mainly German sources has thrown fresh light on the obscure connection between the consolidation of the Protestant position in Germany and the Ottoman threat to the interests of the Habsburgs in Central Europe and in the Mediterranean.

The year 1521 is well-chosen as the beginning of the study proper. In that year Belgrade fell to Sulaiman the Magnificent, and thus the way was opened to Hungary and to an inevitable clash of influence between the Habsburgs and the Sultans.

Ottoman penetration into Central Europe and Ottoman aggressive movements in the Mediterranean, notably the siege and capture, from the Knights of St. John, of Rhodes, sounded an alarm throughout Europe. But such was the disunity of Christendom that a call by Pope Adrian VI for a crusade against the "enemy of the faith" failed to rally such discordant potentates as Henry VIII, Francis I, and Charles V.

Equally well chosen is the date for the conclusion of this monograph. In 1555 the Lutherans were accorded religious and political recognition. Both Charles V and his brother, Ferdinand I, had to yield step by step to the rising tide of Protestantism. Their primary concern—especially Charles V—was the consolidation of the interests of their family outside Germany. German affairs, including the problems created by the "Reformation," were relegated to a secondary place. Charles V almost to the end hoped to bring the Lutherans back to the fold by means of a compromise formulated by a council.

Between 1521 and 1555 the Lutherans skilfully exploited the external difficulties of the Emperor and his brother to extract concession after concession. Dr. Fischer-Galati has also skilfully disentangled, from original documents, the threads of a story of war, intrigues, and parleys. With infinite care he has re-woven a neat tapestry that should afford instruction as well as pleasure to the serious student of history.

Having expressed his appreciation of the book, the reviewer may be permitted one or two critical remarks. Both the title and the subject-matter seem to require a little exploration of Turkish sources, if not contemporary sources at least some modern books. Of the subjects dealt with in this monograph, and for which some reference to Turkish sources seems necessary, the following may be mentioned: Ferdinand's frequent despatch of special ambassadors (pp. 38-39, 47, 108) and Charles's embassy (p. 60) to the Sultan. Similarly the statement (p. 97) that "financial difficulties" were, among others, responsible for the relaxation, for some time, of Ottoman pressure in Central Europe.

But the author in this question of Turkish sources is in good company. Learned works by professional Western historians do still ignore what the Turkish side has to say on so many problems where Ottoman and European accounts, one suspects, cannot be identical. The language barrier is, of course, formidable, but need it remain for ever unsurmountable?

In a very well-documented work it is perhaps too exacting to ask for more. But surely it would have been no difficult task to supply an additional foot-note to the paragraph on pages 9-10 to specify some of the German "pamphlets condemning the conquerors for their religion rather than their aggressions," or some of the products of "the intellectuals (who) became vociferous in their demands for action against the Turks." Another foot-note to page 50 would have been useful. Some of the German literature on the *Landfriede*, the contribution in aid of the fight against the Turks, might have been cited.

One last remark. It seems to be a slip, in a scholarly work not concerned with moral judgment, to use the word "enslavement" in connection with the Ottoman penetration of the Balkan Peninsula (p. 9).

A. L. TIBAWI.

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**The Soviet Union and the Middle East.** By Walter Z. Laqueur. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Pp. x + 360. Index. 35s.

Mr. Walter Laqueur has already made his reputation as an authority on the Middle East and in particular on the social forces which have been emerging in recent decades. In *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* he discusses the impact of Soviet communism upon the area with the same lucidity of mind and expression that distinguished his earlier writings.

The volume is in two parts. In the first, "The Soviet Image of the Middle East," he shows how, after the revolution, the Russians were for many years groping for a policy, and without great success. The Middle East was, in any case, for long only of secondary interest to them—a situation which, as Mr. Laqueur notes, could con-

civably recur. During this period ideological experts were hard at work with their theories and disputes which, to be frank, are not always such as to hold the layman's keenest attention. Mr. Laqueur is doubtless right in saying that "all attempts to account for Soviet foreign policy without due regard to the ideological factor are ultimately sterile." Nevertheless, the layman may be excused if he finds difficulty in appreciating the purpose or at any rate the result of the experts' labours. It would appear rather that the Soviet authorities determined their policy on purely realistic grounds and the experts' chief job was to justify it in Marxist terms. Few of them seem to have given satisfaction for long if one is to judge by the number who came to a bad end.

The second part of the volume is subtitled "The Great Breakthrough." It is convenient to date its beginning from the radical change in Soviet foreign policy after Stalin's death. But Mr. Laqueur gives good reasons for his belief that the initiative came from Cairo and Damascus as much as from Moscow. For not only were the Arab nationalists of the new generation eager to turn in any direction for support against the West (a few years earlier they had turned to the Nazis), but the disintegration of the old order had created a spiritual vacuum which Soviet Russia, now enjoying unrivalled prestige, was ideally placed to fill. For the Russians this involved a change of tactics. Up till then they had frowned on "bourgeois nationalism" and it was still some time before they were ready to abandon their reserve. Mr. Laqueur traces the steps by which they overcame their scruples until they emerged as the knight in shining armour, upholding the cause of Arab nationalism against all opponents.

He makes the interesting suggestion that the Soviet leaders were encouraged in their course by the conviction that the nationalists would be incapable of solving the basic internal problems of the Arab world, thus leaving one way open for real communist régimes to emerge. In the meantime "bourgeois nationalism" served the Russians' purpose very well by being a thorn in the flesh of the Western Powers; but they did not and do not mean it to last for ever, and sooner or later a clash may be expected, though the Russians will be in no hurry to force the pace. Mr. Laqueur himself seems to go along with much of this reasoning. At any rate he believes the social issues in the Middle East to be so formidable and urgent that a mere nationalist movement with no clear social ideas can hardly hope to solve them.

Two comments may, perhaps, here be offered. First, are the social problems of the Middle East really so urgent that they are likely to upset well-established military régimes? In discussing the likely effect of Soviet economic penetration, Mr. Laqueur remarks that the very backwardness of the countries concerned is some defence against economic pressure. Might it not also be a defence against social pressure on the bourgeois leaders? Secondly, it seems possible—and this is hinted at by the author—that the Russians may have their hand forced by the age-long rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad. We ourselves, in our days of authority, found it difficult to be friends with both. Our head told us that it was Cairo that mattered, but our heart was ever straying towards Baghdad. Russians may have harder hearts, yet they, too, may find the dilemma awkward, especially if Baghdad advances towards communism, while Cairo holds back.

The great merit of Mr. Laqueur's book is that he faces the fundamental issues and discusses them with penetrating detachment. He has no axe to grind but is concerned only with seeking the truth. One may hope that his study is receiving the attention it deserves, for his subject is of outstanding importance to ourselves and to the West in general.

J. M. T.

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**A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict. The Arab Refugee Problem.**  
By Rouy E. Gabbay. Published by Librairie E. Droz, Geneva. Bibliography,  
index. Pp. 611. Swiss Frs. 50.

The author of this study, M. Rouy Gabbay, tells us in the preface that he is a Jew who was born in Baghdad and lived for five years in Israel. One should, there-



fore, first and foremost, pay tribute to the striking objectivity with which he has approached the subject of Arab-Jewish relations. It is very rarely that he glosses over points that are awkward for the Jewish case. He might, for example, have made more than a passing reference to the murder of Count Bernadotte and have recalled the circumstances in which the United Nations Assembly was persuaded to approve the partition plan in November, 1947. But these are rare exceptions. In general, he maintains a surprising impartiality, and does not hesitate to criticize the government of Israel when he thinks criticism called for. Thus he believes that they missed an opportunity for a settlement with the Arab states during 1950. This makes his strictures on the Arabs all the more impressive.

But his object is rather to explain than to criticize. He says very truly that fundamentally there is a struggle between two civilizations and the purpose of the study, to quote his own words, is "to contribute in analysing the basic components of the Arab-Jewish conflict, tracing its remote causes and describing its development since the establishment of Palestine as a political entity after the first world war."

The volume is, in fact, an exhaustive study of the Arab refugee problem. Appearing as it does during World Refugee Year it may, therefore, be held to be timely. Nevertheless, it is not a book for the layman, but essentially one for the student. Every phase and every aspect of the problem is discussed in minutest detail and there is rarely a statement without its supporting documentation in a footnote. One of the most interesting parts of the work is a discussion of the reasons which led the Arabs to flee out of Palestine. It seems to your reviewer that the author has said the last word on that controversial topic. Another controversial issue on which he throws a welcome light is the actual number of Arabs who became refugees.

A point that he never tires of stressing is the impediment to any agreement between Jews and Arabs caused by inter-Arab rivalry, first in Palestine itself during the mandate when the great Arab families were contending for power over the Arab population, and later among the independent Arab states. So long as this internecine hostility among the Arabs lasts, the prospect of any progress towards a settlement must be dim, as no Arab state dares breathe a word of compromise lest it be branded by its rivals as a traitor. The moral suggests itself that if we want stability in the Middle East, the first essential is Arab unity. That is what the Arabs all say they want. It seems to be equally a need for the West.

M. Gabbay is on surer ground when he confines himself to the problems of the Middle Eastern states themselves than when he ventures into the realm of Great Power politics, and it is perhaps a pity he added the last seven pages to his work in a section subtitled "The Big Powers and the Middle East." It is difficult for anyone who has devoted long years of study to the Middle East to refrain from offering a blue print for the solution of its problems. As with many others, M. Gabbay's suggestions reveal a certain wooliness.

He asks the Western Powers, for example, to follow a course "which understands and supports the objectives of Arab nationalism." Does he really want the West to support the destruction of Israel? And it is a little odd that after advising the West to "frankly accept the justice of Arab aspirations to self-determination, equality, and independence" (which, after all, they did some time ago), he adds that the West should "make it clear that it could not tolerate any direct or indirect military move in the area. Any such action would call for Western retaliatory steps." Has the author considered the application of this policy to, say, the quarrels between the United Arab Republic and Iraq? And how does he reconcile it with another of his injunctions, that the United Nations should be charged with the responsibility for keeping the peace between Jews and Arabs? The United Nations were not exactly enthusiastic when two Western Powers assumed that responsibility at Suez.

There is so much material in this volume that would interest the ordinary reader that one would like to see a condensed version published, omitting the details and the footnotes. If this were attempted, or if a further edition of the whole volume is contemplated, M. Gabbay will, perhaps, pardon the suggestion that it should first be revised by an Englishman. To have written the work at all is a remarkable feat of painstaking endurance. For a foreigner to have written it in English is a

*tour de force*. Nevertheless, there are too many inevitable lapses in grammar and spelling. In English we arrive "at," not "to"; we speak of "the reason why," not "for why." On every page there are these minor blemishes which, while not detracting from the sense, do impair the style.

J. M. T.

**History and Tribes of Jordan.** By F. G. Peake. Published by University of Miami Press. Pp. 253. Maps.

Colonel Peake passed more than seventeen years in what was then called Trans-Jordan, eventually returning to England in April, 1939. For many years he spent a large part of his leisure compiling historical, geographical, and sociological information about the country and its people. His typescript was finished before he left Trans-Jordan and was translated into, and published in, Arabic. The English text, however, has had to wait twenty years until it was produced by the University of Miami Press, through the efforts of Mr. Henry Field.

Peake Pasha's work is divided into two parts. In the first he deals with the history of the territory now known as Jordan, from pre-historic times until 1956, the final pages having been added after his return to England. Chapters deal with the arrival of Israel in the Holy Land, with the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian Imperial régimes, then the Greek and Roman, the Muslim conquest, the Turks, and finally the British mandate. This portion is a mine of curious and interesting information, much of it about obscure periods of history rarely treated in English historical works. The narrative is supported by copious notes which, in themselves, constitute a useful bibliography for the student. Some of the notes, indeed, are so long that the information which they contain might, perhaps, have been better incorporated in the text.

To those who know Jordan and Palestine, the book can scarcely fail to give pleasure, for it throws a vivid historical light on many features of the country still visible today. In Jordan, almost every other village owes its name to some forgotten language or past empire, every hill and valley has seen the march of great armies or has been the site of ancient battles which decided the fate of empires long ago.

To those who know Jordan, and are familiar with the places where the events described were enacted, the narrative cannot fail to bring delight. But the absence of maps to illustrate the events enumerated, will probably greatly reduce the interest of those readers who are unfamiliar with the country.

To write a history of Jordan covering thousands of years is, in a sense, an impossible task, for Jordan, as it is today, has had no continuous history. The boundaries of all the states in the area have varied unendingly, so that at times the area of modern Jordan has been divided into half a dozen little rival states, whereas at other periods the whole of Jordan as it is today has been a minor province of a great empire. It is thus impossible to write a history of Jordan without becoming involved in that of the Middle East as a whole. As a result, although Colonel Peake emphasizes events which took place in the country which is now Jordan, he treats also of the wider historical events which involved all of what are now called the Arab countries.

The second part of the book is entirely devoted to the tribes and villages of Trans-Jordan as they are today. These chapters descend into details not only of tribes, but even of families, in a manner which gives eloquent witness to Colonel Peake's care and perseverance. To such as can wade through them, they afford many interesting sidelights into the life of the country during the period of Turkish supremacy, the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, during which little contribution was made to world history by the Arab countries.

In brief, the first part of Colonel Peake's book should be a *sine qua non* as a source of information and reference to Middle East students or to European residents in Jordan. The second portion will be of less general interest, but will be used for reference in historical research or by residents in Jordan who are really interested in the country.

J. B. GLUBB.

**Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868.** A contemporary account by Antūn Dāhir al-'Aqīqi, and other documents translated by Malcolm H. Kerr. Published by the American University of Beirut, 1959. Pp. 159. Index.

This book consists of three parts. First, there is an introductory commentary by the translator; secondly, an historical narrative by Antūn Dāhir al-'Aqīqi; and thirdly, some letters found in the Maronite Patriarchal residence at Dair Bkirki. The translation of the last two parts reads very smoothly.

Everyone knows of the Druse massacres in 1860 in the Lebanon, but not everyone knows of the social and political disintegration which preceded them. Mr. Kerr maintains that at that time the issues of feudalism were more important than inter-sectarian relations, and thinks it probable that more significance attached to the Maronite clergy in their rôle of rivals to feudal authority than in their rôle as champions of the Maronites against the Druses. It is an interesting thesis, which one would like to see developed more fully: Mr. Kerr appears inclined to believe that the publication of French diplomatic archives and other contemporary documents would support his view.

It is salutary to be reminded that Egyptian rule in the Lebanon, during which some members of the Shihab family (the present President of the Lebanese Republic is of that family) were converted from Islam to Christianity, greatly improved the lot of Christians in the Lebanon. Britain and other European states opposed the Egyptian, Ibrahim, while France supported him. But Mr. Kerr indulges in no facile generalizations: he nowhere suggests, for instance, that the British were upholding feudalism in the Lebanon while the French advocated peasant proprietorship. The author adheres in a scholarly way to that part of the Lebanon—Kisrawan—and to the years indicated in the title of his book.

Those who have known the Lebanon since the end of the First World War will not be surprised by the recurring mention of bribery and corruption in these pages, nor by reference to the effects of araq and wine. The independent Lebanese Republic had indeed to survive much dismal history, the legacy of which may not even yet be entirely dispelled, before it attained its present position.

**Sun and Shadow at Aswan.** By Herbert Addison. Chapman and Hall. 1959. Pp. 166. 18s. Indexed and illustrated.

Mr. Addison's book could well be called a literary "photomontage." His style is informal as he displays before us reminiscence merging into scientific fact, facts giving way to philosophic quotations, or snapshots of his youth, and character sketches of the great founders of the first Aswan Dam.

All the pictures are linked to the central subject, the Aswan Dam, begun in 1898 and twice heightened, in 1912 and in 1933. All these pictures are steeped in the author's own enthusiasm for hydraulic engineering in general and for this special dam in particular.

Now that the preparations for the early stages of the new Aswan High Dam are actually in process (some four miles south of the old dam) it is interesting to be led back, by so authoritative a guide, to the engineering feat of sixty years ago. Mr. Addison tells us how personal conflicts raged round the working of the dam at a certain point in its history. An Englishman and a Scotsman, though men of greatness in many ways, yet waged a feud of such intensity that legal proceedings had to be taken in an endeavour to sift truth from falsehood, libel from fact.

Today, as the world views the possible emergence of the far vaster High Dam, the conflicts which surround it are ideological. "It was not my idea to write a controversial book," says Mr. Addison, "but since I was told that people are more interested in the clash of ideas than in a straight tale, I have done my best to oblige." Some readers might have liked more on this clash of ideas. For today, though a great dam can be conceived, and immense constructional and financial power can bring it to birth, yet its ultimate use is dependent on what global idea

rules the hearts and minds which control it. Ideology is the significant issue to which financial and political considerations are subordinate.

Mr. Addison's book mostly looks to the past, but it is important reading in as much as it stimulates a forward look at that vital part of the world where relationships between the United Arab Republic and the West may in part determine the future freedom of both.

The author pays tribute to the Upper Egypt workmen labouring on the dam at the close of the last century who "displayed the strength and endurance that had made them world famous." It is interesting to note in passing that the Egyptian weekly illustrated paper, *el Mussawar*, of November 20, 1959, showed photographs of these men's grandsons now at work on the High Dam—"with their faces glowing with health and large-heartedness," runs the caption.

There are two small errors, presumably over-looked in the proof reading, for the author would never have called the President of the U.A.R. Abdul Gamal Nasser (p. 119); and Sharia Gameh Kharkass should read Sharia Gameh Sharkass, the street of the Circaasian mosque (p. 77). The fact that Mr. Addison alludes to the big Nile boats for merchandise as "gyassas," not "fellucas" (the word often used loosely by the English) shows that he is at home in the Egyptian idiom.

The book has interesting illustrations, sketch maps, diagrams and an index.

M. ROWLATT.

### **Bankers and Pashas.** International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt.

By David S. Landes. Heinemann. 1958. Illustrated. Pp. 344. 30s.

The author, who is Associate Professor of Economics at Columbia University, bases his book on correspondence during the years 1858-1868, between Alfred André, an international financier in Paris, and Edouard Dervieu, private banker to the Viceroy of Egypt.

On this thread he strings his historical facts so as to form a thought-provoking pattern. He uses known facts about Said, Ismail, de Lesseps, and Nubar, about the chorus of concession-hunters and cacophany of consuls in nineteenth-century Egypt. But he also introduces lesser-known factors and personalities—Dervieu and André themselves, Henry Oppenheim, Jules Pastré, and their significant affairs.

Professor Landes is a scholar. He does his work thoroughly. The footnotes at times cover a greater part of the page than does the text. The first seventy pages of his book deal with the Middle East and European financial scene in general. Then, under the heading "Klondyke on the Nile," he dives into the full turmoil of Said's financial Egypt, and on into Ismail's day amid the welter of shady loans, debt dodging, dubious claims and counter-claims, and the games of double- or treble-crossing. Some early facts of the Suez Canal construction are here brought to light.

The character sketches which emerge through the feverish scene are of great interest. We see Europeans, some of them men of faith and standards, yet who think nothing incongruous in having two codes of behaviour, one of integrity among themselves, and one of "justified" extortion towards Egypt and its citizens.

"The historian is compelled to recognize," writes the author, "that most of the business community in Egypt was honestly upright in its own eyes; and it is this combination of matter-of-fact and apparently unprincipled exploitation with clear untroubled consciences that is, perhaps, the most striking aspect of relationships between the foreign colony and its diplomatic representatives on the one hand, and the native population and the government on the other." ". . . it was the imposition of inferior social and moral status that shaped the reaction of the Egyptian to the European. . . . The fact remains, however, that in the many-sided impact of imperialism, it is the injury to self-respect that hurts most."

This book, with its meticulously documented sources (from private and public archives), should be widely read and the implications studied. Not all who express themselves freely on the mid-twentieth-century Egypt know much about the mid-

nineteenth-century scene. A great deal of today *can* be clarified when seen in the light of yesterday.

If we Westerners of today can, with grace, acknowledge these truths then they can never be a weapon in the hands of communists, but if we are blind to the facts, through having no ideology ourselves, then our past can be mercilessly used by Russia, which has an ideology.

The publisher's blurb inside the jacket calls this book "exciting"; "absorbing" but "enlightening" would do it more justice. It is well produced and has a minimum of debatable points—three to be exact. Of Maximos Sakakini, Cairo agent for Dervieu, the author says: "Although presumably Greek, he is not mentioned in Politis, *Hellénisme*," p. 149, n. 4. Are not the Cairo Sakakini's Syrian? The name is Arabic. Mr. Habib Sakakini and others of the family still live there. One of the illustrations of the book is the reproduction of an early Victorian picture of a station on the Cairo-Suez Overland Route; part of the caption reads: "Note the carrion birds on the roof." To the reviewer they look indistinguishable from homely beledi pigeons perching on the flat roof of the khan immediately above the travellers' heads. And lastly, a description of Alexandria in the 1860s includes the words, "not a monument preserved from the great city of Alexander, not a turret or a minaret from the golden age of Islam." What about the fine fifteenth-century minaret of Qait Bey on Cape Pharos, overlooking the eastern harbour? It was later destroyed by British shelling in 1882.

Professor Landes' style is polished, yet virile. He includes appendices showing Egyptian cotton prices and output, state finances, and public loans during the era under discussion. Bibliographical notes and a good index complete the book.

M. ROWLATT.

**The Tales of Marzuban.** Translated from the Persian by Reuben Levy. Thames and Hudson. Pp. 254. 25s.

*The Mürzübān Nāmeḥ* is one of the least well-known Persian classics outside Iran. It is not an easy work for the foreigner to read. Indeed, it probably presents difficulties for the average Iranian reader of today: a knowledge of Arabic is essential for savouring the full import of many of its words, and familiarity with the *Qorān* helps to make many of the allusions clear. While some Persian compositions have been so stamped with the universally-accepted seal of genius, or, in one instance, so transmitted into another tongue by genius, that they have become known in other lands, the *Mürzübān Nāma* has had to wait a century after the publication of Fitzgerald's translations from *Omar Khayyām* before being introduced to foreign readers for the first time. It lacks the sheer power or universality of the poetry of Ḥāfiz, Sa'di or Rumi and is not one of those historical annals that attract those seekers after knowledge of the past of other lands who pass by poetry, but are eager to read social and political records. But it has an abundance of grace, and it is grace akin to that of great Persian poetry. The hunter's vision when he found the gazelle caught in his net—*dār chāshmāsh khayāl-i-ghāzmāzch-ye-khübān dīdī gāh hār gārdānāsh zivār-i-husn-i-dilbārān bāstī*: "Now," in Professor Levy's translation, "he fancied that he saw the languorous glance of some lovely maid, now he ascribed to her neck the beauty of some ravisher of hearts,"—has the same kind of lyrical charm as that of the poetry. It is a grace which springs from the same capacity to invest one object or gesture of arresting beauty with the transposed beauty of other beautiful creatures or movements, and which is founded in the belief that beauty reflects some higher good. It is also related to the grace of the miniature. It is the power of the miniaturist, to petrify for us and yet leave vital the movement of men and beasts, which these words immediately evoke: *āhu'ī dār dām uftād bichāreh dār dām miṭāpīd vā bār khud mipīchīd vā āz hār jānīb nigāh mīkārde*: in Professor Levy's words, "into the snare . . . a gazelle stumbled. There the unhappy creature struggled and floundered, looking on every side for help, . . ."

Thus the *Mürzübān Nāma* is thoroughly part of the kind of artistic contribution typical of Iran. Though in prose, it breathes the spirit of the poetry. Though in

words, it is full of the lineaments of the miniature. And the whole is as vivid in colour and as exquisite in design as a Persian carpet.

Leaving aside the question of a common source of inspiration for the different forms of Persian art in the Iranians' longing for an ideal harmony in a state of grace from which man has fallen, or from which the souls of men are temporarily suffering separation, coming down to more immediate details, we find that the harshness and cragged indelicacy of much of the Iranian landscape, coupled with the clear light of its high altitude, invest a tree, a flower, a bird, or a pool of water with a peculiar significance. This ineradicable lustre, assumed by the smallest object of beauty in a land often so pitiless, is reproduced by the Iranian artist, whatever his medium. The patterns and colours of nature, the movements and glances of living creatures, spellbind him into a state in which he can recapture them in the intricacies of a carpet design, in the images of speech, in the very order of words. The result is an artistry unique among mankind and to which the *Märzubän Nāma* is yet another testimony.

It is also an important book for those who do not seek only to revel in the word and sound patterns, or the images, of Persian speech and writing. For the enquirer into Persian religious psychology it contains ample evidence of what concepts of religion and ethics exist among a people who are the heirs to some and the originators of others of the great religious forces of the Near East, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; not to mention numerous other fermentations of religious genius, the particulars of which are less well known. There is a great deal in the work Professor Levy has translated to interest the student of religions; not least its frequent hints of Manichaeism.

As for the student of political and social history, let him not concentrate too exclusively on the great Histories to be found in Persian. On every page of the *Tales of Marzuban* is evidence of that phenomenon of Persian society and politics with proofs of which Persian literature is so sadly replete: the lack of justice and the craving for it of a people languishing under the caprices of despotic power. The stories were told to inculcate a sense of responsibility in rulers and their minions, whom they remind repeatedly of the evil consequences of tyranny. They also emphasize the virtues of disinterested friendship and of fair-dealing. Neither of these are common in an oppressed society. In his Preface, Professor Levy observes that "elaborate imagery and embroidered speech" were necessary to hold the attention of audiences who did not read the tales, but heard them. It should be added that these devices were also necessary to cushion the impact of truths and admonitions on potentates whose wrath might otherwise have been aroused and who visited anger on their victims cruelly and swiftly.

Professor Levy's translation is so competent that trying to compare it with the original in an effort to find errors is a task soon abandoned. Such a comparison is disagreeable in a work of so much excellence. It leads to utter beguilement in revisiting the beauties of the Persian original, and to the conclusion that Professor Levy, despite one apparent lapse over the word *dehqān*, is a gifted translator. But, alas, his work is not so beguiling as the Persian: it gives rise to thoughts which cannot be pursued here, about how far the beauty of a Persian book like the *Märzubän Nāmah* can ever be justly reflected in another language. A detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of Professor Levy's version would have to be part of a study of the problems of translation in general, and of translation from a language like the Persian in particular. Here an end must be made of the matter by saying that Professor Levy has produced a readable book without any serious injustice to the original; and that it is obviously the result of very considerable scholarship happily combined with not inconsiderable urbanity.

Only in the first paragraph of the Preface do his scholarly discrimination and civilized perception appear to desert the translator, where he says the wisdom of the *Tales* was "wrapped in entertaining material to make it palatable to hearers who must, by modern standards, be regarded as unsophisticated." It could only be some kind of unnecessary modesty which made a man who had devoted his time to such a laudable project as this translation seek in this way to decry the cultural environment in which the work of his choice had come to life. The work in question is one of the most sophisticated compositions ever written. As it was clearly written

for public utterance and has survived as one of the great classics of the Persian language, it must have been written for a highly sophisticated people. If it cannot be appreciated by us, this is not because we are more sophisticated, but because we are not sophisticated enough, though the word sophisticated can be taken in one of several ways. P. W. A.

**Human Relations Area Files Incorporated.** Subcontractor's Monograph. **Afghanistan.** Edited by Donald N. Wilber (1956). 2 vols. Indexed. 460 and 842 pages..

Although it is not very easy, when encountering the above title for the first time, to make out what it is all about, investigation shows that H.R.A.F. Inc. is a company or society with headquarters at Newhaven, Connecticut, which publishes a large number of monographs on various and, for the most part, little-known countries. The monograph under review is the 53rd of the series. It consists of an exhaustive study of every possible aspect of Afghanistan and the Afghans under three main heads: Sociological, Political, and Economic, which are themselves divided into an aggregate of thirty-two subheadings. There are 842 pages in the two volumes of this small, loose-leaved, close-printed production.

The value of a handbook of this nature depends on the degree of reliability to be attached to the contributors. The names of these are given in the preface, and they would appear to have adequate enough credentials for the task. In addition to their own personal knowledge of the Afghan country and people, they have hit on the ingenious, if slightly hazardous, expedient of enlisting the help of Afghan students working in the United States. Fifteen interviews with these young men, studying in various institutions in America, were undertaken with the object of probing into the little-known but vital field of sociology. In addition bibliographies given at the close of each section include a majority of the standard works on the various aspects of the subject; works which, to judge by an occasional familiar ring in the phrasing of a sentence in the handbook, appear to have been carefully studied. The general outcome is a valuable compilation, which should give any student a very useful background to Afghanistan and its people.

Sociology takes up the whole of the first volume, and includes a description of the general characteristics of Afghan society, a brief historical background, the ethnical grouping of the country, a detailed description of family life and patterns of living, the arts, education, religion, public information, general labour questions and public welfare. Although the authors are, on the whole, very candid in their observations, there is a tendency here to convey the impression that the Afghans do live up to the high ideals set before them by their religion and their customary law, whereas, in fact, they are no less prone than other nations to shortcomings in these respects. Again in discussing "Cultural themes and Goals," the book is somewhat misleading. It opens with the statement: "Afghanistan is a unique country with a unique people," which is, no doubt, true, but it is also true of any other country in the world. Perhaps the authors would have conveyed their meaning more justly if they had written: "All countries are unique, but some of them—and Afghanistan is one—are more unique than others."

There is also a reference here, and elsewhere in the book, to the "glorious ancient past" of Afghanistan and its people. It is, of course, a common and harmless weakness in an individual and a nation to seek for and dwell on renowned ancestors. But it is quite another thing for an authoritative and objective handbook to give weight to such traditions, which, so far as the present occupants are concerned, seem to have little or no basis in fact. It is strange also to note in this connection that, in the Historical section, the one great feat of arms which might have laid for the Afghans the foundation for a glorious, if not yet truly ancient past, is omitted. This section has, perforce, to be brief, but the victory of Ahmad Shah Durrani over the Maharattas, in 1761, on the historic field of Panipat outside Delhi, ranks with Gettysburg and Alamein among the decisive battles of the world, and should surely find a place in any account, however brief, of the Afghan people.

These are, however, among the very few criticisms which can be offered in

surveying this exhaustive treatise on one aspect of Afghan society and the country they live in.

The Political section is no less detailed, though at times inclined to be repetitive. The section opens with another historical review, which, though written from a different angle, is rather confusing and liable to give rise to unnecessary mistakes. For instance in Vol. I Mahmud of Ghazni came to power in A.D. 997, and in Vol. II in 988. The question is never likely to be of importance, and in any case no two authorities appear to agree in the matter, but it is always advisable in such cases to stick to the same figure throughout any one publication.

Again under political dynamics we have a rapid glance at the banking system. The same subject reappears briefly under the Agricultural Potential sub-section of the Economic section, and later is treated exhaustively under the Public Finance and Banking and Currency sub-sections. It is at times a little bewildering.

Under the Political section there is a detailed survey of the Constitution, followed by an account of the Structure of Government, which ends with some pungent remarks about the shortcomings of Afghan civil servants. We then pass to Public Order and Safety, and so to Foreign Relations, and the vexed issue of Pushtunistan, ending with Subversive Potentialities, Propaganda questions and brief Biographies of key personalities.

The Economic section is full of interesting matter on the development of Afghan trade, on the economics of agriculture, on roads and transport, on the development of textile industries and kindred subjects. There is a long and interesting account of the Helmand Valley Project, which neither overestimates American achievement, nor underestimates the appalling difficulties, both human and natural, with which the American contractors, Morrison-Knudsen, were faced. The development of the resources of the Helmand Basin is undoubtedly a great engineering achievement; whether it will bring in a return in any way commensurate with the resources and expenditure lavished on it, is another matter.

Finally it must be pointed out that, though much of this handbook is of lasting value, a good deal of it requires constant revision and reappraisal, like all handbooks of this type. The volumes under review were published in 1956, and the material of which they are composed dates from 1955. Much has happened since then inside Afghanistan, as elsewhere, and a new edition is obviously required.

W. K. F.T.

**The Foundation of Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1638-1658.** By K. W. Goonewardena. Under the Auspices of the Netherlands Institute for International Cultural Relations. Amsterdam, Djambatan. 1958. Pp. xx + 196. Maps and illustrations. Dfl. 30 (57s.).

**Dutch Power in Ceylon, 1658-1687.** By S. Arasaratnam. Under the Auspices of the Netherlands Institute for International Cultural Relations. Amsterdam, Djambatan, 1958. Pp. xxii + 246. Maps and illustrations. Dfl. 32 (60s.).

The Dutch period in Ceylon lasted for nearly 160 years, is of great intrinsic interest, and had influences on Ceylonese society which have lasted until the present day; but it has hardly received the attention from historians that its interest and its importance deserve. P. E. Pieris, it is true, wrote a book entitled *Ceylon and the Hollanders* and also published translations of some of the Dutch archives that are preserved in London, while R. G. Anthonisz' *The Dutch in Ceylon, Early Visits and Settlements in the Island* has something of interest to say about the earlier part of Dutch times. But these and other historians have lacked access to most of the great mass of archives preserved in the Algemeen Rijksarchief at The Hague.

It is therefore very welcome news that two Ceylonese historians, Lecturers at the University of Ceylon, have now had access to these archives and have written books covering respectively the period from 1638-1658, during which the Dutch were struggling for power with the Portuguese in the lowlands of Ceylon, and the period 1658-1687, during which the Dutch, having expelled the Portuguese, were mainly



concerned with the consolidation of their power and of their trade in the face of the hostility of Raja Sinha II, the Kandyan Sinhalese king.

Dr. K. W. Goonewardena, the author of the first book, begins with a brief review of the Portuguese period, but is mainly concerned with the way in which the Sinhalese king, Raja Sinha II, "gave pepper and took ginger," as the Sinhalese proverb has it: in other words, the way in which he got rid of the Portuguese by enlisting the aid of the Dutch, only to find that he had succeeded in establishing in his kingdom a power more formidable than the Portuguese which was, in fact, never dislodged either by him or by his successors. Dr. Goonewardena is at pains to show that the Dutch, although ostensibly aiding the king, were in fact consistently feathering their own nest and that, in the course of doing so, they were often guilty of deceit and duplicity. To a reviewer who is not a professional historian, it appears that he has often made out his case but that there are times when he jumps to conclusions. Dr. Goonewardena's history is, in the nature of things, mainly diplomatic and military in character, though the commercial motives of the Dutch East India Company colour the narrative throughout.

Dr. Arasaratnam's work takes the story on to the death of Raja Sinha in 1687. His first five chapters are concerned with Dutch efforts to consolidate the position they had won while ostensibly aiding Raja Sinha. There was much ebb and flow in the relations between Dutch and Sinhalese. Under the remarkable Commissary and Superintendent, Admiral Rijkloff Van Goens, who often pursued a policy independent of Batavia, the territory under Dutch control expanded. This led to financial difficulties, criticisms from Batavia, and, eventually, to retaliation on the part of Raja Sinha in the period 1670-1676, which, though it did not regain much territory for him, certainly embarrassed the Dutch and increased their economic difficulties. Thereafter the group in Batavia that was opposed to Van Goens' expansionism prevailed, and it was decided to try and come to terms with Raja Sinha and to concentrate on the cinnamon trade, eschewing unnecessary military conquests. But by this time (1682) Raja Sinha was a very old man, well over 80, and, as Dr. Arasaratnam says, "Dutch-Kandyan relations fizzle out," through cautious retrenchment on the one hand, and senile inaction on the other. Dr. Arasaratnam tells his tale well, draws a firm picture of the two main characters, Van Goens and Raja Sinha, and so far as one can judge, only concludes what he can support.

The second half of his book analyses a number of separate aspects of Dutch policy and activity, such as administration, economic affairs, trade, the cinnamon industry, policy towards colonization by Europeans, religious policy, and the impact of the Dutch on society. Much of all this is intensely interesting to the student of Ceylon as it was later and, indeed, as it is today.

Both authors include an adequate critique of the sources available to them and stress the unfortunate absence of Kandyan archives; this handicaps both of them, but Dr. Arasaratnam in particular. Both highlight Raja Sinha as a remarkable man, and, making all due allowance for their patriotic enthusiasm, a remarkable man he must have been. (Their patriotism is, it should be said, of a most moderate variety on the whole.) Both show how well-matched were Sinhalese, Portuguese, and Dutch in military terms, a point we too often lose sight of. What went against Raja Sinha was, of course, his lack of sea-power.

Both books are very well produced and illustrated with maps that, on the whole, are adequate to their purpose. Both books are written in good English, apart from occasional Ceylonisms and too liberal a sprinkling of commas. Both, however, suffer from careless proof-reading: there are far too many typographical errors.

Certainly the sponsors, publishers and authors of these two books are to be congratulated on their enterprise and energy. One hopes that these two authors, or others, will go on to exploit the riches of the Rijksarchief and to give us an equally refreshing reassessment of later phases of the Dutch period in Ceylon.

B. H. FARMER.

**The Junkman Smiles.** By G. R. G. Worcester. Chatto and Windus, London. Pp. 254. 8 Plates, drawings and map by the author. 21s.

This book was reviewed by Cliff Michelmore on TV in "Tonight" and the film of the Yangtze Gorges shown at the same time must have revealed to millions the beauty of that wonderful part of China where the author spent much of his interesting, useful, and successful career in the Marine Department of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service.

Mr. Worcester tells the story of how, under the various Inspectors General, Sir Robert Hart, Sir Francis Aglen, and especially Sir Frederick Maze, the dangerous coast of China was provided with a magnificent system of lighthouses, radio beacons, and typhoon warnings. But the author's activities were mainly devoted to the Upper Yangtze, which river was opened by the Customs Service (1954-1950) to steam navigation, for no less than 1,500 miles. Surveying the Gorges, especially the clearing and marking of a safe channel, entailed years of arduous, lonely, and dangerous work. The channel to be used had to be selected, but, above all, rocks outside this channel, rocks that hold the water back and help to keep the river deep, had to be left; otherwise for one rock blown up, a dozen formerly innocuous ones would become a menace. Apart from the dangers of cataracts, whirlpools, and sudden storms, there were the dangers of the endless civil wars and the eternal bandits. However, Mr. Worcester went fully armed, though not with a revolver but with his disarming smile, with his courage, patience, and sense of fun, and with his eyes wide open.

By 1950, when the last foreigners (60 per cent. British) left the employment of the Chinese Government which had gone communist a year before, the efforts of the author and his colleagues of many nationalities, had made travelling on the Yangtze by junk or steamer safe, and the disasters formerly involving thousands of lives annually had been reduced to the loss of a few individuals; and cheap freight rates enabled the wealth of the world and of Szechuan, China's richest province, to be exchanged for the benefit of all.

But unhappily today, steamers have nearly all disappeared from the Yangtze, not a single chart of even the entrance to Shanghai has been printed by the communists since they came to power ten years ago, the lighthouses (apart from twenty-six serviced from Formosa) have nearly all ceased to work, the Quarantine Service has become a farce; and, in short, the work of a hundred years appears to have been wasted. However, the author realizes that the efforts of few of us last for very long, and he remains sensibly content in the knowledge that his labours have assisted his contemporaries, not only the few thousands of old China hands, but the millions of the Chinese people he was happy to serve.

This book is packed with funny stories, with Chinese lore, and with history, but perhaps the compelling reason for buying this book is, in your critic's opinion, the author's true appreciation of the Chinese character. Men who have lived close to the people themselves, who have had to control them, to get them to face hardships and dangers, and to induce them to contribute their share, realize that a people's character is revealed better by their blank stare when they are asked to return a dollar they happen to owe, rather than by their charming smile when presented with a free school or hospital, or with a fat cheque for flood relief.

The publishers and printers have given us an exceptionally beautiful book at moderate cost. But let your critic end on a sour note! When will authors take the trouble to put all the places they mention in the text on the maps they otherwise so kindly provide?

ROLLA ROUSE.

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**Chinese Art and Culture.** By Rene Grousset. Published by André Deutsch. 55s.

"What a very beautiful book" is your reviewer's first reaction to this attractive volume.

The author first defines China, its isolation, originality, and civilized foundation, and leads one through the neolithic age into the Shang dynasty of the fourteenth

to twelfth centuries B.C. Here we are shown the bronzes of that period, ceremonial and ritual vessels, mirrors—the ancestors of later examples of porcelain.

The period of the Warring States was not too disturbed to produce the poetry of Chü Yüan (350-295 B.C.), the historical documents described in the "Spring and Autumn Annuals." This chronicle of the principality of Lu, the birthplace of Confucius, is an historical account of China from 722 to 450 B.C.

221 B.C. saw the founding of the Empire and the beginnings of Chinese unity, a unity which lasted for twenty-one centuries. The coming of the Hans and their creative art of carved stone and vivid earthenware figures, terra cotta statuettes of animal and human figures, of which many examples exist today and bring to mind with a "vivant" quality the art of the period. How fortunate that the museums of the world house examples of the art of such gems of craftsmanship and that such men as Rene Grousset have given of their knowledge and time to writing of and describing them.

When we depart from the Tang period we are led into that Paradisical period of the Sung. It is difficult to think of anything more satisfying to the eye than the monochromes of this period which depended entirely on shape and colour for their ineffable beauty.

The author says, "Sung pottery is the most beautiful and perfect of all time," and it would be a bold man who questioned this pronouncement.

There are, no doubt, many who admire the ceramics of the Ming Period, and fortunate is he who possesses examples of this great period, but, beautiful though the Ming colours of green, yellow, aubergine, turquoise, and cobalt blue may be, they cannot vie with the purity of the Sung monochromes.

The translation from the French by Haakon Chevalier is extremely good—one never feels that the script is not in its original tongue. How immensely is this helped by the super-excellent reproduction of the coloured plates and the black and white illustrations. The publishers are to be congratulated on having secured the services of a firm of Italian printers whose work is worthy of high praise. This is a book to own, not to borrow or lend, to which one can refer for refreshment to the soul.

H. ST. C. S.

## An Early Victorian Family in Bombay

Looking through old family correspondence, Miss Mary Rowlatt has found the following account of her great grandparents' voyage to Bombay in 1844 and their description of family life out there at the time.

**I**N 1844 my great grandfather decided to cut loose from the Levant trading firm of Samuel Briggs & Co., leave Alexandria where he had worked for many years, and seek a new career with an East Indian trading company in Bombay.

He set forth ahead of his wife to explore conditions. Being twenty-five years before the opening of the Suez Canal, the journey led up the winding Mahmoudieh Canal from Alexandria to Cairo, in real discomfort, and then across the desert from Cairo to Suez on horseback, or in rickety little carriages. He writes to his wife from "on board the Honourable East India Company's Steamer *Cleopatra* in the Red Sea. . . . I embarked on the steamer which started from Suez at half an hour after midnight and we are now progressing nicely with a fair wind and fine weather.

"My fellow passengers are very numerous and consist of Mr. Davis, Governor of Hong Kong, and his suite, merchants, officers going to re-join their regiments, young cadets and civilians, ladies going to their husbands, and young ones going out to be married to Chinese missionaries, and several Italians, and a few children, now rosy and healthy, going out, I fear, to fall victims to the climate. What a change will not a few years produce! A few may soon become wealthy, but now many will die either by disease or by the hand of an enemy; or return to England with loss of health and disappointment in their expectations.

"The weather is becoming very hot so that I shall be obliged, in a day or two, to put off my cloth clothing. The steamer is crowded with passengers in a very uncomfortable manner and everything is very dirty. I am rather unwell, also from the want of a refreshing night's rest which I cannot get on my sofa berth in the saloon, and as I did not provide myself with bed linen I have to wrap myself up in my cloak. We are all obliged to turn out at half past five every morning and wash and dress in the best manner we can. I had secured a cabin berth but was obliged to turn out for one of the Governor's suite for whom the Captain had been ordered to reissue it.

"The Governor has drawn up a complaint signed by himself and by part of the passengers for insertion in *The Times*. All the Bombay passengers were sent off from Alexandria without the least attention paid to their comfort, and were huddled on board the canal steamer like cattle or slaves, without even sitting room. We were, therefore, obliged to sit up two nights. Bad provisions, wine also of the commonest description. For a bottle of common wine, which they dignified by the name of Claret they charged me 30 francs!

"Everybody on board the *Cleopatra* seems full of 'ennui' not knowing what to do to kill the time. When the nights are cool some of the young men and ladies dance on deck to some very horrid fiddling."

In spite of this unattractive picture of the journey, some months later his wife and three small children set forth to join him.

Papa wrote out many instructions and suggestions for the voyage: "You should bring a good bonnet or two for yourself, a good supply of stockings and shoes, a few pairs of good white kid gloves, a few hair brushes, a stock of soap, some Eau de Cologne for on board, and a box of biscuits for the children—and bedding for the steamer.

"I shall require a dozen new shirts, some socks, a stock or two of ties for the neck. Bring the chronometer with you, but be careful that it is packed in such a manner amongst your clothes that it will receive no knocking about. . . . I should like to have all my books here . . . bring the pistols and guns. I left a rule showing the comparisons of the foot of different nations. I should like to have that. I should like to have the cherry stick pipes and a little good tobacco. Bring the chessmen and board, and backgammon and board . . . bring my white trousers if you can do so without encumbering yourself too much." And finally—irony of irony—"do not bring more luggage than is necessary as the cost of carriage across the desert (Cairo to Suez) is very heavy."

This formidable journey was successfully accomplished without a

word of complaint from my great grandmother, though she did write back to a little daughter left at school: "You ought to be glad you remained, for I do assure you it is no joke; the heat has been killing and the passengers are ill—very ill—from the bad Suez water, which is all we get to drink. I have been very ill in my stomach with great pain, but today am better from taking camomile tea. One lady passenger thought fit to have a little girl just as we entered Aden Harbour. It was all over in an hour; I hope they will call the baby "Berenice"—the name of the steamer."

A few weeks later she was able to write: "From the back of our house we look out on the sea and the most lofty mountains on the other side of the water. The boats glide by with their lateen sails on the blue water and the elegant tall trees of the cocoanut and beetle bend backwards and forwards over the wide-spreading and beautiful trees below. I do admire Bombay," she adds, "all but the people—that is the lazy, cold, proud English. No wonder they get sick when they lounge about all day with about twenty servants to wait upon them."

This view is shared by her husband: "The system of keeping so many servants is very ridiculous," he writes, "but the only answer I can ever get to my remark is, 'you are obliged to do so—every one does, because one servant will only do one thing.' It has all originated from the indolence of the English residents, some of whom have servants to put on their stockings. I am only surprised that they do not keep servants to masticate their food for them."

A constant source of interest and delight seems to have been the pedlars who came to the door, often strangers from China or Persia, who sold all manner of things very cheaply, from kid gloves and feather boas to odds and ends of ornaments. Some curious yet apparently necessary things seemed unobtainable locally and had to be sent for from England, thus: "I fear I will have to wait for the bears grease and tooth powder a long time, as Uncle Fred has sent them round the Cape."

The joy of buying some things cheaply from pedlars was offset by the expense of various foods. "One little sponge cake of a penny is here fourpence, bad biscuits a shilling a pound. People have red herrings put on the dinner table with the sweets as a great luxury, and they are very dear. Cheese two shillings a pound, and bacon the same. . . . We never get fruit or vegetables except when we have company; potatoes are very dear. Rice and curry for ever, indeed I believe they curry all the old shoes. . . . We get a nice English baker to come and we get brown bread baked in tins, and hot rolls and muffins if we want. The children have a roll between them and as we have some Irish butter from a transport which came with troops, they enjoy their breakfast. Our great deprivation is not having fruit, no grapes, no oranges, a few bananas and not good and very dear. . . . But we all enjoy perfect health. The children gallop about the garden morning and evening, playing horses. We allow them to eat everything which is contrary to the general practice here, for children are generally kept upon chicken broth, arrowroot and other trash, and are made such little candles of, that they are, in consequence, very puny and miserable."

From 1842 to 1846 the Governor of Bombay was Sir George Arthur. My great grandmother gives an account of one of his receptions. "On the 27th the Governor gave a fête at Parell [?] to celebrate the victories at Moodhee and Treorzeshukeer. We received an invitation and though we do not care about balls, I thought it right to go as many who wished to be there were not invited. I was very glad we went, there were not many people, and a most splendid supper we had, and arrived home at about three in the morning. The gardens were illuminated and over the entrance was a V.R. and a crown. I say only two really pretty women in the room. Almost all wore white muslin dresses and coloured gauze with flowers, and ladies who did not dance, black velvet and satin with a black lace fall, and white kid half-long gloves. Although a black satin is very expensive it is always genteel and useful. I paid ten shillings a yard and sixteen shillings to the French dressmaker to get it made.

"The rooms were not at all crowded and I do not think there could be two hundred. The polka was danced in turns with quadrilles, etc. The Governor made a tolerable speech, but Sir Thomas McMahon a very good one, returning thanks in the name of the Bombay Army. Sidney [her husband] grumbled very much when it was time to dress but I think he was glad we went as it was not a general ball as we had imagined."

Life in Bombay for this happy early-Victorian family came to a sudden sad end.

"At the full of the moon I suppose the monsoon will commence in earnest. We all wish for it as cholera is about," writes my great grandmother. "Our Sais had a sister die down at our stables. Next day the man and child died. We had the house whitewashed. Our tailor's wife was attacked but he came here and I gave him some of the medicine everyone keeps in the house and she recovered immediately. Thank God we all continue in excellent health."

But in December, 1847, my great grandfather fell a victim to cholera. Not all the loving nursing of his wife, nor the medicine used so successfully with the tailor's family, could save his life. Soon after the funeral his widow with her children started the long, sad trek back to England.

## NOTICE TO MEMBERS

FOR the past few years the Journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. The Council again appeals to all members to sign this deed of covenant, and would particularly ask that those proposing candidates for election point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed.

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## CONTENTS

OFFICERS AND COUNCIL	178
ANNOUNCEMENTS AND NOTICES	179
IN MEMORIAM	180
THE UNITED NATIONS AND ASIA	181
THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.	193
THE PATTERN OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL TRAINING IN THE U.S.S.R.	206
MIDDLE EAST TRADE	222
ANNUAL MEETING	234
THE IMPACT OF THE COMMONWEALTH ON ASIA	241
ANNUAL DINNER	250
ARABIAN EXTREMITIES	260
THE INDIA-CHINA FRONTIER DISPUTE	270
INSIDE AFGHANISTAN—A BACKGROUND TO RECENT TROUBLES	286
THE ASIAN CONTAINMENT FRONT FROM TURKEY TO KOREA	296
CORRESPONDENCE	309
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	342

### REVIEWS:

Light from the Ancient Past, 310	Jungle Nurse, 324
La Peninsule Arabique, 310	Forest Adventure, 325
Le Golfe Persique, 310	Middle East Diary, 1917-1956, 325
The Union of Burma, 311	Industrialization in the Middle East, 326
Buddhism in Chinese History, 311	Persian Cities, 327
The Purple Barrier, 312	From a Persian Tea-House, 327
China in the Morning, 313	The Day of Sacrifice, 328
Impatient Giant — Red China Today, 314	Rakaposhi, 329
The Muslim Architecture of Egypt, 314	The Red Snows, 329
Caste and the Economic Frontier, 316	Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 330
Caste and Communication in an Indian Village, 316	Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917, 332
The Story of My Life, 317	Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia, 333
New Patterns of Democracy in India, 319	My Russian Journey, 334
No Purdah in Padam, 319	Hannibal — One Man Against Rome, 335
India's North-East Frontier in the Nineteenth Century, 320	Turkey's Politics, 336
India Meets China in Nepal, 321	Turkey: An Economy in Tran- sition, 337
Where the Lion Trod, 322	Yemen on the Threshold, 338
Islamic Law in the Modern World, 322	A History of Greek Fire and Gun- powder, 339
The Arabs in Israel, 323	New Fabian Colonial Essays, 340
Maronite Historians of Mediaeval Lebanon, 324	

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## ANNOUNCEMENTS

### SIR PERCY SYKES MEMORIAL MEDAL

The Council announce the award of the Sir Percy Sykes Memorial Medal to Professor Ann Katharine Swynford Lambton, O.B.E., Professor of Persian at the University of London since 1953, for her outstanding work in relation to Persia and the Persian language.

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### LAWRENCE OF ARABIA MEMORIAL MEDAL

The Council also announce the award of the Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal to Mrs. Violet Dickson, M.B.E., of Kuwait, for her notable work among the women of Eastern Arabia and her contribution to knowledge of the flora and fauna of the desert.

## NOTICES

*REVISED MEMBERS LIST.* A revised List of Members of the Royal Central Asian Society is due to appear in 1961. This list will include all Members whose subscriptions have been paid up to and including 1960. Members are asked to ensure that the Secretary is in possession of their correct designations and current addresses.

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*FOUND at the Annual Dinner.* A pair of lady's elbow-length gloves. Will the owner please apply to the Secretary.

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It is desired to improve the amenities in the Society's offices and Library. If members have any small tables, carpets, rugs or bookcases they would be willing to present, or to lend, to the Society, these would be gratefully accepted by the Secretary. Gifts of books on Asian countries would also be welcomed for the Library.

## IN MEMORIAM

ERIC HENRI KENNINGTON, R.A.

**M**ANY members of the R.C.A.S. will have seen the appreciations of Eric Kennington which appeared in the Press, e.g., *The Times* of April 16, a few days after his death. Although not a member he had a special connection with this Society. He designed the Sir Percy Sykes Medal (see R.C.A.S. Vol. XLIII, p. 217) and Lawrence of Arabia Medal (R.C.A.S. Vol. XXIII, p. 413), which are awarded for distinguished work related to Central Asia.

Kennington, a close friend of T.E.'s for fifteen years, was chief artist and art editor of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, which included many fine portraits of Arabs: he made the head of T.E. in St. Paul's crypt, and the recumbent effigy in St. Martin's Church, Wareham, in Dorset (there is a replica in the Tate). A fine pastel of the great C. M. Doughty, "headed and bearded like some renaissance Isaiah," is in the National Portrait Gallery.

Kennington was a robust open-air man himself, uncomplicated, but shrewd and very receptive, and in other circumstances might well have been a good explorer instead of an artist. This no doubt helped him to paint Arabs as individuals, and not as types. There cannot be many better portraits of Bedu than those of Auda abu Tayi, "the greatest fighting man of northern Arabia," and Nawwaf Shaalan. The work of this artist has accordingly been a direct and valuable contribution to those interests which the R.C.A.S. seeks to promote.

L. S. MORRIS.

### COLONEL D'ARCY WEATHERBE

**D**'ARCY WEATHERBE joined the Royal Central Asian Society in 1926. He left us for a short period but rejoined in 1946. He was a renowned traveller and had *walked* to many odd corners of the earth.

I knew him well when he lived in Peking and whipped in for him when he was Master of the Peking Hunt. He was a very keen sportsman, and to me, he belonged to the Elizabethan era. During the last war in Cairo at the Turf Club I saw two lions set up which had fallen to his gun. We met there and that was the last I saw of him. He did valuable work in Intelligence in the last war, and will always remain in the memory of his friends as a very gallant gentleman.

H. ST. C. S.

Obituary notices on Miss Francesca French and other distinguished members whose deaths have been reported recently will be published in the next issue.

# THE UNITED NATIONS AND ASIA

By THE RT. HON. THE LORD BIRDWOOD, M.V.O.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, February 17, 1960, Sir Olaf Caroe, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: There really is no need to introduce Lord Birdwood to members of this Society; he has been a Vice-President and a member of our Council and is also very active in the Upper House of Parliament. He was during the latter months of 1959 a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Lord Birdwood is now about to tell us of his experience and impressions, mainly in relation to Asia.

I FEEL I should begin by saying that although I went as an official delegate with the United Kingdom delegation to the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, it is in a personal capacity that I am now speaking. If it be true that "A little knowledge is a dangerous thing," then the experience of the Fourteenth Session, one session of the United Nations, means a little knowledge; and if you accept the danger of a little knowledge I shall try to paint in a few personal impressions of Asian problems at the United Nations. If any conclusions or opinions emerge, again they are my own personal views.

The Royal Central Asian Society has built up a welcome reputation for conveniently accommodating speakers who have a good deal to say about Arabs, Africans and Europeans but very little to say about Asians, certainly not about Central Asians. We might term the process that of interpreting the international scene with a breadth of vision and depth of perspective, and so on. I have profited from that process in the past and hope to do so again this afternoon. Indeed, I can do so because the label of my talk is a broad and generous one, "The United Nations in Asia" and that entitles one to talk about the Byelo-Russian Republic or Haiti. I do not, however, propose to talk about countries so distant. But I have something to say about Africa, and for two reasons.

Firstly, it so happened that, never having been to Africa, I was given the specific task to look after the three South African items, so that it would be unintelligent if I said nothing about African problems. Secondly, it is impossible in these days to discuss the United Nations without considering the position of a large, rather cumbersome but quite effective group—the Afro-Asian bloc—which is increasingly playing its part in the annual round of political poker at the Assembly. At the Fourteenth Session there were some eighty-two Member States; this year there will be eighty-six Member States.

The machinery allows for five main delegates from each State, five alternate delegates and any number of technical advisers. The British delegation are, according to tradition, extremely flexible. If a delegate is missing from his chair in a plenary meeting anyone can sit in it if he so wishes, provided he is a member of the United Kingdom delegation. The

permanent representative, Sir Pierson Dixon, is always in New York, and one or two other permanent representatives can be regarded as available to fill the seats of people like myself who happen to be away on committees. It is all extremely flexible.

Naturally, the United Kingdom delegation is bound strictly by the instructions received from Whitehall. The briefs I received on my three South African items were the result of consultation between the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, and one has in the nature of things to keep to one's brief. United Kingdom delegates are there as the mouthpiece of the policy laid down by Whitehall; and if a speaker offends do not blame the speaker, blame Whitehall.

It is fair to say that a delegation can exert its influence in an opposite direction; it can offer advice, and some delegations offer more advice than others. In some instances one has the impression that there is little advice given from a particular government to a particular delegation.

The General Assembly has seven Main Committees, and remember I shall be speaking of the Assembly, not of the permanent structures such as the Food and Agricultural Organization and the World Health Organization, both operating all the year round in various parts of the world, or the various organs of the United Nations such as the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council which, again, are permanent. The Assembly of which I am speaking can be compared to an attempt at an international Parliament.

The first happening in the Assembly is the election of a President for the year, and thirteen Vice-Presidents, and also seven Chairmen of the seven Main Committees, those twenty-one together forming the General Committee or the Steering Committee. The task of the General Committee is to allot out to the seven Main Committees the seventy or eighty items on the agenda. The election of the General Committee is no mere formality; it must be of a "representative character." It would be rather disastrous if it were, shall we say, to have an Iron Curtain bloc bias, because one would never then get such items as Hungary on the agenda.

I have time only to outline the more interesting features of one or two of the Main Committees. There is the Social Committee much concerned with human rights, sometimes known as the "Girls" Committee, presided over in 1959 by Mme. Ciselet of Belgium, and discussing social and educational matters. That Committee spent a good deal of time discussing somewhat obscure items in connection with the rights of the child. When asked how it was progressing we discovered that the Committee had not decided when the rights of the child began. On going more deeply into the question it was found that the ladies were wondering whether the rights of the child were to be post-natal or pre-natal. It does seem that one is in a topsy-turvy world when one notices a delegate from a certain Middle East country puzzling over this obscure subject, when it might be said that in his own country adult men and women had not yet received any rights at all. The Fourth Committee, the problem child of the United Nations, is perhaps the most interesting. It is sometimes known as the Trusteeship Committee and it deals with non-self-governing territories and colonial problems generally.

As the elections proceed so the General Debate starts up, providing the opportunity for any State to get its particular obsession out of its system. In the case of the Irish, the partition of Ireland; in the case of the Arabs, the existence of Israel; in the case of the Soviet Union, the non-representation of Communist China at the U.N. There is a tendency to regard the General Debate as of not much importance. In fact, it is very important because by listening carefully one can get an idea of the various attitudes States will take up, when they come to discuss matters in a Committee.

I shall hope to touch on the particular position of the Commonwealth bloc within the United Nations, but at this stage in relation to the General Debate I would only say that we obviously were waiting to hear what would be the attitude of India towards Tibet. Would Mr. Krishna Menon condemn China's action in Tibet and expose India to criticism of her part in Kashmir? Would Pakistan be prepared to keep Kashmir in cold storage for a little longer? As you probably remember, in 1954 India had signed her agreement with China renouncing extra-territorial rights in Tibet; therefore India's abstention when it came to the Tibetan item was not altogether unexpected.

Concurrently with the winding up of the General Debate, the seven Committees are starting their work. As my first preoccupation was with the item "S.W. Africa" in the Fourth Committee, it may be useful to say something of the work of that Committee, since it faithfully reflects much of the position of Asia at the United Nations in a general sense. The Fourth Committee is generally regarded as the focus of all anti-colonial obsession. For years we have attempted to resist extension of the recognized legitimate field of enquiry of the Committee into activities which are not recognized under the U.N. Charter.

For example, Article 73(e) requires that we submit information on non-self-governing territories (for information only) concerning statistical, technical, economic and educational conditions, but *not* political information.

There was a resolution in 1959 sponsored by Guinea (which in 1959 could be regarded as the *enfant terrible* of the Fourth Committee), a resolution calling on administering countries to name a date or set up a timetable for independence to be achieved in all non-self-governing territories. That resolution was resisted by certain adult countries who perhaps four or five years earlier would have supported it. In that way there is constant pressure to extend the authorized activities of the Fourth Committee into the political field and to call for action which would suit the less responsible delegations.

Hitherto we have been remarkably successful in resisting such moves and I attribute that during the last three years largely to the influence and prestige of one man, Sir Andrew Cohen, whose method is not to shun an issue. One usually associates an abstention with complete silence. In contrast, I recall an occasion when on abstention by the United Kingdom, Sir Andrew Cohen made an explanation lasting over an hour. As the result of the position Sir Andrew has built for himself, I would claim that the United Kingdom stock in the Fourth Committee is extremely high; and I claim this in spite of criticism of the United Kingdom in relation to the way in which we registered our vote last year on South African items.

Among the Powers which control colonial territories, the United Kingdom is obviously the one which commands the most respect.

As an example, there was last year a typical Fourth Committee resolution to set up a Committee of six to study the principles which would guide members in determining whether an obligation exists to transmit information called for under Article 73(e). It was aimed at the Portuguese. The Committee was to consist of three Member States who administered non-self-governing territories and three who did not. Of the three administering Powers we well headed the poll, in spite of having abstained on the resolution, which shows the influence one good man can have.

Therefore I stress that, in spite of what I have said as to delegations being guided by the policies they receive from their Governments, there is an anomaly, in that personalities do play a tremendous part in a curious manner which seems to be detached from the policies that they are instructed to present. It may be that on occasions certain delegations—and this may apply to the Afro-Asian bloc—allow their leading delegates a fairly free hand. We have sometimes had that impression over Mr. Krishna Menon. Nevertheless, certain men at the United Nations have their following and influence in a way which tends to put the personal influence within the United Nations far ahead of the normal channels of diplomacy, where we feel our way forward in international relationships through Embassy exchanges and the great traffic in telegrams. Krishna Menon, Dr. Tsiang of Formosan China, a gentleman known as “the Arab baritone” and in their quiet but persistent way, men such as Sir Pierson Dixon and Harold Beeley are constantly exerting influence, reflecting for better or worse their country’s position and prestige at the United Nations in their different ways. Frequently one encounters a single individual in rather a small obscure delegation who plays his part out of proportion to the physical size of his country. Mr. Dorsonville of Haiti and Mr. King of Liberia are examples.

In regard to the position enjoyed by the United Kingdom delegation in the Fourth Committee, we are in some ways affected obliquely by the growing pains of the Afro-Asian bloc itself and its internal troubles in trying to digest the views of Africans, Arabs and Asians; people who are none too sure of their own group relationships. For example, those Siamese twins, Ghana and Guinea, are today not very happy in what seems to have been a rather hastily conceived union. Within the Arab fold the shifting twists and tugs in the Middle East, of which we are all aware, are at play, though curiously not so prominent as I had expected. But when we come to consider the slightly artificial efforts to present a common view over the whole field of Afro-Asian affairs, then the cracks under the paper become very noticeable indeed.

I think it true to say that India’s initiative to some extent dominates the Afro-Asian bloc, and it is an initiative which is not always welcomed by other members of that bloc. I can recall a certain occasion in the S.W. African debate in the Fourth Committee when there was very nearly an explosion between Mr. Krishna Menon and a forceful lady, Miss Angie Brooks of Liberia. And so a fair conclusion is that the Afro-Asian bloc is really too large a unit to represent a permanent united political pro-



gramme and is really a rather hasty get-together of convenience, to present a vague common approach concerning the sharing out of a past history of colonial status by most—but not all—of its members. Turkey and Thailand, for example, have no colonial complex.

A further conclusion might be that as time passes the bloc will splinter into its more logical three components—African, Arab and Asian—and then the internal pains of each component will perhaps be more pronounced. For example, this year when Nigeria arrives it will be exceedingly interesting to note to what extent Nigeria may affect the position hitherto regarded as the prerogative of Ghana.

I have mentioned the Commonwealth bloc. Once a fortnight a meeting is held of the heads of the Commonwealth delegations. Such meetings in my view are more useful and effective than other more numerically powerful gatherings on a geographical basis of Latin-Americans, Afro-Asians, Western Europeans. The reason for this is obscure, because on no occasion I know of have those meetings resulted in a unanimous Commonwealth vote on any resolution. But there is an atmosphere of relaxation and friendship and an exchange of ideas which is free and frank, and this implies that although our decisions may not be the same, the thought processes by which we reach those decisions *are* the same. At those meetings nearly every item on the Agenda of the United Nations is covered. Occasionally if there is an item recognized as too prickly and charged with explosive material for any particular delegation, it is avoided. Otherwise we discuss most things; and the Asian members are usually prepared freely to help us in presenting the views and voting intentions of the Afro-Asian bloc.

A word about Asian Commonwealth delegates and their delegations. I, of course, felt very much on the home ground with both the Indians and the Pakistanis. Not knowing Ceylon well I would only say that the wisdom and moderation of Sir Claude Korea, whose friendship in London many of us came to value, was a constant factor in modifying extreme attitudes, and he was always ready to take the initiative in putting forward proposals. That at least was my impression at our fortnightly meetings. Of Mr. Krishna Menon one could say that he never provided a dull moment. I had no experience of the old days when five- or six-hour speeches on Kashmir were the fashion, with consequent anxiety on the part of his doctor in the wings. But at the Fourteenth Session (if the previous reports one heard were true) Mr. Krishna Menon was a much mellowed man. His approach to a problem might seem sometimes Machiavellian, sometimes puckishly mischievous, but never dull.

I do not know how Mr. Krishna Menon's own delegation view his habit of turning up in any Committee at any time to assume charge of the presentation of the Indian delegate's view. That sometimes resulted in a certain seeming confusion of papers with muttered imprecations which invariably came over the ear-phone system to the entertainment of the Committee. But there was often much to be admired in Mr. Krishna Menon's handling of the Indian attitude in regard to certain resolutions and items. For example, in sponsoring the annual resolution on Apartheid (in South Africa) he was skilful enough to present an extremely mild resolution, and

thereby made it all the more embarrassing for those intending to oppose him. He declared—and I personally believed him—that he did not wish to convey the impression of a pointed and concentrated attack on South Africa—a sort of vendetta. Indeed, he paid tribute to South African achievement, with particular reference to Field Marshal Smuts. He was insistent that he did not recognize “Apartheid” in reverse. So much for Mr. Krishna Menon.

Behind him is a powerful and capable delegation: sturdy men such as Mr. Jha, an administrator raised in the old tradition of the I.C.S., and with him a number of much younger men of ability, in my view, well above the average of the majority of Asians at the United Nations. The Pakistanis were again led by Prince Aly Khan, again also a man who displayed, to my mind, much more ability and enthusiasm than one might have associated with a great expert on racehorses, and who did ensure that all was well on the hospitality front. The Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Manzur Qadir, only put in an appearance in the first few days; but his speech in the General Debate was quite outstanding. After he left much of his work in the first two Committees fell to Mr. Baig, again, in my view, one of the clearest and most effective of advocates.

With two such powerful delegations at the United Nations one must always hope for a close working understanding between them. Unfortunately, the factors which make for estrangement on the Indian sub-continent are effective enough in New York; not that Indians and Pakistanis studiously avoid each other, but there is a lack of common interest which should be there.

Of our Fourth Asian Commonwealth delegation, the Malayans, under their charming leader, Dr. Dato Ismail, I would only say that they seemed to remain happily outside controversy, until, of course, with the Irish they tabled the item, “The Question of Tibet.” They then attracted the black looks of the Soviet bloc and some of their Asian disciples. In fact—to break down the voting—the resolution was carried by forty-six to nine, with twenty-six abstentions. Of those twenty-six, sixteen were members of the Afro-Asian bloc; and seven of the sixteen were Asians.

You will recall that the United Kingdom delegation voted for the inscription of the Tibetan item and then joined the abstainers on the resolution itself. In regard to that position I wish to be quite objective and factual—in fact I must be. We were able in a speech to condemn, and did condemn, the physical acts of the Chinese in Tibet. By abstaining we intended to convey the impression that we were in doubt as to the legal implications, and the application of the controversial Article 2(7) of the Charter. That Article is the one which reads: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.”

In the case of our relationship with Tibet and China, I think it could be shown that until 1951 we were in direct relationship with a Tibet which we regarded as autonomous. In May, 1951, Tibet signed, under duress, the seventeen-point Agreement with the People’s Republic of China. In the first clause of that Agreement there occurs the following passage: “The

Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland—the People's Republic of China." In the fourteenth clause there is the sentence: "The Central People's Government shall have centralized handling of the external affairs of the area of Tibet."

Those two sentences seem to constitute the background to the legal doubt which we have said attaches to our own view of the status of Tibet, subsequent to the 1951 Sino-Tibetan Agreement. When one plunges further into this particular wood, the trees become very thick indeed. For several reasons I do not intend to follow up a comment made only on the fringe of the problem.

But as we are anchored to the United Nations, I would like, within the context of the Tibetan problem, to touch briefly on a matter which must be included in any discussion on Asia and the United Nations. I refer to the non-recognition of China at the United Nations.

For several years past India has proposed that the item "Question of the representation of China in the United Nations" be placed on the Agenda. India has hitherto been defeated, largely due to the United States' initiative, with resolutions rejecting India's request, and deciding not to consider any proposal either to exclude the representation of Chiang-kai-Shek's representative or to seat the representative of the Central People's Republic (C.P.R.). And so Dr. Tsiang, an attractive gentleman of some personal influence at the United Nations, continues to speak on behalf of the Chinese; in other words, to represent Formosan China.

This year the tendency was to ask: Why admit Communist China at the moment of their rape of Tibet? Is that not to yield to blackmail? Alternatively, Communist China, is enabled to ask: On what grounds is the United Nations interested in the action in Tibet of a State they do not recognize? The United Nations does not accept the Peking Government; why should the Peking Government accept the United Nations?

Various expedients have been suggested for overcoming this international dilemma, not within the United Nations so much as, I believe, in Asia itself. I speak not as a United Nations' delegate (and indeed even if I did, I have no particular inside information), I speak merely as a student when I assume that one day within the next few years the United States' resistance to the seating of Communist China must be withdrawn. For the moment, one of the expedients spoken of is to seat two Chinas as representing China at the United Nations. If that was ever possible in the General Assembly, what would happen in the case of the Security Council seat? Meetings of the Security Council would, I anticipate, be stimulating, to put it mildly, with two gentlemen, who according to alphabetical seating would presumably have to sit next to each other, and yet who would with equal certainty never exchange so much as a glance at each other's profile, let alone the spoken word!

It will be interesting to note India's intention next year. In view of the present temperature of public opinion in India over China, I doubt if the Government of India could, at this moment, table a resolution to seat Communist China at the United Nations. Quite a lot could happen before next September. So we will just have to wait and see.

But suppose for a moment that Communist China is there in that trium-

phant mood of Power politics which has brought her over the Indian frontier, are there not some very interesting situations which might arise at the United Nations? There is, I think, general agreement that we live at a moment when China and India are struggling in rivalry for the moral and political leadership of Asia. India may be unconscious of the process. She may be the victim rather than the initiator. But the process is there. And it would be of intense interest and significance to see it fought out on the more concentrated international stage at New York. In those circumstances, it would seem to me that some of those new nations now apt to think of the world in terms of two communities, the rich imperial "haves" and their poor victimized "have nots," would be reminded that in inverse proportion to the manner in which colonialism by the mere process of time recedes, so do new and just as fundamental problems arise. To simplify the matter, there are reasons to suppose that a Power such as the United Kingdom might welcome rather than regret the arrival of Communist China at the United Nations.

Finally, a word with regard to East-West relations at the United Nations. I had the impression, on the whole, that the Soviet Union were on the defensive. One can usually gauge whether sentiments are defensive or offensive by the way in which a Power such as the Soviet Union treats an item when it comes before the General Committee, not for debate but merely for decision as to whether it should be inscribed or not. If a Power starts to make the speech which it would make in a plenary session discussing the substance of the resolution at a time when the decision is only as to whether or not the item is to be inscribed, one can be fairly certain that that Power has a "guilt" complex. That was evident when it came to discussing Hungary and Tibet in the General Committee.

One is apt to give way too hastily and become extremely frustrated and angry when listening to a country such as Roumania delivering a homily on primary education in colonial territories on human rights. But I had the impression that inside the United Nations all nations, the smallest and the newest, are developing a sense of discrimination. Here is the only forum in the world in which all the great Powers can be studied side by side and judged on their merit. Although a new nation in its first flush of independence may arrive with some sense of suspicion and may fall for the Soviet line that only the Soviet Union and its associates are the champions against the monsters of imperialism and that kind of talk, they fall less for it in the second year and still less in their third year. An outstanding example is India who when that country first entered the United Nations was not unaffected by such influences; but which today is an effective and balancing influence in world affairs so far as the United Nations' organization is concerned.

As to the Soviet bloc itself, of course the heavens would fall if there was any deviation from the dictated attitude to be taken on a particular item. When one speech has been heard, all have been heard. Any one of us could have written their speeches for them; I knew exactly what the delegates were going to say. I recall in the Fourth Committee, when a vote was taken on a resolution there were eight No's registered from the Soviet bloc instead of nine; whereupon the leader of the Soviet delegation

called for a recount. For once the little Indonesian Chairman stood his ground and said: "I am sorry; the vote has been taken and we are not counting again," one of the distinguished representatives from the Soviet bloc—and we are all distinguished at the United Nations—raised his yellow pencil and said: "I voted No; I was a good boy." Of course the others then took their cue from him: Bulgaria, Roumania, Poland and the rest one by one said "No," and when added up the No's came to nine. By that skilful means the leader of the Soviet delegation got his point; nevertheless, it indicates the degree of servility to which those particular people will descend.

An interesting question sometimes asked is: To what extent is there a long-term intention on the part of the Soviet to gain control of the United Nations? It seems to me that that is putting the matter far too precisely. If one accepts that there can only be a long-term intention, where a leader is a Communist brought up on Marx-Engels as interpreted by Lenin—one day to see the whole world, by a mingled process of persuasion and coercion, brought into the Communist fold, then the United Nations is as much a goal to be achieved as any institution or nation in the world.

As to the United Nations itself, we make the mistake—I made it when I first arrived there—of believing that it is the answer to all lost causes in the world, believing that it can protect the weak, punish the aggressor, that it can restrain the tyrant and bring enlightenment to Darkest Africa.

There is a story which puts the position of the United Nations fairly aptly. A very undeveloped country at the United Nations applied for aid and the form it required was to ask for the improvement of its cattle. So the United Nations sent a bull to that undeveloped country; but after two years the breed of the cattle there had not improved. Neither had it increased. So the country being backward, decided to send a soothsayer along to the bull to find out what had gone wrong, and the soothsayer whispered to the bull and said: "Tell me, what has happened," whereupon the bull replied: "I am a true servant of the United Nations; and am only here in an advisory capacity!"

Criticism of the United Nations might be regarded as inherent in the manner in which it expresses its conclusions; and I refer to the resolutions, around which the life of the General Assembly revolves. I calculated that some 200 or 300 resolutions come up during the session. Is it better to go for a mild resolution which will secure the necessary two-thirds majority or better to have a tough resolution, which may be much nearer the truth but which would not receive such a majority? Is a mild resolution with teeth put into the speech better than a mild speech on a tough resolution? Mr. Krishna Menon on one occasion made an extremely conciliatory speech and then produced a resolution which had not a hope of being looked at by the South Africans.

Such are the tactics surrounding this crossword puzzle of resolutions, and they involve many huddles in the lounges and corridors, private drink parties in hotels and so on. The question posed to me was: "Does all this admirable zeal and skill, and mental horse-power and time lavished on resolutions, lead to anything realistic? Is the United Nations living in an Alice-in-Wonderland world of its own, unrelated to the affairs of

the millions outside? Are the obsessions about the vote on resolutions producing results? Is the game of resolutions becoming an end in itself rather than the means to the end?

That is putting it very forcibly, and to restore the balance I must put up the defence. The defence would be that in fact these resolutions are recorded. The French may be absent when a Sahara bomb explosion is debated; the South Africans when Apartheid is debated, the Soviet may resent Hungary being debated, but the fact is that the results are registered and when they return to their countries the delegates are asked what has happened. I am told that the Soviet Union are extremely sensitive to what is said about them at the United Nations through the resolution and its implications.

A more tangible claim might be that the United Nations is exerting an educative effect, is acting as an educative agency in the art of Government, in the conduct of Parliamentary affairs, and indeed in good manners in Parliamentary affairs, because whether it be owing to the limitations of language conditions which have to be imposed, the fact is that the behaviour in Committee is extremely good, certainly better than one notices in the House of Commons.

Away in the distant background one is aware of remote and efficient control. Very few ever meet or talk to the Secretary-General. We are told that he is a man of austerity dedicated to his purpose and ideals and one naturally associates certain features of the United Nations with him; because the administration *is* efficient. The people who open and shut doors; the girls who answer our stupid questions at the Information Bureau in the lounge, the men who hang up coats, the service in the restaurant and the good food there—all these reflect a remote but very efficient control and have the effect, to my mind, of creating some sense of a family all living together. A thousand or so delegates and members share in a good Club; and we must not think of the Club as only a Club for the good boys. We feel frustrated when we walk into our own Parliament and see a particular side which we do not like airing its views. In exactly the same way we become frustrated when we enter Committees of the United Nations and see the same thing happening.

Of one thing I am fairly certain, that if there were no United Nations there would very soon have to be something to take its place. The story goes that a senior General, when the Suez crisis took place, was asked what he thought when he saw the United Nations' Emergency Force, comprising miscellaneous small forces from different parts of the world, arrive; a cynical answer was expected; but instead his reply was: "This is a 6-lb. baby and it is going to grow." And I think that is the only intelligent way in which to approach an unknown future of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN: You will all agree that we have listened to an eloquent and fascinating talk and one that has instructed us on many matters about which we were ignorant. Can Lord Birdwood explain a little further the difference between inscription and voting on resolutions? I have read Sir Pierson Dixon's speech, and I noticed he voted for inscription, and that the speech condemned China on the human rights issue; nevertheless on the substantive resolution we abstained.

Lord BIRDWOOD: When voting on an item in the General Committee for or against inscription one is not supposed to discuss the substance of the matter being inscribed or opposed. It is necessary merely to record whether one is going to vote for inscription or not and objectively give a very brief reason. Once you launch into elaboration of reasons you are discussing the substance of the resolution; in other words, you might be accused of saying: Well, I know this item is not going to be inscribed and, therefore, I get off my chest what I can say now. Of course, when the particular item was inscribed, Sir Pierson Dixon took the opportunity to project the Whitehall view, which was that while we could condemn what had happened in Tibet, we should avoid anything that might encourage the raising of the legal aspect of the position of Tibet—the constitutional side.

Mrs. ST. JOHN COOKE: Is the language difficulty very serious?

Lord BIRDWOOD: The language problem is overcome very ingeniously. There are five official languages, English, French, Russian, Spanish and Chinese and three termed "working" languages, English, French and Russian. Every speech and all proceedings are put into five languages, in any Committee there are interpreters who are able to deliver a running interpretation, so that with the earphones on one is only about half a sentence behind the speaker, having tuned in to the language one wants. Of course the process does mean a certain slowing up in that in Committees there cannot be a sort of free-for-all, give-and-take brawl between a couple of delegates. The Chairman has to call on any speaker who wants to intervene. That is due to the language difficulty, in that the translation facilities could not compete with a kind of slanging match. A delegate speaking in a language other than the five official languages is responsible for making his own translation arrangements.

Dr. BRAMLEY: I do not understand whether or not the United Nations have any power over an aggressor. The Suez Canal and the passage of Israeli ships; Nasser says he will not let the ships through. Hammarskjöld goes out, gets rebuffed and returns to the United Nations. Nothing happens. Could the lecturer elaborate on that?

Lord BIRDWOOD: The speaker is right; the United Nations have no power over an aggressor. The only power the United Nations as a body possesses is the power which the Member States are prepared to give it; in other words, acceptance of the United Nations' resolutions means giving that body a certain amount of power. The United Kingdom, of course, accepted the United Nations' verdict in the case of Suez; the Russians did not, and have not, accepted the United Nations' verdict in the case of Hungary. The United Nations have no power of enforcement whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN: Can we be told the difference between the Security Council and the General Assembly? The latter was not, I believe, originally conceived as the body competent to deal with great political problems?

Lord BIRDWOOD: No. The role of the Security Council is to deal with all problems concerning security and disarmament; and its importance is that it is available all the year round. Now, more and more there seems to be the impression that the Security Council is becoming rather impotent and the General Assembly's powers are accordingly being increased. I

do not say that the Security Council has become a complete anachronism; not yet; but its power has dwindled since the days of San Francisco. The Security Council gets bogged down because of the veto. But under the Resolution known as "Uniting for Peace," an emergency meeting of the General Assembly can now be called and action can be taken on a two-thirds majority vote.

Mr. HAMILTON: How was the cost of the Emergency Force worked out between the nations?

Lord BIRDWOOD: I believe I am right in saying that there is a quota worked out according to a formula based on population, revenue and that kind of thing, and a scale of contribution is produced by every single Member State. Whenever a United Nations' Emergency Force has to be paid for, the matter is referred to the scale of contributions to the United Nations as a whole for administration purposes in order to work out the smaller contribution which is called for.

The CHAIRMAN: The two-thirds majority is not conceived in relation to all of the Member States? Forty-six is much more than two-thirds of the number voting.

Lord BIRDWOOD: An abstention does not count; it is two-thirds of those present and voting.

The CHAIRMAN: Forty-six to nine then does provide a two-thirds majority?

Lord BIRDWOOD: It provides much more.

The CHAIRMAN: Then it was in this case a two-thirds majority which would have, in principle, enabled action to be taken?

Lord BIRDWOOD: In principle, yes.

The CHAIRMAN: No action was taken—so there you are.

Lord BIRDWOOD: Action was not called for in the resolution. The Irish reduced the terms of the resolution considerably as a result of all the jockeying that goes on behind the scenes when the Irish were given to understand that such-and-such a power would abstain instead of voting unless such-and-such a clause was watered down. Thus the resolution when it came up was fairly innocuous though for certain reasons was not entirely acceptable to us.

Dr. BRAMLEY: Is Egypt represented at the United Nations?

Lord BIRDWOOD: The United Arab Republic is represented; not Egypt.

Mr. WHITTERON: Does the United Kingdom permanent representative function on the Security Council and on the General Assembly?

Lord BIRDWOOD: Sir Pierson Dixon represents the United Kingdom on the Security Council and leads the United Kingdom delegation at the Assembly when the Foreign Minister is not present. The Foreign Minister usually remains about ten days and when he disappears his place may be taken by a Minister of State. In 1959 it was taken for a month by Mr. David Ormsby-Gore.

The CHAIRMAN: I feel sure all present wish me to indicate to Lord Birdwood how very much we have appreciated the extraordinarily informative and eloquent address he has given us and also we are appreciative of the way in which he has answered the questions. (*Applause.*)



# THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R.

This is the sixth in a series of reviews of new Soviet literature on the six Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R. and the countries bordering on them. It includes books and some periodicals received between January and March, 1960. It is contributed by the Central Asian Research Centre in collaboration with the Soviet Affairs Study Group of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

## I. THE SOVIET MUSLIM REPUBLICS

### *General surveys*

EVERY few months new popular descriptive pamphlets and booklets are published in the Soviet Union on the Central Asian republics and Azerbaydzhan. They conform to a fairly standard pattern: a brief history of the area under discussion before the Revolution, painted in sombre colours, an account of the establishment of Soviet rule, and a glowing account of the economic and cultural achievements of the past forty years and the success of the "Leninist nationalities policy." According to their length, these publications contain more or less factual information on the present state of the republics, but the approach is uniform.

The brief pamphlets on the six Muslim republics now available in English from the Intourist Office in Regent Street conform to this pattern. Each one is written by the respective republic's Chairman of the Council of Ministers and no attempt seems to have been made in translating them to adapt them for an English-speaking and non-Communist public. For instance (*Kazakhstan*, p. 5): "Working as foreman in one of the Karaganda coal mines is Sundedbai Bapeyev. He and his father worked here when the mines belonged to the British . . . There were no machines and cave-ins occurred every day, resulting in casualties. People lived in want, in yourtas full of holes, and many who escaped a fall of rock died as a result of beatings which the British supervisors were not slow in giving . . . The Socialist Revolution in 1917 freed the people from their exploiters." Some of the statements are deliberately misleading. For instance (in the same pamphlet, pp. 8-9) there is a section entitled "250,000 specialists": "Today the Kazakhs are justly proud of their science and culture . . . A quarter of a million specialists who have graduated from an academy, institute or specialized secondary school are employed in the republic's industry, agriculture and in the cultural field, among them 75,000 teachers. If the great Kazakh scholars, Chokan Valikhanov and Ibrai Altynsarin who once dreamt of leading their people out of darkness and ignorance could know it!" The implication is, of course, that the 250,000 specialists are Kazakhs, but to take one specialized field only—research workers in higher educational establishments—it is known from a Soviet source (*Kul'turnoye stroitel'stvo S.S.S.R.*, Moscow, 1956) that of the total of 4,817 research workers in Kazakhstan in 1956 only 1,172 were Kazakhs. This fact does not, of course, necessarily mean that Kazakhs are discrim-

inated against, except in so far that to be a research worker a Kazakh must almost always know Russian, but it does give an indication of the predominant position of the Russian settlers in Kazakhstan's cultural life, a position which the pamphlet is evidently at pains to conceal. The national question is discussed with spurious arguments in the sections entitled "No longer a problem" and "Not a colony" (pp. 9-12). For instance: "In many countries the national question still remains a difficult problem. We know that in the United States, Negroes are discriminated against, and we know other facts testifying to the inequality of races and nationalities. In Kazakhstan the national question has long ceased to be a problem. No nation in the Soviet Union oppresses another, nor can there be such oppression. Kazakhstan is one of the equal Union republics making up the U.S.S.R. . . ." But Kazakhstan cannot today be equated with the Kazakhs who make up little more than a third of the republic's population, a fact established by the latest census which the pamphlet deliberately ignores.

The pamphlet on Kazakhstan is perhaps an extreme case, but those on the other Muslim republics too contain their share of blatant propaganda written in a cosily ingratiating tone. The best feature of the pamphlets is their photographs. It is to be hoped that before too long something of a higher standard may be made available to English-speaking readers who want to learn about the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union today. (Pamphlets Nos. D., E., G., K., L., and N. in the series *The Fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics Today and Tomorrow*. London, 1959-60. Price 6d. each.)

More substantial and more serious in tone are the new Russian booklets destined for Soviet readers. P. A. Azizbekova's *The Azerbaydzhan S.S.R.* (Azerbaydzhanskaya S.S.R. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Moscow, 1958. 75 pp. 10,000 copies) briefly describes the republic's development from the earliest times but with particular emphasis on the Soviet period. V. F. Pavlenko's and S. N. Ryazantsev's *The Kirgiz S.S.R.* (Kirgizskaya S.S.R. State Publishing House of Geographical Literature, Moscow, 1956. 119 pp. 20,000 copies) gives a general description of the republic's geography and economy, with sections on its different regions. The economic history of Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan are surveyed in M. Musayev's *The Uzbek S.S.R.* (Uzbekskaya S.S.R. State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1959. 182 pp. 40,000 copies) and N. Islamov's and others' *The Tadzhik S.S.R.* (Tadzhikskaya S.S.R. State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1958. 194 pp. 25,000 copies). N. Kiykbayev's *The Triumph of Lenin's National Policy in Kazakhstan* (Torzhestvo Leninskoy natsional'noy politiki v Kazakhstane. Kazakh State Publishing House, Alma-Ata, 1957. 155 pp. 14,000 copies) describes the economic and cultural development of Kazakhstan in the Soviet period. Finally Ye. I. Lagovskaya's *The Union Republics of Central Asia* (Soyuznyye respubliki Sredney Azii. State Pedagogical Publishing House, Moscow, 1959. 190 pp. 12,000 copies) is intended as a textbook for teachers and gives a general account of the geography, culture and economy of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Turkmenistan. Within the frame-work of the standard approach a good deal of factual material can be found in all these works. They are, of course, interesting

also as current examples of the official Soviet attitude to the Muslim republics.

### *Geology and anthropology*

Of interest to geologists is No. 4 of the Kazakh Academy's *Questions of the Geography of Kazakhstan* (Voprosy geografii Kazakhstan. Vypusk 4. Sector of Geography, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 208 pp. 1,010 copies). The twelve contributions cover such subjects as the natural features of the Karaganda coal basin, the origin of the Imantau group of lakes, and glaciation in the river basins of the Dzhungarian Altai mountains. Only one of the contributors bears a Kazakh name and all the articles are in Russian.

V. V. Ginzburg has written a detailed study of the anthropometry of the earliest inhabitants of central and eastern Kazakhstan, based on the bone relics found in recent excavations. His findings show that the earliest inhabitants of these regions were of europoid type, but that from the middle of the first millenium B.C. mongoloid types began to be mixed with them. His article is to be found in *Anthropological Symposium* (Antropologicheskii Sbornik, I, Institute of Ethnography of U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1956, pp. 238-98).

### *The ceramics of Khorezm*

Since 1937, with a break during the war, Professor S. P. Tolstov's Khorezm Archaeological and Ethnographical Expedition has been at work in the region bisected by the lower reaches of the Amu-Dar'ya, a region now mostly contained in the Kara-Kalpak A.S.S.R. and in antiquity known as Khorezm. The fourth volume of the expedition's report is entitled *The Ceramics of Khorezm* and is edited by Tolstov and M. G. Vorob'yeva (Keramika Khorezma. Trudy Khorezmsky Arkeologo-etnograficheskoy Ekspeditsii, IV. U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1959. 396 pp. 1,500 copies). As the editors explain in the introduction, pottery is one of the most valuable as well as one of the most frequently found archaeological relics. This is particularly true in Central Asia where climatic conditions are destructive of both buildings and metal ware, and where frequently all that remains of a settlement is its pottery. The volume contains six contributions which describe the ceramics of Khorezm from the earliest times until the present. There are numerous line drawings and some full-page colour reproductions. Particularly valuable is the inset sketch map indicating the positions of the more important sites which until now have not always been easy to identify.

### *Regional geographies of Kazakhstan*

The Kazakh Academy of Sciences is publishing a series of books on the geography of the oblasts of Kazakhstan. The first to appear, on the Alma-Ata oblast, was reviewed in the last articles in this *Journal*. The volumes on the North-Kazakhstan and South-Kazakhstan oblasts are now available. Both areas are predominantly agricultural regions, North-Kazakh-

stan being part of the virgin lands development scheme. Both areas have some industries, of which the most important are food and light industries. South-Kazakhstan has a little coal. The Trans-Siberian railway runs through the north of North-Kazakhstan, and Petropavlovsk, the oblast capital, is an important railway junction. The main Tashkent-Saratov line runs through South-Kazakhstan roughly parallel to the Syr-Dar'ya which also traverses the oblast.

Some of the most interesting sections of these books are those on the history of settlement and the changes in population. North-Kazakhstan, for instance, was very early the object of Russian and Cossack colonization: even by 1869 the non-Kazakh population amounted to one-third. The building of the Trans-Siberian railway and the Stolypin reforms hastened the influx of Slav settlers; by 1926 the proportion of Kazakhs in the population had dropped to one-fifth, and by 1939 to 16 per cent. The Kazakhs moved to other regions and those that remained were concentrated in the south of the oblast. But it was precisely the southern part of the oblast that in 1954-55 became part of the virgin lands reclamation drive, an operation which brought further heavy immigration from Russia and the Ukraine. An interesting point mentioned in connection with the virgin lands scheme is that in the summer of 1955 settlers (of an unspecified number) came to the oblast from Sinkiang; they were mostly Russians and Kazakhs, descendants of earlier emigrants from Kazakhstan to Sinkiang, but there were also some Uygurs and Dungans. The author gives percentages for some of the nationalities in some of the rayons of the oblast but it is not clear if her figures refer to before or after the influx of virgin lands settlers. In the Sokolovskiy rayon in the north, for instance, 82 per cent. of the population is Russian and only 5 per cent. Kazakh. The highest proportion of Kazakhs is in the Oktyabr'skiy rayon in the south where they amount to 34 per cent. It seems likely that taken as a whole the population of the oblast cannot now contain more than 15 per cent. Kazakhs out of a total population of 454,000.

In South-Kazakhstan, Slav immigration started later—towards the end of the nineteenth century—and on a smaller scale. The immigrants tended, however, as in the case of North-Kazakhstan, to settle on the more fertile lands and thus deprived the Kazakhs of many of their winter pastures. In 1939 the Kazakhs amounted to 49.7 per cent. of a total population of about 585,000; by 1955 the total population had risen to 860,000. The present national proportions are not specified.

Both these books contain useful material on the natural conditions and economy of the oblasts they describe. Both have bibliographies, but neither has an index. (*Priroda i khozyaystvo Yuzho-Kazakhstanskoy oblasti*. By M. I. Semenova. Department of Geography, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 142 pp. 1,500 copies. *Severo-Kazakhstanskaya oblast'*. By Ye. N. Gladysheva. Department of Geography, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 185 pp. 1,250 copies.)

### *The establishment of Soviet rule in Kazakhstan*

Two booklets describe Bolshevik and Soviet activity in Kazakhstan in

1917-1918, that is, from the February Revolution until the Civil War. T. Yeleuov's *The Establishment of Soviet Rule in Kazakhstan* (Ustanovleniye sovetской vlasti v Kazakhstane. Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1957. 115 pp. 6,300 copies) is a chapter from the forthcoming second volume of the official *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.* T. Guba's *The Struggle of the Bolsheviks of Kazakhstan for the Victory of the October Socialist Revolution* (Bor'ba Bol'shevikov Kazakhstana za pobedu oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii. Kazakh State Publishing House, Alma-Ata, 1957. 139 pp. 8,000 copies) covers almost exactly the same ground. Each of the books consists of three chapters, the first covering the events of the period March/April, 1917, to October, 1917, the second the spread of Soviet rule in the period October, 1917, to March/April, 1918, and the third the measures taken by the Soviet authorities in the latter period. Emphasis is given to the Bolsheviks to the exclusion of all other parties. The implication of both works is that the firm foundations of Bolshevik rule had been established before the Civil War started in earnest, which is a highly disputable fact.

#### *Kazakhstan, 1919-1938*

Volume 2 (History) of the *Works* of the Kazakh Academy's Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography (Trudy Instituta Istorii Arkheologii i Etnografii, 2, Kazakh Academy of Sciences. Alma-Ata, 1956, 227 pp. 1,100 copies) contains three valuable contributions. T. Yeleuov writes on the siege of Ural'sk in the spring of 1919 by Kolchak's troops and its relief by the Red Army under Frunze in June of the same year. This is an extremely full account, using much archive material, of a little-known episode in the Civil War.

A. S. Yelagin writes on the economic rehabilitation of the Ural'sk province after the end of the Civil War (1921-25), and F. I. Kolodin has written an article of exceptional interest on the collectivization movement in Kazakhstan. This is almost certainly the first time this stormy period in the history of Kazakhstan has been fully described using local Party archives.

#### *The ethnography of Azerbayzhan*

The second volume of the *Caucasian Ethnographical Symposium* (Kavkazskiy etnograficheskiy sbornik. II. Institute of Ethnography, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958. 274 pp. 1,200 copies) contains a scholarly bibliography, compiled by M. O. Kosven, of early Russian writings on the Caucasus and Transcaucasia (pp. 139-274). The period covered is approximately from 1790 to 1840 and brief biographies are given of the authors. Much of the material listed is preserved in archives and is now described for the first time. Material referring directly to Azerbaydzhan is to be found on pp. 151-4.

#### *The national literatures of the Soviet Union*

An interesting and revealing account of the literatures of the peoples

of the "Soviet East" is to be found in L. Klimovich's *From the History of the Literatures of the Soviet East* (Iz istorii literatur sovetskogo vostoka. State Publishing House of Literature, Moscow, 1959. 350 pp. 10,000 copies). Professor Klimovich is an established authority on eastern affairs and is particularly noted for his writings on Islam which he has been producing regularly since the late 1920s. (One of his latest excursions in this field "What an atheist should know about the Quran" is translated in *Central Asian Review*, Vol. VI, No. 4.) Klimovich is in fact a skilful propagandist whose arguments are based on scholarly research; he is perhaps the perfect example of a Soviet "committed" orientalist, a scholar whose whole activity seems to be directed towards political aims.

His latest book consists of thirteen studies, most of which appeared as articles between 1953 and 1958. The opening chapter, entitled "On the study of the literature of the peoples of the Soviet East," is a historical account of the attitude adopted towards Eastern literature by Russian and Western scholars since the nineteenth century. The West is accused of "racism" in their neglect or disparagement of the culture of the Eastern peoples of Russia, accusations which have perhaps some basis though hardly for the reasons Klimovich advances. On the other hand, Russian "forward-looking" intellectuals and writers had always shown interest in the East. The first task of the Soviet régime was to establish the individuality of the national literatures. Just as in the political field the Muslim peoples were divided into nations with their own republics, so in the artistic field national literary ancestors had to be found for the new national culture. The Tadzhik cultural heritage had to be differentiated from the Persian, the Uzbek from the Chagatay, the Azerbaydzhani from the Turkish, and the common elements in the cultural heritage of the Muslim peoples, whether Arabic, Persian or Islamic, pushed aside. Yet such localization created new dangers for the Soviet authorities: the "theory of the single stream" according to which all native folk art was considered "democratic," and the theory that the modern literatures of the Soviet East "developed spontaneously by themselves" (*samostikhiyno*) was condemned in 1932. Henceforth strictly class-conscious criteria were to be applied when evaluating the national cultural heritage, and the concept of "Soviet literature," i.e. Party hegemony, was to be the guiding principle for all new literature.

Five articles in Klimovich's book are on classical literature. The authors he discusses are carefully related to the cultural heritage of the modern Soviet nation in question; thus Nizami (1141-1203), who in the West is normally held to be among the greatest of Persian poets, is described as an Azerbaydzhani on account of his birth-place and in spite of the fact that he wrote only in Persian. The Timurid poet, Alisher Navoi (1441-1501) who wrote in Persian and Chagatay is claimed as the father of Uzbek literature, and the Persian influence in his work is minimized. Both these poets are shown to have had "progressive" ideas for their period. Klimovich is on safer ground with the other writers he describes: three Turkmen bards of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Uzbek satirist and lyric poet Mukimi (1855-1903), and the Azerbaydzani writer Mirza Fatali Akhundov (1812-78) always popular to Soviet critics

as the first Azerbaydzhani to break away from the Persian cultural tradition.

The sixth study in the book is on the Indian poet Mirza Abdulqadir Bedil (1644-1702) who became particularly popular among the Tadzhiks. Klimovich produces some interesting material on literary connections between India and Central Asia.

Five articles are devoted to the oral folk art and epics of Central Asia and Azerbaydhan. Klimovich discusses the epic *Kor-ogly* or *Gur-ogly* which is known to the Azerbaydzhanis, the Turkmen, the Uzbeks and the Tadzhiks in various versions; the *Forty maidens*, a Kara-Kalpak epic; *Kuz-Kurpyach*, a Bashkir epic also found among the Kazakhs; and Turkmen popular oral folk tales. The most interesting study in this section is that on the epic *Alpamysh*, a work first taken down in 1927 from an Uzbek bard which became widely popularized. In 1952, however, it was declared "undemocratic" (*antinarodnyy*) on account of its "feudal-clerical ideology." The question of the epic's ideology was thoroughly discussed at the "All-Union Conference on Problems of the Epics of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R." held in Moscow in 1954, and again in 1956 at the "Regional Conference on Alpamysh" organized by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and the Uzbek Academy of Sciences held in Tashkent. At the latter conference the work was finally rehabilitated. The story of *Alpamysh's* condemnation and rehabilitation gives Klimovich the opportunity to discuss the "difficulties" of studying the epic creations of the Central Asian peoples, in particular since "the struggle against a nihilistic attitude to cultural heritage and against its idealization has not yet been called off." He is stern with the detractors of *Alpamysh*, accusing them of distorting its meaning and of relying only on one version. This last point seems to be the key to Klimovich's approach to the study of epics: *Alpamysh*, like most other Central Asian epics, exists in numerous versions. The task of the Soviet scholar is to select those texts which most truly reflect the epic's "popular spirit" and to reject variants that have "feudal-clerical" additions and distortions. Scholarship is thus essential, but it must be politically conscious.

The final article in the volume is on the influence of Russian literature on the literatures of the other peoples of the Soviet Union. It is entitled "The friendship of the literatures of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.," a title which gives a clue to the tenor of the piece, which is in fact fairly crude propaganda. Klimovich quotes book production figures for the leading Soviet authors. He fulminates hysterically against Senator MacCarthy and American "Komiks" and "bestsellers" and contrasts them with "the truly free national development and blossoming, the creative mutual aid and co-operation, and the triumph of the idea of internationalism" exemplified in Soviet literature. He argues that literary contacts between the Russians and the eastern peoples are age-old, that Russian literature had always "a beneficial action," that to Russians the East was never something "overseas" or "exotic," and that conversely the peoples of the East have always shown interest and sympathy for Russian literature. All this is to a certain extent true before the Revolution of the Tatars and the peoples of the Caucasus, including the Azerbaydzhanis, but can hardly be

said of the Central Asians; Klimovich himself implies this when he says of Russian literature that its influence "was most felt among those people who to a varying extent had passed through the period of industrial capitalism." For the post-revolutionary period close cultural contacts are undeniable, but for reasons of Party dictatorship in the arts rather than "creative mutual aid." Klimovich describes some of the achievements of the national literatures: the Azerbaydzhani writer, Mekhti Guseyn's (Mehdi Husain) novel *Apsheron* on the oil workers of Baku, the Kazakh Mustafin's novel *Karaganda* on the miners and industrial workers of Kazakhstan's chief industrial centre, novels on cotton-growing, on irrigation works, novels that contrast the poverty and oppression of the past with the glories of the present. As an example of the political awareness of modern Central Asian writers, Klimovich quotes approvingly the poem written by the Uzbek poet Gafur Gulyam (Ghafur Ghulam) on the occasion of American intervention in the Lebanon in 1958. The last stanza reads:

"Peace and unity! With them life is splendid,  
The peoples of all countries move towards them!  
May oppression rot away! May the flames of war be quenched!  
Robbers go back! Go back beyond the ocean!"

But not all poetry now being written is considered satisfactory. Klimovich writes: "In the poetry of the Kazakhs, the Kirgiz, and the Karakalpakhs . . . are to be found . . . archaic images and metaphors mechanically applied to modern manifestations and taken from the decayed poetry of a feudal-patriarchal society and a nomadic way of life, etc. Not only are young Soviet people described as something like heroes of ancient epics, Soviet soldiers compared with legendary warriors, workers with tigers and lions, factory sirens with the bleating of sheep, trains with galloping horses, but our State is compared with 'a great nomad grazing ground'."

Though Klimovich mentions such "archaisms" only as a brief aside, there can be no doubt that the problem of how the principle of "national in form, socialist in content" should be applied in literature is still far from settled (see, for instance, Altmyshbayev's book reviewed in the last article in this series). The Soviet authorities can rightly be proud of many of their successes in the cultural field: the Kirgiz and the Turkmen, for instance, now for the first time have their own alphabets and their own literary language; all the peoples of the Soviet Union have universal education in their own language; and publishing figures in all the languages are formidable. But quantity should not be confused with quality: most of what is written by the Soviet eastern peoples, and certainly all that is published in large quantities, conforms to the strict canons of socialist realism and to the current Party decrees; and there is good reason to believe that the younger writers of the Muslim republics are stultified and inhibited by such directives and that the Central Asian literary scene leaves much to be desired even from the point of view of the Soviet authorities (See "Recent literature in Central Asia." *Central Asian Review*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1959). This Klimovich does not mention.



*The Muslim republics and the outside world*

While a considerable number of foreign delegations visit Central Asia and Azerbaydzhan and while many of the chief cities can be visited by private tourists (if they can afford the travelling costs), as yet comparatively few Central Asians and Azerbaydzhanis travel abroad. The Soviet delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference held in Cairo from December 26, 1957, to January 1, 1958, however, consists mostly of non-Russians. It included Sh. R. Rashidov, the President of the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet; the Tadzhik writer, Mirzo Tursun-zade; the rector of the Turkmen State University, P. Azimov; an Azerbaydzhani oil official; Kazakhstan's Minister of Social Insurance, B. Bul'trikova; a Kazakh kolkhoz chairman; the President of the Muslim Religious Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Z. Babakhanov; the Uzbek poetess, Zul'fiya Israilova; a Kirgiz trade-union official; and a representative from Central Asia of Soviet youth organizations. The texts of some of the speeches and resolutions made at the Conference are published in *The Conference for the Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia and Africa* (Konferentsiya solidarnosti narodov Azii i Afriki. State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1958. 223 pp. 20,000 copies) which includes an introduction by Rashidov.

## II. THE BORDERLANDS

*Sinkiang*

About three-quarters of the six million inhabitants of Sinkiang are Uygurs. Sinkiang is now in fact officially titled the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region. About 100,000 Uygurs are settled over the border of Sinkiang in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizia, the largest community (over 50,000) being in the south-eastern regions of Kazakhstan. Conversely, about 350,000 Kazakhs are to be found in Sinkiang. Volume I of the Kazakh Academy of Science's *Works of the Oriental Department* (Trudy Sektora Vostokovedeniya, I, Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Alma-Ata, 1959. 222 pp. 675 copies) is devoted primarily to Uygur history and linguistics.

*Collectivization*

G. Bakhamov writes on the collectivization movement in Sinkiang from 1950 to 1957. The first stage, 1950-53, was confined to the redistribution of agricultural land among the poorer peasants; private ownership was still respected but efforts were made to group the peasants into "labour mutual-aid brigades" and agricultural producer co-operatives "of a lower type"; rents and taxes were reduced. At this stage no attempts were made to reorganize the stock-raising areas. None the less, by the end of 1952 it became apparent that "leftist" mistakes had been committed: that pressure instead of persuasion had been too frequently used and that the Party activists had tried to go too far in imposing advanced socialist forms on a backward peasantry. In January, 1953, the Party reaffirmed the right to private property and relaxed its pressure, so much so that by

the end of the year the number of "labour mutual-aid brigades" had dropped by a half. But the respite did not last long. In December, 1953, the Party published a decree on the establishment of agricultural producer co-operatives and this measure began to be put into practice in Sinkiang in 1954 and 1955.

By the first half of 1955, 5 per cent. of the peasants were grouped in co-operatives and 66.4 per cent. in brigades, compared with 30 per cent. in brigades and a negligible number in co-operatives at the end of 1953. But the pace was too slow. In the autumn of 1955 Mao Tse-Tung criticized "the right-wing deviationists" who were delaying the collectivization of agriculture in China as a whole and from this time collectivization began in earnest. By the spring of 1956 practically all the peasants of Sinkiang belonged to agricultural producer co-operatives of the lower type and after the spring sowing of that year, these began to be transformed into co-operatives "of the higher type." The difference between the two types of co-operative was that in the "lower" or "semi-socialist" type the peasants still owned land individually but pooled their finances and equipment, while in the higher type all land, cattle and implements were owned collectively. By October, 1957, 95.49 per cent. of the peasants belonged to co-operatives of the higher type and the collectivization drive was considered to have been fulfilled.

The collectivization of stock-breeding was carried out much more slowly, presumably because of the tribal and nomadic way of life of most of the stock-breeders. The movement started in 1955 and by the end of 1956 about 20 per cent. of the stock-breeders had joined co-operatives and about 30 per cent. belonged to mutual aid groups. It was not until the autumn of 1958 that the process of semi-socialist collectivization was considered complete. Unfortunately, Bakhamov does not bring his story up to the present, nor does he describe what measures have been taken to settle the nomads—an essential requisite for collectivization as the history of Soviet Central Asia shows.

### *The resettlement of the Muslims of Kuldja, 1881-83*

The second article, by Yu. Baranova, is on the migration of the Uygur, Dungun and Kazakh population of the Ili valley to Russian territory after the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881. In 1871 Russian troops occupied Kuldja and the upper Ili valley as a move to forestall the extension of Yaqub Beg's dominion. They held the region for ten years and under the terms of the Treaty with China in 1881 offered Russian citizenship to those of the Muslim population who did not wish to live under Chinese rule. As it turned out, practically the entire population accepted this offer. Baranova gives an extremely interesting and well-documented account of the negotiations and arrangements which were made for the resettlement of nearly 70,000 Uygurs, Dungans and Kazakhs in Russian territory. Although for reasons of prestige Russia was committed to receiving the immigrants, as the negotiations proceeded and the numbers of those wishing to emigrate remained high, the practical difficulties of resettlement made the Russian authorities progressively less eager to receive this in-

flux. On the Chinese side, the loss of almost the entire population from a fertile region which supplied the Chinese Army in northern Sinkiang with much of its food and fodder seemed a disastrous blow. Thus both the Russians and the Chinese attempted to persuade the population not to move. The Muslims were, however, adamant and the resettlement took place in 1882-83 in spite of the fact that the Russian authorities offered hardly any financial aid and imposed numerous conditions. But the diligence of the new settlers was such that they were at no time a burden on the Russian Government and were able almost immediately to establish themselves as a prosperous community who contributed greatly to the economy of Semirech'ye. On the other hand, the Ili region, left with only the poorest of its inhabitants, took many years to recover.

Baranova's article includes a sketch map showing the frontier between Russia and China in the Ili region before 1871, during the Russian occupation, as defined under the Livadia Treaty of 1879 and finally as defined under the Treaty of St. Petersburg.

#### *Uygur land tenure during the Mongol period*

An article by D. Tikhonov discusses feudal landownership among the Uyghurs in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The author admits that source material on this subject is extremely limited but none the less he attempts to describe systems of land tenure by the state, the church, by private individuals, and by the peasants; he also discusses the terms "korigi" and "indju" which refer to certain types of land tenure as yet not clearly defined by scholars.

#### *Other contributions*

Four articles are devoted to Uyghur linguistics. The subjects dealt with are: particles in the Uyghur language, compound verbs in Uyghur, principles for the classification of vowels in the Uyghur literary language, and the question of Uyghur terminology (the last two articles are in Kazakh). There is also an article on Uyghur folk tales.

G. Stratanovich writes on the decorative art of the Dungans living in the Soviet Union, an art which is almost wholly derived from the Chinese, although the artists no longer understand the meaning or origin of the ideograms and stylized designs they use. Z. Zhantakeyeva writes on the poetry of the Kazakhs of Sinkiang. And Ts. D. Nominkhanov, the editor of the volume, contributes a comparative study of Turkic and Mongol cattle-raising terms.

#### *A new reference book on China*

*Our Friend China* (Nash drug Kitay. State Publishing House of Political Literature, Moscow, 1959. 630 pp. 50,000 copies) is designed to give the general Russian reading public a summary of all they need to know about modern Communist China. It is divided into sections on Geography, Politics (including personalities, official bodies, treaties with

foreign powers, political movements and ideas), the Economy, Culture (including philosophy, education and the arts), and History. All entries are given alphabetically within their section. There is an index and a table of weights and measures. The work is limited both by its size and its official Communist approach, but is probably the only reference book on China available in the West and contains a good deal of factual information. There are entries referring to Sinkiang and Tibet *passim*.

#### PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN

##### *Economics*

Both Persia and Afghanistan are included in the volume *The Economic Position of some Asian and African Countries in 1957 and the first half of 1958* (Ekonomicheskoye polozheniye stran Azii i Afriki v 1957 g. i pervoy polovine 1958 g. Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1959. 295 pp. 3,400 copies). The section on Afghanistan (pp. 97-112) shows the extent of Afghan dependence on the Soviet Union: in 1956-57 27.5 per cent. of the country's exports went to the Soviet Union who thus rose to second place after India (29.5 per cent.) while 36 per cent. of Afghanistan's imports came from the Soviet Union who held the leading position. Soviet credits to Afghanistan in the three years preceding 1958 amount to 120 m. dollars.

The section devoted to Persia is longer (pp. 113-140) and like that on Afghanistan contains much factual and objective information. The two concluding chapters of the book are on "The oil industry in the Near and Middle East" and "The economic expansion of West German monopolies in the Near and Middle East and South-East Asia"; both contain reference to Persia, and the latter chapter to Afghanistan also.

##### *The Afghan Durrani Empire*

The Durrani Empire is a favourite subject for Soviet orientalists. The symposium *India and Afghanistan* (Indiya i Afganistan. Ocherki istorii i ekonomiki. Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1958. 290 pp. 3,600 copies) contains nine contributions, all but two of which are devoted to various aspects of Indian history and economics in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and present centuries. The two exceptions, both by Yu. V. Gankovskiy, are on Afghanistan in the eighteenth century under Durrani rule. The first, entitled "The Army and military system of the Durrani shahs (1747-1819)" (pp. 57-87), analyses the social structure of the armed forces. It is well documented. The second is a review of a book by the Afghan historian Aziz ad-Din Popolzai on Timur-Shah-Durrani, published in Kabul in 1953. Gankovskiy welcomes the work as the first attempt to describe the life of Timur-Shah who was the son of, and successor to, Ahmad Shah Durrani—the founder of the dynasty. He points out certain inaccuracies and suggests that the author should have devoted more space to describing Timur-Shah's internal policies which were directed against tribal autonomy and towards the centralization of the state.

*Persia and the Soviet Union*

A. Z. Rozenfel'd reviews the journal *Peyame Nou*, the organ of the Persian Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union in an article entitled "On the history of Soviet-Persian cultural relations" which appears in *The History and Philology of Eastern Countries* (pp. 107-115) (*Istoriya i Filologiya stran Vostoka. Uchenyye Zapiski* No. 282 (Oriental Studies Series No. 11), Leningrad University, 1959. 203 pp. 1,000 copies). The same volume contains a brief biography of I. P. Petrushevskiy, a scholar specializing in mediæval Persian and Transcaucasian history, in honour of his sixtieth birthday (pp. 5-6) and a bibliography of his works from 1930 to 1958; the list of sixty-six titles includes books, articles, reviews, and contributions to composite works. In addition there are lists of works as yet unpublished and of works to which Petrushevskiy acted as editor (pp. 197-203).

ANN SHUKMAN.

# THE PATTERN OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL TRAINING IN THE U.S.S.R.

## The New Development in Novosibirsk

By DR. C. R. S. MANDERS, M.A., M.Sc., Ph.D., A.K.C., F.Inst.P.

A meeting of the Society was held at The Royal Society's Hall, Burlington House, Piccadilly, London, W.1, on Wednesday, April 6, 1960, at 1.30 p.m., when Dr. C. R. S. Manders, M.A., M.Sc., Ph.D., A.K.C., F.Inst.P., spoke on "The Pattern of Scientific and Technological Training in the U.S.S.R." Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C. (Chairman of Council), was in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: It is my privilege to introduce Dr. Manders and to say how pleased we are to welcome him here to talk to us on a subject which is very topical and interesting. I do not really know whether Dr. Manders is a physicist first and an educationist second, or an educationist first and physicist second. In any event, being a physicist is one of the most important things in modern development, and being an educationist is equally important, if not more so, for this country.

We have heard and read about the relative figures between America and the U.S.S.R. of the numbers of physicists and other technicians rather than scientists that have been produced in Russia and the worry that this has caused in the United States, as it does in this country, because we have not got the necessary trained people.

It will be most instructive and interesting to hear what Dr. Manders has to say on the developments in technical education in the U.S.S.R. and also about what is happening at Novosibirsk, in Russian Asia, which is a centre of development.

Dr. Manders is at present with the Scientific Civil Service and has been a lecturer in physics at the Royal Military College of Science and a Scientific Adviser to the Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office at the end of the war.

### I. INTRODUCTION

LET me divide my talk into two parts. In the first, I will deal with conditions applying throughout the Soviet Union, in both Europe and Asia, and in the second I will try to give a picture of interesting new developments centred on the town of Novosibirsk, which is well and truly in Asia.

It is now just over forty years since the Soviet Union came into being. This happened, you will remember, under conditions of unusual difficulty. The South Russian harvest had been devastated by a locust plague so that food was scarce and morale low. In education and the social services, the country was backward, illiteracy was widespread and, even in the period since World War II, I have seen Soviet journals in which pleasure was expressed that this or the other area had achieved complete literacy. Forty years ago, the supply of trained personnel to lead the Soviet people out of their difficulties was apparently hopelessly inadequate, yet today the

U.S.S.R. challenges the U.S.A. for world supremacy. This achievement is one that bears comparison with any of modern times.

## II. SOME FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO RAPID ADVANCES IN THE U.S.S.R.

Naturally, a whole host of factors has contributed to the Soviet advances of the past forty years. In quoting a few of these factors, I have it in mind to stress somewhat certain differences of practice as between the U.S.S.R. and the West in which the Soviet Union has been notably successful.

### (i) *Leaders qualified in science and technology*

It has been clearly realized by the Soviet leaders from Lenin up to Khrushchev that science and technology are essential means for attaining Communist military and economic aims. With this emphasis over forty years, the scientific and technological disciplines are well represented in the background training of the present Soviet leaders. The President of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. is an ex-officio member of the Communist Party Presidium, a body which might not unreasonably be compared with the Cabinet of a British Prime Minister. Until recently, some thirty-nine out of sixty-seven members of this body were scientifically or technically qualified. Further, the first Deputy-Chairman and nine out of the remaining thirteen Deputy-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers had similar qualifications. At top administrative level in the U.S.S.R., scientific and technological projects may be expected to have an easier passage, more understanding and sympathy than they would in the West.

### (ii) *Central control and planning*

The U.S.S.R. has central control and planning. These offer obvious advantages for achieving maximum efficiency in a training, or, for that matter, practically any other, programme. Uniform standards can be set for the whole country, the system can be simplified and much of what is confusing in Western countries, where the training system has grown piecemeal, can be eliminated. If planning and production keep in step, there should be no unemployed, but people with the right qualifications should come available at the right time for all the jobs the State needs doing. With a centralized system, there exist the possibilities of being gloriously right or disastrously wrong. The essentials of the Soviet method are as follows. Ministries forecast their requirements in materials and manpower for a five (now seven) year plan in response to an overall directive from the Party executive. These stated requirements of Ministries modified slightly each year in the light of experience, are collated and plans drawn up by the State Planning Commission. The scientific and technological parts of the plan are vetted by the Academy of Sciences.

### (iii) *Newly-trained manpower at disposal of State*

Nearly all who train in the U.S.S.R. beyond the legal minimum stage receive aid from public funds in order to do so. The State requires that such people, professionals and semi-professionals alike, shall serve in posts

to which they are allotted for a period of three years after completing training. Some three-quarters of a million freshly-trained professionals and  $1\frac{1}{4}$  million semi-professionals, in the main young folk without a load of other commitments, can be readily switched to the solution of the State's varying priority problems such as the great development schemes, teaching, etc. This group does not form a sweated labour force: individuals are paid the "rate for the job" and, moreover, military service is not required of them.

(iv) *"Small" subjects*

The U.S.S.R. is a large country. Thus it is able to produce a study group, and cater for it adequately, for small subjects, e.g., gyro engineering or boiler engineering, whereas many Western countries could only manage an occasional course, and that of an extremely compromise nature.

(v) *Combing of Western information*

Western publications are available in translation in the main Soviet establishments within about two months of original publication. The Academy's Institute of Scientific Information provides the finest and most complete abstracting service in the world. The combing of Western sources of information is carried out magnificently.

(vi) *Ploughing back*

Over the years, a generous proportion of the personnel trained has been ploughed back into teaching in order to train more specialists. Pay and prestige in teaching are good. The net annual increase in the body of trained personnel is currently 7 per cent. in U.S.S.R. (cf.  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. in U.S.A. and  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -3 per cent. in the United Kingdom).

(vii) *Strong basic subjects*

Soviet training is soundly based with undoubted insistence upon strong basic subjects. All 200 of the technology curricula followed in higher educational establishments of the Soviet Union devote approximately 10 per cent. of the time to advanced mathematics and a similar amount to physics.

(viii) *Teacher-training a first priority*

With each foreshadowed major scientific or technological advance there is initiated an appropriate teacher-training programme. Teachers of programming have been trained since 1955 in Moscow State University.

(ix) *Efficient propaganda*

The national targets are kept before the people and there is genuine pleasure and excitement among the population as the achievements tot up. Again, there are posts in the U.S.S.R. that people might not be keen



to fill, places where people may not be keen to work. Propaganda in the educational establishments presenting these posts and places as a challenge produces many young people eager to work for their country in the less favoured conditions.

### III. THE SOVIET EDUCATIONAL LADDER

The diagram of Appendix 1 represents the conditions under the last (abandoned) five-year plan and, although changes have been taking place at primary and secondary stages during the last twelve months, the diagram represents the system that has produced the bulk of the present Soviet trained manpower.

Formal education in the Soviet Union begins at seven years of age and the primary stage until last year, lasted seven years. By 1960, the last five-year plan aimed to make the ten-year school available overall. Where ten-year school could be provided, such training was made compulsory by local regulation, in consequence of which the numbers graduating from ten-year school rose during the four completed years of the plan from 440,000 to 1,500,000! In the seven- and ten-year schools, boys and girls alike followed the same course. In the secondary stage—i.e., grades eight, nine and ten of the ten-year school—pupils spent 42 per cent. of their time on mathematics, physics and chemistry. Clearly, the ten-year school product was not so highly trained as the product from the Science VI of a British grammar school. A far higher average level in science was, however, attained by all completing ten-year school training in the U.S.S.R. and, of course, by vastly larger numbers of pupils than is the case in the West.

Other possibilities at the seven-year stage are illustrated in the diagram of Appendix 1. It has been possible to go out into paid employment at the seven-year stage, but the numbers doing so dropped sharply during the five-year plan. The labour reserve schools are run in association with industries and agriculture. The specialist secondary schools, mostly *tekhnikums* provided by appropriate Ministries, gave semi-professional training in some 2,000-plus specialities, the courses being of strongly practical character.

Of recent years, some 40 per cent. of the ten-year school output has been going on to some form of higher education together with a lesser percentage from the semi-professional schools and there has been talk of raising the figure to 70 per cent. Soviet universities provide only 10 per cent. of the country's trained manpower and instruction in them is given in basic subjects only. Medicine and engineering, applied subjects, are not university disciplines in the U.S.S.R. Pedagogical institute courses last four years, basic subjects in universities (physics excepted) take five years. Courses in the technologies take five or five and a half years (physics too). whilst medicine is a six-year course. For all courses but those in pedagogy, the student has to carry out a six-month diploma project, the account of the research being embodied in a dissertation that is defended in public. About one in six or seven people from higher educational establishments proceed to higher studies. Students, aspirants and doktorants are required to develop competence in one, two, three foreign languages, respectively.

### *Modifications*

The Khrushchev Memorandum of September, 1958, envisaged replacement of the seven-year period of primary education by one of eight years. This was to be followed by a three- or four-year course of secondary education in one of five types of school, viz. :

(a) Academic type secondary school for perhaps 20 per cent. of pupils, differing from the old eighth, ninth and tenth grades in having four divisions.

(b) Technical type secondary school.

(c) Specialized schools for ballet, theatre, fine arts, military service, etc.

(d) Part-time secondary schools enabling people to work in factories and farms while studying.

(e) Evening class labour reserve schools.

Clearly, the changes in the system imply no relaxation of standards. The existing secondary school facilities can be readily adapted to serve the new purposes. The year 1959 saw the progressive introduction of the new arrangements.

#### IV. MANPOWER RESERVES AND PRODUCTION RATES

Appendix 2 summarizes the position. Table I demonstrates the heavy bias in the U.S.S.R. in favour of science and technology. Prestige and rewards are high in these fields, particularly in teaching, and people tend, therefore, to remain in these fields more than they do in the West.

At higher degree level, the U.S.S.R. is not going to be starved of men qualified to direct the country's projects. At higher education and school level there is every indication that the outputs of trained personnel can not only be maintained without difficulty, but even stepped up.

Appendix 3 gives breakdown figures summarizing achievements in ten years after the war. The notable contribution of women to the trained manpower figures of the U.S.S.R. will be seen.

#### V. DEFECTS/DIFFICULTIES

The Soviet training system with some 35 million people studying at its various levels is gigantic. One of its outstanding merits, stemming from central control and planning, is its relative simplicity. Let me, however, as a former co-opted member of an education committee and a university nominated school governor of some years' experience, note how the U.S.S.R. has fared in coping with problems that have dogged us in the West.

##### (i) *Accommodation*

At all levels in Soviet schools, a two-shift per day system is normal and less than a twelvemonth ago I picked up a broadcast where an area was rejoicing at seeing the end of a three-shift system. The provision of classroom, lecture-theatre and laboratory space is undoubtedly the most severe problem with which Soviet training has to cope. The short-fall in its building programme was one of the factors contributing to the abandon-

ment of the last five-year plan. Almost certainly it was a major factor precipitating the modification in the educational system at secondary level. Currently, candidates for higher education with two years of industrial experience are being accepted in preference to those with none, other things being equal. A two-year breathing space will enable the building programme to catch up somewhat.

(ii) *Equipment*

Western observers have, in general, been most envious of the quantity and quality of equipment in Soviet training establishments.

(iii) *Staff-student ratio*

With a planned economy, there can be no teacher problem. Prestige and pay make the happy position doubly satisfactory.

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.K.
Higher educ. establishments	1 - 12.6	1 - 14.1	1 - 9 1 - 18.1 (gram)
Schools	1 - 17.6	1 - 21 (sec.) 1 - 30 (prim)	1 - 22.3 (S.M.) 1 - 30.5 (prim)

(iv) *Military Service*

Neither in education nor in any other sphere of scientific or technological endeavour is military service required of trained personnel. They have in any case to serve where the State requires for three years after completion of training.

## VI. THE FUTURE: A DIGRESSION

In the West, there is a considerable tendency to adopt extreme views concerning the Soviet Union. Its people are neither supermen nor inferior material, but human beings with the same range of abilities and emotions as any other. With central control and efficient propaganda, the U.S.S.R. has got its trained personnel working with, to all reports, unusual intensity and to priorities well understood in appropriate Government Departments.

The Soviet Union is setting the pace in certain fields of scientific and technological endeavour and there is every indication that the process will go much further. If this country is to compete with the U.S.S.R., there are but two alternatives:

- (a) to think up continuously methods superior to those of the Soviets;
- (b) to adopt and adapt Soviet methods.

This latter could easily involve, among other things:

- (i) abandonment of cherished, traditional ideas about women;
- (ii) a demand for service to the State from those who have received aid from public funds for training beyond the legal minimum;

- (iii) abolition of a "free market" in trained personnel and the acceptance of some, and probably increasing, measure of direction by the State.

One thing that is obvious is that any teacher supply problems must be solved as a first and urgent priority.

## THE NEW SCIENTIFIC TOWNSHIP OF NOVOSIBIRSK

### I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S.S.R. is centrally organized with the seat of government in Moscow. Not unnaturally, therefore, there has been a tendency for scientific and technological teaching and research establishments to concentrate about the capital. At the present time, rather more than half of these establishments are in the Moscow area; somewhat less than a quarter of them centre on the former capital, Leningrad. More than nine-tenths of the scientific and technological activity of the U.S.S.R. takes place west of the Urals. Yet, to quote "Stroitel'naya Gazeta" (December 11, 1959), "Siberia contains three-quarters of the coal, four-fifths of the peat, three-fifths of the ore of the country, 100,000 km. of navigable rivers and there are obvious sites for hydro-electric power stations that would provide over seventy times as much power as the Lenin power station on the Volga."

Two things are obvious to the Soviet Government:

- (a) there is a need for decentralizing;
- (b) Siberia cries out for scientific and technological development.

### II. SITUATION UP TO 1957

After World War I, A. F. Ioffe, now the grand old man of Soviet science, mindful of the desirability of developing other parts of the country than that around Moscow, was instrumental in setting up a number of physico-technical institutes. This venture, as might be expected, was a mixture of considerable, partial and modest success. The effort was on too small a scale. In the main, the major towns of Siberia possess only pedagogical institutes, an occasional medical institute and a few technical and forestry institutes.

The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. has set up filials at Novosibirsk (West Siberia), Irkutsk (East Siberia), Vladivostock (Far East Siberia) and Yakutsk, a base on Sakhalin and a physics institute at Krasnoyarsk.

In the post-war period, four significant factors may be noted.

(a) Since World War II, there have been many scientific expeditions into Siberia, probably well over a hundred. Thus, in the last decade there has been a much increased knowledge of the natural resources of the area.

(b) In the research institutes of the U.S.S.R. too, much successful work has been accomplished on breeding strains of food crops that can mature under the inhospitable conditions to be found in much of Siberia.

(c) The Soviet leaders are only too well aware that the world military situation makes dispersal imperative. An unusually determined effort to remedy the national as well as the Siberian situation presumably was behind the announcement of May 18, 1957.

(d) A commission which toured Siberia in 1957 reported that everywhere existed an acute shortage of scientists and a need for the strengthening of scientific knowledge.

### III. THE PLAN

On the date referred to above in May, 1957, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. announced that a new scientific township was to be set up at Novosibirsk. This was to be associated with the creation of a Siberian Division of the All-Union Academy of Sciences.

The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. has a three-fold function. Its members and corresponding members form a learned society of size and status not unlike that of our own Royal Society. The Academy also functions rather like a Ministry of Science and Humanities. Thirdly, somewhat like the D.S.I.R., the Academy runs about a hundred research institutes with 14,000 qualified workers and 35,000 ancillary staff. The President of the Academy is an *ex-officio* member of the Presidium. The Academy is organized in eight Divisions (Physico-mathematical sciences, Chemical sciences, Technical sciences, etc.). Since 1957, there has been added a Siberian Department with the same horizontal structure but, naturally, smaller in size. The new department took over all the filials, bases and institutes of the All-Union Academy of Sciences to be found east of the Urals. Besides strengthening all of these—e.g., eight new institutes for Irkutsk—new institutions are under development at Kemerovo, Ulan Ude and Kamchatka.

The new scientific township is being built on a site 28 km. west from the centre of the Novosibirsk that figures on present-day maps, on either side of the Novosibirsk-Berdsk motor highway. The site is on "one of the most picturesque shores" of the Obsk Sea, a large artificial lake feeding a hydro-electric power station on the Ob river. The "area" of the township is 1,300 hectares, of which 750 are at present covered with forest. The township is administratively part of Novosibirsk since it falls within the boundary of a new "rayon" of the city—Sovetskiy.

### IV. UNDER CONSTRUCTION

In the northern part of the township some fourteen institutes are currently going up. The emphasis in layout is on space and room for expansion. The other main features of the township are a university and an experimental factory employing 1,000 workers. The State Scientific Technical Library of several million volumes is to be transferred there from Moscow.

### V. THE UNIVERSITY

This began to function in September, 1959. Besides undertaking the normal university basic scientific studies, it is also to give training in mechanical engineering. The avowed aim is to produce specialists capable of solving important scientific and practical problems and of introducing into practice the attainments of modern science and technology. To this end, it is being built and developed in close contact with the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences.

The main university building is to house the faculties of pure and applied mathematics, geology-geography, biology and economics. A second building is for the physics and chemistry faculties. There is to be a whole complex of accommodation for students, research workers and staff.

Moscow University is known to have some autonomy in framing its courses—subject to approval of the Ministry of Higher Education—whereas other establishments have curricula imposed from above. Novosibirsk University is also to have some autonomy like Moscow. However, the absence of any stated faculties for the humanities and the 28 km. to Novosibirsk make one doubt whether the students will, in fact, find themselves in a scientific utopia—more likely, in a scientific wilderness. Whether there are, or are to be, 1,500 students is not for the moment quite clear.

## VI. THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTES

The Mathematics Institute of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. will have four high-speed electronic computers, there is to be a Cybernetics Group and over all is Academician Sobolev.

Some sixty to eighty scientists are to be transferred from the Academy's Institute of Atomic Energy, Moscow, to the Institute of Physics already operating. The head is Corresponding Member of the Academy Budker. Much work is to be done on controlled thermonuclear reactions.

The Institute of Thermophysics under Novikov is to be concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The Institute of Inorganic Chemistry—Corresponding Member Nikolayev—is to conduct research into the chemistry of the elements involved in nuclear energy and groups of chemists are to be transferred from Leningrad and other cities. A number of papers have appeared bearing the institute's address, but whether in fact it is in operation in premises in the new township is unknown.

The Institute of Automation, concerned with the automation of production processes, is to be directed by Karandeyev, a Corresponding Member of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences.

The Hydrodynamics Institute is to be run by Academician Lavrent'yev, who, besides being Chairman of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R., is also Vice-President of that body and a world-renowned mathematician.

The Institute of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics is to be directed by Academician Khristyanovich, one of the world's highest authorities on aero-hydro-gas dynamics.

Academician Trofimuk, former Minister of the Oil Industry and discoverer of some oil deposits, is head of the Geology-Geophysics Institute.

Academician Nemchinov, replaced later by Corresponding Member Prudenskiy, have inaugurated the Institute of Economics and the Organization of Industrial Production.

At the Institute of Cytology and Genetics, Corresponding Member Dubinin has now been replaced by D. K. Belyayev.

Institute of Experimental Biology and Medicine—Meshalkin; Institute of Organic Chemistry—Corresponding Member Vorozhtsov; Institute of

Catalysis—Corresponding Member Boreskov; Institute of Chemical Kinetics—Corresponding Member Kovalskiy.

Whether the projected High-Voltage Institute has materialized, I do not know. There is to be an independent Laboratory of Measuring and Computing Electronics headed by Corresponding Member Ardeyev.

The Siberian Department has been allotted special tasks for joint research with the Academy of Sciences of the Chinese People's Republic.

## VII. WILL IT SUCCEED?

An eventual population for the new township is estimated at 60,000. So far, 2,000 research scientists and 3,000 additional scientific and technical workers are reported to be working there. Modern research is a complex structure and for first-class work the services of numerous disciplines are required. In addition, library and publishing facilities, computation services, provision for pilot production are all essential. A modern science/technology complex has of necessity to be large.

Laurent'yev and Khristiyonovich are outstanding scientists and there are others there too, who are first-class. At the first election of the Siberian Department, five academicians and eleven corresponding members were created. Whether first-class facilities for work, first-class (but not necessarily the top class throughout) scientific leadership and high prestige will suffice to make a successful project, is a matter of opinion. What is happening in distant Siberia is, however, a large-scale experiment that will give the world much food for sober thought.

Documentary material was also provided for those present at the lecture, illustrating:

- (i) Types of Soviet higher educational establishments.
- (ii) Distribution by subject of the output of professional and semi-professional manpower, 1955.
- (iii) Curriculum of seven- and ten-year schools.
- (iv) Physics curriculum, Moscow State University.
- (v) Chemistry curriculum, Moscow State University.
- (vi) Curriculum in Radio Equipment Design and Production Technology.
- (vii) Curriculum for Teacher of (Pure) Mathematics, Rostov-on-Don Pedagogical Institute.
- (viii) Curriculum for Teacher of (Pure) Mathematics in Secondary Schools, Moscow State University.
- (ix) Curriculum in Applied Mathematics, Moscow State University.
- (x) Data relating to research work in U.S.S.R., Establishments/Personnel/Subjects.

## DISCUSSION

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Dr. Manders very much for his talk and for the documentation, which has enabled us to give a lot more thought to the subject. He is ready to answer any questions that anyone may wish to put to him.

Mr. EGERTON SYKES: I should like to ask two questions. Of the new

institutions to which Dr. Manders referred at Irkutsk, would it not be correct to say that they are mainly concerned with aerodynamics, space flight, rocketry and things of that kind? That seems to be the centre from which a large number of the satellites are supposed to have been put into orbit recently.

Dr. MANDERS: I have heard the same story. I cannot, offhand, quote the list of institutes going up in Irkutsk. Given a few minutes' warning, no doubt I could have done.

Mr. ECERTON SYKES: Do you not consider that one of the main reasons why the Soviet technological system of education tends to score over ours is to be found in the course papers and the diploma projects which each student has to do, when he has not only to put up a project, but has to defend it himself in front of a concourse of teachers and experts to show that his stuff is really good? That is a type of examination which is practically unknown in the West.

Dr. MANDERS: You are not quite right in saying that it is practically unknown in the West. There are quite a number of places in this country where work of this kind is done. I agree that it is not done on quite the same scale as in the Soviet Union.

There is something else which always impresses me about these diploma projects. From something like 290,000 graduates per annum, subtract, say, 100,000 for those going to the teaching side who do not do a project. That means that something like 190,000-200,000 projects per annum have to be thought out. That is a fantastic number of problems to set, and it is a fantastic number of people tackling them.

I have enquired into this particular problem and I am informed by British experts that the level of achievement in these projects varies from the genuine contribution to knowledge to the downright poor. That must be inevitable with the numbers involved. I quite agree with you, however, that even if a student produces a rather poor effort, it has been good training for him and it will stand him in good stead in his subsequent career.

Colonel G. WHEELER: Will Dr. Manders say whether the institute in Novosibirsk is particularly concerned with Asian peoples or whether it is exclusively concerned with the R.S.F.S.R.? I do not know about this. The Central Asian Republics have their own training establishments and Academy of Science, and so on, but is it possible that this establishment in Novosibirsk is used in any special way for the training of Asian peoples as distinct from, or with, the Russians and Ukrainians who mostly inhabit Siberia?

Dr. MANDERS: I do not think it is possible to give the exact answer to that question. The Soviet intention, as far as I can read their thoughts, is to get a marked decentralization. If they can build up this set-up in Novosibirsk, no doubt the intention is that it should be built up in the same sort of way as Moscow and attract people from all over the Union to it, although inevitably, being stuck where it is, it will draw most heavily on the peoples who are closest—in other words, the R.S.F.S.R. more particularly in the first instance.

Colonel WHEELER: This is an interesting question. The Asian peoples



of the Central Asian Republics do aspire to higher education in the R.S.F.S.R. The great ambition of students in these Republics is to go to Moscow or Leningrad. I wonder whether this isolated place would have less attraction for them than Moscow. Are they likely to be compelled to go to Novosibirsk.

You mentioned particularly decentralization, which I thoroughly understand, but it is more decentralization than a plan to create a special Asian establishment. It is not really territorial. It is simply in order to have something which is far away from possible attacks.

Dr. MANDERS: Yes. Undoubtedly, at the present time, the majority of people, certainly in the western side of the Soviet Union, are not too conscious of any desire to move over to Novosibirsk. I have met a number of Soviet scientists in the last year and the question has been put to them very tactfully, whether they would accept a higher appointment if offered one in Novosibirsk, and most of them simply shudder. But undoubtedly both the stick and the carrot will be methods adopted for building up this new township.

To a lesser extent, no doubt, the student population will be recruited in the same sort of way. Undoubtedly, too, a man trained in physics in, say, Novosibirsk is most likely to find a job in Siberia. Unless he has exceptional qualities which make it desirable for him to go to Moscow, my guess is that he will not get to Moscow except on a visit.

Lady BONHAM-CARTER: Do I gather that the humanities are not to be taught at all at the new university of Novosibirsk, and that there is to be no art, history or language?

Dr. MANDERS: The present programme of the university makes no provision whatever for humanities. Physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics and mechanics—that is the lot.

Colonel GASTRELL: May I ask the location of this place on the map?

Dr. MANDERS indicated the position on the map of Novosibirsk and Irkutsk and added: I mentioned that there was to be development of an establishment out here, at Kamchatka. It does not need much imagination to guess what might be happening there.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to express, on behalf of the Society, our thanks to Dr. Manders for coming and giving us this talk. (*Applause*). Whether we can get any satisfaction from the fact that the electronic computers of which Dr. Manders spoke for Novosibirsk and for other places in Russia are likely to come from this country, with our system of education, I do not know.

The agreement with the Soviet on the exchange of technical studies with this country has brought visitors here, and I believe that the Russians who came over were extremely impressed with the advances that this country has made in electronic computers and are quite likely to establish these in some of their university establishments.


It is obvious that for the development of a new country—and the Americans are finding Alaska rather similar—there has to be some kind of order in the plan or nobody will go to live there.

I thank you very much, sir, on behalf of the Society.

*The vote of thanks was accorded by acclamation.*

APPENDIX I

SIMPLIFIED SOVIET EDUCATIONAL LADDER



Kindergartens, crèches, etc. N.B.—Double line implies proceed by examination.

TYPES OF SOVIET HIGHER EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENT  
(1959)

	<i>No. of estabs.</i>
1. Universities .. .. .	40
2. Polytechnics and industrial higher educational establishments .. ..	32
3. Power engineering, electrotechnical, radiotechnical and physico-technical higher educational establishments .. .. .	8
4. Mechanical engineering, shipbuilding, aviation, printing and cine-engineering higher educational establishments .. .. .	30
5. Geological, mining, petroleum, peat and metallurgical higher educational establishments .. .. .	27
6. Chemico-technological higher educational establishments .. .. .	10
7. Higher educational establishments of the Food and Fish industry .. ..	13
8. Higher educational establishments of light industry .. .. .	8
9. Civil engineering, surveying and motor-highway higher educational establishments .. .. .	30
10. Hydro-meteorological institutes .. .. .	2
11. Higher educational establishments of transport and communications .. ..	30
12. Agricultural and Forestry higher educational establishments .. ..	109
13. Economics higher educational establishments .. .. .	23
14. Juridical higher educational establishments .. .. .	4
15. Higher educational establishments of the Arts .. .. .	47
16. Medical higher educational establishments .. .. .	80
17. Higher educational establishments of physical culture .. .. .	15
18. Pedagogical, historical-archive and librarianship higher educational establishments .. .. .	209
19. Correspondence institutes .. .. .	21
<b>TOTAL</b> ..	<b>738</b>

## APPENDIX 2

TABLE 1.—TRAINED RESERVES

(1959—estimated)	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.K.
"Graduates" working in all fields .. ..	3,230,000	4,598,000	530,000
Net annual rate of increase (approx.) ..	7%	3½%	3%
"Graduates" working in sci./technol. fields	1,748,000	1,438,000	160,000
Populations .. .. .	210 M	162 M	52 M

TABLE 2.—HIGHER DEGREES

(1959—estimated)	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.K.
Numbers working in sci./technol. fields ..	79,000	67,000	12,000
Annual increase in sci./technol. fields ..	6,000	4,300	600

TABLE 3.—HIGHER EDUCATION

(1958)	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.K.
Total enrolment .. .. .	2,250,000	3,259,000	99,536
Number of "graduations" .. .. .	290,000	440,304	24,000
includes—engineering .. .. .	90,000	37,040	} 11,100
—science .. .. .	70,000	65,000	

TABLE 4.—TEN-YEAR SCHOOL

Completing 10-year school in ooo's .. .. .	1950	1952	1953	1954	1956	1958
	220	315	440	750	1,300	1,500

TABLE 5.—SEMI-PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.K.
Semi-professional reserve (1956) ..	3,680,000	Wide variety of sources, no figures available.	Wide variety of sources, no figures available.
Total enrolment (1957) .. ..	1,961,000		

TABLE 6.—LABOUR RESERVE SCHOOLS

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	U.K.
Annual output (1956) .. .. .	650,000	See above	See above

### APPENDIX 3

#### HIGHER EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

#### SEMI-PROFESSIONAL TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS

Field	Enrolment 1955-6		New entrants 1955-6	Output 1955-6	Output 1946-55	Enrolment 1955-6		New entrants 1955-6	Output 1955-6	Output 1946-55
		Women					Women			
Industries and constructions .. .. .	550,600	35	144,812	56,446	331,900	843,100	42	245,527	140,799	826,800
Transport and communications .. .. .	99,000	35	29,775	9,465	60,900	150,300	42	48,498	23,920	165,900
Agriculture .. .. .	195,900	39	51,065	24,136	136,800	337,800	43	98,208	57,769	408,400
Economics and law .. .. .	106,700	67	28,537	15,645	109,000	134,600	82	51,711	30,479	238,700
Educational (Univs., Pedagog. and Librarian- ship Inst.) .. .. .	741,600	72	172,056	120,836	915,500	247,200	85	51,682	73,541	655,500
(Univs.) .. .. .	(166,256)		(36,690)	(22,866)						
Arts and cinema .. .. .	14,400	42	2,901	2,493	21,400	31,500	51	10,682	4,951	38,200
Public health, physical culture, sport .. .. .	158,800	69	32,298	16,825	196,900	215,900	89	81,246	56,311	501,400
Total .. .. .	1,867,000	52	461,444	245,846	1,773,000	1,960,400	55	587,554	387,770	2,837,900
(Number of correspondence students) .. .. .	(639,100)			(62,014)		(286,500)				
Number of establishments .. .. .	765 (1955-6)					3,753 (1955-6)				
Number of correspondence establishments .. .. .	22					41				

TECHNOLOGICAL TRAINING IN THE U.S.S.R.

## MIDDLE EAST TRADE

By THE HON. GEORGE NELSON, M.I.C.E., M.I.MECH.E.,  
M.I.E.E.

Report of a lecture delivered to an Evening Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society at 2 Hinde Street, W.1, on Tuesday, March 22, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is my privilege to introduce The Hon. George Nelson who has come to speak to us on "Middle East Trade" on behalf of the Advisory Council concerned with that subject. Lord Nelson, the speaker's father, has done a magnificent job in seeing that Great Britain has been brought to the fore in various parts of the world through the great Company of which he is the head, and of which his son, who is now about to speak to us, is Managing Director. Only a few days ago I met Mr. Nelson in Cairo when he was on his way to Addis Ababa, leaving at 2 a.m. We owe a great deal to him for the work he is undertaking and we are fortunate in having one with his wealth of experience prepared to make these trips to various parts of the Middle East. I now ask Mr. Nelson to address us.

I PROPOSE, Ladies and Gentlemen, to make my talk completely informal and it will be in no way a lecture. I look forward to some useful discussion at the end because this may perhaps bring out more than the talk itself. At the outset I wish to make clear that I am not here in any way as an expert on the Middle East, that being a relatively new territory to me, so that there are undoubtedly many in the audience who know more about that part of the world than I do.

I speak as the Vice-Chairman and Industrial Leader of the Advisory Council on Middle East Trade, set up by the British Government about two years ago. The function of the Council is to advise the Government on ways and means of improving British trade in the important Middle East area and also to advise industry on ways and means in which it can play its part also.

I have just returned from the visit to Ethiopia for which I was leaving when I had the pleasure of meeting Sir Philip at Shepherds in Cairo. It is nice, Sir, to meet you again so soon after we have both returned to England.

The Advisory Council on Middle East Trade is composed of representatives of Government departments concerned with overseas trade, such as the Foreign Office, the Board of Trade and the Treasury; and of representatives of all aspects of industry, commerce and banking. The Advisory Council meets at regular intervals to study the problems of Middle East trade, how it might be improved, what the trends are and what are the causes behind those trends. The objective is to stimulate Middle East trade to even higher levels, to encourage industry to achieve this objective

and to encourage Government to make it easier for industry to do so. In this we are, I am glad to say, achieving some success.

The term "Middle East" is misleading because it suggests a single territory whereas in fact the area covers such wide and diverse territories: some rich, some poor; some oily, and some non-oily; some Aryan, some Arab; some democratic, some autocratic and some even feudal; and, of course, every type of climate. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize in any way but each particular territory has to be taken in its own context and in relation to its own problems. The countries covered by the Advisory Council are Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Trucial States, Bahrein, Kuwait, Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya. You will appreciate the point of my remark as to the wide area covered.

To put the problem in its context it is necessary to have clearly in mind the trade with which we are concerned. The imports into the area are running now at the rate of about £1,000 million per annum—a sizeable trade objective well worth going after. Of that trade Great Britain at the moment does about 20 per cent. or £200 million per annum, which in itself is also quite worth while. I regret to have to add that the trend over the years has been against us and our percentage has tended to diminish to the benefit primarily of West Germany and Japan. Whilst the United Kingdom supplies goods worth £200 million a year, the United States of America comes second, with £180 million a year, and West Germany third, with £145 million a year. West Germany has come up from practically no trade in 1948 to third place in 1959, which is a measure of West Germany's resurgence in the area and which, of course, reflects similar trends in other areas. Other countries have also come into the area, probably most significantly the Soviet bloc, the amount of whose trade with the Middle East is somewhat difficult to estimate. It is, however, thought at the moment that the Iron Curtain countries are exporting to the area at the rate of about £100 million a year, about 10 per cent. of the total import. Other countries participate to a lesser extent. Significant increases are those of Japan, now running at £6½ million a year and Holland at £4 million a year. That is a general picture of the trade we are going after: £200 million a year is what we have; £1,000 million a year is the amount of trade being placed. We have to compete particularly with the Soviet bloc and the Germans who are actively endeavouring to get a higher percentage of that total amount of trade.

The area is extremely interesting because of its wide variation but also it is particularly sensitive because it is so largely dependent upon one or two vital sources of revenue, the outstanding example being oil. Revenues from this particular product run at the rate of about £500 million a year, followed by cotton, running at the rate of £150 million a year and Suez Canal dues at £40 million a year. These are the main sources of revenue available to finance the purchases made by the various countries.

But this is not the whole story, because the Middle East is a developing area and, therefore, attracting a considerable amount of investment of one sort and another. That in itself leads to more opportunities for trade. The oil companies have been particularly active in investing in the area over the past decade; the World Bank has made a number of important

loans to countries in the area; whilst industrial investments have also added to the resources of the area and have enabled high rates of purchases to be maintained and justified.

With this general picture in mind let us now consider some of the political and economic climates in which we are operating in the Middle East. The variation is enormous; as one goes from territory to territory there are completely different circumstances to be considered; a completely different set of facts, figures, percentages and so on; also wide differences in historical backgrounds, some of which are very important in the whole context. But it seems to me that the important point to keep firmly in mind is that we are dealing with an undeveloped area, an area in which living standards are going to rise; in fact, an area in which living standards must rise.

In spite of the fact that there are such wide differences, in spite of the fact that there is a picture of, shall we say, political immaturity or political instability—or do we merely call it the development over the years?—whichever way we look at it we get a picture of political uncertainty but through it all runs the main thread that whoever is in power, whatever form of government there may be, all are speaking the same sort of language, all are asking the same questions: What can we do to develop faster, to raise the standard of living? What sort of credit do you think we could get? How much money are you prepared to lend us? That is the common denominator, as I see it, in my visits to these very diverse countries.

In spite of political instability, without doubt whatever form of government there is in these countries, the standard of living is, as I have said, going to rise. The aim of every new government is to try to better the previous government in raising standards. Therefore, these countries are going to require goods; technical aid and investment, added to which they have goods to sell. Their revenues from oil are flowing in. Whatever political party is in control oil must be kept flowing, otherwise their source of revenue disappears and therefore the means to achieve their political aim, which must include an improved standard of living, will disappear also.

As a trader I would say that in spite of political instability this is an extremely promising area, and I would not dismiss as lightly as some do that the objective is too difficult or too uncertain of achievement. As these countries in the Middle East progress, oil will flow and there will be money available, and whilst money is there the governments are going to buy. This is a view taken by many of our competitors, West Germany in particular, already very strong on the ground.

Competition is very keen and apparent; we have not an easy row to hoe in the Middle East. Some parts of the market are traditional to Great Britain; other parts are not traditional to us but to our European competitors. Throughout the area I found that our European competitors look on the Middle East as a further market for their goods. This is particularly apparent in Egypt. Prior to Suez, British trade was in an extremely good position in most of the area; since Suez, the Germans have taken full advantage of the situation and have been most active in replacing United Kingdom traders. In fact, the West Germans are well dug in and will take a good deal of digging out. They regard the area as of



great potential value to them and are particularly active in it, especially in selling motors-cars, and in selling engineering equipment of all types. Additionally, I found the Iron Curtain countries fairly active in specific fields; somewhat curiously, steel was coming into the area from Iron Curtain countries, also cement and sugar. It seemed that products are being produced behind the Iron Curtain which may be surplus to their own requirements so that it is found to be convenient to push such products out into this Middle East area. Japan comes in also although to a lesser but, nevertheless, quite important extent, particularly as related to price levels, most of their goods being very low in price, including railway equipment, textiles and, again, cement. Another interesting feature is that Indian textiles come in in some quantity and, again, at pretty low prices. This is particularly interesting bearing in mind India's own need for foreign exchange and particularly in relation to her own needs for goods at home.

It must be recognized that competition in the area is very severe in spite of the favourable circumstances to which I have referred. Apart from price, there is the question of credit which comes up with monotonous regularity. Here, again, we find a highly competitive position. All these developing countries—and I do not blame them, looking at the problem from their point of view—are anxious to go ahead faster than their normal resources will allow. They all want to obtain additional resources with which to buy more equipment, to put up more factories, develop industries, provide irrigation and so on. Hence anybody who comes offering credit is always very welcome. There is even competition to give these countries credit in many respects, the Iron Curtain countries being particularly active. Some of their loans at very cheap rates have proved particularly attractive, and they have captured some of the important projects in the area. Personally I think the rates are a little misleading; obviously  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. interest, which is what the Russians are charging, is uneconomic. On the other hand, they are not free loans, being granted only in the case of specific projects and only for goods supplied by the lending countries themselves. It would be interesting to ascertain at some time how the price is related to the goods supplied under loan. It may be that perhaps the loan was not so cheap after all. That is an opinion which is gaining ground. The Iron Curtain countries are active in regard to credits throughout the Middle East and particularly in Egypt, in Ethiopia and in Iraq.

Japan is also active in regard to credit, rather surprisingly, and again without any general pattern; the Japanese seem to come in when they want to sell a product for purposes of foreign exchange. Their interest rates also seem pretty uneconomic. The United States is granting Import-Export Bank loans very extensively, particularly for railway equipment. The terms of payment are considerably more favourable than those we can offer from the United Kingdom. This widespread credit competition needs to be carefully watched. On the other hand, perhaps the faster the area develops the more wealth will be created and, in turn, the more business there will be.

The United Kingdom, as most of you are aware, is lending very substantially overseas; in fact, lending to the limits of our resources, at a rate

of about £300 million a year to various parts of the world. Therefore, we as a country need not be ashamed of the amount of resources that we are devoting to help under-developed territories, and this needs to be said as often as possible. On the other hand, the presentation of all that the United Kingdom is doing to help the Middle East does need some improvement. If the head of a foreign State does not get the credit he requires for the particular project in which he is interested, he immediately thinks we are not granting sufficient credits. Over and over again I have been asked: "Why does not Great Britain give credit for this?" "Why does not Great Britain give better or longer terms of credit?" When one asks: "What do you mean?" the questioners refer to what Germany and other countries are doing. On going into these cases one finds that in actual fact we are doing just as much as other countries are although we are not quite so forthcoming about it. Our propaganda is not as good in making clear exactly what we are doing, whereas some of our competitors, West Germany in particular, seem to put over to Middle East countries in a very big way just how much credit they are prepared to grant and how favourable are their terms, although in fact they are not really granting any more than Great Britain does and their terms are no better and often not as good. It is a question of salesmanship which obviously needs looking into.

Another aspect in which various countries compete is in the granting of technical aid of one sort and another; all these developing countries are short of qualified technical staffs; some are better off than others but all need technical assistance and training. Anybody who comes along and offers to do this, that and the other is extremely welcome. Great Britain is doing a good deal in this respect although it seems that, once again, we are hiding our light under a bushel; our foreign competitors seem to make a good deal more of the technical aid they are giving. That also requires our close attention.

Our foreign competitors are also clever in picking out one or two key projects which attract publicity and attention whether it be from the public or members of the government concerned. In Ethiopia, for instance, a technical college has been completely erected and manned by West Germans at West Germany's expense. Everybody talks about that. In the Sudan an agricultural research station has been put up and manned by West Germany. That also has had tremendous effect. We have to consider carefully whether we are properly presenting what we are doing in the Middle East; I am not implying that we are not doing what we should; in fact, in many instances we are doing as well as others but we do not make such a splash about it. Apart from competition in the price of our goods and competition in credit-giving, we have to look carefully into the presentation of exactly what we are doing for these countries.

One of the problems in some of the countries is to find really good agents, people who can represent British industry adequately. Many British merchant houses have, of course, specialized in covering these territories, and I hope they will continue to do so. On the other hand, there is a wave of nationalism running through the area and a feeling on the part of many purchasers that purchases should be made through local mer-

chants. We have to pay due regard to that. The problem is to find adequate merchants able to represent the whole of industry in all its different facets and to do a really good job.

And now I would like to add a word or two on individual territories. In Iran there are 20 million inhabitants. Our rate of business there is running at about £40 million a year. It is surprising to note how our trade has picked up again since the Mussadiq trouble a few years ago and has become extremely promising. The Germans took full advantage of those troubles, but we British are getting back. It is an oil country; there is a good deal to be done; the economy is a little over-stretched at the moment, but there is a promising market for the future. Steel works, power plants and chemical works are being erected, industries being developed and housing built.

Iraq is an interesting phenomenon, with six million inhabitants; a revolution and everything unstable. Nevertheless, oil continues to flow and the total business done by the United Kingdom with Iraq in 1959 amounted to £31 million. So, in spite of all the difficulties, our trade with that country continues and we can expect that it will go on. Long may it do so.

The Lebanon has 1.6 million people; and £10 million a year trade with us. It is the entrepôt of the Middle East, perhaps the one part in which we can rely on expert merchant service.

There are plenty of merchants in the Lebanon who could provide the agency services I have mentioned but because of feelings of nationalism, many who previously looked to the Lebanon as being a merchant trading area are feeling that they might skip it and trade direct. That is another change taking place.

Israel has two million inhabitants and does £15 million trade a year with the United Kingdom; the trade is developing rapidly within financial limitations. Jordan has 1.6 million inhabitants and does £5 million trade a year with us. It is a small area doing a satisfactory level of trade in relation to its size, but, of course, the prospects are limited.

Saudi Arabia has six million inhabitants and does £6 million trade with the U.K. It is still a relatively undeveloped area and is likely to be slow to develop. Bahrein is a small place, but an entrepôt in the Persian Gulf. Our business there was worth £7 million in 1959. Its oil revenues are possibly limited. The Bahreinis look upon Bahrein as the entrepôt centre of the area but it is not known whether its entrepôt trade will develop as the people would like it to; at any rate, they try to persuade visiting industrialists that it will. On the other hand, elsewhere in the Gulf there is a striking atmosphere of independence and a trend towards direct trading. Kuwait is almost one of the Seven Marvels of the world, completely resident with 200,000 inhabitants and an annual revenue of £200 million per annum—Quite fantastic! Kuwait is one of Great Britain's best customers with purchases from the United Kingdom running at £18 million a year.

The Trucial States, developing now at the bottom of the Gulf, are probably an important market for the future.

Then we come to Africa, to Egypt from whence I have just returned.

I went there at the head of a Seven-man Trade Mission at the invitation of the United Arab Republic, the first trade mission to go there since the renewal of diplomatic relations. We were exceedingly well received and had some most useful discussions, very frank and friendly; we shall be issuing a report on the results. The general feeling I had was that the Egyptians are most anxious to renew trade with Britain, and to see it restored to our pre-Suez level. It is already showing good signs of improvement, reaching £14 million in 1959. Egypt has nearly 25 million inhabitants; it is a country determined to go ahead. We examined and discussed their next Five-year programme, their industrialization plans; their need for communications, irrigation, Canal and Alexandria ports development. There is much business to be done if the ways and means can be found to pay for what is wanted. Credit comes very much into the picture, and, of course, reciprocal trading, cotton and other products. I came away from Egypt cautiously optimistic that we could re-build our position, although that will not be brought about overnight in view of the problems of finance. Nevertheless, there are reasonable hopes of recovery. I repeat my warning: others are there; the West Germans are strongly entrenched and have made good use of the opportunities presented to them.

The Sudan with its 10 million inhabitants, buying from Great Britain at the rate of £13 million a year is anxious to continue these excellent trade relations. Great Britain is a great purchaser of Sudan's cotton and the Sudan buys a large proportion of its goods from our country. They like British goods; they are used to our standards of trading and from every aspect they are anxious to continue, but once again competition is extremely severe. When one is in a good position one is always vulnerable and our competitors, West Germany in particular, are anxious to get into the Sudan in a big way and, if possible, replace British goods. We must not be complacent about the position in the Sudan.

Ethiopia has 18 million inhabitants, its communications are extremely difficult, and its resources are also difficult to develop. Trade is at a relatively low level; they would like to see it much higher and considerably more aid coming from Great Britain. In fact, the Ethiopians are quite disappointed that we have not done more for them. They respect very much the help Great Britain gave them before the war in connection with the Italian invasion; also the help given to their Emperor during that period when he was living in England. They also respect the help we gave to enable them to recover again. Nevertheless, disillusionment has set in in many quarters that more has not been done for them since that date, and to such an extent that they feel they have no option but to look elsewhere. As we know, Ethiopia is now receiving aid from the Iron Curtain countries to enable the desired developments to take place. We should take note of that and see whether more should not or could not be done by Great Britain for Ethiopia.

Finally, we come to Libya, to which I have not been so that I cannot speak from direct experience, but from all accounts it is a country with a future. Oil has been found there and it seems that development is likely to be fairly rapid. Incidentally, it is causing some concern to the Canal authorities in Egypt because they can see the centre of gravity of oil rather

shifting—with the discovery of oil in Libya and oil in the Sahara—and they wonder how much this is ultimately going to affect traffic through the Canal, as it may well do.

The area covered is so wide that I have been able only to touch lightly on one or two points. I could spend much more in telling you of the detailed talks we have had during the various visits, talks with heads of the States, with Government officials, local business men and others. But it seems best to invite any questions which members might care to raise and so help to bring out any particular point.

I conclude by repeating that it seems to me that it is an extremely valuable area which we as a trading nation cannot afford to neglect. There is much to be done. There is much going to be done. The area covered is not as unstable as it looks. Of course, politically it is important to the West. Trade can help a good deal in that direction. Finally, when looking at the territory tradewise I always remind myself of the vast revenues from oil available to the countries in the area and say to myself that while oil flows, so money will flow, and where money flows trade will follow. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sure we all greatly appreciate Mr. Nelson's survey of an area which is of extreme importance to the United Kingdom. I gathered the impression that some of the countries in the Middle East are not, economically, in a happy position. They need money largely for two purposes: firstly, to bring in water, sanitation, or whatever it may be, to improve the standard of living; secondly, they need money in order to establish local industries. Whilst to some extent by establishing local industries these countries provide trade for the United Kingdom, in so far as equipment is concerned, and for the other competing countries—the United States, Japan, Germany especially—competition in which this country is out to play an important part, nevertheless some of the industries mentioned seem to me to be uneconomic propositions, possibly because of lack of raw materials and so on. So I ask Mr. Nelson to add a word or two on the establishment of local industries in countries which may not be suitable for the particular local industries in mind. Is that outside the sphere?

Mr. NELSON: Not at all. It is a pertinent question but one extremely difficult to answer. Sir Philip is entirely right. There are a number of uneconomic propositions under discussion and it is most difficult to sort out the good from the bad. Egypt is more closely planned probably than any other country I visited. I studied in some detail their Five-year plan which included a considerable amount of industrialization. It had been gone into in fair detail economically and was framed much as the plans of some of the other territories, with a view to conserving foreign exchange which is in short supply, by manufacturing in their own country. That is probably the dominating factor in deciding on the industries to be established. It is not so much a question of whether they can make the particular goods more cheaply than they can buy them, but whether they can make them using their own labour and raw materials because even if it costs more but at the same time saves foreign exchange it is worth doing. That seems a sensible approach, although it can be carried too far. Ob-

viously there comes a point when it makes no sense because if such an idea were spread throughout the world there would be a policy of self-sufficiency which could not be sound, in any case. But up to a point, while these countries are so dependent upon the availability of overseas finance, that thinking can be justified.

In the Sudan, for instance, I saw a project for producing textiles, using their own raw materials; a sugar factory was being built, also pretty sound. I saw steel being produced in Egypt but I am not saying that was sound because the coke was imported and must have been costly. On the other hand, it is cheaper for them to import coke than steel.

It is difficult, Sir Philip, to generalize on your question, but there is no doubt there are many reasonable projects which can be exploited, also many we need to watch from our side because they might alter our own pattern of trade. I visited a tyre factory in Alexandria making apparently good tyres; I did not gather what the wearing characteristics were like but the tyres were supplying the needs of Egypt for the large range of sizes and, what is more, the Egyptians are starting to export the tyres and reckon to expand considerably, which will have an effect on our trade. On the whole, it seemed to be an economic proposition from Egypt's point of view. On the other hand, one saw and heard of a number of what appeared to be quite ambitious projects—chemical plants, oil refineries and more steel works in Iran—which seemed difficult to justify.

MISS MARY ROWLATT: Did Mr. Nelson find any evidence that the people of the Middle East countries visited were beginning to wonder whether the Iron Curtain countries use all their trade almost purely as a means of pushing their ideology, or was there no evidence that their wondering was along that line?

MR. NELSON: I would not say the Iron Curtain countries are pushing their ideology with success. Actually the people in the Middle East were asking themselves whether the particular trade was in their best interests. As I mentioned, we had an excellent reception in the United Arab Republic due partly, I believe, to a certain amount of concern as to whether the extent to which their economy is getting tied up with the East is likely in the long run to be to their advantage. As I have said, cheap loans do not always prove to be as cheap as they at first sight may appear to be. Also I believe Iron Curtain products when delivered have their limitations; it is found in many instances that the products are not as good as the countries have been used to receiving from the United Kingdom in the past.

Similarly, as one would expect, I also found that their after-sale service (their supply of spares and so on) is often very defective. That is also to be expected because the Iron Curtain countries have not a long experience as exporting countries. Personally, I do not think a Government department is the best body to deal with that sort of trade. Then, too, the Middle East countries are finding the currency situation somewhat difficult. Egypt is getting tied up with the eastern economy; she is selling too much of her cotton in that direction, and is anxious to reverse that process. By and large, I would say they realize that there is danger in getting too much Iron Curtain trade.

Mr. M. CONNOR: Is much trade done by State trading corporations or is it mostly private enterprise in the Middle East countries? Is it mostly straight trading in the countries themselves?

Mr. NELSON: By and large straight trading. One must, however, qualify that a little because in Egypt, for instance, much industry is Government controlled one way and another, although I did not see much evidence of purchase by Government departments.

Mr. T. G. HUTSON: A number of the Middle East countries have passed laws with a view to encouraging foreign investment in their countries, but Nasser seems to have taken an opposite line, saying Egypt does not want private investment which would only be coming in to milk Egypt; he wanted Government investment. I wonder if during Mr. Nelson's visit that point arose at all; whether that attitude might slow Nasser's prospects of speedy development; whether he was cutting off his nose to spite his face?

Mr. NELSON: The situation in Egypt is difficult; they are very much governed by the background of the revolution, part of the object of which was to disentangle themselves from the hold over their economy which foreign investment had previously involved. Therefore, the Egyptians are shy at present of any large amount of foreign investment coming in. In fact, on a number of occasions they would welcome a certain amount of foreign investment up to certain percentages but not to the extent of foreign control. I personally think the speaker is right; there is a limitation; probably more would be obtained if the door were opened wider, although in view of the political background one realizes that that is not easy for Egypt to do.

In India the same sort of process took place. At first India took every step possible to frighten foreign investment away and succeeded in doing that; later the Government of India realized that they could not develop their economy at the pace they wished unless they attracted the foreign investor. They reversed the earlier trend pretty successfully. The same may happen in Egypt although, as I have said, there is the difficult political background which renders such a progress all the more difficult in that instance.

Mr. BYRT: We know that since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, Truman and others, the Americans have conducted a world-wide propaganda campaign against British imperialism, the purpose of which has been, on their own confession, to filch from Britain for America's benefit the goodwill which British trade enjoys throughout the world. Can Mr. Nelson say whether he noticed any effect from that propaganda in the countries he visited in the Middle East? Is it not possible that in view of damaged British prestige there the Germans have been even quicker than the Americans to take advantage of the gap thus made?

Mr. NELSON: I can only answer that from the trade point of view. I would agree entirely that the Germans have been quick off the mark in taking advantage of any opportunity. We should not under-rate them in any respect. They have seized the opportunities and made very good use of them. As far as Great Britain is concerned we have almost lost out as a result of the various upheavals which have taken place, but gener-

ally speaking I am not sure ours is an entirely lost cause by any means. Having tried others and had some experience of dealings with them, there is in many cases a desire to get back to trading with Great Britain. They like our methods, they admire our integrity and also they like British products. Having said that, we have, of course, to be competitive with the rest of the trading nations. By and large, I do not necessarily take a pessimistic view; I do not think we shall lose as much as one might think possible at first sight.

Mr. J. Cook: Mr. Nelson has told us how we should make British credit terms appear in a good light, but to some extent our credit terms are not as good as those given by Germany and Japan. Mr. Nelson has also said that one of the ways in which to improve British trade is to improve credit facilities. Does he think that that is wholly the job of exporters or does he think the Board of Trade could do more?

Mr. NELSON: That is a question which has been put to me in every country I visited in the Middle East. It has been said that the Germans offer better credit terms than we do. If I can be given examples of exactly that, I shall be glad to have them because I have failed to get any examples.

As to Japan I agree with the speaker; they are offering entirely different trading conditions to our own.

I believe that the Board of Trade must inevitably come into this; it is a question of the Government backing financial policy. As with the individual, as I see it, one cannot lend more than one has got; therefore, it is obviously not industry's job to decide where or how the country's resources should best be lent round the world. Great Britain has enormous demands to fulfil in the Commonwealth and other trading areas all of whom wish to have credit, loans and so forth; there are very many demands being made on us. As a country we only have a certain amount to put up and we are making our resources available to the full extent of the country's ability, as I understand it. I feel it must inevitably be the duty of the Government through the Board of Trade, as being the operative department, to decide how those resources should best be lent in the various conflicting spheres. Having said that, it is up to industry to give to the Board of Trade as much guidance as possible; we would probably not all agree as to what guidance we should give; we all have particular interests of our own; we all feel one area more important than another; we all feel one section of business more important than another. Nevertheless, it is up to us to put our views to the Board of Trade and it is then, as I see it, for the Board of Trade to take those views and relate them to the over-all economic position of the country, and then decide accordingly. Some would agree with what they decided; some might disagree. It must, in any case, be the job of the Government to decide.

Mr. M. CONNOR: The remark as to not putting over what Great Britain is doing for the Middle East countries reminded me that Glubb Pasha, speaking to the Society on his return from Jordan, said that all along the line he had not been able to get support from the Government to put over the English point of view; that the views of the Communist countries were being put over to better effect. I gathered that Mr. Nelson's trade mission is Government representative. Whose responsibility is it to see



that Great Britain puts over what it is doing in a way which impresses the various interests in the respective countries?

Mr. NELSON: Not being a member of the Government I do not know that I am in a position to give a direct answer. In the Communist countries the whole system is highly centralized and their presentation of their views is no accident, whereas in our country one can well ask the question just posed: Whose responsibility is it?

Mr. CONNOR: That point does appear to continually arise.

Sir CHARLES BELGRAVE: Would it not be the responsibility of Dr. Charles Hill?

Mr. NELSON: I do not know; perhaps he should be asked.

Mr. WEATHERHEAD: The lecturer mentioned Russian aid to Ethiopia; is he able to be specific as to what is being spent?

Mr. NELSON: No, I have no details of what is being spent by the Russians in aid; the particular point I had in mind was that the Emperor of Ethiopia visited Russia, I do not, of course, know what was discussed, but following that visit it is proposed to erect an oil refinery in Ethiopia. The Emperor had, I understand, endeavoured to obtain support for this particular project from elsewhere but had failed. While I was in Ethiopia it was said that the Russians had undertaken to build the oil refinery and, what is more, it was stated that that was one of the matters discussed during the Emperor's visit to Russia. That is just a case in point.

The CHAIRMAN: We have now come to the end of the time allotted. Mr. Nelson has given us a most interesting talk on commercial activity in the Middle East which is very important and he has spoken from first-hand knowledge. Moreover, he has answered a number of questions. I thank him on your behalf for having come at this hour to talk to us when we know how busy he is with so many other activities. I know you will show your appreciation in the usual way. (*Applause.*)

Mr. NELSON: Thank you, Sir Philip, and thank you also Ladies and Gentlemen.

## ANNUAL MEETING

The Annual General Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society was held in the Hall of the Royal Society, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W.1, on Tuesday, June 28, 1960.

The President, Lord Scarborough, was in the chair, and the Anniversary Lecture was given by Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, who spoke on "The Impact of the Commonwealth on Asia."

The PRESIDENT, opening the proceedings, called on Group-Captain Smallwood to present the Honorary Secretaries' Report.

### HONORARY SECRETARIES' REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1959-1960

Group-Captain H. ST. CLAIR SMALLWOOD: It is my pleasant duty to mention some of the activities of the Society during the past year. A very wide field has been covered by the lectures—Hong Kong, Tibet, Persia, Mongolia, the United Nations and Asia by Lord Birdwood; Afghanistan, Indo-China, Japan, "The Asian Containment Front from Turkey to Korea" by Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark; and the most recent lecture was by Major Streater, who described "The Army Training Expedition to the Karakoram, 1959."

The Society's *Journal* goes to 131 universities and colleges and to 51 institutes, libraries and museums; it is very widely distributed, from Finland to Japan, Africa to the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. There has been a gratifying increase in the number of individuals who receive the *Journal*.

Membership stands at about 2,000. There have been some losses by death and by resignation. General H. G. Martin, for many years a member of the Council, has retired to Cheshire; General Sir Frederick Pile has resigned, as also has Prince Chula of Thailand. We have lost by death Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, Chairman of the Council for many years, Sir Charles Innes, who was a trustee, and various other distinguished members.

One of the Society's unusual activities during the past year was that of receiving a visit from Mr. K. M. Abdullaev, head of the Academy of Science in Uzbekistan, and a distinguished geologist. He represents an area containing about 8,000,000 inhabitants.

For many years the Society has had the services of Colonel Bailey as Honorary Librarian. He now lives in the country and finds it difficult to come to London, so that he has asked to be relieved of his duties. The Council recommend the election of Mr. Frank de Halpert as Honorary Librarian, he having wide knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs. A number of new books have been added to the Library, and with Mr. de Halpert's assistance we shall be able to render even better service to members using the Library.

The issue of a Members' List is somewhat more costly than some might think, but I am glad to say that the Treasurer has allotted £200 towards

the publication in 1961 of a revised Members' List. Such expenses are quite unavoidable.

One of your Honorary Secretaries visited the Maldive Islands in April, 1960, under the aegis of the Commonwealth Relations Office, travelling 22,000 miles in sixteen days. While there he broadcast from Gau on the advantages of membership of the Royal Central Asian Society.

This Society will be represented by Colonel G. E. Wheeler at the International Congress of Orientalists to be held in Moscow from August 9 to 16, 1960.

Reference should be made to the Society's distinguished line of Secretaries from the days of Miss Kennedy, followed by Miss Wingate, then Mrs. Putnam, who resigned in 1959, and now we welcome our new Secretary, Miss Marsh.

#### THE HONORARY TREASURER'S REPORT

Major E. AINGER presented the financial statement, as audited, and the Honorary Treasurer's report, as follows:

The Balance Sheet and the Income and Expenditure Account have been in members' hands for some little time. The position generally appears to me to be satisfactory.

As regards the Balance Sheet, I call attention to the fact that the Trustees' new policy of moving out of fixed interest investments into equities has paid, the value of the securities now being even higher than shown in the Balance Sheet as at December 31, 1959. You will notice that we have increased the Reserve for Contingencies both to meet the cost of publication of the revised List of Members and also to allow us to re-decorate the Society's offices.

Turning to the Income and Expenditure Account, once again I must congratulate Mrs. Putnam and her staff on the way in which the expenses have been kept nearly level with the previous year, which is quite a feat in these days.

I mentioned in my speech last year the question of the Inland Revenue and Covenants. Thanks to the Society's Honorary Solicitors, the position as regards the repayment of tax on Covenants has now been cleared up, and the Income and Expenditure Account shows how the Society has benefited.

I now propose that the accounts for the year ended December 31, 1959, be adopted, and if there are any questions I shall be pleased to answer them.

Colonel GALLOWAY formally seconded the proposition and, there being no questions or comments, the President, on a show of hands, declared the accounts duly adopted.

#### ELECTION OF COUNCIL AND OFFICERS FOR 1960-61

The PRESIDENT announced that the Council had elected for the ensuing year: as Chairman of the Council, Sir Philip Southwell, re-elected; as Vice-Presidents, Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Wheeler, C.I.E., C.B.E., and Mr. G. Wilfred Seager.

The PRESIDENT next gave the recommendations of the Council for the

re-election of Major Ainger as Hon. Treasurer; as Hon. Secretaries Group-Captain Smallwood, Colonel G. M. Routh and Mr. J. M. Cook; and for the election of Mr. F. de Halpert as Hon. Librarian; and of Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., and Sir Lionel Lamb, K.C.M.G., O.B.E., as members of Council.

Mr. C. J. Pelly proposed that these members be elected *en bloc*.

Mr. A. H. S. Candlin formally seconded the motion, and it was carried unanimously.

#### NEW RULE ALLOWING FOR LIFE MEMBERSHIP

Major E. Ainger, Hon. Treasurer, proposed as an amendment to the Society's Rules, the inclusion of the following new rule allowing for Life Membership:

*Rule 3a.* A Member may compound for all future annual subscriptions by paying in lieu thereof one sum calculated according to his or her age and category as follows:

Under 40 years of age ... ..	15 times the annual subscription
Between 40 and 50 years of age	12     "     "     "
Between 50 and 60 years of age	9     "     "     "
Over 60 years of age ... ..	7     "     "     "

*Alternatively,* a Member paying United Kingdom income tax at the standard rate will be granted Life Membership on execution of a Deed of Covenant to pay subscriptions to the Society as follows:

Under 40 years of age ... ..	12 years' subscriptions
Between 40 and 50 years of age	10     "     "
Between 50 and 60 years of age	8     "     "
Over 60 years of age ... ..	7     "     "

Colonel G. M. Routh formally seconded the motion and the new rule was unanimously adopted.

#### AN AFTERNOON PARTY IN JULY, 1961

Sir Philip Southwell: Perhaps, before proposing a resolution under this heading, I might explain what we have in mind. In a Society of this kind it is always difficult to cater for younger members and for those who may not wish to travel to London to attend an Annual Dinner which entails staying the night in London, but who might be prepared to come up and be with the Society at an afternoon party. If we ran into bad weather the Society might have to face a small loss on the party. Hence it seemed desirable that such a proposal as this should be considered at an Annual General Meeting. We hope, if members agree, to hold a party in the afternoon one day in July, 1961, at a reasonable cost to members and to which overseas visitors can be invited.

I now propose that the Society hold an Afternoon Party in July, 1961, and that the Council be asked to go into the best ways and means of putting this proposal into effect.

Nineteen sixty-one will be the Society's sixtieth anniversary, so that it

seems appropriate that we should, at any rate for one year, have two functions, after which we can decide whether they should be repeated.

Sir JOHN TROUTBECK formally seconded the proposition.

The PRESIDENT: Are there any comments or questions? As there are none, do you or do you not agree with the proposal? That is agreed. Thank you.

#### AWARDS

Sir PHILIP SOUTHWELL: Another matter to which your Council have given a good deal of thought is that of the medals which the Society awards for distinguished service in Asian countries. The Council has in hand recommendations for the award of the Sir Percy Sykes Memorial Medal and the Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal. Unfortunately, the proposed recipients are abroad. It is necessary, of course, to ascertain whether they will be happy to receive the awards, so that at this Annual Meeting it is not possible to mention names. It is hoped that by July 13 something will be settled so that at the Annual Dinner the President may be able to announce the awards. We are not sure whether the proposed recipients will be returning to England by that date or not, but as it is felt that questions might be raised as to when we were going to award the two medals, we should clear the atmosphere at this meeting by letting members know that the Council have two awards in mind.

#### VOTE OF THANKS TO PRESIDENT

Sir RICHARD GALE: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, it was on November 2, 1954, that Lord Scarbrough wrote accepting the Society's invitation to become its President, since when he has taken an immensely keen interest in all our activities, and, indeed, I think I am right in saying that he has never missed an Annual General Meeting or the Society's Annual Dinner except one year when he was not well. Lord Scarbrough has given us a generous amount of his thought and time and we have benefited enormously from his wisdom and judgment. And when we think, as most here are aware, of the very onerous other duties he has, and the heavy calls on his time, I feel you would all like to join with me in thanking Lord Scarbrough immensely for all he has done for us. (*Applause.*)

As you are all probably aware, Lord Scarbrough will not be vacating the Presidency until after the Annual Dinner. The President-Elect is Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir William Dickson, who is well known to many of you. He is a man of great experience as a fighting man and as one who has spent a great deal of his life in various Eastern countries.

*The vote of thanks to the President having been heartily accorded,*

The PRESIDENT said: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank Sir Richard Gale for his most kind remarks. It really has been a great pleasure and privilege to be President of this Society. You have always been kind, Mr. Chairman and members of the Council, in not calling upon your President for more than he could be willing to do, and I much appreciate your forbearance. I have come to feel quite sure during the five and a half





years in which I have occupied this position that the Royal Central Asian Society performs most valuable work. The statistics given by Group-Captain Smallwood as to the way in which the Society's *Journal* is disseminated through most countries of the world certainly point to the usefulness of the Society. I have felt it a great privilege to do what little I have done as President of the Society, which I am quite sure has many useful years of activity ahead of it.

I am delighted that Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson has been persuaded to accept the post as President.

Sir PHILIP SOUTHWELL: I have one announcement to make which gratifies your Council enormously, but of which members are so far not aware, and that is that Lord Scarbrough has agreed to become one of the Society's Honorary Vice-Presidents, and therefore we shall not lose him from the Society. (*Applause.*)

It now remains for me to declare the Annual Meeting over and to thank you for your attendance.

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The following back numbers of the Society's *Journal* are urgently wanted :

1914 Part 3.	1934 Parts 1 & 3.
1916 Parts 2 & 3.	1935 Parts 1 & 3.
1917 Part 4.	1936 Part 3.
1918 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1937 Part 1.
1919 Parts 1, 2 & 4.	1938 Parts 2, 3 & 4.
1920 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1940 Part 3.
1921 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1941 Parts 1, 3 & 4.
1922 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1942 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.
1923 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1944 Parts 2, 3 & 4.
1924 Parts 1, 2, 3 & 4.	1945 Part 1.
1925 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1946 Parts 3 & 4.
1926 Parts 3 & 4.	1947 Parts 1, 3 & 4.
1927 Parts 1, 3 & 4.	1948 Parts 1 & 2.
1928 Parts 1 & 3.	1949 Part 4.
1929 Part 1.	1950 Part 2.
1930 Part 1.	1951 Parts 2 & 3.
1931 Parts 3 & 4.	1952 Part 2.
1932 Parts 1, 2 & 3.	1957 Part 1.

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# THE IMPACT OF THE COMMONWEALTH ON ASIA

By SIR GILBERT LAITHWAITE, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.,  
K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

Anniversary Lecture delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society on June 28, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is my privilege to introduce Sir Gilbert Laithwaite who is to lecture on “The Impact of the Commonwealth on Asia,” a subject of extreme importance at the present time. Sir Gilbert has a life experience in Burma, India and Pakistan, and for the last five years has been Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations Office. He needs no introduction to the members of this Society, and we are indeed glad that he has agreed to become a member of Council and that he has been elected today.

I WOULD like, in the first place, to thank Sir Philip Southwell for his kind words of introduction and to say what a pleasure and honour it is for me to have been elected to the Council of your Society today. It may sound odd, but this year is the fortieth anniversary of my joining the Society, so that I feel I have had experience of its activities over a lengthy period.

For the topic on which I have unwisely said I would speak I have it in mind to analyse how “The Impact of the Commonwealth on Asia” has been built up. I must confess to a certain amount of untidiness in the title because, in the first place, nothing I say will apply to Russia in Asia, which occupies such an immense area, but on which neither the United Kingdom nor any other part of the Commonwealth have ever made any particular impact. Secondly, when I speak of the Commonwealth I am bound to admit that the Commonwealth for this purpose means, up to the end of the First World War and, to a large extent, up to the end of the Second World War, the United Kingdom. It is since the Second World War that the association with Asia of the countries of the Commonwealth lying outside Asia has become so much more marked, and it is also since the end of the Second World War that there have been, for the first time, independent Commonwealth countries in Asia itself—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya—which are able from inside that great continent to exercise an influence of their own with their Commonwealth background and Commonwealth thinking behind it.

I need not remind you of the origins of our United Kingdom association with Asia. Everybody knows that it started with our trading operations under Elizabeth I and thereafter through the East India Company, and it has been a case of the flag following trade quite as much as of trade following the flag. It is the dynamic impulse, the drive, the interest in

overseas expansion, which has sent people from the United Kingdom for 300 or 400 years to face difficult conditions, difficult climates overseas, in the hope, I do not deny, of doing themselves good as well, in very many cases, but also of doing some good to the places in which they settled, that is responsible for our impact on Asia. We are not, I know well, the only European country or country of European origin which can make a claim in that regard. There are the earlier colonizers, the Spanish and the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French; and during the last few years the United States of America have started to take an immense and most generous interest in Asia and its problems. But it is we, of the old settlers, if I may so call them, who have made the greatest contribution, and, in my judgment, the deepest and the most marked impact on the Asiatic continent. One reason for our greater success may be that we have never been unduly troubled, save during the Civil War, by internal strife at home, and that we have always operated from a strong home base, not interrupted, as all continental countries have been, by wars or revolutions which—and one has only to look at the history of France to see an example—have had so fundamental an influence on the fate of their overseas possessions, and on the effort and energy that had been put into building those possessions up.

We can but wonder at the courage, possibly the unconscious courage, shown by those who went on these great expeditions, with no idea that 400 years later Asia would be what it is today; the courage shown by early explorers, by our early traders, by our early political and civil officers, by our early military officers who invaded, one might say, the Asian continent. Just consider what Asia contains and what confronted our predecessors. Three of the great religions of the world—Islam, with the Holy Places in Arabia; Hinduism; Buddhism—all solidly established, great empires such as Persia, the empire of the Moguls, the empire of Japan, which came into our ken rather later; and, above all, the Chinese Empire. Their enormous riches, their huge populations, populations with great martial elements and with distinguished records of their own, populations as large relatively then as now. Their natural resources: tin, oil, rubber, jute, cotton, tea, spices, gold, every sort of valuable product. A great prize, had people known what the prize was, and had they been looking for a prize. In fact they went to Asia on their ordinary business. But they so conducted themselves there that in the end they held a dominating position in much of the Asian continent.

If you ask next what was the essential basis and what the central point of our impact on Asia, the answer is immediate: the answer is the Indian sub-continent. From our association with India there flowed progressively our interest in Arabia, in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq, the routes to the East; second, our interest in Persia and Afghanistan; thirdly, our absorbing interest in the great mountain mass of the Himalaya and in what lay behind it at all times; fourthly, our concern with Tibet, Sinkiang, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal on the north-east border of India, all of which brought us, further east again, in contact with the mighty Chinese Empire of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Travelling from India as our base, it was trade, successfully pursued in India, that led us gradually further east to Malaya, to the Far East, and to our relations with China.

We need only look at the great ports of Asia. All save Canton have been established by us—Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai. Every one of those represents a degree of European impact and every one of them a major British impact. The Portuguese still retain their famous settlement at Macao, but I do not think it can fairly be suggested that, important and interesting as it is, it can historically compare with any of the other great ports I have mentioned. That is the background of our association with Asia.

What has the nature of our impact been? I would like to try to answer that question, to go on to trace some recent developments, and to ask whether the position that has developed is one that is a good one from Asia's point of view, and one that is likely to last.

First, as regards the impact itself. Taking it in its most general form, one could simply say that we, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, could claim to have laid the foundations on which India and Pakistan, and of course Ceylon and Malaya, stand today. We can claim, even if we never have penetrated in any material way into the middle of the immense Chinese Empire, or beyond its coastal fringe, to have made great contributions to development in China communications, by the work of Sir Robert Hart and the Chinese Customs Service, and so on. I do not deny that there were such things as the Opium War and certain other aspects of our association with China which do not stand too close investigation! Finally, our association with Japan. I do not know whether I am right in saying that the British were the first great Western power to enter into an alliance with a major Asiatic modern State such as was the original Japanese Alliance, an alliance that was not affected in 1904 and 1905 when the Japanese were engaged in a major war with a great European power which was on friendly terms with ourselves. There have been changes over the years in our relations with Japan. But the impact on Asia of that particular alliance, and of the excellent relations that we had with Japan during the First War, and for many years afterwards, are significant.

Inevitably our impact has varied from time to time both in scale and in nature, and, inevitably again, I would say that it is where we have had and have exercised authority that for obvious reasons that impact has been greatest. Accepting that it has been greatest for that reason and where we have had power, it none the less remains the case that the example which we have set, the ideas which we have germinated in the Asian mind, have had an immense effect on countries in which we have not, and never have had, any power or authority, so that the effect and the importance of our impact are not limited by the mere fact that we did in certain areas control or greatly influence the course of events.

On particular facets of our impact let me first touch on religion. I have mentioned that Asia is the home of three of the great religions of the world, with hundreds of millions of adherents, and British and Commonwealth activity there has been characterized by much patient endeavour, much self-sacrificing labour, by missionaries and others anxious to spread the Christian faith, not without grave risk to themselves and often in circumstances of much privation and danger from time to time. The missionaries have left a great mark in education by example and in various

other ways. In terms of the number of adherents whom they gained one cannot think the outcome important in relation to the masses of people who continue to profess the historic faiths of Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. It is more in terms of example, in terms of the new turn of thought which Christianity has given to the outlook and to the speculations of philosophers and religious men in these countries that the importance of our religious impact on Asia is to be counted.

Next the political and the administrative side. Here I believe we can claim credit for a policy that has sought to establish the rule of law; equal justice; an uncorrupt, impartial and independent Judiciary; fair treatment for the common man; integrity. That is something for which we can claim a great responsibility. Incidentally, the fact that in a country such as India we introduced and operated a uniform system of law through the sub-continent had no small effect in maintaining that internal unity and uniformity which can be of such real political importance.

Secondly, we can claim to have established the freedom of the Press and freedom of speech, and by freedom I mean freedom, not licence. We have eliminated civil war, established security of life and property, kept the peace. We have not exploited the countries which we have governed. Naturally, people's salaries and their pensions have been paid. But no one can say that these countries have been held to ransom by the United Kingdom. That tradition of disinterestedness is a precious thing.

Next we are responsible for introducing parliamentary and democratic institutions. We must not be disappointed if people, once they have achieved their independence, think they can improve on what we have given them, or may want to modify what we have given them. That is perfectly natural; and if independence means anything, it means that a people have the right to go their own way, in so far as they wisely can, if they want to.

What else have we given to Asia? A point of extreme importance is that against the background of political and economic stability which we have secured in all these countries we have built a platform on which the new countries—India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaya—have been able to establish themselves and to come to the fruition of their present independence and the full enjoyment of international prestige. How has that been achieved? By the generous and self-sacrificing work of administrators, soldiers, sailors and airmen, who have trained up the natives of the country and given them every encouragement to apply the political ideals which have always characterized the United Kingdom, to work on towards self-government and looking after their own affairs. But it is only because so solid a foundation had been laid—administrative, educational, political, economic—that it has been possible—and I say this with the greatest respect for the present governments of India and Pakistan and the greatest admiration for both—for those two immense countries, with 500 million people between them, to have achieved the great success and the position in the world that they have achieved, and to have consolidated that position in the way they have during the thirteen years since independence.

In the cultural field we have made a great contribution by way of education, and we can claim to a larger degree probably than any other

country to have familiarized Asia with Western thinking, with the operation of Western science and with Western political thought—and I underline “Western political thought.” We all know how much more often one has heard Burke quoted in the sub-continent than in the United Kingdom. British political ideals and ideas, representative government, parliamentary control, the ideal of independence, the idea even of the nationalist approach, the idea of self-government, to all of which we have continually come back in the course of our long association with the countries under our authority, English political thought has in all those ways made an immense impact on Asia. And the impact which it has made on the countries under our authority has been reflected vividly and immediately in other countries which are not under British authority, and has led in countries—for instance, such as Japan, in which we never have had any particular position except a trading position—to parliamentary developments which stemmed strongly and directly from Western thinking and from practice in the United Kingdom.

Finally, there is our economic impact, and that can be stated simply. We can claim to have capitalized Asia. Perhaps that is particularly true of the sub-continent. But equally a great deal of British capital has gone into China, into the Islands, into Malaya, and, at various times, into Japan; and that at a stage when capital for development was of great importance.

We have contributed, too, on a generous scale that economic and technical know-how the importance of which the new countries realize more every day. It is heartening to us all to think today of the help being given by the United Kingdom and by other Commonwealth countries, as well as by the United States of America and friends outside in terms of technical assistance and of the training in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the Commonwealth, and in the United States, of Asians who will return better equipped to enable their own countries to carry their burdens in the industrial and economic fields on the shoulders of people of their own races.

That is the background and the nature of the impact the Commonwealth has made on Asia. Let us look now at the developments of recent years. Up to, say, the end of the First War Great Britain was still one of the greatest Powers, if not the greatest Power, in the world. At the end of the First War, badly scarred and shorn of a great deal of our wealth, we still were a very great power indeed, and our greatness was reflected and was accepted in Asia, as elsewhere.

In 1920 Great Britain had been responsible for the establishment of the two Arabian kingdoms, first of all the Hashemite kingdom and then Ibn S'aud. We had played a decisive part in the freedom of Iraq. For many years Great Britain had been of the greatest importance in safeguarding the position of Persia. Colonel Bailey, whose name was mentioned this afternoon and who was such a legendary figure, had been wandering during the War even behind the Himalaya mountain mass. In Tibet, Sinkiang and China we were great people. A significant point was that in 1920 we recognized Afghan independence in a fuller way than ever before.

Between 1920 and the Second World War things were still much the

same. We were already, and had been since 1919, continuing our work to bring the Indian sub-continent, which had made such an enormous contribution in the First War, on to self-government. That process continued, and with great vigour, and had gone very far indeed by 1939. In other spheres between the wars there had been troubles of various kinds in Asia. Our relations with Japan were cooling; there had been the Manchurian business and trouble in Korea. But the real change took place with the Second World War. Asia was very much cut off, as many will remember, from the West. The West was fighting for its life, and was not in a position to give the help it would gladly have given. Be that as it may, the Second World War saw Japan revealed as an open and ruthless enemy, and, while we won the war, we in the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth suffered in the process still more than we had during the First War.

Looking back in 1945 to a long record of disaster and of damage to prestige, we had been driven from the Far East; we had temporarily lost Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaya; we had lost Burma; India had been threatened; we had lost the great Islands. Australia and New Zealand, which had made so significant a contribution to the fighting of the war in Asia, and to maintaining in Asia those ideals which we hold dear, were themselves threatened. All worked out well. The Commonwealth and its allies were victorious. But when the Second World War ended our position in Asia was still a great one, as it is today, but I submit that it was no longer a position of authority and power. It was a position of influence and of character; and that, I believe, is what it is today.

In 1947 there took place again a change, quite radical in its importance to the Commonwealth, with the independence of India and of Pakistan. When thinking what I might say this afternoon, and remembering that the title I had chosen was "The Impact of the Commonwealth on Asia," I asked myself whether from 1947 it could not be argued that a more suitable title would be "The Impact of Asia on the Commonwealth." I would like to add a few words as to why that is the case.

India and Pakistan became independent in 1947 and became republics two years later. That was followed in Asia by the independence of Ceylon and Malaya. That was an example which, right or wrong—and I believe that it was right—set the pace and pattern for every other so-called colonial power. Once we had made that change there was no going back for any other country similarly placed, and no going back for us in the United Kingdom either. We have continued to go forward to this day with the peripheral extension of that wave into Africa, the British West Indies, wherever else there is a viable economy which has reached a point of being self-governing and able to look after itself. It was from Asia that that impulse originated, and it did so because of our previous impact on Asia, and because of the lessons in political thinking which we and the other nations in the Commonwealth had striven to convey to our friends in that great continent.

Let me ask you to contrast for a moment the Commonwealth position in 1947 with the Commonwealth position as it is in 1960. In 1947 there was a Commonwealth of, say, 90 million people, more than half in the

British Isles, essentially Christian in religion, European in race, owing allegiance to H.M. the Queen, in temperate climates, with the other characteristics which I have mentioned—freedom of the Press, freedom of speech, respect for the law and so on.

What is the position today? If we take into account Nigeria, which becomes a Commonwealth country on October 1, 1960, we have a Commonwealth of 640 million people—and I am not talking of the Colonial Empire, but of the independent Commonwealth countries—a Commonwealth of 640 million people as against, in 1947, 90 million. The Christian element in the Commonwealth has become a minority of little importance in terms of numbers. The Commonwealth contains three republics and the Kingdom of Malaya, none of the subjects of any of which owe allegiance to H.M. the Queen. The Commonwealth is predominantly tropical, not temperate. It is in no sense European in race; the European element is of relatively small importance. But that Commonwealth holds together in a remarkable way, and not least important of the things that hold it together—you may think I am exaggerating this, and perhaps I am—is the bond (leaving out all political bonds and, above all, the headship of the Commonwealth by H.M. the Queen) of the English language. The English language is spoken perhaps by only a tiny minority of the inhabitants of Asia, who have their own great and famous languages and literatures. But the minority who speak English, and for whom it is a lingua franca, who can use it at the highest levels of diplomatic, political, military and economic activity, are the tiny minority who govern the countries of the vast Asian continent. It is of immense importance that from Aden to China there should be this common medium of talk, of conversation, and that that medium should be our English language, a medium which incidentally gives all these countries the open door to the United States of America and to countries within the United States' orbit.

A great change thus has taken place since 1947, and it is a change which has taken place with the full support and great good will of all our other partners in the Commonwealth who have contributed in that way in a greater degree than was possible at an earlier stage to the general Western impact upon Asia.

Has all this been for the good of Asia? Has the impact of Great Britain and of all the other Commonwealth nations been to Asia's advantage? I do not understand how anybody can for one moment question that that has been the case. There have been plenty of misunderstandings and mistakes. One cannot make omelettes without breaking eggs. In the process, over 400 years, there have been things we regret, errors, grievous errors, and stupidities; and so there will continue to be in this sort of relationship until the end of the world. But, testing our performance over Asia so far as it has been affected by us, in any respect that you may care to take, I do think that we can face the world, and that our contribution to modernizing Asia, to enabling the countries in which we have had influence to stand on their own feet, our help to them with advice and with economic and political wisdom, our introducing of them, if I may use that rather rude word, into the greater club of nations outside and giving them the fullest support and the fullest co-operation that we can in

the international field—I am quite certain that all this has been of real value to Asia. There may have been mistakes, and many of them. But they count for nothing in comparison with the great good that has been done by the European and particularly by the British impact, and, as I said earlier, it is we in the United Kingdom and our friends in the Commonwealth overseas who can claim to have left the deepest mark on this great continent.

Is that influence going to last? Is our present Commonwealth going to last? I have every hope and confidence that the answer to both questions is Yes. Our influence has been disinterested. The closeness of our ties today with the Asian Commonwealth countries once under our authority are a tribute to that. I am confident that our influence will continue and that it is very much to the interest of Asia that it should continue and that she should continue to take advantage of the experience of our association with her. I recognize that one cannot speak for Communist China, or possibly even for Japan at the present time. But one can speak, and with confidence, of the areas with which we have been closely associated.

In the Commonwealth today we have a new partnership, vital, imaginative, flexible. Over the thirteen years since the independence of India and Pakistan that partnership, and the reality of that independence, have been tested out by many grave emergencies. It has stood the strain largely because of our wisdom in having in the Commonwealth neither constitution, nor rules, nor anything to which anybody can be compelled to conform, nor anything which anybody can claim has been infringed. Because of the excellent relations between us all, we respect one another's independence, we are frank with one another in our correspondence and talk. The Commonwealth countries are all free to follow their own policies. India and others are neutral; Pakistan a member of Seato and Cento; Australia and, I think, New Zealand do not recognize Mao Tse Tung's government as we do. We know we differ, and it is impossible for 640 million people scattered over all the continents of the world, except South America, not to differ from time to time fundamentally on every type of issue. But for all that we have held together. I believe that all being well we shall continue to hold together. But if we are to do so we must proceed as we have proceeded in the past—empirically, feeling our way, not too disturbed by the absence of rules, remembering what old Peter Fraser said of New Zealand, that Commonwealth membership was independence plus, remembering, too, that as a Commonwealth we have in the councils of the world a status, a background, and an authority which individually none of us would have—and that goes for the United Kingdom also—without the comradeship, the co-operation and the assistance of our other colleagues in the Commonwealth, be they whom they may.

But patience is needed. Wisdom has not died with us. I mentioned the traditions of the Parliamentary and the Westminster system which we have handed on to the new Commonwealth countries. We must not be unduly upset if these countries, now that they are independent, free to shape their own destinies, decide radically to modify, or even to abandon, what we have handed on to them. We have handed on what we have handed on in the belief that it is the best that we have been able to devise



for them and for ourselves. But it is for those countries to make up their own minds how to use or adapt it; their own national genius may lead them to develop on different lines; and, indeed, one can see an example of that in one of the most interesting and important experiments being made in the Commonwealth at the present time, the experiment in Pakistan in basic democracy.

Let us, too, not lecture people if we disagree with what they are doing; let us be patient if they sometimes do things we think stupid. We frequently do what they regard as stupid. If we can hold together, as I am confident that we shall, then I am certain that the Commonwealth will last and that it will be good for Asia and for the world that it should last.

And in Asia, for the first time, we have now four Commonwealth countries, two of them with 500 million people between them, to spread Commonwealth ideals.

I am confident that in the perspective of history the Commonwealth impact on Asia will be seen to have been outstanding in scale, in disinterestedness, and in significance, and I hope, as indeed the attitude towards us of the Commonwealth countries in Asia shows today, that it will be appreciated that we were not there to exploit but to help them to develop and to progress.

That is the spirit that will, I am sure, continue to inform our Commonwealth association with Asia which has been so fruitful for good for that great continent.

THE CHAIRMAN: All that remains, it not being customary to have questions following the Anniversary Lecture, is to thank Sir Gilbert on your behalf and on behalf of the whole Society for his magnificent address. I only wish many more of our younger men could have heard it.

At a dinner in Beirut recently I sat opposite a Ghanian, a member of a parliamentary delegation going to Athens to attend an international parliamentary meeting. I asked what part he played in Parliament. He drew himself up and said, "I am the Deputy Speaker." I said, "I presume that the Speaker in Ghana behaves rather like the Speaker in England?" and he replied, "Exactly, precisely." It was a first-hand example of what Sir Gilbert has indicated. We have given something in this connection which we are very proud of, and it is pleasing to feel that others appreciate it. I feel sure you all wish to express your appreciation to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite for his magnificent address. (*Applause.*)

# ANNUAL DINNER

The Annual Dinner of the Society was held at Claridge's, Brook Street, London, W.1, on Wednesday, July 13, 1960. The President, the Right Hon. The Earl of Scarborough, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., T.D., was in the chair.

## ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT

After the Loyal Toast had been honoured, the PRESIDENT said: You will have seen with dismay from your Toast List that there is now to be an Address by the President. I intend to be brief. This gathering is the annual festival of the Royal Central Asian Society, and I am delighted to see so many present at it. It gives me very great pleasure, as President, to offer a very warm welcome to all our distinguished members and guests.

I would like to say a word about the affairs of the Society. The Society is very well managed. I can say that because the President takes no real part in its management, which is, fortunately, in more capable hands. Much of the value of a society like this lies in two things: first, in the interest and quality of the views expressed at its meetings; and secondly, in the dissemination of those views in useful quarters.

As to the first, the Society has, in the past year, held seventeen meetings, and among the subjects dealt with have been: Tibet, Mongolia, the Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R., Ceylon, The Hadhramaut, Bahrain and many others. With regard to the dissemination of views, some very interesting figures were given at the Annual Meeting, and I think it is worth while to repeat them here. Our *Journal* penetrates into 131 universities and colleges, of which sixty-three are in the United States of America and fourteen are in the U.S.S.R., where I am quite sure they are carefully read. Others are in India and China, and in universities and libraries all over the world. These facts are interesting because they provide evidence of the rôle which this Society takes in its relationships with the East, that of spreading knowledge in this and other countries about the countries of Asia.

I would like to mention one growth that has taken place within the Commonwealth during the past year. Some of you may know that at the Commonwealth Economic Conference in Montreal two years ago a Commonwealth Plan was conceived, and that the Commonwealth Educational Conference further developed it at Oxford last year. Under this Plan, all the countries of the Commonwealth are to co-operate, with the aim of sharing among all Commonwealth countries the educational advantages which each possesses. There will be provided throughout the Commonwealth, when the Plan is in full operation, at any one time, 1,000 scholarships, of which 500 will be held in the United Kingdom. There is a Commission set up—of which I am Chairman—in the United Kingdom to handle these 500 United Kingdom scholarships. The first awards have been made quite recently and we hope that more than 200 scholars will arrive in this country in September of this year. They will include scholars

from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Malaya, and other countries in the Pacific area. In addition, it will cover Australia, Canada, and all other Commonwealth countries.

I wanted to draw the attention of members of the Society to this important Commonwealth Plan. It will be very interesting to see how the Plan develops over the years, and it may be that the Society, or individual members of the Society, will want to take a particular interest in the Commonwealth scholars who will come to universities in this country from Asian countries.

That illustrates one kind of contact that this country has throughout the world. There are others of a different nature. I need not remind you that we are to have a State visit from the King and Queen of Thailand to this country next week. The Ambassador of Thailand, whom we are delighted to have with us this evening, with his wife, may be sure that their Majesties will receive a most warm and friendly welcome. Then in October there will be a State visit from the King and Queen of Nepal. There will be many who have a great affection for Nepal and its people. (*Applause.*) I have not the slightest doubt that those of you who have memories of Nepal will join in welcoming the King and Queen here in October.

Ladies and gentlemen, I retire from the Chairmanship of this Society tonight, and I am delighted to know that my successor will be Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir William Dickson. He has had great experience all over the Commonwealth, and indeed the world, and he will be a great asset to the Society when he becomes its President. I would say, "Thank you" to the members of the Society for having me as their President, and for having done me that honour for six years—a year more than was intended, but that was not my fault! I would like to thank also the Officers of the Society who have really carried on the work of the Society during these years that I have had the honour to be its President.

May I say a word, in conclusion, about the future of the Society? Many of us who are members of the Society have a past—and not a bad one either—of which we need not be ashamed. I am convinced that the relationships between this country and the countries of Asia, with which we have dealt so much in the past, will grow, and will take some of their colour from the past work of many distinguished people who have tried to serve these countries. It is the future of those relationships which, I am sure, we will think of much more than the past. In trying to think of the future of this Society we should try to imagine what those relationships will be ten years from now. There will be hardly any British administrators left in Asia; there will, perhaps, be rather more diplomatists, but many more will be engaged in trade, which was, after all, our first type of relationship with India, and other countries of Asia. I hope that this Society will be able to recruit among its members many of those who are engaged in trade with those countries.

That alone will not be enough to keep flourishing the relationships that there ought to be between this country and the countries of Asia. There must be knowledge in this country of what is going on there and of the problems that confront the Governments of those countries. If this

Society, and others like it, can continue to promote in this country that knowledge of those other countries, then the future of this Society can be bright indeed.

I have felt it a very great honour to be President of the Society for five or six years and I wish the Society very well in the future. (*Applause.*)

#### THE GUESTS

Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C. (Chairman of Council) in proposing the toast of The Guests, said: At this time of the year your minds will not be very far removed from the beauty and colour of our gardens, but in view of the awful weather we have had this week, I think the little poem entitled "The Sundial" is probably most appropriate. I will not burden you with it, except for the end, which runs something like this:

"There it stands, among the flowers,  
Recording only sunny hours,  
Undeterred by rain or mist—  
The brassy-faced old optimist!"

In proposing the toast of The Guests, I am entirely free from any worries about the weather, when looking at this indoor scene full of beauty and colour. It calls immediately for a welcome to all the ladies here who are our guests this evening. Without them, this party might be rather dull and sombre. While saying a few words about the ladies, I should like to say how glad we are to have Lady Gore-Booth with us tonight. The Society, and I am sure everyone here, wishes her husband, who could not be with us tonight, every good wish in the important post to which he will shortly be going in India.

We are always delighted to have with us, on these annual occasions, a distinguished representative at the Court of St. James from an Asian country, H.E. Ambassador for Thailand; we welcome him here tonight very warmly. Most of you already have seen the preparations for the State visit of His Majesty King Bhumibol, which starts on July 19. Both their Majesties will be welcomed here very much, when they arrive on the State visit. I hope the weather will be as gracious as possible, so that they may have an enjoyable visit.

It is more than twenty years since I was in Bangkok, but that visit is quite fresh in my memory, as I am still fascinated with what I saw there. What was so very pleasant was the gracious courtesy that I was given when there. The country is making great progress. It is the Headquarters of S.E.A.T.O. at the present time. We are very pleased to have Their Excellencies with us as our guests tonight.

We, in this Society, owe a great debt of gratitude to the Royal Society, which permits us to use its historic and beautiful rooms for some of our meetings. So, I should like to welcome a fellow of the Royal Society, Sir Stewart Duke-Elder, particularly because of the work which is going on in the Middle East and which may well have great advantages throughout many Asian countries. I refer to the research work on Trachoma, which is so prevalent in Asian countries. I gather that a start has already been made in isolating the virus; I hope that Sir Stewart and his team will get

a good grip on this nasty little chap and will not let go until they have been able to secure a vaccine that will cure that awful disease. A lot of help from people in this country will be needed to ensure that, and members of this Society are particularly interested in such great work, which will result in great human benefit in many parts of Asia. We must give it our maximum support.

We always delight in welcoming Captains of Industry among us. They are, as our President has said, of great importance to us. And we welcome here tonight as one of our guests, Lord Nelson, not only for what he has done in building up a great British enterprise, but for his work in a much wider field. He has taken an interest in research and education in a way that has been of great advantage to this country. We welcome him on that score very much. We have not long ago had the pleasure of hearing an address by his son, Mr. Nelson, who led a British Trade Mission in the Middle East, and we enjoyed that talk very much. I happened to be in Cairo at the time that he was there, and many Egyptians said to me, "This Mission has left behind it an amazing amount of goodwill, as the result of Mr. Nelson's efforts."

Nothing has given the Society more pleasure than the fact that the date of this function coincided with the visit to this country of Lord and Lady Casey, coupled with the fact that they have been able to be present with us tonight. Lord Casey has kindly agreed to reply to this toast. It would be impossible for me to describe to you what he has done, and perhaps inappropriate, because he is so well known. I believe that he is the only man who has been a Cabinet Minister in two Commonwealth countries, and of course he has been the Foreign Minister or Minister of the Exterior of Australia for a longer time than anyone. The work that he has done has been so great that a very reputable London newspaper, when congratulating him on his Life Peerage, headed its article: "Lord Casey's Double Life." I hope that he and Lady Casey will continue to commute to this country from Australia for many years to come and that he will continue to have health and strength to do so.

Now I come to what we all feel to be a very great honour to our Society, that we should have with us the Lord High Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, and Lady Kilmuir. It would not be appropriate for me to say more than how much we welcome them here and how highly we think of the public service that Lord Kilmuir has rendered to this country. They are both very welcome guests here tonight.

Ladies and gentlemen, I now feel rather like a racehorse that has been entered for the Grand National but has been told that he must not jump. I have not been able to jump as high as I would like; there are so many distinguished guests here that although I would like to have welcomed them all individually, that is, unfortunately, quite impossible in a gathering of this nature. Therefore, I now give you the toast of "Our Guests," and ask you to rise and drink to the health of the guests, coupling with the toast, the name of Lord Casey. (*Applause.*)

The Rt. Hon. the Lord Casey, C.H., D.S.O., M.C., in replying said: I do not believe you realize the risk you took in enabling me to address

this great gathering tonight. Having had certain contacts with Asian and Middle Eastern countries, I might well have gone on and on. However any such ideas were put straight by a telephone conversation with a very effective member of your staff, who said, in terms that admitted of no misunderstanding, that she hoped I would be able to say a few words to you this evening. Although she said it in the nicest possible way, I knew that when she said "a few words" she meant a few words. So my bubble was pricked. Although I spent, with my wife, two periods of apprenticeship in areas with which your Society concerns itself—the Middle East for two years and India for two years—I shall not keep you for long tonight.

I greatly welcome this opportunity for my wife and I to be your guests at this dinner of the Royal Central Asian Society. From what you said at this function last year, Mr. President, I gather that the ambit of the Society is not narrowly confined to Central Asia but embraces everything from Turkey to Formosa and from the North Pole to the Equator, and so includes the two areas in which I was privileged to work for some little time. They were two great experiences. In the Middle East for two years we had the opportunity of visiting and of working in most of the countries there. Then came two years in Bengal in old undivided India—and since then nearly ten years as Minister for External Affairs in my country, Australia. Those two periods in the Middle East and in India were invaluable experiences. In the last ten years it has been my task, as Australian Minister for External Affairs, to get to know Asia by establishing Australian diplomatic posts in all the free Asian countries, to visit them myself for about a month each year and to send my senior officers to travel among them. Now, fifteen years after the end of the war, I like to think that we in Australia, Government and people, have got to know something about South and South-East Asia. We cured ourselves very quickly of speaking about free Asia as though it were one country, because we realize that its dozen or so countries were very distinct from each other, with their different histories, religions, traditions, languages and ways of life. They differ from each other about as much as France differs from Germany.

It would be presumptuous of us to say that we know Asia and its countries, but we like to believe that we are on the way to knowing them. We have welcomed into Australia since the end of the war something like 20,000 Asian students, who have gone into our universities, colleges, hospitals, Government Departments and elsewhere. Many of them have come because of the geographical propinquity of Australia to South and South-East Asia. We like to think that we have got to know the leaders of the Governments and the peoples in the free Asian countries, and it has been a most rewarding process. We in Australia greatly look forward to the perpetuation of the many contacts we have made with the charming and accomplished people of the free countries of Asia.

If we had more time tonight, I would speak to you about Sir Kinehan Cornwallis, whom we knew in Baghdad and who died not very long ago; and Sir Reader Bullard of Teheran; and many other people whom we met in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya, as well as in Singapore,

Borneo, Indonesia, the countries of Indo-China, the Philippines, Japan and South Korea, and all the rest. These contacts have been a great experience for us. We people in Australia, as distinct from you on this side of the world, have ringside seats on Asia. The Asians are our next-door neighbours and we are greatly concerned with their welfare. We realize very well that their lot and ours are cast in the same geographical area and that what happens to them for good or for ill in the future can also happen to us in Australia, at one short remove.

Perhaps you will now permit me to say one short word about an old friend who is here tonight—an old and distinguished member of your Society—Sir Esler Dening. He and I have had an association over the years in that, no less than forty-five years ago, he and I were associated together in the First World War, when he was a gallant company commander in an Australian battalion and I happened to be a brigade-major in the Infantry Brigade which included his battalion. Not many people can say that they have recently met a man whom they have not seen much of for forty-five years, and with whom they had shared at that time very much the same experiences.

It is my privilege to speak on behalf of some of the official guests here tonight. There are the very distinguished Lord Chancellor and Lady Kilmuir. We are to hear Lord Kilmuir speak, I know with the very greatest interest. Like myself, he is a guest of your Society. We have with us also the distinguished Ambassador of Thailand, whom I have known and at whose hands I have received great kindness and courtesy in Bangkok in days past. We shall have the privilege of having the King and Queen of Thailand here shortly. There are also Lord and Lady Nelson, and Lady Gore-Booth, who is shortly going out with her distinguished husband as High Commissioner to Delhi.

I thank you, Mr. President, and the Chairman of the Council, for the very gracious welcome extended to us all tonight, and for this splendid dinner. I believe that a Society of this sort can—and does—propagate knowledge of countries which have great size and consequence and hundreds of millions of people and are situated nearly half the world away from this great country, Great Britain. I know something of the work that your Society does, and how difficult it must be to infuse into the minds of the people of this country some knowledge of peoples half the world away, obsessed as you must be in this country by the multitudinous problems that surround you. This is one of the Societies that help to keep alive our interest and knowledge of many countries of great and ancient cultures. I thank you very much for the great courtesy you have done us in asking us to this great function this evening. (*Applause.*)

#### THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY

The RT. HON. VISCOUNT KILMUIR, G.C.V.O. (Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain), in proposing the toast of The Royal Central Asian Society, said: I am deeply conscious of the privilege that is accorded to me in proposing this toast. I cannot claim a profound knowledge of Asia. Our visits there have, I am afraid, been brief, but, I hope, never cursory. I can claim that out of 190 holders of the Great Seal I am the only one

who has inspected a Ghurka guard of honour at 145 degrees Fahrenheit at Singapore. I was clad, not in a modern morning dress, but in the mourning dress of a gentleman of the reign of Queen Anne, and a gold robe weighing fourteen pounds. I think my fortitude is established. Even my kin, who spent their lives in Asia in the early part of the last century, are now separated by the passage of time and are very distant.

Yet there is no part of Asia which has not given me serious thought very often during the whole of the twelve years in which I have been a Minister of the Crown. It gave me equally serious thought during that period when an ungrateful electorate imagined that I ought to take a rest from my Ministerial duties. Therefore I thought that I might inflict upon your patience and courtesy some ideas about Asia and the politician and about the immense value your Society is to that curious tribe of men.

To make my point, I must remind you very briefly—I hope not too distastefully—of the characteristics of a politician. The *sine quibus non*, these are the qualities which a politician can easily acquire and must acquire, can be summarized very shortly. He must remember that the command of listening senates is very different from, but much more satisfactory than, their applause, mentioned by the poet Gray. He must have the power of appreciating the strength as well as the weakness of men. Bismarck was being very superficial when he said: "Each man has his blind spot. Find it, and he is yours." He must be able to take a line through the coruscating pyrotechnics of economic pundits, the line being based on Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Maynard Keynes. You all know that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance, but the politician must learn that the price of vigilance is reading thousands of pages of telegrams and minutes, all roneoed and very closely typed. In addition, he must have a sense of the sweep of history, because the affairs of men are never ringed off but flow on from generation to generation and from decade to decade. These are the easy qualities that can be acquired with a little work and some experience.

If the politician is to be any good he must have a lot more than that. He must have imagination plus—the quality of visualizing how a policy or a statute will work in practice and the gift of adding to it some novel conception of his own that inspires the people or introduces a new hope. He must have the courage to face a hostile assembly, which is nothing like—I think Lord Casey will agree—the courage that is required to face a room full of bored colleagues; and, of course, he must have humour, to guard against that most insidious danger, which has been put so well by our Poet Laureate, of only recognizing true greatness when he is alone. In other words, the democratic leader must always combine leadership founded on his own views and the representation of the views of the people he leads; for thus he fires the latent greatness of the people themselves. The late F. S. Oliver put it more prosaically when he said: "The politician's eyes are not fixed on the millennium, nor yet precisely on the end of his own nose, but somewhere between the two." He added: "We abuse him; he expects this but does not complain. Indeed, like a donkey that is accustomed to being beaten behind, he might stand stock still from



sheer astonishment were the abuse suddenly to cease." Mr. President, I stand before you as a fair example of just such a donkey.

This political animal I have attempted to describe is intensely aware of the practical problems of Asia. He could, for example, demonstrate to you how the Colombo Plan forms a framework within which all the members of the Plan review the development which each country in South and South-East Asia is making in carrying out its individual programme. He could tell you at once that the total assistance given by the United Kingdom to Colombo Plan countries has amounted, since 1951, to about £150 millions. He would be full of enthusiasm, and rightly so, for the technical co-operation scheme, under which the United Kingdom Government has provided for member countries not only the technical equipment but the training places and schemes and the experts, in the United Kingdom. He would know that the United Kingdom had provided 350 experts, 3,000 training places covering a very wide field, and had a prospective expenditure of £9 million for technical assistance in the next three years. He would be quite undaunted by the old attack that politicians use statistics as a drunken man uses a lamp-post, for support more than for illumination.

He would also be well aware that technical assistance and capital assistance on a Government-to-Government basis go hand in hand. He would know, because he would have had to justify it to his constituents, that, to take one example out of many, the United Kingdom had made loans totalling £57½ millions to India during the past two years. He would have every detail—to take examples again—about the great steel works at Durgapur, the Telecommunications Training Centre in West Pakistan and the Technical Training Institute at Gal Oya in Ceylon, and many similar activities. He would be very conscious of the extent of private investment and its effect upon British trade; and rightly, because these are matters with which he is charged and which are his responsibility.

I also believe, my Lord Chairman—and this is only being fair to my own kind—that the politician is also supremely conscious of the triple task of the Commonwealth in this new world first to provide an instrument by which the goodwill and the friendship of the newly emergent nations and the non-committed countries will be gained for the older countries, and secondly, to keep working a constant liaison between communities far apart, with differing interests and sometimes apparent incompatibility. To turn from the general to the personal, I see my old friend Sir Gilbert Laithwaite; and when I think of the work that he has done in the field I have just described, I think he exemplifies how tirelessly and selflessly that work has gone on.

Thirdly, the politician will have a special interest in the areas where the struggle against the political and economic pressures of Communism will be fiercest, such as Asia. If the politician is to do that work, he must be constantly learning; his personal contacts must be wider and wider and constantly increasing, and an essential prerequisite of all this is knowledge of the background. His knowledge of history must be constantly extending. Let me take one example: the older of the male

members of this audience will remember—none of the ladies come into this for a moment!—the fall of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War. I was four years old at the time, and I hope that I shall not appear too odiously precocious if I say that I remember it! How many of us learned afterwards of the secondary effects? I will take quotations which General Fuller took in his *Decisive Battles of the Western World* from Mr. C. F. Andrews and Mr. Pradhan on the effects in Western Asia. The words are: “The most ignorant peasant tingling with the news”; and, in India, “It is impossible to exaggerate the effects of the Japanese victory on the Indian mind.” It is these secondary results of which the politicians in the world must know and, in addition, must try to understand the background, of religion, language, literature and music.

We have not done nearly enough in these fields in regard to Asia and especially in regard to China; although we have, in fairness, outstanding men, and the one College at Oxford of which I have the honour to be Visitor in my own right, St. Antony’s, has made great efforts. In all these approaches your Society has carried out a tremendous task. Your important lectures, of which you have spoken, my Lord President, the book reviews in your *Journal*, the fact that you bring to our attention the books that are reviewed in the *Journal* and, above all, the cumulative interest of nearly sixty years of your Society’s work, constitute invaluable help along the path on which we have still a long way to go.

My Lord President, I see that by a praiseworthy economy of time nobody is to reply to this toast. I am sorry about that, because I had hoped that I should have had the honour of coupling with the toast the name of my friend Sir William Dickson. That would have enabled me to tell a story, which I shall tell all the same because it so exactly expresses what you must all be feeling at this period of my speech. It is a story of recruits who were sent on a route march. When the company was halted, a flute-like voice came from somewhere near the end of the line, saying: “How wonderful is Death!” The sergeant-major, with that characteristic gift of keeping his face to the front and talking out of the side of his mouth, shouted: “Who said that?” The same flute-like voice replied: “Shelley, I believe.” (*Applause and laughter.*) Your encouragement only makes me go on. I hope that Sir William, who is the *chef d’œuvre* in this matter, will excuse me if I do not say a word about Lord Scarbrough, although we were at Oxford and in two Houses of Parliament together, and that you will excuse me if I say one word of introduction about a friend I value so much.

I did not know him when he was a recruit in the Royal Naval Air Service, but I gained his friendship when he was Chief of the Air Staff, Chairman of the Chief of Staffs Committee and Chief of the Defence Staff. You may remember the great indiscretion of a former Duke of Newcastle in disclosing to the historian Kingslake that, except for Newcastle himself, the Cabinet that decided upon the invasion of the Crimea were asleep. I do not think it is any breach of my oath to say that Sir William and I have gone through some difficult times together.

I have tried to show how invaluable the work of this Society is, and I am glad to be able to think that in future the Society will have as its

President not merely one of the great men of our time but one of the kindest and most helpful men it has ever been my lot to know. I now ask you to rise, and to honour the toast of The Royal Central Asian Society.

#### THE PRESIDENT

MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE SIR WILLIAM DICKSON, G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O., A.F.C., in proposing the toast of The President, said: I rise not to detain you with a speech but to try most sincerely to express on behalf of all members of the Society our very real debt of gratitude to Lord Scarbrough for the truly great services he has rendered to the Society during his reign as President. He has already told you that he took the chair in 1954; the Society was extremely lucky in securing him, not only because he is a great man widely respected and admired, but also because through his knowledge and experience of the East, his wide, general knowledge of men and affairs and his great personal charm, he was so eminently qualified to be our President. The Society was quite happy just to have him as President, for everyone recognized that the multitudinous duties of his great office and the many other interests he has would make it difficult for him to participate much in the day-to-day affairs of the Society.

Nevertheless—I have this from the Chairman of the Council—from the very beginning Lord Scarbrough has taken a most lively interest in the Society and in all its activities. He has always been accessible to the Chairmen of the Council and has always been ready and willing to give of his wisdom to help solve the problems of the Council. He has never missed a dinner or an Annual General Meeting, except when he was ill. So we have indeed been lucky in our President.

Thank you, my Lord Chancellor, for your kind words about myself and for your good wishes. I will certainly need them, as it will not be easy to follow Lord Scarbrough as his successor. I think I speak for most members of the Services in saying that when one takes over from a predecessor there is always a lurking hope that he will not have been too perfect. I am afraid that I shall not have that hope tonight. I am like one of the Lord Chancellor's new recruits. But while I cannot bring to this office the same qualifications as our President, I can say that I shall share with him the same sense of mission and endeavour to further the objects of the Society.

I express on behalf of the Council and of all members—and I am sure on behalf of many of our guests—our most sincere thanks to you, Lord Scarbrough, for all you have done and for all you have been to us. The Society will greatly miss you as President. We offer to you and to Lady Scarbrough our most warm and sincere good wishes for your happiness and success in everything. (*Applause.*) I give you the toast of The President.

The PRESIDENT, replying, said: Thank you, Sir William Dickson. I know that you will do far more work than I have done. Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen, very much. (*Applause.*)

# ARABIAN EXTREMITIES

By AIR VICE-MARSHAL M. L. HEATH, C.B., O.B.E., R.A.F.

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, April 27, 1960, Sir John Troutbeck, G.B.E., K.C.M.G., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: We are lucky this afternoon in having as our lecturer Air Vice-Marshall Heath. Air Vice-Marshall Heath has had a most distinguished career. He started in his early days in the Royal Air Force in specializing in armaments and he held many appointments in that sphere before the war. He then spent some years in New Zealand, came back from there, held more appointments, both in the field and in the Air Ministry, and then went out to Aden, where he commanded the British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula. He has come home quite recently and is now Commandant of the Royal Air Force Staff College.

Air Vice-Marshall Heath will talk to us now about the fringes of the Arabian Peninsula and I need say no more in calling on him to give his talk.

**M**AY I start by saying that I feel most honoured to have been asked to talk to you at all—and that I feel very inadequately experienced to do so!

I have called my talk Arabian Extremities because it is literally only the extremities of Arabia that I know anything about and because I want to give you views which concern the fringes rather than the function of the task which kept me in Arabia for two years.

I take heart in addressing you from the conviction that you would not be here to listen to me if you were not interested in Arabia and from the conviction also that to an interested audience another slant, or another view, of even a well-known subject is welcome—and there is no doubt in my mind of the fascination of this part of the world and its people.

I do not feel, therefore, that I need apologize to you for covering ground with which you are familiar, either in description or in pictures, for these are just my views after a two years' acquaintance with the area.

I think I should preface my remarks by explaining what my real task was in Arabia, then I would like to describe to you in words and pictures the country as I know it, and I would like to indicate what I believe to be the main present threat to its future and finally to suggest the line of action which I believe is necessary to retain the goodwill and security of this part of the world—and its freedom from Communist domination.

My appointment in Arabia was as Commander of the British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula—a new Unified Command comprising all three Fighting Services which was set up, with its Headquarters in Aden, on April 1, 1958.

H.Q. British Forces was responsible for the security of the area which included the Persian Gulf States in Treaty relations with H.M.G., the Protectorates of Aden and Somaliland and the Colony of Aden. We naturally had an interest also in the activities of those countries bordering this area for it was from these that the threat to our security arose—and still arises.

The main concern was the protection of these territories from both ex-

ternal threat and internal subversion so that the Middle East oil of the Persian Gulf might flow freely and so that our main base in Aden might be secure. Through the area also run the sea and air communications to India and the Far East.

Our military dispositions were based on the Unified H.Q. in Aden and a subordinate tri-Service H.Q. in the Persian Gulf with small forces only at its disposal in normal times. Our concept of defence was to train and assist local Arab Forces in all areas and back these with small but highly mobile hard-hitting British Forces using sea and air power to provide the mobility and the support for the land forces. I think that is enough to give you the gist of the military task, though I would like to emphasize that military action was never taken without the closest co-ordination with political authority at all levels. I had in consequence to be familiar with the political background of my area of Command and in close touch with the Governors and the Political Resident Persian Gulf, as H.M. Chief Representative in the Persian Gulf area is called. This is the reason why I dare stray from my military function and propound to you ideas which may seem to be only on the fringes—perhaps even beyond the “extremities” of a military Commander’s job!

With that introduction to my talk and to myself I would now like to get on with the job of describing the area and its political background, as I saw fit, in a little more detail.

*Kuwait.* I would like to start with the important oil-producing State of Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf and work my way round. I was unable to visit Kuwait myself for although we have guaranteed the protection of the independent State of Kuwait the Ruler prefers for understandable reasons to emphasize the reality of his independence. As the head of an Arab State he has to consider his relations not only with the United Kingdom but with the rest of the Arab world and in particular with the powerful and conflicting forces represented by President Nasser on the one hand and General Kassem on the other. To preserve her position Kuwait has built up the strength of her land forces but the nearest State which provides us with military facilities is Bahrain, 250 miles to the South, where a small British Garrison is stationed.

*Bahrain.* Here there is open association with H.M.G. and acknowledgment of British protection, as well as the small British garrison, but the Ruler’s position in the Arab World is made difficult by his acceptance of us in Bahrain, because the Egyptian sponsored propaganda on Arab Nationalism decries and derides those States who show dependence on the West. But Bahrain, so far as we are concerned, is the political centre of the Persian Gulf. It is here that the Political Resident lives and it is also the H.Q. of the land, sea and air forces in the Gulf; the operational base of the Naval Forces and a centre of communications between the Gulf States and both Aden and London.

Bahrain is incidentally 1,400 miles from Aden. As far as from London to Moscow which you may think rather remote for a subordinate H.Q.! It is certainly a fact often overlooked by people much nearer to the scene of action than we are here in London!

Bahrain is fortunate in having an abundant supply of water, as well as oil, though where the water comes from is one of the world's mysteries for this flat little island is many hundreds of miles from any substantial rainfall, yet so abundant are the natural springs that fresh water can be obtained in several parts of the Persian Gulf from the sea bed merely by lowering an inflated goatskin and allowing it to fill with water at that level!

*Qatar.* The next place coming South from Bahrain is the flat arid desert peninsular of Qatar. Here also oil is found. The State is kindly but not firmly governed by its Arab Ruler and its main problems seem likely to arise from the development of industrial troubles sponsored by Cairo radio and Egyptian propaganda amongst its oil workers.

*Das.* South of Qatar between there and the Trucial States is the small island of Das where an oil company has built an airfield to drill for oil in the sea bed.

*Trucial States.* There are seven of them but they are relatively poor, small and easily influenced by their neighbours—they are so-called because of the truces made with H.M.G. when piracy was rife in the Gulf. They are now grouped together by us for convenience—they are each in fact independent sheikhdoms—and by their common support of a local Arab Force known as the Trucial Oman Scouts which is based at Sharjah where there is also a staging post airfield on the route to Aden and to India.

At Sharjah the scenery is more typical of what one expects of Arabia. Sharjah is 250 miles from Bahrain and 1,130 miles from Aden.

Some oil prospecting is in progress near Tarif, and Saudi Arabia has, as you know, shown some interest in Buraimi, the oasis cross-roads.

*Muscat and Oman.* The most interesting part of S.E. Arabia, politically, militarily and scenically is Muscat and Oman. The Sultanate has presented us with a number of problems. While these are basically endemic to the country, they have been given an added gravity and importance, both locally and internationally, through outside interference.

Since the second half of the eighteenth century, the family of the present Sultan have held sovereignty as independent rulers over the South-East corner of the Arabian peninsula. Their territories have comprised both the coastal area and the mountainous district in the interior known as Oman. This sovereignty is recognized in international treaties of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During the past 200 years, occasional conflicts have arisen between the authority of the Sultan and that of the so-called Imam of Oman.

These troubles were brought to an end in 1920 by an Agreement concluded at Sib between the Sultan on the one hand and a number of tribal leaders in Oman on the other, who signed the Agreement together with the then Imam. The Agreement of Sib allowed the tribes of the interior a considerable degree of local autonomy, but in no way recognized Oman as an independent State.

During the thirty-four years which followed the conclusion of the Agreement, relations between the Omani tribes, under the guidance of the Imam, and the Sultan's Government were reasonably good. There were no disputes over the Sultan's sovereignty, which the Omanis recognized in a number of practical ways (e.g. they used Muscat passports—they referred their disputes to the Muscat Courts and offered help to the Sultan when the Saudis invaded Buraimi in 1952). In 1954, however, the Imam died. His successor, Ghalib, defied the authority of the Sultan, made contacts with foreign powers, and laid claim to be an independent ruler. By these actions he rendered the Agreement of Sib invalid, and in 1955 the Sultan re-asserted his authority by moving his forces into Oman, without opposition and with the appearance of welcome by the tribesmen and their sheikhs.

The Sultan allowed Ghalib to retire to a village in the interior, but his backers, who consisted of his brother Talib and one or two other tribal leaders, sought sanctuary in Saudi Arabia. There, a rebel army of several hundred men was trained and equipped, and in 1957 Talib returned to Oman to raise a new revolt. In view of the extensive support of the insurrection from outside the country, the Sultan requested help from H.M.G. and this was given. The revolt was quickly brought under control though the rebel leaders took refuge on the Jebel Akhadar and continued to hold out there, causing much trouble until they were ousted, again using British forces together with the Sultan's armed forces early in 1959.

The mountain, the Jebel Akhadar, where the rebel leaders took refuge and from which they were dislodged by British Land and Air Forces, together with the Sultan's armed forces, at the end of January last year, is a formidable stronghold which explains why the rebels were so confident. You can also probably imagine the difficulty of the task of winking them out because the height at the top of the plateau was 7,000 ft., and of the valley at the base 2,000 ft., so that the climb over great rock slabs, was 5,000 ft., with temperatures varying from 120° by day, to freezing by night.

The more peaceful atmosphere that followed the conclusion of the Agreement of Sib would not have been shattered, nor would the recent troubles have been prolonged, had not outside powers, in particular Saudi Arabia, sought to stoke the flames, for the Imam's financial and military support was supplied directly by Saudi Arabia, who recruited, trained, supplied and paid for the "liberation Army of free Omanis."

*East Aden Protectorate.* Muscat is in fact off the direct route from the Gulf, at Sharjah, to Aden and we normally flew round the Saudi border and down to Salalah in the Sultan of Muscat's territory (and the location of his summer residence) before proceeding along the coast to the Protectorates. To do this we had to skirt the Rhub-Al-Kali—"the empty Quarter," a part of the world which has truly earned its name.

At Salalah the temperature seldom rises above 80° so you can understand why the Sultan prefers it to the oven heat of Muscat baking between its high black rocks in a summer shade temperature of 120° by day, and a palpitating breathless radiation from the same rocks by night.

On from Salalah the next staging post is Ryan in the East Aden Protectorate, near to the British Resident's H.Q. at Mulkulla.

Here are some pictures of this lovely Arabian Port—the lecturer here showed slides of Mukulla). And here—because I know he lectured to you recently—is that great and dear character Colonel Hugh Boustead, to whom, after the Ingrams, the East Aden Protectorate, and indeed all South Arabia, owes so much. You see him in a typical scene amongst those “Bloody Bedou” as he affectionately calls them, and making his farewell address in the Sultan's palace on the occasion of his retirement. He is as you may know now at work with the Sultan of Muscat.

This picture, less formal, shows him on the sea-shore evening walk which was so typical of him that it has crept into more than one descriptive book on Arabia!

Here, in the E.A.P. with its rugged country and poor roads and with its improbable but none the less formidable forts, there has been comparative quiet since the Ingrams established peace between the Qaiti and Kathiri tribes and commenced a period of relative prosperity, which was worked on and improved by Colonel Boustead. The work of these two men and their many European and Arab helpers stands as a monument to what can be achieved by co-operation and goodwill—by advice patiently given and carefully nurtured—a monument not to Colonialism or Imperialism but to the work of free men. This is one of the practical answers to the nonsense put out by Cairo and believed unfortunately not only by many uninformed people in the Middle East but also by many who should know better here in England and on the other side of the Atlantic.

But the East Aden Protectorate has had one great advantage in the period since Ingrams took over in 1938. It has not had oil. The Hadhramaut, famous and romantic though it is, is not a primary producer of sufficient importance to arouse envy or avarice, and the Mahra—the region to the East of the Hadhramaut—is as wild and rugged a piece of country as one could imagine—just a tumbled mass of mountains dividing a hot ocean from a hotter desert. In consequence there have been no outside pressures; no sponsoring of rebel causes and, so, no troubles. Oil is now being prospected there so I fear that we must expect trouble makers to show an interest in it in future.

*West Aden Protectorate.* The East and West Aden Protectorates are divided somewhat arbitrarily and it so happens that the division coincides roughly with the junction of the Yemen/Saudi borders to the North. Thus the East Aden Protectorate has a frontier with Saudia Arabia, and the West Aden Protectorate has one mainly with the Yemen. The West Aden Protectorate consists of a large number of small States whose Rulers have at different times sought British protection against the aggressive intentions of their neighbours, usually from the Yemen, and who have been held together since the end of the First World War by the continuing threat of Yemen expansion. Within the Protectorate there is great goodwill for the British. This goodwill is based on the experience of many decades during which the protection afforded by H.M.'s forces has been continually and actively demonstrated and during which the selfless in-






THE DHOW HARBOUR—ADEN



THE CUSTOMS QUAY, MUKULLA. EAST ADEN PROTECTORATE

*To face page 264*




OIL RIG 25 MILES FROM DAS ISLAND, PERSIAN GULF




MUKULLA, THE LONELY ARABIAN PORT WHERE THE BRITISH RESIDENT OF THE EAST ADEN PROTECTORATE HAS HIS H.Q.





MUSCAT AND MUTTRA



CAMEL TRAIN AT THE FOOT OF THE JEBEL ALCHAAR ON THE SUMAIL GAP  
ROAD TO NIZWA



JEBEL AKHAAR—OMAN

The rock slabs, 5,000 ft. high, up which British troops and the Sultan of Muscat's Armed Forces assaulted the rebel stronghold

terest of many British military and political men has been shown by their advice and help in agriculture, education, irrigation, health and assistance of many kinds—not least by famine relief, the opening and protection of roads and the air evacuation of sick people from inaccessible areas to the British hospitals in Aden Colony.

In February, 1959, a big step forward in constitutional development was made possible by H.M.G.'s support for the Federation which six of the Protectorate States desired to form.

Is all this exploitation, imperialism, colonialism? On the contrary here is the natural development of free men bonding together not only for mutual protection but to give each other greater fiscal strength and more enduring prospects. It is interesting to note that there is yet greater goodwill for us within these combined Federal States than there was in the same individual States before we helped them to federate.

*Aden.* Geographically within the West Aden Protectorate lies the Colony of Aden but as you know British administration was established in what is now the Colony in 1839 and British protection was later extended to the States around it. The Colony itself is only some 30 miles by 10 if you include the two peninsulas whose volcanic fists embrace the harbour. Much of this area is either water or sheer volcanic rock and slag. Political development has naturally followed economic growth, stimulated by the turmoil of Arab Nationalism since the war, and to some extent by the progress of certain less well developed or economically sound countries, such as Somalia. I believe we should assist this progress—I do not mean speed it up, but help the people both of the Colony and the Protectorate to develop the right organization, and to achieve the strength that alone can keep them free. I believe the goodwill that is now ours should be nurtured and built upon and I am certain that the legitimate aspirations of the people of Aden can be reconciled with H.M.G.'s rights in the Colony for so long as it is necessary for us to retain them, and that we can secure their friendship and alliance long afterwards.

If we resist the natural development and aspirations of these intelligent, but impoverished people we shall lose the goodwill we now possess and jeopardize our security in Aden, and therefore our ability to protect our oil.

*Yemen.* The consolidating force in the West Aden Protectorate is, as I have said, the attitude of the Yemen to the North. The Yemen is ruled by an autocratic Imam—a combination of King and spiritual leader—who constantly lays claim to rule the whole of South West Arabia. He, the present Imam, is of the Zeidi sect drawn from the hill tribes of the Yemen and the dominating, though numerically smaller, part of the population. The rest of the population, particularly those in lowland areas are, like the tribes of the Protectorates, of the Suni Sect. Zeidis and Sunis are, in the Mohammedan world, incompatible.

In furtherance of his claims to rule South West Arabia, the Imam of Yemen has in the past attacked the Protectorate border tribes and has spent much effort in supporting dissident elements in the Protectorate States but it is unrealistic to think of these activities as warfare in the European sense. Although there is a well recognized border between the Yemen and the

Protectorate it has always been disputed by the Imam. It is not like a frontier so much as a county boundary, for tribesmen move freely in both directions and regularly attend the "Suq" in each other's territories. But over the past year there has been an absence of attacks by the Yemen on the border and a lessening of subversion within the West Aden Protectorate States.

*Saudi Arabia.* Now behind all these Territories lies the vast central mass of Saudi Arabia—rich in oil but overspending its income, not always in a manner best calculated to improve the country's economy. Saudi Arabia is still a despotic country ruled today by a clique of princes under King Saud and Prince Feisal. With a country so vast, and a relatively large income from oil, it might be expected that the policy of Saudi Arabia would be a stable and positive one, which would give a lead to the Rulers and the populations of the small peripheral States, but under the present King, Saudi Arabia has pursued a wavering policy. On the one hand it is conservative and mediæval, though it is clear that the real interests of the Saudi monarchy are bound up with the West. On the other hand, the Ruling Family do not have the courage to oppose Nasser, and they pay lip service to his kind of Arab nationalism. They are also resentful of the British connection with the Persian Gulf States. The result is that Saudi Arabia does not play the leading role she might be expected to play. If her Rulers could be persuaded to co-operate wholeheartedly with the Western world in the combating of communism, great good would come of it. Unfortunately, Saudi Arabian policy in the past has not been such as to inspire confidence among the small Arab States round her periphery whom we protect. If the Buraimi issue and the troubles in Oman are to be regarded as evidence that Saudi policy aims at control of the whole Arabian peninsula, the possibilities of an accommodation are distinctly limited. Such a Saudi policy would, of course, be in accord with Russian and Egyptian objectives.

So the pattern of interference becomes apparent. Both Russia and Egypt, for their own separate reasons, wish British influence removed from Arabia. Both hope to find in the Yemen, and in Saudi Arabia, countries within Arabia which will play their game and further their ends, for their own expected gain. The facile cry of Arab Nationalism is the basis—the tide it is called by some, the flood by others.

I have a great suspicion of these terms, once applied they create a picture of inexorable certainty much beloved by their originators and all too easily believed by their listeners—is it a true picture?

I do not believe it is. In parts of Southern Arabia there are the remains of cities and complicated irrigation systems which go back to 300 B.C. Arabia is very old and its history is uncertain and largely unrecorded but its people although impoverished are not savages. They have long established customs, age old laws and Rulers who count their descent back to the times when our ancestors wore woad—just as the native Bedou today wear indigo.

Their lack of progress since those times is a matter of economy. Until recent time Arabia produced nothing of value. Without trade and money,

and without the means, either material or physical, of attracting outsiders Arabia has remained a country of peasant workers, of Bedouin herdsmen or Coastal fishers ruled over by hereditary families. It is tribal because shortages of water and lack of communications have tended to isolate communities and force on them the need to defend themselves from marauders.

Arabia, as I know it, is not "national," nor cohesive and I would have said that Arabians were about as much like each other in different parts of the country as Europeans are in Europe. Indeed the tendency for coastal Arabs to travel all over the Indian Ocean and on to the Far East confirms this comparison, for these external journeyings—much easier than those inside Arabia—have brought in many foreign strains of blood.

One thing, however, is common to most of Central and Southern Arabia—her people there are mostly illiterate. Their sources of news are verbal. In these circumstances radio is a more powerful influence than it would be if the printed word could provide the factual information which is available in other parts of the world to counteract anti-British propaganda. The sponsors of Arab Nationalism have chosen radio as the principal medium to reach and influence the Arab people. As a result of its impact we have for years now fought a defensive battle in support of law and order and in the interests of peace and free development and we have been much hampered by lack of adequate radio coverage ourselves—steps are now being taken to improve things in this field and I believe that much can be achieved in this way, for the Arabs have a strong sense of honour and an admiration of truth and of strength—they also have a strong sense of humour, particularly of the ridiculous.

These qualities give us a great chance to cash in on the goodwill we already possess, because the propaganda of Cairo, Damascus and Sana radios is so blatantly inaccurate that it would not be difficult to discredit it, particularly if we can provide programmes run by Arabs with items of local interest and if we compete with Cairo on entertainment value.

I'd like to end by telling you a true story which illustrates the sort of way in which Cairo radio's inaccuracies can be exposed and turned to good advantage by exploiting the Arab sense of humour.

After the Oman operations in 1959 and just before a muster parade of the Trucial Oman Scouts on their return from the Jebel Akhdar, Cairo radio announced triumphantly that Colonel Carter their beloved Caid, had been killed by the "Free Omanis." Colonel Carter promptly ordered the flag to halfmast, and then, advancing on to parade, he solemnly informed his delighted men of the tragedy which led to this lowering of the Colour!

This is only one of many incidents which could be used by us to offset the advantage which Russian and Egyptian interests now hold over us and which has helped them to use Yemen and Saudi Arabian aspirations against us.

The line of action which I suggest is necessary in order to retain our goodwill, and our security in this part of the world, is an active and whole-hearted prosecution of the radio war which has been waged against us. That this can be effective is demonstrated by the stand taken against Cairo propaganda by the courageous little King of Jordan.

Mrs. FERGUSON: On the subject of B.B.C. broadcasts, are steps going to be taken to make broadcasts to these countries?

Air Vice-Marshal HEATH: I think so. There has already been some beginning on this. I admit I would like to see more action and initiative being taken, but there has been a beginning.

Wing-Commander MACRO: Can you say anything about any airfields between Salalah and, say, Muscat?

Air Vice-Marshal HEATH: Yes. There are a large number of landing strips of a minor capacity all over Arabia and many of them can be re-activated at short notice for taking light transport type of aircraft, and some will take a thing like the Beverley which is big and heavy and which will take off in a short distance and land in a short distance. But the main airfields are the ones I have described—Ryan, Salalah, Sharjah and one on the South-East tip of Arabia on the island of Masirah. There are two or three in Oman which can be activated when necessary. There is a big one with good runways which were laid down by the oil company at Fahud, where they thought they had found oil, but it turned out to be dry, so there is an airfield there and nothing else.

Colonel CANTLIE: I have a report that gun emplacements have been built at Perim. Can you say whether there is anything effective in them?

I would like to ask a second question about the radio war you talked about. A good many of us at this end in London have been pressing for this for some time, and one objection which is raised, which may be valid, is that it is difficult to put on a specially interesting programme to attract the general listeners because Cairo scooped practically all the entertainers and so on to which the Arabs like to listen. I do not know whether there is anything in that—I would not like to say; it may be merely a question of finance. Possibly you have some information on these points.

Air Vice-Marshal HEATH: On your first question, Perim is, of course, British. In fact, it comes under the Governorship of the Governor of Aden, but on the mainland next to Perim is part of the Yemen Coast called Bab el Mandeb and on that part there are some gun emplacements. I do not think they were built by the Russians, they were built by the Yemen, but they do contain some modern Russian weapons. I have watched them with interest. They are singularly ill-placed and I do not know what they are there for; they seem to be a great waste of money.

On the second question, this is an attitude which is quite common, and I certainly came across it, but it is an attitude of defeat—someone puts on a show, so we cannot put on a better one. I do not believe it. As to scooping Cairo Radio, this is just too easy, but admittedly we have to spend some money. But is it better to spend money on something constructive which will educate these people and give them the facts upon which our goodwill rests—which is the truth; that is all we are asking for—or is it better to spend money in trying to block up the holes made in the wreckage of our position by the untruths put out by Cairo, because we spend a great deal in blowing off bombs and moving troops about over the area trying to make up for what damage is done to us by a whole lot of complete piffle and unpalatable nonsense. I am quite certain we could easily



capture the attention of the Arab listener and having done so, give the facts on which our case would rest of its own accord.

Colonel CANTLIE: There is one more question I would like to ask. In Aden, do you hear the B.B.C. clearly, as there are a great many parts of the world in which it is swamped by more powerful transmission coming from Russia, Cairo and other places?

Air Vice-Marshal HEATH: You can hear it quite clearly as locally, Aden Radio picks it up and relays it. As far as B.B.C. coverage is concerned, one cannot have any complaint. But the point is that the Arab does not listen to the B.B.C. and it is the Arab whom we have to provide with information in the coverage. So far as that goes, it is inadequate. There are Cairo Radio, Damascus Radio, Sana Radio and Baghdad Radio, all of which can be heard more clearly and better than Aden in the local area.

The CHAIRMAN: I am afraid that time is up. It only remains for me to thank Air Vice-Marshal Heath for his extraordinarily interesting lecture. When there is so much pessimism heard not only outside but inside this country about the position of the Arab world, it has given us all joy to hear someone just back from there speaking with this robust note of optimism. I would ask you to express your thanks in the usual way. (*Applause.*)

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# THE INDIA-CHINA FRONTIER DISPUTE

By JOHN CONNELL

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, March 23, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, it gives me much pleasure, on behalf of the Royal Central Asian Society, to welcome Mr. John Connell who is going to speak to us about "The India-China Frontier Dispute." Mr. Connell is known, perhaps to most of us, as an author and writer with a critical mind, also as one with some knowledge of the area about which he is to speak, he having spent some time in India and having been there at the end of the last war as Chief Press Military Censor. It seems to me that today Mr. Connell has a rather big task because I cannot imagine a more difficult but at the same time more interesting subject to study. There are probably present many who, like myself, have no more than a superficial knowledge of this problem and we in particular will be most interested to hear what Mr. Connell has to tell us, so without further delay I call on him.

I STAND amazed at my presumption. A few weeks ago you did me the honour of electing me to this Society, and you linked this great honour—for as such I regard it—with an invitation which was a challenge. I could no more resist the challenge than decline the honour. I, therefore, find myself addressing a gathering, every member of which, I suspect, has a deeper knowledge and experience than I could ever possess of the theme which I propose to discuss. Any attempt at an apology, or indeed any show of diffidence, would be both superfluous and impertinent.

What I intend to do, therefore, is to tell you a story. I am a novelist; I was for many years a journalist, a reporter and commentator; I think of myself now primarily as a biographer and historian. My basic quality as a writer is that of narration. I, therefore, propose to offer you, pieced together from such evidence as is at present available, a narrative account of the Indo-Chinese Border Dispute, giving at the outset this obvious but important warning—the story is not ended yet. Unfinished as it is, I discovered, as I began to unravel it and to see its proportions and its significance, that it is completely enthralling; it excites you, it grips you and it will not let you go. It contains the one essential element of dramatic narrative—conflict. There is in it the clash of arms; rifle-fire spits and snarls across high, remote passes and desolate, snow-bound hillsides; but this is only a manifestation of a much more profound and awe-inspiring conflict between minds and souls. Though it is at bottom tragic, it is not without a streak of rough, ironic comedy; for one of the two principal characters in it is not Oedipus or Orestes, Macbeth or Hamlet; he is Malvolio, monstrously gulled and ill-used; and we classify *Twelfth Night* as a comedy.

I am now going to demonstrate the extent of my temerity. I have invented a new, and horribly cumbrous, word, and I am going to ask you

to accept it. It is only possible, I believe, to attain some comprehension of this issue if one considers it in politico-psychological terms. I have not been brought to bed of this monster of a word without painful travail; but sprawling and ugly as it is, I believe it to be necessary. For I am convinced that it is very difficult, if not quite impossible, to get even a glimmering of what India and China are quarrelling about if one thinks of it merely politically. Here is a great and apparently almost irreconcilable conflict between two outlooks, two ways of life. The two greatest nations in Asia are at odds with each other; but the different outlooks, the different ways of life, which have precipitated the clash are not, on either side, natively Asian. Two social, economic and political philosophies, born and nurtured in Western Europe, have run head on into each other in the Himalaya and the Karakoram. I think the clash has shocked and irritated both sides, not only by its violence but by the intensity and the tenacity of the feelings it has aroused; but it is fair to conclude that it was inevitable.

The Republic of India, under Nehru's leadership, is steeped in British ideas, customs, practices and disciplines. The British way of life, though in origin alien to India, has been taken for granted by generations of educated Indians. The British Raj was debated out of existence in accordance with Parliamentary procedure and the fundamental tenets of British political philosophy. How long this pervasive British influence will remain is, of course, arguable; but at present, thirteen years after the end of the Raj and with Mr. Nehru in his seventies, it is a factor, in Indian life and in the pattern of world politics, of considerable significance. Talk to any Indian diplomatist or official here in London, in Ottawa, in Oxford or in any other city in the world, and you are conscious that he speaks the same language as yourself, not only verbally but at much deeper levels. To Indians and usually, I think, to ourselves, this is a truism; but it has proved to be a truism with very sharp teeth.

The Chinese experience has been radically different from the Indian. Whatever *rapprochement* there was between China and the liberal, democratic West has been wiped out; any intellectual and spiritual ties have been abruptly severed. After a century or more in which Imperial China slithered into social, political and economic chaos, the Communists conquered the country in the late nineteen-forties as, thirty years earlier, the Communists conquered Russia. And while the nation at large—if it is strictly accurate to speak of China as a nation, which I doubt—is being subjected to the whole ruthless process of Communist development, its leaders are sternly convinced that they are the masters of the citadel of Marxist orthodoxy, and that the Soviet Union is perilously deviationist. And they couple their rigid adherence to Marxism, in the letter and in the spirit, with naked colonialist and expansionist aims, in no whit different from those of the Russians in respect of Central Asia and the Baltic republics.

It is the irony of the story that the pursuit of the most ambitious and far-reaching of these aims should have brought China into conflict with India. The Chinese may appreciate the irony: the Indians do not. India became an independent, sovereign State in 1947. The Communists finally

overthrew the Kuomintang and consolidated their authority over China as a whole in 1949. There then ensued a strange, protracted and lopsided love-affair, the course of which I do not propose now to follow in any detail.

It lasted, however, for nearly a decade, and its importance in the whole history of the political emergence of Asia cannot be too strongly stressed, both in the wish-fulfilment fantasies which were its origin and its sustenance, and in the disillusionment and bitterness which followed its collapse. On the Chinese side it was from the outset a sheer matter of cold-blooded expediency, and of the relentless exploitation of Indian sentiment. I have no doubt of the depth and sincerity of that sentiment, in part an expression of a sense of companionship in the enterprise of throwing off subordinate and dependent status, and in part a naïve, self-righteous and very blind griggishness. One of the most brilliant and subtle Indians of his generation, K. M. Panikkar, had what seemed to be an outstandingly successful term of office as Indian Ambassador in Peking from 1948 to 1952—a period which included the Korean War—and although India's foreign policy was based firmly on the principle of neutralism, the temptation, in such circumstances, to adopt the lofty and spiritually satisfying pose of mediator between East and West was too strong to be resisted. It was a pose which became an addiction. It manifestly appealed to the Indian temperament, and for some years it suited the Chinese book.

The love-affair—and I repeat that it must be regarded as such only from the Indian side—survived almost unbruised the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950. It appeared to be bearing fruit when Chou-En-Lai visited New Delhi in June, 1954, and issued, with Nehru, the famous statement expounding the Pancha Shila, the five principles, of the most exalted character, which ought to govern international relationships. The most important of these principles, it is worth recording almost without comment, were: peaceful co-existence between nations, non-interference in the affairs of other nations, and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial rights.

The Indian sense of commitment to this love-affair was at its fullest less than a year later at the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, in April, 1955, which Chou-En-Lai attended. Was his performance then a superb piece of duplicity and effrontery? An almost contemporary assessment by Mr. Guy Wint is not without a sombre interest:

“For five days the countries of Asia which feared Communism expressed their apprehensions about China's plans. A new Communist imperialism by China had replaced the old Western imperialism as a main danger to Asia. Chu-En-Lai dealt with the attacks with skill and dignity . . . he breathed friendliness and conciliation. He was ready to settle with any Asian country the status of overseas Chinese, disputed frontiers, and any other matters which caused friction with China. He was affable and approachable . . . in fact he could hardly have been more conciliatory. . . . Yet when the conference broke up it was clear to everybody that the problem of how the rest of Asia was to live with China had become a prime

one for the continent. The old disputes were sinking back into the past. The old scenes and enthusiasms appeared out of date."

To India the problem seemed, during the next four years, soluble, in accordance with Pancha Shila. It erupted into intense and urgent reality just a year ago, in March, 1959, with the Tibetan national uprising, its ferocious suppression by the Chinese, and the flight of the Dalai Lama into exile in India. From 1950 onwards, a mild Indian protest against the Chinese invasion having then been contemptuously rejected, the Indian Government's attitude towards Tibet was one of scrupulous—some might say over-scrupulous—non-interference, carried (as *The Times'* correspondent in Delhi remarked last year) to the length of diplomatic blindness to every inconvenient fact. Deliberate silence was the ally of deliberate blindness. Inevitably the External Affairs Department of the Government of India was the principal—indeed virtually the only—source of information about what was happening in Tibet; and over the years it kept remarkably mum.

The shock was all the greater, therefore, when it became impossible either to suppress or ignore the story of the Tibetan rebellion, its gravity and its extent, and the savagery with which the Chinese reacted. This shock was the inescapable consequence of the years of soft-peddalling. Nehru's prestige slumped sharply, in India and throughout the world; he was rebuked—justly rebuked—for having scornfully dismissed the preliminary warnings of the outbreak as "bazaar rumours," and for having even later talked smugly of "a clash of minds rather than arms." It soon became clear that this was a national uprising, as spontaneous, as brave and as desperate—and as ill-fated—as that of Hungary two and a half years earlier. Whatever there might have been anomalous or confusing about Tibet's national status, however historically well-founded China's claims to suzerainty, these were no excuses for the brutality with which the Chinese dealt with the situation as it confronted them, and they were in a sense irrelevant. For, though the Chinese bitterly resented being reminded of it, Mao-Tse-Tung, in the constitution which he formulated for the "Chinese Soviet Republic" in 1931, specially named the Tibetans as amongst the minorities who were to enjoy the right to "complete separation from China" if they so desired. As one British newspaper pointed out: "Their desire has never altered; Mao's words have."

On March 23, 1959, with Chinese artillery and aircraft in action, with the Indian Consulate-General in Lhasa isolated and under siege, Mr. Nehru told the Indian Parliament that the situation was difficult and delicate, and urged that "we should avoid doing anything that will worsen it." "We have," he went on, "no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China, with whom we have friendly relations."

This was an accurate summary of India's policy towards China for a decade; it is not to be disdainful either of its sincerity or its tenacity of purpose to hear in it echoes of the British Government's policy towards Nazi Germany from 1935 to 1939. Appeasement need be neither immoral nor dishonourable; it can be gravely and tragically mistaken, and recognition of its mistakenness may come too late for it to be rectified except at

appalling cost. This is what happened to Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement in Europe in the nineteen-thirties; it remains still to be seen whether it will befall Jawaharlal Nehru's policy of appeasement in Asia in the nineteen-fifties.

It is not necessary to trace the course of the Tibetan rebellion in detail. It is enough to record here that on March 25, 1959, the Kashag, the Supreme Tibetan Cabinet, issued a unanimous declaration denouncing the seventeen-point Treaty of May, 1951, with China, on the grounds of persistent violations by the Chinese, proclaiming Tibet, in consequence, to be independent, and calling on the Chinese occupation forces to withdraw. It was a gesture of heroic national defiance, with no effect at all on the grim realities of the situation. By the end of the month the Dalai Lama and a number of his Ministers were in flight towards India, Lhasa was under curfew, and the Chinese were able to announce that they had completely crushed the insurgents.

On April 3, after a fortnight of perilous and very rough travel, and of hairbreadth escapes, the Dalai Lama reached India, and members of Parliament in Delhi cheered when Mr. Nehru gave them the news. India could do no less than treat him as an honoured guest, and offer him and his entourage sanctuary. A decision of this character was bound to mark a turning-point in Sino-Indian relations, but Mr. Nehru was unable to conceal both his embarrassment and his irresolution. These are serious criticisms of a statesman of Mr. Nehru's calibre, but they are mild beside the strictures, from many sections of Indian opinion, to which he had to submit last summer.

For Indian emotions about what happened in Tibet were, and are, strong, sad and self-critical. To Mr. Nehru it was of great importance throughout the earlier part of last summer to preserve the two façades of neutralism and of friendly relations with China. The question to which there was no comfortable answer was: How interested were the Chinese in helping him in this effort? In expounding his policy of restraint Mr. Nehru might talk, in vague but noble terms, about "the larger causes which we hold dear"; but did the Chinese, in fact, give a damn for these larger causes?

In Tibet itself they showed singularly little restraint, they took no half-measures. Various attempts have been made to piece together a coherent account of events in Tibet after the crushing of the revolt and the Dalai Lama's flight. Some twelve thousand refugees filtered out into India, and from the stories which they told it was clear that the Chinese had intensified their policy of rapid and relentless colonization, little different from that which the Russians pursued in Turkestan more than a quarter of a century earlier. Meanwhile in India the Dalai Lama went to live at Mussoorie under courteous but careful surveillance. The Indian Government wished to regard him as a sheerly religious exile, granted a safe retreat in which he might, without harm to anybody, receive due homage from a few exiles and refugees. But this was not at all the part which he sought to play. He was no Cardinal York in gentle and resigned acceptance of defeat at the end of a long, futile struggle. He saw himself—and his followers saw him—as "the god-king of a proud, angry and courageous

people who had come to demand moral recognition and help in the name of religion, from those who profess to believe in it, against the forces of materialism.”\*

The first statement which he made on Indian soil left little room for doubt as to his views and intentions. He said emphatically that he had come to India of his own free will and not under duress. He spoke of his country's unceasing struggle for liberty; and of his fervent hope that the troubles in which it was now involved would soon be over without further bloodshed. His statement concluded: “As Dalai Lama and spiritual head of all the Buddhists in Tibet, my foremost concern is to ensure the well-being of my people and the perpetual flourishing of my sacred religion and the freedom of my country.”

This was no abdication, no tame surrender to the oppressor. But on the same day, April 19, Chou-En-Lai, presenting his report to the National People's Congress in Peking, said that the rebellion by a handful of reactionaries in Tibet had been ignominiously defeated, that the measures subsequently taken had been warmly welcomed by the broad mass of patriotic people in Tibet, both clerical and lay, and that this was “a great victory for our policy of national unity.”

He asserted that the Dalai Lama had been abducted to India, but that it was China's hope that he would soon be able to free himself from the hold of the rebels and return to the Motherland.

His speech contained a sour sop to India: “Prime Minister Nehru has issued successive statements on non-interference in China's internal affairs, and in favour of the continued consolidation of friendly Chinese-Indian relations. There is a friendship of over 2,000 years between China and India which, moreover, are initiators of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. There is no reason at all why either of our two countries should let out mutual friendship and the principles of foreign relations, adhered to by our two countries jointly, be shaken on account of a handful of Tibetan rebels.”

But not all the speeches made at the National People's Congress were even superficially as amiable as Chou-En-Lai's. On April 27 Mr. Nehru saw fit, in a long and detailed statement in Parliament in Delhi, to rebuke responsible people in China for “using the language of the cold war regardless of truth and propriety”; and he dismissed as “both unbecoming and devoid of substance” charges against India which had been made at the Congress, and in Chinese newspapers and on the air.

One of the most significant of the Chinese allegations, in view of what was shortly to happen, was that “Indian expansionists had inherited the British tradition of imperialism.” Mr. Nehru, perfectly genuinely in my opinion, was both baffled and hurt by this accusation, which he described, a little forlornly, as “strange.” He made his ritual obeisance to the totem of anti-imperialism by describing the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 as “an unjustified and cruel adventure,” but pointed out that independent India had voluntarily surrendered extra-territorial rights in Tibet, withdrawn Army detachments, and handed over postal and telegraph installations. This was a sound defensive argument so far as it

\*George Patterson, *The Daily Telegraph*, April 15, 1959.

went; what Mr. Nehru could not at that time be expected to foresee was the way in which the Chinese were planning to use this gambit.

Perhaps an appropriate subtitle for my talk might have been "A Study in Appeasement"; but I emphasize that I do not use that word in a pejorative sense. However, if the leaders of the nation which you are trying to appease are cunning and faithless, there are certain dismal corollaries to a persistent policy of this character. The first is that, crediting them with better intentions than they in fact possess, you prevent yourself from anticipating the unscrupulous moves which they are preparing; you are playing fair, and they are cheating. And the second corollary is that, at each crucial phase in the process, at each revelation that you have been both practically out-manœuvred and morally betrayed, your indignation is apt to be equalled by your immediate impotence to do anything practical about it.

In India the mood of impotent indignation was endemic for most of last summer. But supremely susceptible as he ordinarily is to his country's temper, Mr. Nehru was curiously reluctant to translate this mood into action by a deliberate and, it might well have proved, timely reorientation of his own policy. He drifted back into embarrassment and platitudes. So noticeable was this drift that one of his staunchest friends in England, *The Guardian*, was stirred to a remarkably outspoken rebuke. Mr. Nehru, displaying another facet of that curiously recurrent insensitivity which had afflicted him at the time of the Hungarian crisis, observed: "It is a deeper tragedy for many of us even than the events in Tibet that something we have laboured for in the Five Principles and at Bandung should have suffered in people's minds and become depreciated."

This was more than *The Guardian* could stomach. "Principles do not bleed when they are shot in the back"; it said tartly, "Tibetans do. Indian relations with China are determined by more than words . . . and if words come to mean more to the Indian Government than the sufferings and liberties of human beings, then the mentality of the cold war will have won another big victory."\*

For a little longer the dispute between India and China remained in the realm of words; but they were words, it has to be admitted, that were related to terrible deeds. In June, Mr. Purshottam Trikamdas, senior advocate of the Supreme Court of India, published the preliminary results of an investigation which he had made into the Tibetan catastrophe on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists.

Mr. Trikamdas listed, as part of the systematic policy of turning an independent country by force into a province of China, a series of actions that were characteristic of imperialism in its blackest aspects: the denial of freedom of religion; the denial of freedom of information; the conscription to forced labour of 200,000 men, women and children, with the consequent casualties from hunger, cold and fatigue; the arbitrary confiscation of private, religious and Tibetan Government property; and the wholesale murder, imprisonment and deportation of those opposed to the régime. He estimated, from the sources of information available to him,

\**The Guardian*, May 16, 1959.



which he considered reliable, that the total number of victims of the mass killings was no fewer than 65,000.

The Dalai Lama, at a Press conference at Mussoorie a fortnight later, reiterated this grim figure; he could not give statistics on the number of deportations, but he said that 1,000 monasteries had been destroyed, that more than five million Chinese settlers had already been brought into Tibet, and that another four million were coming.

This is surely up to the level of the achievements of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and makes the long-ago colonization efforts of the English in Ireland and the westward expansion of the United States seem by comparison amateurish attempts at genocide.

No title could, therefore, have been more apt than that which Sir Olaf Caroe gave to the characteristically learned and illuminating talk which he delivered to this Society last October: *Tibet, The End of an Era*. It was a deeply tragic climax to a momentous phase in Asian history. Its closest recent analogy is Hitler's conquest of the post-Munich remains of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1939. In 1959 there was in Asia, as twenty years before in Europe, a brief pause while the aggressor digested his prey.

Short as it proved to be, it was a grimly ominous lull. Mr. Nehru went off on a visit to Afghanistan. In Delhi itself, as I am sure there is no need to remind anyone in this audience, the weeks between the middle of May and the beginning of August are not a markedly suitable time for overmuch cerebral activity, whether in the political, the diplomatic or any other field. But last year beneath the surface appearance of hot-weather inactivity, or greatly curtailed activity, there was an atmosphere of brooding disquiet, and an increasing volume of criticism of the Government, and of Mr. Nehru in particular.

The focus of the irritation undoubtedly was the sense that there seemed to be no limit to the appeasement of China. Indian currency had been declared illegal in Tibet, Indian nationals were being harassed and driven out of the country, Peking had launched a violent propaganda campaign demanding the absorption into China of Sikkim, Bhutan and Ladakh, and there were rumours that Chinese troops were massed along the frontiers of the first two of these three States. Mr. Nehru, though still convinced that a continued policy of patience and restraint in the face of Chinese intransigence was the best way of convincing China of the sincerity of Indian neutralism, was not unaware of the magnitude of the Chinese threat, and not unaware of the depth and strength of popular feeling in India. His problem—and it was not the first time that he had been confronted by it—was to master and control popular feeling and not let himself be driven along with it. But this, of course, was only a tactical problem. The much more fundamental issue was strategic: had his strategy been wrong from start to finish?

For the effects of appeasement were now clearly to be seen on India's own threshold, along her own frontier and those of her small neighbours for whose protection she had assumed a measure of responsibility. As one uncharitable critic remarked, India was now called upon to *do* something instead of standing on the sidelines uttering noble sentiments. The

Chinese, having consolidated their position in Tibet, now began a series of encroachments and infiltrations at a number of vulnerable points along the 2,500 miles of common frontier. It is of some historical significance that the first of these aggressive incursions into Indian territory occurred at the end of July and the beginning of August, and that the news of them was suppressed until the last days of August. But it was impossible to stop the circulation of rumours, many of them, as subsequent events were to prove, only too well-founded.

Mr. Nehru's first steps to counter the Chinese activities were cautious. He began by trying to define the aggression which India would resist. He affirmed and reaffirmed unequivocally that India would defend the McMahon Line. This line, it is needless to remind this audience, was laid down in 1914 after negotiations between the Government of India and representatives of the Governments of China and Tibet. It marks the boundary between Tibet and India's North-East Frontier Agency. Although the Agreement was accepted by the Indian and Tibetan Governments, it was only initialled by the Chinese representative, and it was rejected by the then Chinese Government in Peking, who refused to ratify it. Their objection, however, was not to the McMahon Line as a frontier between India and Tibet, but to the proposed line of demarcation between Inner Tibet, under Chinese administration, and Outer Tibet, governed from Lhasa. This objection apart, the McMahon Line, which geographically is the natural frontier, was accepted and administered as the political frontier by the authorities on either side of it for well over forty years.

Mr. Nehru followed his statement on the McMahon Line with an equally firm declaration about the two small, independent mountain States of Sikkim and Bhutan. He told the Indian Parliament on August 25: "I cannot imagine any foreign authority doing anything which is an infringement of their sovereignty. In the event any such infringement would be an infringement of our undertaking with Sikkim and Bhutan . . . We know that it is our responsibility to defend them in the case of any attack." In answer to one of a long series of supplementary questions, he repeated, "We are responsible for their defence."

Mr. Nehru is the product of his period and his environment. His pronouncements were and are impeccably dignified and civilized, in complete accordance with diplomatic procedure as it is understood in Britain, the Commonwealth and the Western world as a whole. The Chinese, brought up in a harsher school, set no great store by these niceties. They act first and argue later.

On August 28, when the Indian Government—with singularly little satisfaction—had been exchanging Notes with the Chinese Government for nearly a month—Mr. Nehru rose in the Upper House of the Indian Parliament to answer a special notice question. He disclosed that on July 28 a small Indian police patrol, consisting of one officer and five constables, on their way to the Khurnak Fort in Kashmir, had been arrested by a numerically stronger Chinese detachment, at a point several miles inside the border; the Chinese, holding the Indian policemen as their prisoners, then set up camp. The Government of India protested, the prisoners were released, but the Chinese refused to move out, saying that the territory

they were occupying was part of China. Another Note was despatched from Delhi, expressing surprise at this claim; Peking did not deign to reply.

In the course of the same statement Mr. Nehru revealed that the Chinese had built a road from Gartok in Tibet to Yarkand in Turkestan, which cut across the North-Eastern corner of Ladakh, well within the borders of India. He then dealt with two recent incidents at the other end of the frontier. On August 7 a small Indian patrol of a dozen policemen in the Kameng Frontier Division in Assam ran into a sizeable party of Chinese, some 200 strong and fully armed; there was a good deal of rather inconclusive argument, some shoving and pushing, but no firing. In a similar affray in the Subansiri Frontier Division on August 25 the Chinese had, Mr. Nehru, asserted, opened fire. He added, a trifle laconically, "There has been a similar forcible occupation of Indian territory at Longju."

On August 31 he had a little more information about Longju. The Chinese had surrounded an Indian police outpost there on August 26; two Indians had got away, but had not made it clear in their subsequent report whether the Chinese had actually captured the post or were simply patrolling round it. Mr. Nehru went on to enunciate his views on the issue of border control as a whole.

"It is not possible," he said, "to prevent incursions over a frontier of more than 2,000 miles, but it is possible to take some steps to repulse incursions and to strengthen defences. While it doesn't make much difference physically to India or China whether a mile or two in the high mountains belongs to them or to us, it does matter very much if a treaty is broken or an aggressive attitude taken. When, therefore, such matters occur, we have to follow a double policy—defend our countries and settle the matters by conference."

He went on to make a careful distinction between happenings in Ladakh, where nobody knew with any precision where the frontier lay, and incidents in the North-Eastern Frontier Agency with a recognized and long-accepted frontier in the McMahon Line. The Chinese action there, he said, was, in the Indian view, "a clear case of aggression."

He emphasized, however, that he was not going to be bulldozed into hasty action. "One restrains oneself," he said, "one tries to settle matters by discussion." One does indeed; but what happens if the other party to a dispute does not regard discussion as a two-way street?

For the outside observer of these events, who possesses the far from negligible advantage of being able to look back over several months, it is difficult not to feel a considerable degree of both admiration and compassion for Mr. Nehru. He was not in his favourite posture, high above the sordid struggles of *machtpolitik*, loftily—and not a little priggishly—allocating blame and praise. He was down in the heat and dirt of the arena, being chivvied round it, not at his own pace, but at Chou-En-Lai's. One is also reminded of the hapless Mr. Bultitude, in *Vice Versa*, who after many years of pontificating about life in an adult and civilized manner, was suddenly transformed outwardly into a twelve-year-old preparatory school boy, and bundled off into the hands of youthful tormentors,

who were quite unimpressed by his sensible, rational, grown-up arguments.

Even while the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi was busy preparing a White Paper on the two issues of Tibet and the border incidents, which presented India's case with urgency but courtesy, there came news of further Chinese incursions deep into Ladakh, of the seizure of the long-established Indian enclave of Minsar, some 100 miles inside Tibet, of an airfield under construction east of Leh, and of an extensive network of roads both along and inside the borders of Ladakh.

The White Paper duly appeared on September 7; it revealed that there had been some five years in which the controversy had passed to and fro—quite fruitlessly, from the Indian standpoint. The basic Chinese tenets were that any and all blame lay entirely on India's shoulders, that any territory that she claimed as Indian was in fact Chinese, and that any incidents which had occurred had been the result of aggression by Indian troops or police but never of Chinese aggression. As for the McMahon Line, to which Mr. Nehru attached such importance, it was "a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China," it had "aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people," and it could not be considered legal.

By an infelicitous but sharply ironic coincidence the Dalai Lama, who was in Delhi pressing his claim for a direct Tibetan appeal to the United Nations, on the very evening on which the White Paper was published, set the Government of India an uncomfortable conundrum over the McMahon Line. In a speech to the Indian Council of World Affairs, he pointed out that the McMahon Line was agreed by the Simla Convention of 1914, which was only binding between Tibet and the then Government of India: if Tibet had no sovereignty when the Simla Convention laid down the McMahon Line, that line was invalid.

"If you deny sovereign status to Tibet," argued the Dalai Lama with impeccable logic, "you deny the validity of the Simla Convention, and therefore you deny the validity of the McMahon Line."

This raking but well-aimed shot from the flank was not the worst of Mr. Nehru's troubles. Within a few days of the publication of the White Paper he faced a ferocious frontal barrage from Chou-En-Lai himself, accompanied by a 2,000-word statement put out by the official Chinese News Agency. On his first reading of Chou-En-Lai's letter, the Indian Prime Minister candidly told Parliament, he was baffled. "I shall have to read it many times," he said, "to try to understand exactly what it may mean. I confess to a growing doubt whether I and the Chinese are speaking the same language in our exchanges. I have been struck by how difficult it is to translate an idea from English into some other language into Chinese or vice-versa."

With a certain bleak humour he speculated on the effects of putting the works of Karl Marx into Chinese, but was entirely in earnest when he observed quietly, "I don't know how the Chinese mind may think. I wonder whether those qualities of calm and logic for which I have admired the Chinese may not have been overwhelmed."

The analogy which rises to my mind this time is, I fear, a little less

lighthearted than the last which I offered. I find myself remembering the stubborn bewilderment of Neville Chamberlain at Godesberg in September, 1938, when he was suddenly confronted by Hitler in a temper, presenting Germany's minimum demands on Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain could hardly believe the evidence of his own senses; did it ever cross his mind, I wonder, that this is where appeasement gets you? And so with Mr. Nehru last year: for, however puzzling Chou-En-Lai's letter, there could not be much mistake about the official statement which accompanied it. This roundly accused India of drawing her maps in such a way as to cut 38,000 square kilometres deep into Chinese territory along the Sinkiang-Tibet-Ladakh border; of invading a number of places claimed to be in China along the Tibet-Punjab-Uttan Pradesh frontier; and of annexing 90,000 square miles of Chinese territory along the Assam-Tibet border.

Forty-eight hours later Mr. Nehru had digested the Chinese Prime Minister's letter. He told the Lokh Sabha that the Chinese claims were "fantastic and absurd," and that they were quite impossible for India or almost any Indian to admit, whatever the consequences.

Politicians are people. It is one of Mr. Nehru's more attractive qualities that he does not hide his ordinary human emotions. The Chinese actions had stung him badly; though he still appealed for calm and reasonableness in meeting the situation, he suddenly showed something of his own anger and pain.

"It is the pride and arrogance of might that is showing," he cried, "in their language, in their behaviour to us, in so many of the things they have done . . . They talk about imperialist pressures against their borders in the past, but they themselves use the arguments of a strong and aggressive Power. Are we perhaps dealing with a case of national paranoia?"

The moment of bitter outspokenness was the moment of illumination, belated but blazing. It was a pity for Mr. Nehru's sake and for India, that the light did not come earlier and stay longer.

"When we first complained about their maps," he went on, "there were bland reassurances from Peking, 'Oh, those are old maps; we'll revise them.' But now what we are faced with is a demand that the Himalayas be handed over as a gift to them. This is an extraordinary claim which cannot be agreed to. There the matter ends."

But the Chinese had no intention of letting it end there. On Tuesday, October 20, an Indian police party encamped at a place called Hot Springs, some 40 miles inside the Ladakh border with China. Two constables sent out on a patrol did not return, and on the following day a search party set out to look for them. This party was surprised by sudden and heavy fire from Chinese troops entrenched on a hill top. The Indians fired back in self-defence, but they were overwhelmed by the Chinese, who greatly outnumbered them, and were using grenades and mortars as well as small arms. Ten Indian policemen were killed, seven were taken prisoner and others wounded.

First reports of this serious and quite large-scale affray reached Delhi later that day, and were quickly followed by a memorandum from the

Chinese Government which turned the facts upside down, accused the Indians of violating the frontier and of opening fire first.

Mr. Nehru made his customary report to Parliament. "The incident," he said, "has caused grave anxiety to India, but I do not say that there will be war with China."

He stressed his and the Government's conviction that the battle took place well within the borders of Ladakh, thus in India and not in China; that remote, barren and windswept as the area was, and guarded by one small checkpost, it had until less than two months earlier not a Chinese in it. Now they were there in considerable force. To this desolate pass all the fine, uplifting talk about peaceful co-existence had been brought.

It was a climactic explosion of violence; from the Chinese point of view, it may have been unintentioned in the sense that they had become contemptuous of India's will or capacity to resist aggression—aggression which, however, they themselves were determined to maintain, and from which they desired to extract every advantage.

Mr. Nehru handled the feeling in his own country with skill, subtlety and patience. As I said, at the beginning, he had been gulled to the full: but not unlike Malvolio he acquired stature by the dignity and the restraint with which he faced his own exposure and grief. After this extreme shock, his hold on Indian public opinion was not diminished; though other countries in free Asia—not to mention some here in Western Europe who had felt the lash of his tongue in his high-and-mighty days—were perhaps not so charitable.

As the fierce Central Asian winter enveloped the greater part of the regions under dispute, the conflict moved over into the sheerly diplomatic sphere. On November 9 Peking published the text of a letter addressed by Chou-En-Lai to Mr. Nehru. It contained a good many flourishes of rather empty courtesy, a side-kick or two at the sinister aims of those who would seek to disrupt by any means the great friendship between India and China, and two concrete propositions: first, that China and India should each withdraw their troops  $12\frac{1}{2}$  miles on either side of the disputed border; and second, that he and Mr. Nehru should meet soon to discuss the dispute.

The catch was obvious. Mr. Nehru was no longer so easily deceived. He was sustained by the knowledge that the Soviet Union was undisguisedly anxious about her ally's carryings-on, and that Mr. Khrushchev had described China's behaviour as very old-fashioned. He did not hasten to reply to the Chinese proposals, and when he did, some ten days later, he made two vigorous and practical counter-proposals. He made a clear division between the situation on the North-East Frontier Agency and the situation in Ladakh. It would be sufficient in the eastern sector, he said, for both sides to cease patrolling, but India could not, he pointed out firmly, agree to any arrangement, even as an interim measure, which would leave the Chinese in possession of Longju; the Chinese must evacuate it and the Indians would not reoccupy it. So far as Ladakh was concerned he proposed that Indian forces should withdraw west of the line claimed by the Chinese, and Chinese forces east of the frontier as it had always been understood by India; since the region was almost entirely uninhabited, there was no need for civilian administrators, and they too could be with-

drawn; and since the two lines were separated by considerable distances, there should then be not the slightest risk of border clashes on either side.

A week later, on November 27, there was a three-day debate in the Lokh Sabha on the whole issue. Mr. Nehru was very forthright. He accused China of a "breach of faith" against India, who had from the outset championed her cause.

"The prospect of a future," he said, "in which the two giants of Asia are constantly at each other's throat is bad for the future, bad for China, and bad for India, or for Asia, and a war between them would be a great tragedy . . . People think that in spite of all that has happened on our borders and elsewhere it has made no difference. That is not correct. It has made a tremendous difference not only to the Government's present relations with China but also to what may happen in the future. That is something very obvious from the widespread and deep-seated reaction in India. There is no doubt about that . . . the reaction has been powerful, from children in a primary school to grown-up people. I have ventured sometimes to ask people to be calm. But I might tell you that I was proud of that reaction . . . I ask you all to realize the gravity of the situation created by China. If unfortunately this situation worsens we shall have to become a nation in arms. Let there be no mistake. Every single activity and planning will have to be conditioned by the major fact that it is a struggle for life and death."

In the course of the debate Mr. Nehru extended the guarantee, previously given to Sikkim and Bhutan, to cover Nepal as well. This decision, coupled with the general tone of resolution evident throughout his speech, won Press and public approval throughout India. The Chinese Prime Minister did not reply to Mr. Nehru's letter of November 20 until December 18; he then proposed that the two of them should meet on December 26. This was not acceptable to Mr. Nehru, who reiterated his previous insistence as a precondition to any meeting that Longju and other areas occupied by the Chinese should be evacuated; and added a new stipulation that officials of either side should meet before the two leaders conferred. The exchange of letters thereafter was leisurely, and the letters themselves were lengthy restatements which only served to reveal that there was no common ground between the disputants. But in the middle of February, just before Mr. Krushchev's visit to India, Mr. Nehru invited Mr. Chou-En-Lai to come to Delhi as an honoured guest, and suggested some time in the second half of this month. On February 28 Mr. Chou-En-Lai accepted the invitation with what *The Times* Correspondent in Delhi described as "evident gusto," and said that he would like to make the visit in April.

So far, then, we have come in our unfinished story. We must suppose that this meeting in Delhi next month, if it comes off, will open a new chapter—in a new atmosphere. It is impossible to believe that Sino-Indian friendship will be restored on its old basis. For all Peking's naïve blarneying on this issue, Indian disillusionment is complete. There will be no going back down that hard and humiliating road. The love-affair is over, once and for all. But there are many questions still unanswered.

India's political stand, though belated, has been on the whole firm. She is committed to the defence of her own territory against aggression, and she is also committed to the defence of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. Has she the military capacity to fulfil these commitments, or are her guarantees about as practicable as that which Britain gave to Poland in April, 1939? Colonel Crocker, whose authority in these matters commands considerable respect, holds\* that a large-scale invasion of the Northern States, on the scale which succeeded in Tibet, is unlikely; but—I hope I interpret his argument rightly—that if such an invasion occurred, India would not be able to do very much about it, since neither Mr. Nehru nor the Army Staff have given much thought as to how the guarantees could be made effective.

The prospect, therefore, in front of the Northern States may be pretty bleak. What are the Chinese intentions? I am neither a prophet nor a soothsayer, but I would hazard a grim guess that they do not wish to leave matters as they are. Do they intend in the short term to bring the border States, at present independent, under their control in the way that the Soviet Union brought the Baltic Republics? And is this, or is it not, the prelude to any long-term plan to subjugate the Indian sub-continent? To what extent do Chinese plans and purposes clash with those of the Soviet Union? Is the Soviet Union either willing or able to restrict China's ambitions? Is it not likely that the two great Communist Powers, however much they may differ on tactical activities, such as this border dispute, are in full agreement on the strategic—one might almost say the teleological—intentions of world Communism?

No issue in all the twelve years since the attainment of independence, a very competent Indian commentator has observed, has made India so angry and so united. Are these emotions enough? Was Mr. Nehru speaking merely rhetorically, or was he envisaging in outline a possible future policy for his country, when he said on November 27 that if the situation worsened, India must become a nation in arms, committed to a struggle for life and death?

These are large and far-reaching questions. They arise inevitably, I submit, out of the dispute whose course I have tried to trace this afternoon. The answers it is neither within my responsibility nor within my capacity to give. So I leave my story unfinished, on a large—and admittedly sombre—note of interrogation.

The CHAIRMAN: The meeting is now open for questions and observations.

Lt.-Colonel E. H. COBB: What importance does the lecturer attach to the recent visit of Koirala, the Prime Minister of Nepal, to Mr. Chou-En-Lai?

Mr. JOHN CONNELL: I tend to use analogies from political experience in Europe. There are, however, other grim analogies. I attach a good deal of importance to that particular visit, and it is not a happy augury.

MR. BYRT: Why are the Chinese doing all this? So far that question has not been answered. Mr. Connell has suggested that the dispute is due to the politico-psychological differences between India and China, but there

\* *Army Quarterly*, January, 1960, pp. 212-213.



seems to me to be a much more practical reason. I suggest that it is concerned with their Pacific coast line; that there is no real dispute with India but that the American threat in the east has led the Chinese to feel that they must have a back door. They have already negotiated and come to terms over the Chinese-Burma frontier in a way they would never have done with India or the British Foreign Office. Having fixed transport arrangements with Burma, the Chinese as part of their general plan, are trying to make certain of a back door in India also; they are already importing goods along the new road to Ladakh.

Mr. JOHN CONNELL: It seems rather rough to be both the door and the door-mat and to have 400 million chaps making a door-mat for the back door.

Judge AMEER ALI: There is the overweening conceit of the Chinese nation. I have not in mind individual Chinese, but for 2,500 years the Chinese have had an overwhelming superiority complex over the rest of Asia. Even now the Communist Chinese (as in the past Imperial and Republican Chinese), are never so happy as when "coming it" over another Asiatic or European, if possible.

Mr. G. W. PYKE: The lecturer several times mentioned 1938 and 1939. I understand that the real reason why the Germans and the Russians during those years fell out and failed to agree, lay in the fact that they could not decide who was to have Suez and the Persian Gulf. It has occurred to me that perhaps we are already again in 1940 and that probably the position has been already agreed upon by the Chinese and the Russians, and that India, and parts east and south-east thereof go to China and the Russians will have the rest, including Africa, the Middle East and Pakistan. In other words, the future position in that part of the world has already been decided?

Mr. JOHN CONNELL: I accept that proposition.

The CHAIRMAN: We have passed the time allotted to us, but before we leave I feel sure you would like to join in thanking Mr. John Connell for the fascinating lecture he has given us. It must have meant a serious piece of work to compose and deliver in a short time a documentary talk on a subject so immense. Mr. Connell can feel that the result of his work has given satisfaction to those present and that we have all listened with intense interest to what he has told us. You will, I am sure, wish to express your thanks in the usual way. (*Applause.*)

# INSIDE AFGHANISTAN—A BACKGROUND TO RECENT TROUBLES

By ANDREW WILSON

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, March 2, 1960, Group-Captain H. St. Clair Smallwood, O.B.E., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, Ladies and Gentlemen, that our Chairman, Sir Phillip Southwell, is away on a tour of oil-producing countries; hence I have been asked to introduce our lecturer, Mr. Andrew Wilson, a journalist who has spent something like six years in that profession. He may be described as a trained observer. He has recently visited Afghanistan and knows that country in an up-to-date way, which not very many people do. A month or so ago he had an article in the *Observer* entitled "Inside Afghanistan." Mr. Andrew Wilson served as a carabineer in the North-West Frontier Force in 1945 and, generally speaking, it would be difficult to find one so well informed in regard to this particular subject today. I asked Mr. Wilson what were his chief amusements and he said "Going for long periods to unlikely places." That, I think, should recommend him to this audience.

**H**ALF an hour is not a long time in which to try to describe something of the background to the recent troubles in Afghanistan, or even to clarify the situation there—because basically the situation is a very confused one. Perhaps I might be your reporter, so to speak, as to my short visit to Afghanistan in the autumn of 1959.

The first impression one gets on arriving in Afghanistan is that of family and tribal divisions. In Kabul I met people who talked accurately of Pathans, Tajiks and Uzbeks and other different races of the country; some in diplomatic circles spoke of "the Afghans" and yet others referred to the "oriental mind"! If there is one thing one learns about Afghanistan it is that it does not typify in any degree the "oriental mind," or even the mind of one nation; it typifies a divided community: races at variance with one another, one tribe in a position of dominance over others. Again, the tribal structure is now, probably for the first time in the country's history, being broken up and becoming a kind of class structure. It is not yet fashionable to speak about "class" in Afghanistan, but the idea of class is a new concept which is going to affect the country in future. There is in the capital a small middle class which is quite new; it consists at the moment of those who have received their education in the West and of others imbued with ideas which come from the North. There is going to arise a larger class of this kind because during the past few years the Government has promoted a universal system of education and there is the beginning of a community who, if not intellectuals, are people with modern minds. Apart from whatever tribal background they have, these people are looking to the West or North for new patterns on which to fashion national life.

Within this rather divided community two large events have taken

place. The first has been the influx of Russian influence and Russian aid, beginning with military aid which has transformed the armed forces, and then extending to technical aid which has brought into being factories, flour mills and, above all, roads. And then within the last half year there has been the impact of female emancipation. I need not describe what that means in Afghanistan. There is possibly no other country in which female emancipation could have the same impact, except the Yemen. So far as Afghanistan is concerned it has been a severe shock, and if we are to understand the troubles which have been experienced in the country in the last five or six months, female emancipation must be regarded as one of the basic influences. It began in the summer of 1959 at the time of the annual Independence celebrations, being prompted very discreetly by Royal wish. When the wives of various senior personalities went to official functions they appeared without their *chadduris*, the tent-like veils which the women of the country have worn for generations past. This small ripple spread outward, from the world of senior personalities to lower levels of society: to the wives of local government officials, school-teachers and so on, not only in the capital but also in the provinces.

When I arrived in Kabul at the end of September, 1959, the movement appeared to be proceeding very peacefully, and the only evidence of tension was the presence in the streets of an unusually large number of policemen to ensure that women not wearing veils were shown no discourtesy. I was assured that for every policeman in uniform there were three in plain clothes. By the time I left Kabul, nearly two months later, the police had disappeared and one would have said that female emancipation had passed off without resistance. But that was not the case. There was evidence otherwise.

As I travelled through the provincial parts of Afghanistan I came to places where persuasion was certainly a misnomer for the policy being adopted. I recall arriving at Pul-i-Khumri, a textile town on the north of the Hindu Kush, which is quite a show-piece of Afghan progress. There I found that the drivers of gharis (the carts we called *tongas* in India) had been forbidden to carry women passengers in veils under threat of a heavy fine. Then again, at this same town, I found that the wives of factory workers were being refused admission to the Co-operative, a great stand-by in smaller Afghan communities, a place where the women can buy tea, flour and other necessities; they had been refused admission unless they came openly and without veils, with the result that nobody was appearing at the Co-operative any more.

I went further north to another industrial centre, Kunduz, the centre of the cotton industry and also of the new soap and china industries; and the news which greeted me was that ladies were working in the factories—a very startling development in Afghanistan. I thought what marvellous progress had been made, until I discovered that the ladies working in the factories had only been doing so for a week; they numbered only a dozen and were actually the wives of the factory management. It had been impossible to get local women workers for the factories, so the wives of the managers had been ordered to set a national example, and they were not very happy about it. I managed to get into the factory and take

some photographs, and found the ladies sitting idly around in the time-honoured fashion drinking tea. There were other places where local governors, often military men, were competing in their zeal to impose the reform by compulsion; only with the greatest difficulty were they put off by wiser counsels.

The reform has developed a very considerable resistance in the country. While I was in Kabul, though it was impossible to obtain the exact number, it appeared that between ten and forty mullahs were imprisoned in the capital. Also a number of senior army officers had found themselves unable to obey the official invitation to bring their wives unveiled to public functions; they had been removed from their posts and a number of these, too, were reported to be under arrest.

About the time I was in Afghanistan there was a large defection by Mangal tribesmen across the border into Pakistan. Since then there has been trouble in Kandahar; there has been shooting and about forty people appear to have been killed. The latest reports coming out of Afghanistan—that is to say out of southern and eastern Afghanistan—are of secret but well-organized resistance to the régime. It would, however, be oversimplification to suppose that the grounds of this resistance are simply objection to female emancipation. There are other causes of grievance and friction. First, the building of roads in the south. The building of motor-roads has in a number of instances removed local livelihood from the caravan traffic. Again, there has been an attempt in various areas to impose conscription on tribes which were hitherto exempted in return for their support of King Nadir Shah when he restored the country after Amanullah's abdication.

Yet again, there has been trouble as the result of the distribution of funds for the Pakhtunistan campaign. Here, in Britain, we get a view of an aggressive campaign vigorously directed against Pakistan. In Afghanistan one gets a different view; one gets a view of a campaign which had badly missed fire. Wherever I travelled I raised this question of Pakhtunistan and I would say that interest in it diminishes rapidly as one gets away from Kabul; on reaching areas near the border, such as Jalalabad, I found interest in it had dropped almost to nil. On the other hand the campaign was causing the Afghans themselves a considerable amount of trouble on the frontier. The allocation of large amounts of money to keep the campaign going, in the form of tribal subsidies, gifts and so on, has put a good deal of power into the hands of local officials who are naturally compromised by family and personal loyalties. There have been rivalries connected with the giving or withholding of money, but all this has been kept extremely quiet.

Before I arrived in Afghanistan the governor or Kharma down on the Khyber road was killed. The circumstances of the murder are obscure but one fact resulting from it is that the local director of Pakhtunistan affairs is now in Kabul gaol.

I think one might draw a lesson here, in that whatever may seem to be the cause of the troubles in the south, it would be unwise to identify it too closely with resistance to Russian influence. Similarly there is no necessary connection (whatever dissident Afghans may say) between Rus-

sian influence and the emancipation of women, or Russian influence and other reforms demanded by the condition of a poverty-stricken nation. There is an infant mortality rate of seventy per cent before the age of one in Afghanistan. The staple diet of the people, which I enjoyed myself for a couple of months, is bread and tea. Once a month, if there is a special occasion, the family may eat meat. Bread may be supplemented in various areas by rice, but over large areas even rice is not obtainable. During the past few months the price of bread has increased out of all bounds. The country has only been fed for the past four years because of gifts of wheat from America and Russia.

When I returned home by air through Russia I could not help being impressed, as I crossed the frontier, by the obvious vigour and well-fed look of the people of the southern Soviet republics as compared with the palpable under-nourishment of the people of Afghanistan. The Afghan government has had no choice but to improve the situation. The improvement has often gone against local custom and has aroused a great deal of resentment. But I do not think one would do oneself any great service if one welcomed the movement against the new pattern of things in Afghanistan simply because it fulfils a double purpose by also operating against the Russians. Similarly one should be clear in one's appraisal of the extent of Soviet infiltration into Afghanistan, deep though it is. The Afghan Government has made some grave errors in attempting to solve its problems with an Army and Air Force equipped with modern Russian weapons. On the other hand, there is no longer need to suppose that Afghan aircraft are flown by other than Afghan pilots, or that there are combatant Russian officers in the Afghan army. Rumours that Russian pilots and tank commanders have been used against tribes in the south have fed anti-Russian feeling, but again I think it would be unwise to accept everything reported of Afghanistan from Karachi or Peshawar. I believe the Pakistan authorities have been very conscientious in attempting to assess the situation, but one cannot go into southern Afghanistan without being conscious of a trade which goes on in sensational reports.

Looking at the future of Afghanistan it seems to me that there are three possibilities: first, the Government may master the present situation and the relatively peaceful development of the country will continue. In this case it looks very much as if Russian control of the country will also increase, although I do not see any immediate possibility of Russia formally taking over Afghanistan. Logically, it is not difficult to understand that, first of all, Afghanistan in its poverty would represent a big liability to Russia. Secondly, the annexation of this vast population with all its religious complications and traditional prejudices would saddle any Soviet administration with a great burden from which at present it is free.

And, then again, Afghanistan as it stands at present is a great asset to the Soviet Union. It is not a formal ally, yet it permits the building of bases with Russian aid which could be occupied at any appropriate moment, and which almost certainly *would* be occupied, if there were any reason to do so for defensive or offensive purposes—for example, if the Russians thought the Americans were about to occupy bases in Iran and Pakistan.

If, as I say, Afghanistan continues without any serious internal upheaval, Russia is obtaining a great advantage which we could only offset with some Western diplomatic counter-policy which has hitherto been lacking. If one looks for an exit from this situation, one looks to Afghanistan's southern neighbour. There is an overwhelming argument to be made out for some sort of link between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan is a country without any proper northern defences. The North-West frontier is no strategic frontier; the defence line of India and Pakistan lies on the Hindu Kush. Afghanistan is a country which occupies this favoured defence line, but a country which has no seaboard. Afghanistan is entirely dependent on Soviet aid from the north on one hand, and on the other upon trade through Karachi in the south. The two countries have thus a number of complementary factors which but for the political question of Pakhtunistan, which stands between them, would provide them both with a viable future.

I noticed the day before yesterday that the Afghan Foreign Minister, Mohammed Naim, reported negatively on his latest visit to Pakistan. I fear the Pakhtunistan issue is a very difficult one which will not be solved quickly. On the other hand, the West has only one line of hope so far as Afghanistan is concerned—and that is in the promotion of some link which would afford the Afghan government that freedom of manœuvre which it has lost through its association with the Soviet Union.

If Afghanistan should fail to develop on the lines the Government has chosen, if its development should be interrupted by rebellion—and I think one cannot discount that possibility, remembering the disastrous effects produced by the reforms of King Amanullah in the late 1920s—if there is rebellion, who will stand to gain? It seems to me that an internal break-down would invite an immediate move from Russia to occupy the northern part of the country. At the moment there are at least 1,000 Soviet citizens in Afghanistan, and the number is probably much higher. There is a considerable Russian stake in the country. Would not all this paraphernalia be used to justify a take-over on the lines with which we were familiar in the nineteenth century?

One can look a little ahead and see that with such a break-down any government which managed to secure control in Kabul would naturally look to the south and west for support against the Russians moving in from the north. There might thus be a situation in which the Russians occupied the north of the country, while the south—that is to say the whole of the country south of the Hindu Kush—would ally itself with the Muslim and western nations of the free world; and from a military point of view, and quite a considerable one, perhaps that would not be an unsatisfactory solution.

From a military standpoint the present frontiers in this part of the world are quite inefficient; neither the Oxus nor the North-West Frontier provide proper defence lines. The Hindu Kush would become what it has always been geographically—the barrier between Southern and Central Asia. And yet this is not something one can view as coldly as all that. If you were to travel through the country, as I have travelled—and I am sure that if you lived there, it would weigh with you even more—you

would find that you cannot overlook friendship; you cannot overlook people; you cannot see people away from politics and you ask yourself: What really can one say of all this affair? Can one really treat it as a kind of military equation? I do not think one can, not merely on moral but also on self-interested grounds. You cannot travel within an area such as Afghanistan today without feeling that the military consideration, the military situation, is rather a secondary one.

The struggle in Afghanistan today is not really a military struggle; it is not actually a political struggle, because the Afghans are an entirely unpolitical people. The struggle that goes on is the commercial one, an industrial and economic struggle; a struggle for friendship if you like. In Afghanistan today there is no visible sign of British investment. American economic activity has been devoted to some schemes which were grand, long-term schemes and are a little out of people's sight. The country which has made the most impact on Afghanistan, with comparatively the minimum of money, is Western Germany. While the Germans have built a number of hydro-electric projects, they have at the same time done much more in that they have established agencies in Afghanistan, the Siemens' agency and others, which are providing the Afghans with the small industrial and consumer goods which are needed—electric cookers, refrigerators, household electrical equipment, all the things which belong to the industrial and domestic betterment of the country over the next fifteen or twenty years. The Dutch have also moved in. Wherever you go in Afghanistan, if you want to buy a radio set it is a Philips' radio from Eindhoven. There are some British bicycles, and the Afghan Army is equipped with musical instruments from Messrs. Boosey and Hawkes; but there is nothing else which blazes the name of British industry in Afghanistan. Oddly enough, when going through the country you meet Frenchmen on archaeological missions, and Italians and Finns on their way round the world on bicycles; you see Australians quite frequently; you see Germans; and I have met Japanese in Afghanistan—but the British are remarkably absent from the country.

One cannot help wondering what has come over the moral climate of our country which two generations ago was filling this part of the world with all kinds of men—men of purpose and character who were representing the British mind to the Afghans. Today an Afghan may ask: "Where do you come from?" and when you say: "I come from London," he says, as has been said to me, "And what part of America is that?" Perhaps the moral is there. It may be that with more understanding and some investment, the name of Britain could be much better known in Afghanistan. At the moment it has fallen very much behind. It seems to me that if the West is to achieve a firm basis for its future policy, there must be not only Government but private investment—and a very patient and long-term effort to solve the running sore of the Pakhtunistan question and so provide Afghanistan with an open back-door to the free world.

Mr. C. G. HANCOCK: Would the lecturer amplify what he said in regard to bases in Iran and Pakistan. Are these bases now in Pakistan?

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: This is a matter of public and not private knowledge. The American foreign aid programme has provided in both Iran

and Pakistan a number of bases which are not occupied by American military personnel. The bases are for the military forces of the country concerned. My argument is that if ever the Russians believed that such bases were about to be occupied by American personnel with American aeroplanes, the Russians would occupy the bases which they have built under similar circumstances in Afghanistan.

**THE DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PAKISTAN:** The lecturer's statement that American-built bases in Iran and Pakistan are obviously not for American personnel and forces, but could conceivably be occupied in the event of an emergency by American forces, is a somewhat sweeping statement. In so far as Pakistan is concerned, there have been no bases built for any such express eventualities. I am sure that many here know that bases have existed in West Pakistan for many years past. Bases built in recent years are also for the express purpose of the Pakistan Army which is a force of some considerable size and strength. If one accepts the hypothesis that bases in Pakistan can be occupied by forces other than those of the country itself, then it seems to me that any bases in any country can be occupied by any other country. But was Iran occupied by British forces during the last war? Are we to say that such bases as existed in Great Britain before the war had not been built expressly for the forces that occupied them in a given situation?

I should also like to crave indulgence to comment on what the lecturer said as to news emanating from Peshawar and Karachi. The news is issued by the Government of Pakistan, it goes to the news agencies and across the border and although certain allowances have to be made for exaggeration, I would claim that the news issued by the Government is correct and factual. Much depends on the avenues through which news comes. But for Peshawar and Karachi we would not in England have known what was happening in regard to defection of the Mangal tribesmen. That news came from Peshawar and it was contradicted and questioned by reporters here who should have known better. Similarly, the news about Kandahar came from Karachi. The news comes across the border, it is picked up by certain news agencies and is sent out to the rest of the world.

So far as Pakhtunistan is concerned, the position is well known in this country, and all I have to add is that a harbour for Afghanistan is the crux of the whole matter. But I fear we have yet to find any country in this world ready and willing to give a harbour to another country. In so far as Karachi is concerned we have tried during the past twelve or thirteen years to provide as much facility as has been possible to offer to Afghanistan. We continue to provide Afghanistan with transport facilities to Karachi. Following the incident in 1955 there was an endeavour to switch transport from Karachi to Afghanistan over the land route, but that was fraught with delay. Transport facilities, as I say, continue and not a penny is charged by Pakistan to the Government of Afghanistan, and we are willing to help in any other way possible; for instance by storage. When I was in the Foreign Office, there was the question of building special warehouses for the Government of Afghanistan's use. So far as Russian aid is concerned, there has been a trickle of food.



Mr. ANDREW WILSON: The trickle of food from Russia is no longer a trickle; it is a flood.

The DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PAKISTAN: I stand corrected.

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: Before I arrived in Afghanistan I was under the impression that the people there were receiving their goods in very poor quality in so far as they were coming from Russia. This appears not to be the case. A large amount of boiler equipment was imported into Kunduz in the summer of 1959, and that came across country from Western Germany through Russia, having been shipped from the Baltic when it was ice-free; it eventually came into Afghanistan across the Oxus river at Qizil Qala. I was told that goods and equipment by this route were arriving faster and in better condition than the equipment sent from Karachi. I am, in a sense, speaking on the basis of Afghan information, my informant complaining that goods were held up at Karachi and saying that the goods sometimes failed to arrive.

The speaker's point in regard to the port is a valid one. It is no small affair to find any country a port, but there has been a period during which the port of Trieste has served Austria and Switzerland in much fuller measure than Karachi has been able to serve Afghanistan.

As to the bases—correct me if I am wrong about Pakistan—but certainly in Iran the building of bases by the Americans has not been confined to purely military bases; it has included airfields with particularly long runways. It was those runways I had in mind when I said that the Russians would be likely to occupy the bases they have built in Afghanistan should there be an emergency.

The DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PAKISTAN: Pakistan is now, for the purpose of commercial airways, building the longest possible runways in Karachi.

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: The Russians say they are building their airfields in Afghanistan for commercial aircraft.

A MEMBER: I had the honour to serve in Afghanistan as a Political Agent. What I then saw was all much as the lecturer has described. In my time there were no bases in Afghanistan so far as I know. There were always two things in mind: the Russian menace and what we used to call the Yellow Peril. Afghanistan seems to be in more or less the same position now.

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: It seems to me that the position has changed and that is because of China. Although there is a very short border on the Pamirs between Afghanistan and China, there is no real intercourse between the two countries. But if one considers the position in Afghanistan *vis-à-vis* Russia and at the same time the situation on the frontier of India with China, one realizes that the Russians are building roads in Afghanistan and the Chinese building them in Tibet. One can ask: Is this a great co-operative pincer movement, aimed at pincering off the Indian sub-continent? Or one can ask—and this seems the more fruitful question—Is there not perhaps, instead of a concerted movement between these two great Powers, a movement of rivalry? One can interpret the Russian move in Afghanistan as a counter to the Chinese move in Tibet, because whoever gains the most prominent position first is going to win control and

domination of the whole of India. A formal Russian occupation of Afghanistan could under certain circumstances be precipitated by the occupation of American bases, but it might equally be precipitated by an early Chinese move on the Indian north-east frontier. That is a possibility.

Sir CHARLES BELGRAVE: May I ask whether men and women in Afghanistan are equally opposed to emancipation of women? Does resistance come more from one side than the other? In other countries when that reform has been made the women have been in favour of it but their husbands and brothers opposed to it.

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: The women in Afghanistan have definitely been more in favour of the reform than have the men, and good luck to them. When I arrived in Afghanistan the women wore curious scarves which covered the greater part of the head. By the time I left the country the head scarves had disappeared; the women had ceased to wear their usual black gloves and were altogether very much freer. I hardly dare mention this for fear of disbelief, but the last thing that happened to me in Kabul was that a woman asked me to photograph her. Definitely the women have been very forward in demanding the change. I think you can take this as attributable to the women of the middle class, because in Kabul they formed a body of propaganda even before the reform came off.

Mrs. ST. JOHN COOK: Are the women good-looking and of good physique?

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: Magnificent.

Sir NEVILLE BUTLER: Does the Royal family belong to the Pathan tribe, or is there any feeling against the Pathans?

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: Yes, they are the tribe of the Royal family. The feeling against the Pathans comes in its most active form from the Hazaras who occupy the central mountains. The Pathans treat them like dirt. The northern provinces have their Uzbek and other populations. I never saw any open resentment. It had passed beyond the stage of hostility, so far as the Pathans were concerned. One cannot fail to notice the awful deadness of the northern tribes; they exist in a position of sufferance. The Pathans provide the government of their provinces; the political representation of the Uzbeks and Turcomen is almost nil. As to the Royal family, whilst it might be endangered by discontent I do not think it is endangered by the tribes, but rather by its own position within the Pathan hierarchy.

Judge AMEER ALI: Is there not a slight confusion between the so-called Pathans and the ruling family? The Pathans are mountain folk living in the hills, and the name applies particularly to the Pashtu-speaking tribes. The Durrani claim Semitic descent and the tribe come from the neighbourhood of Kandahar. One should not confuse the Durrani Royal family with the tribes on the borderland; they are two separate entities. It is not right for the Durranis to claim relationship with the Pathan tribes on the border.

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: The Royal family tends now to discourage the use of the word Pathan altogether. The word in current use in Afghanistan is "Afghan," the word being used to include all tribes of whatever location, the whole of the people occupying the frontier area and the Kabul

area right up to the areas in the north. The language also is referred to as Afghan, not Pashtu.

Judge AMEER ALI: The people north of the Hindu Kush are mostly Tajiks, people of Persian descent or of semi-Persian descent. Is that not so?

Mr. ANDREW WILSON: Yes, indeed; and looking very much to Persia for the whole of their culture.

The CHAIRMAN: Having come to the end of the time allotted we now take the opportunity of thanking Mr. Andrew Wilson for his most interesting lecture and for stimulating a useful discussion. I also add a word of thanks to the Deputy High Commissioner for Pakistan because his remarks were those of an expert, listened to by all in this audience with great respect and satisfaction. I have expressed to Mr. Andrew Wilson the hope that he will pay another of his visits to little known countries and return to talk to us again. (*Applause.*)

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# THE ASIAN CONTAINMENT FRONT FROM TURKEY TO KOREA

By H.R.H. PRINCE PETER OF GREECE AND DENMARK,  
LL.D., PH.D., G.C.R., R.E., C.B. (MIL.)

Report of a lecture delivered to the Royal Central Asian Society on Wednesday, May 18, 1960, Sir Philip Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Your Royal Highness, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen—It is my pleasant duty to welcome our lecturer who is known not only as a distinguished member of our Society but also as one of those who is ready at any time to give his service to the Society, and for that we appreciate H.R.H. Prince Peter being with us today.

About fifteen months ago we received from His Royal Highness a very erudite talk on researches in Ceylon and India. Today his subject is particularly topical, "The Asian Containment Front from Turkey to Korea," an area in which the Western peoples are together faced with great problems. There are times when a Chairman should add a few words in regard to the subject, but today I want you to have the whole time in which to listen to His Royal Highness, and so I ask him to now commence his lecture.

**M**R. CHAIRMAN, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I, first, thank the Chairman for the way in which he has introduced me. I assure you that it is a great pleasure to come to speak to our Society, especially because many of the ideas which I have developed over the years in regard to certain problems have been gestated, one might say, because of the possibility of exchanging ideas with members of this Society. In that way you have helped me to arrive at certain conclusions in regard to Asia, particularly Central Asia.

I should like next to place the subject on which I am to speak in what I believe to be its context; then there will follow a brief narration of the journey, a description of the places visited, and some of the conclusions to which I have come. As, unavoidably, some of my points will be controversial I should like to make it clear that what I have to say will be purely my personal opinion and should not involve anybody except myself.

In a book I wrote in 1948, published in 1952, I tried to show that it seemed to me that there were two main civilizations in the world in opposition to each other: the one, the liberal maritime civilization of the Mediterranean based on Greece and Rome; the other, opposed to it, the more autocratic nomad steppe culture of the people of Central Asia. I endeavoured to show that the conflict between these two cultures was an "Eternal Question," as it had been called by Herodotus many years ago. In my book I tried to show the nature and the historical development of this "Eternal Question" throughout the years and concluded by showing that after the close of World War II the "Eternal Question" had developed

into the opposition between, on the one side, the West—the United States and Western Europe—and on the other side the U.S.S.R., today in occupation of a large part of Central Asia, having been greatly influenced by the Mongol conquest of that part of the world. The opposition of these two cultures has been termed the “Cold War” and it is principally about this opposition that I now wish to speak.

The struggle between the two cultures has been rendered much more dangerous since the end of World War II, because today both sides are armed in quite a different fashion than in the past; it is no longer a matter of bows and arrows; both sides could now use nuclear weapons and what are known as “I.C.B.Ms.”—inter-continental ballistic missiles. In spite of the great danger which this represents, both opponents seem to carry on, each urged on by their traditional cultural and historical trends, the U.S.S.R. spilling over from Central Asia, and the West, along the maritime periphery, trying to contain it. Both at the same time are struggling desperately to avoid a suicidal atomic war.

The initiative in this struggle, as always, is with those in occupation of Central Asia, the U.S.S.R. today, because they have an outwardly directed drive from a somewhat poor, isolated part of the world, Central Asia, while they are also in possession of inner lines of communication. In fact, they are all the time on the march, even if at times their course has been described as zig-zag. Since the destruction in World War II of the, in the end, unsuccessful reactions to Soviet encroachments—Fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism—the U.S.S.R. has met with greater success against its Western opponents by making use of novel devices for penetrating its opponents' territory, devices more effective than those ancient ones of the Tsars, for example, the support of Greek Orthodox Christians which led to the assassination at Sarajevo and to World War I. These newer devices could be listed as follows:

(1) The promotion of Communist doctrines with the object of creating a World Revolution under Soviet leadership.

(2) Anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist propaganda—directed against old forms of imperialism though not against the new form, the Soviet form.

(3) Infiltration of workers' unions; the infiltration of the World Federation of Trade Unions being an apt example.

(4) The creation and support of youth organizations.

(5) The creation and support of women's organizations.

(6) Promotion of Peace Movements and anti-atomic bomb propaganda in opposition to what the Communists term “capitalist war-mongering.”

(7) Giving economic and technical assistance to specially selected under-developed countries in direct competition with Western effort in such countries.

(8) Trade penetration of certain countries where State monopolies are encouraged rather than the investment of foreign private funds.

(9) Armed action if and when possible as, for example, in the Korean War in 1950.

In fact, the Communists stir up and exploit all the trouble spots in the

world rather than try to appease and clear them up. Their greatest success so far has been the communization of China, the vast population of that country now being under the drastic dictatorship of Marxist-Leninist theoreticians who (and Mao himself is responsible for this) have added the unorthodox idea of peasant revolt to other methods of advance. The leaders of the present-day China may be, to some extent, in disagreement with the leaders of the Soviet Union, but they are still paralyzingly dependent on the U.S.S.R. for armaments and for industrial assistance.

What is the reply from the West to all this propaganda? It can be said:

- (1) The West promotes liberal democracy—freedom.
- (2) Gives self-government and independence to its overseas possessions, in which respect Great Britain has been outstanding during the last few years.
- (3) Supports non-Communist trade unions—which is really the same as the promotion of liberal democracy.
- (4) Gives economic and technical aid to under-developed countries, principally former colonial possessions.
- (5) Sets up military defensive organizations throughout the world.

The West does little under other headings such as youth movements, women's organizations, peace propaganda and anti-atomic propaganda which have been left to individual initiative, as befits liberal democracy. On the whole, the Western reply has been somewhat ineffective because the West is at a disadvantage, being on the defensive in order to maintain the *status quo* rather than to destroy the existing order and create something new. Those familiar with Indian philosophy will recognize in this struggle something akin to Siva *versus* Vishnu (the Destroyer-Creator against the Maintainer).

The West has been at a special disadvantage outside Europe where Asian colonies (and African—but this is not our subject today) were created by the maritime expansion of Europe resulting from the advance of the Ottoman Turks westwards in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Also there has been the arrival of the West in the Far East, over the Pacific, with the defeat of the Japanese at the end of World War II, where the West is now also containing Central Asian expansion—although eastwards this time. The arrival of the West over the Pacific in that part of the world is new and unconsolidated. The U.S.S.R.'s success in China is, I think, a proof of this. The U.S.S.R. is actually making a special bid to get at the West through the East because that is in conformity with Marxist teachings and has been repeatedly encouraged by leaders of the Soviet Union—Lenin, Zinovieff, Stalin and others.

From January to May of this year I undertook a visit to some of the Far Eastern countries to see for myself what the situation was all around Central Asia. The trip came about by combination of a holiday, after my thesis gaining me a Ph.D. at the University of London, and invitations from the Shah of Persia, the Government of Siam, friends in Hong Kong, Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, friends in Japan, the Governments in Korea and in Turkey and even B.O.A.C.; all helped me on this trip. I also had

a desire to see our Asian allies after the unpleasantnesses that we had been through at Kalimpong recently and the Tibetan revolt of last year. As a result of the trip I am now aware of the existence of what can be termed an *Asian Containment Front* from Turkey to Korea. I am especially in on the military aspect of this Front in what is the South-Eastern section of N.A.T.O., the C.E.N.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O., or the Central and the South-East Asia Treaty Organizations, what is happening in Malaya, Formosa and Japan, and in the United Nations Headquarters in South Korea.

I will now give a short synopsis of my impressions, while avoiding indiscretions which might embarrass my hosts who welcomed me so warmly. The warmth of the welcome was due, I believe, partly to the anti-Communist reputation of Greece, possible, of course, largely because of the help we received from Great Britain and the United States of America after the war, and also because last year I was in some trouble through my outspoken support of the Tibetans in their struggle against annihilation by the Communist Chinese. Unfortunately, the more one sees the less one can talk. I hope that anything that I may have to cut out will not detract from the general interest of this talk. I made a film during the trip, showing the chiefs of States visited, street scenes and festivals, and the armies. When that film has been edited and is ready for showing, perhaps I could come here again in the autumn and show it to you.

### *Turkey*

Coming to the narrative of the trip I will start with the first country visited on the way out: Turkey. The tour in this case began in Smyrna or Izmir to which I flew in a Greek Air Force plane on January 7, 1960. Asia Minor is the classical land of the "Eternal Question," when the Greeks were under Persian rule. Today the area is peopled by Turks from the last Central Asian overflow, but they are allies now forming a bulwark against the next threatened wave!

I was probably the first member of my family to visit Turkey in this fashion since 1920-22, when the Greek Army, in which the Duke of Edinburgh's father, my uncle Andrew, was serving, was forced to re-embark after our defeat by the Turks in the Turkish War of Independence. However, I was everywhere on my visit well received by the Turkish authorities, who asked me to return as their guest. We came to an agreement that I would return in the spring.

While in Izmir I stayed with the American General Commanding Allied Land Forces S.E. Europe, at N.A.T.O. Headquarters. I was briefed as to the present situation there. I also visited the Allied Tactical Air Force, a branch of N.A.T.O. Air Force based on Naples, and I saw how Turks, Americans and Greeks are working harmoniously and effectively together for the common defensive purposes of that area. I realized as never before perhaps the vast strategic importance of the much larger Turkish territorial expanse in comparison with that of Greece. I went on to Istanbul and from there by B.O.A.C. to Teheran in Persia. But I returned in the spring, accepting the invitation by the Turkish Government to visit their country, so that on April 7 I was back in Istanbul.

I went to Ankara which I had not visited for twenty-three years, and found it much changed, in that from a small village it had become a capital. I was warmly welcomed and generously received by President C. Bayer, by the Foreign Minister, Fatin Zorlu, and the Turkish Army gave a demonstration. Altogether I was much impressed by what I saw. I took the opportunity to visit C.E.N.T.O. headquarters in Ankara, an organization covering the former Baghdad Pact and comprising Britain, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and with U.S.A. backing. I met the Secretary, Mr. Baig, who is a Pakistani, brother of the Indian Protocol chief in the Ministry of External Affairs. From Mr. Baig I heard of the political co-ordination of the powers in this organization and how they were not actually militarily co-ordinated but were going to promote that. Presumably since the last meeting in Teheran something better has been organized because the U.S.S.R. has protested against currently planned C.E.N.T.O. Air Force exercises in Persia.

Since the revolution in Irak it seems that the C.E.N.T.O. powers have enhanced their defensive organization in view of the threat not only from the north but also now from other directions. Regarding Irak, for instance, there seemed to be concern about the fact that an attempt was being made to create an independent Kurdistan in Sulemanieh under a certain Mollah Mustafa (he having returned there as a U.S.S.R. general after having been trained in the Soviet Union). The object of this is apparently to connect the Caucasus directly with Mesopotamia and so facilitate incursions by the U.S.S.R. I noted that the Afghan situation in the east was also giving rise to concern because there is strong Soviet penetration there. I regretted that I was not able to go on to Pakistan from Persia and expressed that regret to Mr. Baig, but having been to Pakistan many times previously I knew that country already.

After Ankara, I went on a goodwill tour to Anatolia with a Greek-Cypriot friend; we visited Kayseri and Konya on the Anatolian plateau and were much impressed by the fine roads; we saw silos and numerous sugar factories which seemed to be functioning very well indeed. A few years ago it would not have been possible to travel here in this way.

I spent Easter at the Patriarchate in Istanbul, and went on from the Dardanelles to Bodrun right along the coast of Asia Minor, where there are numerous interesting ancient classical ruins. There was, however, also much development taking place and having been received by the authorities in nearly every village I came to, I was most impressed by the keenness of the youthful *kaimakans*, the officers in charge of local administration.

Since I left Turkey, there has been some trouble, but, so far as I can learn, there have been only student demonstrations. The Government has promised that elections shall take place in the autumn. We wish our friend and ally every success because she is needed by our side. In fact, I gained the impression that we had gone back to the days of the Crimean War over one hundred years ago.

### *Persia*

The country I visited after my first tour of Turkey was Persia where



I was the guest of the Shah. I will satisfy your curiosity at once by saying that I met the new Empress immediately on my arrival and afterwards saw and chatted with her quite frequently; she is a most charming and composed young lady, nineteen years old. Until recently, she had been a student in Paris, but she seemed, nevertheless, to take to the big change very well indeed.

I found Teheran enormously developed, with two million inhabitants. All my personal friends there received me very well indeed. I definitely had the impression that the Persians are 100 per cent. on our side, but they are subject to a four-pronged attack: hostile propaganda over the radio from the banned Tudeh party abroad, and from Irak and Afghanistan. (In the latter case there may have been some improvement since Prime Minister Daoud Khan's recent visit to Teheran.) One of the most embarrassing things, however, was the proposal by the U.S.S.R. to the Persian Government to abandon its membership of C.E.N.T.O. and adopt a more neutral, Indian type of attitude which would enable Persia to be financed from both sides. As the Persians, like everyone else, are always in need of money, this was tempting, especially as the United States press was at the same time attacking the Persians for graft, backwardness, a feudal type of social order, etc. Such an attack, in my opinion, only makes things more difficult and weakens the alliance and our common front.

### *Thailand (Siam)*

From Teheran I flew in a direct seven-hour flight to Bangkok by B.O.A.C. Comet and, after having left freezing conditions on the Persian plateau, I was suddenly subjected to a temperature of 106°F., with many mosquitos around. I stayed at the Danish Embassy with the Ambassador and the Ambassadors who are old friends of mine, and, because of the special relations between the Danish Royal Family and the Thailand Royal Family, the King received me at once and told me about his coming trip to Europe this summer. I saw Prince Dhani, Prince Prem and other members of the Royal Family; all very charming and easy-going. The chief change was in the present government of General Sarit Tanarat which is certainly most austere. Having been known previously as a jolly individual, the General has suddenly become extremely ascetic and has put a ban on a large part of the night-life of Bangkok; dogs have been exterminated; there are no trishaws any longer in the streets, and he is filling in the canals (the klongs). The public ascribe this to the Prime Minister's Buddhist preoccupation; he is ill, they say, and fears he may die shortly. Nevertheless, the city has changed a lot for the better.

I visited Chiangmai in the north of Thailand to find an opium war on. And then Prince Dhani asked me if I would lecture to the Siam Society on Tibet, so I stopped off on my return journey in March and addressed a very sympathetic audience which took great interest in Tibetan affairs. I heard that the Siamese found it difficult to invite the Dalai Lama to Bangkok because they felt that might embarrass India; in spite of not approving Indian's neutral policy, they obviously do not want to offend the Indian Government.

Whilst in Bangkok, I visited the headquarters of S.E.A.T.O., which

is made up of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan and Thailand. I met the Secretary General of that organization, Mr. P. Sarasin, a former Thailand Prime Minister, from whom I heard all about the organization of S.E.A.T.O. and the military exercises which have taken place in recent years; how protection can be extended, if called for, to both Laos and Cambodia. I was able to film the Thai Army which I found to be entirely United States equipped.

My impression of Thailand was that the country is too far away from the Communists really to worry. They certainly seem to be solidly on the side of the West, possibly because they have never been colonized by the Western powers. The  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million Chinese who live in Thailand are considered to be loyal to the Thais.

### *Malaya*

I flew down from Bangkok in March, or rather at the beginning of April, and found Singapore, my first port of call, much cooler than Bangkok. I was glad to visit the Malay Federation because of the Emergency which had existed over the last few years and which seemed to be similar in its origins to the Greek Communist movement. I went to Johore and to Kuala Lumpur. I filmed the 1st Royal Malay Regiment which was in action fighting the CTs (an English abbreviation for "Communist Terrorists"). They had killed thirty-two CTs out of thirty-eight. Some of the Gurkha regiments seemed to be unemployed, possibly because the total number of 12,000 CTs has been reduced to 700, and the Emergency is at an end, all the leaders having been killed.

I visited plantations, mainly palm and rubber, and found work going forward again, in a peaceful and productive fashion. My impression was that Malaya is an orderly country, progressive and modern, under constitutional reorganization. The three races, Indian, Chinese, Indonesian or Malay seem to be living most harmoniously together, and they appear to have a good future ahead of them. Of course, the Malays are even further away from Communist influence than the Thais, but there is a large Chinese colony in Singapore. The present Prime Minister Lee is, however, acting in a satisfactory, moderate fashion.

### *Hong Kong*

Going east I stepped off in Hong Kong, my third visit to the colony, to which I always take pleasure in going on the way out or on returning. I stayed with a Chinese friend. I cannot say that Hong Kong is in the Containment Front of Asia because the defences of Hong Kong have, I believe, been abandoned. I found that Hong Kong had considerably changed since I was last there. Certainly the colony is no longer a British trading outpost, in fact one has the impression that it is a place where the Chinese Communists make the foreign exchange they need. Some of my Chinese friends seemed uneasy but I could not ascertain the reason for this. Many refugees are still coming in, mainly from Macao. The place is overcrowded; there is less water than ever, it being available everyday only from 4 to 8 p.m. New industries have been created and are absorbing a

certain number of refugees, but they are having trouble with foreign markets. Anyhow, the Chinese Communists seem to be determined to leave Hong Kong alone because they need it. The "forbidden city" which is part of Kowloon, a piece of land which really belongs to China, was entered while I was there and cleaned up by the Hong Kong police. Also a number of Chinese agitators were deported to Communist China, but there was no reaction by the Chinese Communists. What they are doing on the other hand is to build large reservoirs for fresh water behind Hong Kong and Macao, with the intention of selling the fresh water to the two colonies and thereby having a means of putting pressure on them when the need arises: if they don't do what is required of them, their water will be cut off. It is a plan for blackmail on a large scale.

### *Formosa (Taiwan)*

From Hong Kong I went on to Taiwan, and I went there by invitation of Chiang Kai-shek's Government. I arrived in the middle of February. This visit was one of the main objects of my trip because I was a military officer in Chungking in 1945, attached to Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters. I had a great reception on arrival and a full programme had been arranged. The programme consisted of three parts: Seeing old friends, the military part of the programme, and visits to civilian establishments, to which one should perhaps add Tibetan discussions. These latter discussions took place shortly after my arrival in a forum lasting for five hours between myself and about a hundred Chinese experts plus a Tibetan delegation which had gone to Formosa. We exchanged information and I also learned that the Government had invited the Dalai Lama to come to Formosa but had not received a reply.

The old friends I again saw included the Generalissimo or the President; Chen Cheng, the Vice-President and Prime Minister; Ho Yin-shin, who used to be Commander-in-Chief when I was in China before; also Dr. Hu-shö, President of the *Academia Sinica*, and many others. I found the Generalissimo very bright indeed in spite of his seventy-two years. I had a long conversation with him and he questioned me at length about Yugoslavia, asking me which side I thought that country would eventually be on. It was interesting to find that people so far away took an interest in a country such as Yugoslavia. It is an indication of how international things are becoming.

The military programme included a visit to Quemoy or Kinmen island, as it is also called sometimes. I went by air on a non-shelling day. The Chinese Communists and the Nationalist Government only shell each other on odd dates. I saw dug-outs on the island which are most elaborate and costly; in fact the military live in luxury underground. I received a briefing from the Chinese Army (which was more extraordinary than the briefing I received in Smyrna) with the enemy very close. The island is tightly fitted into the coast with Chinese-Communist troops all around. Nevertheless, I had the impression that the position was impregnable, despite the large "Chincom" (an American abbreviation this time for "Chinese Communists") concentration on the coast opposite. I have seen that there are today 400,000 men and 250 new jet bombers grouped oppo-

site Kinmen. The Chinese Nationalist Air Force is probably one of the best in the Far East. The day I was there there was an air fight and a Communist M.I.G. was shot down by the Nationalists. The United States has given Formosa some new fighters because of the concentration of Chinese Communist forces opposite Kinmen. There are 45,000 inhabitants living on Kinmen, and they do not seem to worry about the state of war. I spoke to an Italian Catholic padre who had been three years imprisoned and tortured by the Chinese Communists. He had come back to run a church on the island, which church had already been hit three or four times on shelling days. He said nevertheless, that it was paradise compared with the three years he had spent in a Communist jail.

I went down to the southern tip of the island to visit Kaohsiung where there is an Air Force school and a big naval base. There I was given lunch by the Top Brass of the Navy and shown some of the sailors who paraded for me. I was given a naval briefing and shown a war game; I was taken aboard a destroyer and asked to review the cadets; I saw a marine display and finally witnessed an exercise with live ammunition. It was all very impressive. The troops were very fit, well-trained, and their morale was high. I was told that there are 650,000 armed men on Formosa, costing, in 1959, three billion dollars. I wondered for what purpose all these men were armed and asked for the reason. They told me that they were needed for defence, because the Communists on the mainland have a militia of 100,000,000 soldiers. This may be an explanation, but in spite of it, I saw all over the country slogans such as these posted up: "We must return to the mainland" "Quemoy and Matsu are the eyes and ears of Free China and must never be given up."

On my visit to civilian establishments in Formosa, I saw the land reform scheme which was fostered by Premier Chen Cheng himself. As a result they are producing three rice crops a year which makes the island self-sufficient in food; they also produce cane sugar which is exported to neighbouring eastern countries. I visited a large dam for which a Greek engineer was responsible; the Kaohsiung oil refinery, into which oil is imported from the Persian Gulf and then carried through pipes all over Formosa. I visited five factories in one morning and saw the new harbour works at Kaohsiung, which will eventually give it very extended port facilities.

My general impression was that there was a great difference between the Chinese Government which I had known on the mainland during the war and the one that is now on Formosa. I had the feeling that since they had come to Formosa all the good people had stayed and all the bad ones had left. The present Nationalist Government is certainly carrying on with the liberal principles of the Sun Yat-sen revolution, and they describe their Communist opposites as "leftist reactionaries" against the revolution and as "U.S.S.R. puppets." I believe that propaganda has some effect on the Chinese. Fourteen thousand Chinese "volunteers," prisoners from the war in Korea, are now happily settled in Formosa. In fact, I felt that China is divided today just like Korea, Viet-Nam, Germany, even India and Kashmir, the division being along ideological lines irrespective of the geographical and demographical aspects. I remind you that things

in China do last for a very long time, and therefore this situation can continue for many years. After all, there were partisans of the Ming dynasty in Yunnan right up to the beginning of World War II, in 1939!

The United States are supporting Formosa because since the attack on North Korea in 1950 they have become involved and it is a necessity for them to do what they are doing; they cannot get out of it now. But for the Korean war, it is possible that the United States would have abandoned Formosa. The Seventh Fleet patrols the straits between Formosa and the mainland and their presence there is felt quite distinctly.

### *Japan*

I flew on to Japan; it was my second visit there. I stayed with a British friend in Tokyo. When I landed at the airport, I learned that the Crown Princess had given birth to a son and that there had been an earthquake at the same time. I was told that that was a good omen for my visit. Shortly after my arrival I was received by the Emperor and Empress. I had lunch with the Crown Prince. I certainly enjoyed Tokyo and was able to relax after the strenuous days of my visits on the way to Japan. Many changes were everywhere apparent: for instance, the greater number of cars on the streets and the fact that the Japanese are now producing high-quality goods—transistor radios were thus an outstanding feature among other things on sale in the shops. I heard, too, that the Italian Government have acquired a Japanese fishing fleet, because they have found it difficult to supply as much tunny fish to the United States as their quota entitles them to. They have taken on a Japanese fleet which is fishing for them now in the Atlantic and delivering the fish to Italian ports where it is canned and sold to the U.S.A.

When I was in Japan, discussions were taking place in the Diet, regarding the proposed Mutual Defence Treaty with the U.S.A., and there was much opposition to it. Some appeared uneasy about this and said that there was a strong Communist element at work in the country, mainly to be found among trade unionists and the educated classes, but actually the figures show that the Communists have lost ground during the last few years. The fact is that anti-militarism is the fashion of the day and that there is a desire to restore relations with China so that trading can once again be carried on with the Chinese mainland. In my opinion, if there should be a swing of any kind towards extremes, it will be to Nationalism again and not to the Left, simply because Communism is too much identified with the U.S.S.R. in Japan and nobody wants it for that reason.

I visited the Prime Minister, Mr. N. Kishi, and talked of the possibilities of Greek trade with him. The Greek shipowners have lately built a considerable amount of ships, mainly tankers, in Japan. I visited the country, and went to Nikko and Ise, respectively the tombs of the *shoguns* and the shrine of the Sun Goddess from which the Japanese imperial dynasty descends. I went to Hiroshima, one of the two cities in the world, with Nagasaki, which has already been hit by an atom bomb. The town has been rebuilt on an American plan. I went to the hospital and saw some of the 300 patients there still suffering from radiation and burns, and I saw the depressing museum. The general impression was that the

monuments which have been put up are puny compared with what took place at Hiroshima. The most unpleasant impression, however, was at 9 o'clock at night when I suddenly heard the bells of an electric chime ringing out "Onward Christian Soldiers" all over the town. I asked the hotel clerk what it was and he said it was the gift of an American Methodist minister who wanted to atone for what the Americans had done to Hiroshima. I left feeling somewhat grim.

### *Korea*

I went on to South Korea, invited by the President, Dr. Syngman Rhee. Although I tried to make it a private visit, because of this invitation, it eventually turned into a semi-official State visit. I was given a colossal reception at the Seoul airport, where representatives of the Korean Government met me, also Americans, Scandinavians, even the British Ambassador whom I had known in India in 1938 when he was the Commissioner of Delhi. The Apostolic Delegate also came to greet me; he said times were such that all Christians should stick together. The Koreans and Americans had a programme ready for me, as also had the Scandinavians.

The American Commander at U.N.O. headquarters received me and made me review some of the contingents under his orders, one being a small contingent of the British Commonwealth, made up of British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand troops. Of all the other foreign contingents which took part in the war the only large force, apart from the Americans, is that of the Turks who have a whole division still left in Korea. It was arranged that I make a visit to them as part of the American programme and at my request. I went there the next day in the rain and it was very cold. The Turkish General briefed me on his position and on his participation at the front. I saw some of the Turkish units, soldiers paraded for me, and I was taken round to the villages where I noted, with interest, that many signs on shop windows were in Turkish. When I asked whether the people spoke Turkish then, I was told "Yes, especially the women." I understand that the Koreans learn the language easily because theirs is an Altai-Ural language. In fact, there was always a small Turkish colony in Seoul, and Korea can be looked upon as the furthest outpost east of the Turkish-speaking people; the furthest west is that of the Ottomans in Europe.

I had dinner with the American Commander and met all the American generals, and next day they flew me in an American helicopter to what they call the *D.M.Z.* ("Dee Em Zed," another American abbreviation for "Demilitarized Zone"). There I found an armistice line five miles wide with a tape down the middle of it from coast to coast, so that there are  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles on either side belonging to each of the opponents (these are allowed to patrol their half of the *D.M.Z.* with soldiers equipped only with a rifle and a wireless set). Once a month the two sides meet at Panmunjon, a Chinese General representing the Chinese "volunteers" and a North Korean General the North Koreans on the one side, and, on the other side, the United Nations Command, that is the American General with the Allied Liaison Officers. Separating the two is the United Nations Neutral

Commission made up of a Swedish admiral, a Swiss, a Pole and a Czech. The two sides cannot speak directly to each other; they have to speak through the Commission, in other words through its intermediary.

I heard that the Chinese General representing the "volunteers" had been away for some months and his return coincided with the visit to Peking of Mr. Khrushchev on his way back from the United States. Some people seemed to connect these two events, but the official explanation was that the General's wife was expecting a baby and he returned after the baby was born. I found the *D.M.Z.* ("Dee Em Zed") very desolate. On the mountain opposite the Observation Post there was an inscription in Chinese characters which said: "Yankee go home." The Allied Forces do not take the North Koreans very seriously, although they do the Chinese armies and the U.S.S.R. Army Corps massed north of the Yalu river. I heard that there are 600,000 Soviet citizens in Manchuria; 100,000 in Dairen—Port Arthur; 23,000 in Chiamuz, Mutankiang and at the Chingpo lake dam in the east; 90,000 in north-west Manchuria. Thus, North Korea is, to all practical purposes, the real dividing line between the two adversaries.

I went on to see the United States divisions and the special regiments. I also went to one of the Korean divisions, a ROK division in a dug-out where I was briefed again about the situation. I was told that the troops were on a 30-minute alert and it was obvious that this Army was very efficient, well-trained, and enjoyed a high morale. The Korean Generals were all under forty years of age, very keen and good at training their soldiers. There are 600,000 Korean troops in the South, the cost of their upkeep being considerable. What their future is I cannot say, especially when the position is as tense as it is. I finished by seeing the battlefields where the Greeks fought in the last war.

The Korean programme included dinner with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a visit to the Defence Ministry where I met the Minister, General Kim Chung Yul, a former Japanese pilot who shot down a number of American 'planes during the war and for this reason is extremely popular with the Americans. I went to a dinner at Korea House where I met the greater part of the South Korean rulers and sat next to Mrs. Lee Ki Poong, the wife of the Vice-President, who died, with her, as you know, during recent troubles. Then I visited Dr. Synghman Rhee. It was just about his eighty-fifth birthday and he seemed very old. He told me that he did not know whether he was eighty-seven or seventy-eight; he did not know which way the figures went, he said. He stressed the Greek contribution to the struggle against Communism, and asked if he could not do as we had done in Greece: attack the North, get rid of the Communists throughout his country and put up an Iron Curtain along the Yalu river. His point was that Korea has not signed the armistice. I answered that if he did what he had asked me, he would be as bad as the North Koreans who attacked the South without provocation. He insisted, however, that he would like to attack the North and would do it one day; he said that every month he wrote to President Eisenhower asking him for permission to do this. I had the impression of an intensely patriotic, stubborn old man, used as a kind of national emblem by others. There has, as you

know, been trouble since I left. Dr. Syngman Rhee's adopted son shot his real father and mother, his brother and then himself. I think the trouble was caused by youth resenting that old men have been so long in control of the Government and are still hanging on, because Dr. Syngman Rhee had been head of the Free Korean Government since he was in Shanghai in 1920, which is a very long time.

I returned to Japan on March 21 feeling I had reached the end of the Front and that the journey had been well worth while. Korea is an all-important axis in the Far East, around which turn the affairs of China, the U.S.S.R. and Japan, and now of the U.S.A., and of its Western and Asian Allies in the Far East.

In conclusion, I should like to say that my narrative may have appeared somewhat sweeping at times, in view of the briefness of my visits to the various countries. But you must remember that I saw most of the top people in each area, and I had been previously in most of the countries visited. My knowledge of them helped me to judge better what was taking place now. Also what I have said may seem biased by my "Eternal Question" theory. I agree that this is so, but the object of my study was just exactly to see how this famous question was faring. It is, I think, one of the principal aspects of the present international situation; there are other aspects, of course, such as sitting on the fence, trying appeasement, not excluding, if possible, of course, coming to terms, as was attempted at the recent Summit meeting, now so tragically disrupted.

I found the Containment Front in Asia most impressive, especially the United States effort in the Far East and the progress they have made in understanding Far Eastern problems. Although the emphasis is mainly military, the political and economic aspects are being developed. The weakness of the Front is the high cost of its upkeep by the U.S.A. and possibly the excessive American preoccupation with democracy, because American press articles perpetually attack the various existing social orders and accuse them of being feudal. That only ends in weakening the Front. After all, our Allies have eyes of a different shape and skin of a different colour, but we do not try to change that. Why cannot we do the same in regard to their political systems, provided, of course, that they are not pro-Soviet? One of the main reasons for the friendly attitude of these people towards us is that they fear the U.S.S.R. and are very anti-Soviet, not that they particularly treasure liberalism and democracy.

Gaps at the Front are Laos and Cambodia but, as I have said, S.E.A.T.O. protection is available to them if needed. I regret I was not able to visit South Vietnam, but I have been there, too, before. I believe, however, the main gap to be India because of its neutrality, benevolent to the other side. I know the Indians prefer to call it "non-alignment" because they say that there is no war on. But "neutrality" is a better term, I think, because there is, after all, a Cold War on. Many of our Asian Allies seem sure that Indian neutrality favours the Communist bloc. Some to whom I spoke feared that many things were passed on to the Communists by India, especially intelligence, and for this reason there is considerable distrust of the Indians. The Communists certainly know these gaps in the



Front and, as you have seen by recent events, it is just for those points that they have been going.

I was astounded when I realized that it was possible to visit the entire Front so quickly by B.O.A.C. jet 'planes. It is somewhat frightening to realize how closer international tensions are now, tied up as they are with national, traditional, historical and cultural trends, with over-population in the Far East and, paradoxically, with the immense material progress which has taken place in these countries. I felt at times that it was unnatural that there should be no armed conflict, but, then, nobody wants an atomic war. Thus the dilemma continues.

It seems to me that there must be a way out through moderation and through reason. The greatest obstacle, of course, is the other side's persistence and intolerance in wanting to impose its avowed purpose of World Revolution on all of us. As long as this continues it seems there is only one alternative: to hope for the best and prepare for the worst even at the risk of nuclear conflict. This is precisely what I saw the West and its Asian Allies doing all around Central Asia, all along the Containment Front from Turkey to Korea.

The CHAIRMAN: I feel sure all present would like to ask questions upon the lecture but we have really had something better; we have heard from His Royal Highness a lecture which has taken us up to the close of our time in this room. Hence all I have to do now is to express your appreciation to Prince Peter for coming here today and to say how much we have enjoyed his lecture, what food for thought it has given us and how lucky we are to have had the opportunity of having a cross-section of this important area dealt with not in a superficial way but against a background of great knowledge. (*Applause.*)

## CORRESPONDENCE

DEAR SIR,

Mr. Calver's letter, printed in the April *Journal*, raises interesting points, two of which can have an immediate reply.

Evening meetings were quite common and successful in 1957, but as they were mainly film shows, they were not reported in the *Journal*. There was one well-attended evening meeting in March this year, and there is to be another in August. It is hoped to have them more frequently later.

The activities abroad are at the discretion of the local Honorary Secretaries and the Society must leave it to their assessment of local conditions as to whether meetings and other activities would be welcomed.

Yours truly,

(sgd.) JOHN COOK,

*Hon. Secretary.*

May 14, 1960.

## REVIEWS

**Light from the Ancient Past. The Archeological Background of Judaism and Christianity.** By Jack Finegan. Second Edition. Princeton University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1960. Pp. xxxvii + 638. 6 maps. 204 plates. 4 plans. Price in U.K. 63s.

The first edition of Professor Finegan's book, which appeared in 1946, bore the sub-title "The Archeological Background of the Hebrew-Christian Religion." Some reviewers curiously misunderstood the meaning of "Hebrew-Christian"; perhaps it was to prevent more misunderstanding of this kind that the wording of the sub-title has been slightly altered in this new edition.

The new edition represents a considerable expansion of the former one; the work has been increased by about 140 pages, in which more recent excavations and archaeological studies are taken account of. Among the new items included in this edition we notice the Lipitisttar and Eshnunna law-codes, the excavations at Jericho, Hazor and Gibeon, the Brooklyn Museum papyri, and the Dead Sea Scrolls.

About half of the book is devoted to the archaeological background of the Old Testament; the second half deals with the archaeological background of the New Testament and the early Christian centuries. The whole work is a comprehensive and up-to-date introduction to biblical archaeology, and is to be heartily commended to all who are interested in the subject.

In the new section on the Dead Sea Scrolls, Professor Finegan regards as probable the identification of the Qumran community with an Essene group, or at least a group related to the Essene movement, but he adds: "While the Essenes were also to be found in other places in Palestine, the relatively elaborate character of the main building at Qumran and the extent of the library even make it possible to suppose that at the time this was a headquarters for the entire movement" (p. 282).

A specially welcome feature of the second edition is an appendix of 46 pages on "The Principles of the Calendar and the Problems of Biblical Chronology," which pays attention to such new material as D. J. Wiseman's *Chronicles of Chaldean Kings* and the evidence for the Qumran calendar with the work done on it by A. Jaubert and others.

F. F. BRUCE.

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**La Peninsule Arabique.** Terre Sainte de l'Islam, Patrie de l'Arabisme et Empire du Pétrole. By Jean-Jacques Berreby. Preface by Pierre Rondot, Directeur du Centre de Hautes Etudes d'Administration Musulmane. 4 maps. Bibliography. Appendix. Pp. 270. Bibliothèque Historique. Payot, 106 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris. 1958. 1,200 Fr.

**Le Golfe Persique.** Mer de Légende—Réservoir de Pétrole by Jean-Jacques Berreby. Preface by Jacques Vernant, Secrétaire Général du Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, etc. Pp. 228. Bibliography. 4 maps. 11 photographs. 4 appendices. Bibliothèque Historique. Payot, 106 Boulevard Saint-Germain, Paris, 1959. 1,700 Fr.

M. Berreby has, for some years now, devoted himself to the study of political, social and economic problems of the Arab world. He is well qualified therefore to write these two excellent companion volumes on the Arabian Peninsula. Both are excellent in concept and written with a penetrating passion so familiar to those who have read much of his previous material. The two volumes form an adequate handbook of the peninsula with particular emphasis on recent political and petroleum developments. They well deserve translation into English.

ERIC MACRO.

**The Union of Burma.** By Hugh Tinker (Second Edition, 1959). Published for Chatham House by Oxford University Press. Pp. 424. Bibliography. Map. Index. 42s.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs have issued a new edition of Dr. Tinker's work (first published in 1957), on Burma since the attainment of independence. A number of passages in the original edition have been revised and brought up to date: the principal alterations are an addition to Chapter II, carrying the picture of the Communist rebellion up to October, 1958: a new passage at the end of Chapter III, covering political developments in the period from 1956 to October, 1958; a short addition to Chapter IV, on economic policy; and a brief reference at the end of Chapter XIII to the split in the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League and its effects. In general, the story of Burma since independence is thus extended to the point at which, in October, 1958, U Nu made way for General Ne Win as Premier. The value of Dr. Tinker's study of independent Burma is well known: this careful and sympathetic examination of the problems which the country has had to face, and of the measures taken to cope with them, has already established itself as the basic work on this subject: the new edition should be on the book shelves of everyone interested in Asian affairs.

B. R. P.

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**Buddhism in Chinese History.** By Arthur F. Wright. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California. London: Oxford University Press. Pp. 144. 8 illus. Index. 25s.

This book gives an account of Buddhism in China from the time of its earliest appearance in the country to the time when it no longer had serious influence on China's religious and political development. This was roughly a period of a thousand years.

Its author, Mr. Arthur F. Wright, is one of five editors of "Stanford Studies in the Civilizations of Eastern Asia." The quality of the combination may be gathered from the fact that one of his colleagues is Sir George Sansom formerly of the British Foreign Service, who had a distinguished career in the Consular Service in Japan and is the author of "A Short Cultural History of Japan."

Mr. Wright's book, in effect, reproduces six lectures given by him at the University of Chicago under "the joint sponsorship of the Department of Anthropology and the Federated Theological Faculty." It is intended as "a report on work done in a relatively neglected field of study . . . Such a report has been made possible by the rapid advance of modern scholarship in the fields of Chinese and Buddhist studies . . . In the hands of pioneering scholars, the study of Chinese Buddhism has emerged from the limbo of pious exegesis to become an integral part of the study of Chinese civilization in its historic growth."

No excuse is needed for quoting these extracts from Mr. Wright's Preface to his book for the book fully justifies his claim. It not only fills in detail to the outline of the course of development of Buddhism in China to which Dr. Soothill limited himself in his book "The Three Religions of China" published in 1923 when he was Professor of Chinese at Oxford, and adds to the illuminating sketch by Mr. E. R. Hughes, sometime Reader in Chinese Religion and Philosophy in the University of Oxford, and his wife in their "Religion in China," published rather more than twenty years later, but it also gives us a scholarly and reasoned account of the influence of Buddhism in the Chinese political and cultural fields.

There is evidence of Buddhism as "an accepted part of the life of Chang-an, the Han capital, about A.D. 130." But the process of interpreting it to China was a long and arduous one: influence on Chinese thought took time by what Mr. Wright calls the "slow complex interweaving of Chinese and Indian elements in the steadily changing context of an evolving Chinese society." The author takes us along with him in a clear and penetrating analysis of the interaction of Buddhism and Taoism, which was not at first unresponsive to the invading thought, on the one hand, and the hostility of the Confucianists, on the other.

The parallel development of Buddhism, with its differences, in the old China,

which is identified today with the North China plain and the valley of the Yellow River, and the new empire begun to be built up in the Yangtse Valley by the dispossessed Tsin Dynasty and their adherents early in the fourth century, is convincingly described. It becomes clear that while Buddhism had its ups and downs, remarkable use was made of it in the statecraft of those early centuries. This became especially pronounced at the end of the sixth century when the Sui Dynasty in the north succeeded in A.D. 589 in reuniting China. Though the dynasty was credited with no mean achievements, it was a comparatively short-lived triumph. In just under 30 years the Tang Dynasty arose, destined to write a splendid page in Chinese history. Some historians indeed have compared its literary distinction to that of the Augustan Age.

Mr. Wright's book is a fascinating study which clarifies and throws much light on the evolution of the centuries, which might perhaps be called the Middle Age of China, when elements in the great empire as the West first knew it were being forged.

In place of a bibliography Mr. Wright gives a series of valuable notes on "a selection of further readings." But he will forgive those who owed much to Dr. Soothill's "Student's Four Thousand Character Dictionary" or had the privilege of knowing him, if they find it difficult to believe that any work of his in the Chinese field could be of doubtful value. "The Lotus of the Wonderful Law" may be "partially translated from the Chinese version" for the purposes of the book, but "imperfectly" some would take the liberty to doubt.

P. H. B. KENT.

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**The Purple Barrier.** By Peter Lum. Published by Robert Hale, 1959. Bibliography. Index. 21s.

The phenomenon of the Great Wall of China has been explained and described with considerable skill by the author. She has interwoven the history of China so well with its construction that one acquires, in a most palatable way, a knowledge of the Celestial Empire in the reading of it.

The wall was originally constructed to keep out the "barbarians" from the Middle Kingdom, the only really civilized portion of the globe.

In the preface the author points out that one cannot write about the Great Wall without being swept "into the long and complicated stream of Chinese History" and it is fortunate for the reader that this is so. It is curious that Marco Polo makes no mention of the Great Wall, even though he must have crossed it. Some would infer that this omission is evidence that Marco Polo never got to China at all, but in view of the mass of evidence that he did, I prefer to think that some of his manuscript may have gone astray. The wall from Shan Hai Kwan on the sea coast to the last desert fortress of Chia Yu Kwan in Central Asia traverses eighteen provinces. No hill nor dale prevents its progress. Mr. Barrow, a member of the Macartney mission in 1793 calculated that the amount of material used in its building was greater than the total amount of masonry which had gone to the building of all the houses in England and Scotland. Beside these figures the Maginot Line seems like a row of insignificant ant heaps.

A romantic sight is to look at the Great Wall at the seashore at Shan Hai Kwan and to realize that for two thousand miles this wall thrusts, and creeps and crawls across China, to the westernmost point at Chia Yu Kwan. Here the traveller says good-bye to the wall and starts his journey on the Silk Road, perhaps to end in Rome.

The poet expresses this sad parting moment in the following words:

"When I leave thy gates, O Chia Yu Kwan,  
My tears will never cease to run . . ."

It was customary to throw a pebble against the outer side of the wall—if the pebble rebounded towards the thrower he was to return safely. One may compare the piles of stones (Obis) left in the Himalayan passes, though these stones are more in the nature of a thanksgiving for having safely negotiated the pass.

History states that the wall was begun by the Emperor Ch'in Shih Huang Ti in the third century B.C. and completed in twenty years. One may, however, conclude

that the building took very much longer, possibly hundreds of years longer, down to the Ming Dynasty in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It is quite possible that protective walls were in existence long before the Great Wall and perhaps they existed in the Shang Dynasty, 1500-1028 B.C.

This propensity to wall one's self in, points to the Chinese characteristic of intro- rather than extroversion. Houses and compounds have walls, cities have walls, and finally countries, to keep the unwelcome guest or stranger, or enemy, away.

Facts and fables are interwoven in this Great Wall's history. At least a million men were employed in its construction, and not all of them of the coolie class. Criminals, political offenders, rebellious students were sent to the Wall to end their days, as in Russia the misfit was "sent to Siberia to the Salt Mines." Many left their bones as part of the structure of the wall. The author aptly calls it the "longest cemetery in the world." Those behind with their work were thrown into the section of the wall they were building, and there buried alive. Many were the sad stories of wives and maidens visiting their menfolk and finally committing suicide on finding that their beloved ones had already passed on.

The recipe for the mortar used in cementing the bricks together has been lost, but it is believed to this day that this "Magic Mortar" had wonderful curative properties particularly when "pulverized and mashed together with the body of an unborn mouse"!

The Ming Dynasty came to an end with the suicide of Ch'ung Cheng at the foot of the Coal Hill. He was succeeded by Li Tzu Ch'eng who entered the city of Peking in 1644, his frontier being guarded by Wu San Kwei, remembered in history by his great romance with Ch'en Yuen Yuen, known as the Round-faced Beauty, at one time one of the concubines of Li Tzu Ch'eng. It is possible that she was used as a lure for Wu San Kwei, but it is probable that Li himself was captivated by her beauty, which seems to have been of a very high order. After an engagement near Shan Hai Kwan, Li was defeated and escaped into Shensi leaving the Round-faced Beauty on the bank of a river he had just crossed, there to be reunited with Wu. This romantic story seems to have completed itself by the Beauty entering a convent as she felt herself contaminated by her contact with Li.

From the beginning of the Manchu rule there was a certain diminution in importance of the military value of the Great Wall though in early Manchu days cannon were cast, with foreign assistance, and installed at certain points. Solar observations were carried out by the Jesuits from the wall and the same body mapped the entire length, and produced a document fifteen feet long which showed every gate, watch-tower and outer fortification.

There the Great Wall remains, a lure for tourists, haunted by the ghosts of thousands of dead. Soldiers, workers and rebellious politicians. A monumental example of Chinese history, epitomized by the poet who stood on the highest tower near Nankou and found himself so near heaven that he climbed the rest of the way on a moonbeam. Can it be that this poet looked down from heaven and was the originator of the theory that the Great Wall is the only man-made monument that is visible from the moon.

The maps and illustrations are all worthy of praise and the whole volume well deserves a permanent place in the library of any sinologue.

H. St. C. S.

P.S.—It is perhaps of interest to note that a large part of this book was read and reviewed in the front seat of the nose of a Shackleton aircraft flying between Gan in the Maldiv Islands and Ceylon passing over the smooth and oily waters surrounding the coral atolls and over the Indian Ocean, an interesting contrast with the rough and stern country of the Great Wall.

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**China in the Morning.** By Nicholas Wollaston. Jonathan Cape. 1960. Pp. 208. Illus. 25s.

This does not pretend to be an exhaustive tome on China and its problems today, but is a readable description of the author's travels in that controversial country. He succeeded in seeing a great deal of the "inside" of the country. He

saw the industrial side of Manchuria and a lot of the less travelled provinces like Szechuan and Yunnan. He frankly informs the reader that when he first entered China it all seemed simple and easy to write about, but gradually the picture became more complicated. How right he is—the longer one lives in China the less inclined one is to generalize, or even to come to any conclusions. He agrees with most writers on China today that the most scrupulous honesty is evident everywhere in *small things*. He also acknowledges the appalling dishonesty of so many big things, "vicious lies, outrageous claims and unreasonable decisions to obstruct plans." As in other Communist countries the figurehead is idolized—China has not yet reached "De-Stalinisation." He feels that a meeting between Wollaston and Field Marshal Montgomery would be an interesting one.

The book is mis-titled because nearly half is devoted to the author's travels in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia on which your reviewer does not feel qualified to dwell.

The illustrations—photographed by the author—are beyond praise and really convey the spirit and ambience of the countries described.

H. St. C. S.

**Impatient Giant.—Red China Today.** By Gerald Clark. W. H. Allen. Pp. 224. Indexed. 21s.

Mr. Clark is a newspaper correspondent who was fortunate enough to have a longish sojourn in China during 1958, the year of the backyard furnaces. In the manner of newspaper men the world over, he writes a book about it, and it is good that it should be so. He was allowed to visit the same places as other visitors, to see the same communes, the Peking prison, the Ming Tombs reservoir. But whilst the basic facts are the same for all to see, each observer has a different mind and treats what he saw from a different angle. It is these variations in perspective which are so valuable in building up for the reader the true proportions of the picture of China today.

Mr. Clark is greatly impressed by the material achievements of the people of China, and contributes a thoughtful analysis of the tactics employed by the Party rulers in controlling and directing this vast store of energy and of the effect on the workers themselves. Whilst recognizing the organizational efficiency of the commune rule, he feels that this experiment in persuasion is likely to prove the most successful example in human history of conformism and mass brain-washing. He questioned Chang Hsi Cho about this compulsion to work and to conform. Chang replied "You can force some of the people some of the time, but not a whole nation all of the time."

Of the communes, he says, that it is the spiritual angle that is both fascinating and disturbing. They are cultivating an anonymous, "personalityless" society, producing children for a mass experiment in obedience and Marxist inoculation.

There is a delightful touch in the account of the anti-sparrow campaign in Peking and of how our Embassy there gave diplomatic immunity to millions of weary Chinese birds which descended on their trees to rest.

Mr. Clark's admiration for the physical achievements of China is contrasted with his abhorrence of the restraints on the soul of man. But as a country to be reckoned with, he considers that it should be recognized diplomatically by the Western Powers and admitted to the United Nations.

H. J. C.

**The Muslim Architecture of Egypt.** By K. A. C. Creswell. II. Ayyūbids and Early Bahrite Mamlūks, A.D. 1171-1326. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1959. 18" × 13". Pp. xxiv + 300 + pls. 126 (+ 151 text illustrations). £25.

Among books on the history of art, few have ever been conceived on the vast scale of Professor K. A. C. Creswell's work on Muslim Architecture; fewer still of such magnitude have been the product of a single scholar, and there can be no exaggeration in applying that overworked adjective "unique" to the contribution made by Creswell to architectural history. The present volume is the fourth of his

classic study, which began with the two volumes of *Early Muslim Architecture*, published in 1932-1940 (revised as *A Short Account of Early Muslim Architecture*, 1958), and was continued (1952) by the first part of *The Muslim Architecture of Egypt*, covering A.D. 939-1171, reviewed in these columns in the issue for January, 1954 (vol. XLI, pp. 67-8). From that review it is pertinent to quote, as equally applicable to the present sequel, the description of the method adopted: "Every known monument of the period is described in meticulous detail, provided with plans (and often elevations and sections) to uniform scales, and sumptuously illustrated by magnificent collotype plates, mostly from the author's own photographs. The date of each building is discussed in detail, together with all former references to its architectural history, and in each case there is a full bibliography chronologically arranged. Here is an exemplar of clarity and perfected method."

This is a further massive instalment, covering 156 years, of this architectural history of Muslim Egypt, produced not by the usual method of "lucky dips" and reading of a cross-section of the antecedent literature, but by personal survey of every monument, coupled with comparative and chronological study of all the forms of structural and ornamental detail. Documentation is not overlooked, for all the known historical references are listed, and many quoted *in extenso*, while surviving or recorded inscriptions are summarized. The result is to provide, in addition to a history, an authoritative inventory comparable only with the work of such official bodies as our own Royal Commissions on Historical Monuments, provided with a large staff, public funds, and *special facilities for access*. The last is a factor of immense importance, as will be realized by anyone who has to deal with the custodians of religious monuments and private buildings in this or any country, but more especially outside north-western Europe, in countries where the possibilities of prostration and courteous evasion are unlimited. Not least among the extraordinary qualities displayed by Professor Creswell are the tact, patient persistence, and unassuming courage with which he has continued his work for over forty years, sometimes in the face of the most adverse political conditions. And, politicians apart, it is a tribute to the Muslims among whom he has worked, and especially to the population of Cairo, that they should have responded with an almost universal friendliness and help, even during the aftermath of the Suez Operation. Outside Egypt too, Creswell must in a number of cases have been the first, or only, non-Muslim to penetrate fanatically guarded shrines without disguise, having won the confidence and support of the official custodians.

The design and production of the volume by the Oxford University Press maintain the very high standard set by its predecessor, and both line drawings and collotype plates make a splendid show, enabling æsthetic quality to be appreciated as fully as it can ever be, short of a personal visit to the building concerned. A large proportion of the drawings, and most of the photographs, are by the author himself, and frequently record detail which has been lost in the course of the past generation.

Typographical errors are remarkably few in a work so largely concerned with technical terms and Arabic names and quotations: on p. 8, line 3 from bottom "Muqattam" should read "Muqattam"; p. 18, line 7 from bottom, read "two towers . . . a staircase"; p. 65, line ii, read "al-Ghauri"; p. iii, line 8, the Arabic text diverges from the transliteration of the name "Abū Hanifa," printing *yā* for *wāw*; in the Index, p. 283, a reference to p. 53 should be added under Badr al-Gamālī; and on p. 287 the reference to Sultan al-Ghauri given as "i.65" should read "ii.65"; the caption to Plate 61 should read "Khānqā al-Bunduqdāriya."

Many readers may feel the need of a map of the Islamic world, to identify the places little known to the western student, brought into comparison with Egyptian works. The need is accentuated by the fact that the index does not identify such place-names by adding the modern country in which they are to be found: it is, for instance, mystifying to the non-specialist to seek for Mayyāfāriqīn, now in Turkey and masquerading under the modern name of Silvan.

The volume begins with an extended survey of all that is left of Saladin's Citadel at Cairo, disentangling the twelfth century work from later accretions, and throwing much light upon the progress of military architecture in the East (as in the West)

due to the Crusades. The decision to build a citadel was not, however, due to external threats, but to fear of a serious revolt in 1176 in favour of the deposed Fāṭimid dynasty; the site was chosen after experiment had shown that, whereas meat exposed in the city went bad after a day and a night, it kept fresh for two days and nights on the lofty site found! The enormous scale of the work can be realized from the facts that Saladin's northern ward alone is longer than the whole of Windsor Castle and over twice as wide, and that one of the square towers added to the curtain-wall by the Sultan al-Adil (c.A.D. 1207) is larger than the Keep of Norwich.

Outstanding among later chapters is the detailed discussion of the cruciform Madrasa, which provides a full chronology of every known example, and refutes the criticisms of Herzfeld. Professor Creswell has been able triumphantly to demonstrate the correctness of his deductions published in 1922. Among his discoveries are the true plan of the Mustanṣiriya Madrasa at Baghdad, and the existence of Cairene houses of the twelfth century similar in plan to those of the fourteenth, the earliest known to survive 40 years ago. It is now certain that the Madrasa of two liwāns developed from the private house in which a professor lectured to his students; that the cruciform Madrasa is not necessarily connected with the four rites of Islamic tradition; and that its architectural form is a spontaneous functional growth within Egypt, and not borrowed from elsewhere.

Summarizing the Ayyūbid period, it is shown that it is notable for the *general* use of the bent entrance in fortification, hitherto only occasional; the improvement of arrow-slits to command a full field of fire downwards as well as outwards and laterally; the introduction of the Madrasa; the wide use of stone rather than brick; the making of windows of coloured and painted glass set in stucco grilles of arabesque patterns, an import from Syria; and, decoratively, the employment of the beautiful Naskhi script, also from Syria. Further modifications in style were brought from the north by refugees from North Syria and Iraq, fleeing before the Mongols, especially noticeable in the Mosque of Sultan Baybars al-Bunduqdārī (A.D. 1266-69). Migration of craftsmen at this period occurred on a large scale, not only from north and east, but also from the west, owing to the Christian Reconquista of Spain.

Not the least attractive feature of the book is the spattering of personal anecdotes in the text, giving valuable and precisely dated information on conditions in a given building at a given date, and including the remarkable sight, in 1951, of a dome being climbed by al-Ḥabbāl, the foreman-mason of the Comité de Conservation, who seized a thick chain anciently attached to the finial for the purpose of placing wheat in a metal "boat" for the birds, leant back, and *walked* up the surface (p. 71, note 2).

Much important material is here made available for the student of early and high Gothic, the parallel western stream to this great architecture of the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk realm (a forerunner of the United Arab Republic, plus Jordan and south-eastern Turkey). Besides such direct contacts as are implied by the employment of many Christian prisoners in the late thirteenth century, and the taking down and re-erection in Cairo of a splendid Gothic portal from Acre (p. 234-5), there lies a background of vaguer, more general links of cultural contact, through Cordova with Christian as well as Muslim Spain, through Sicily, and perhaps through pilgrims and merchants with the commonplaces of western Christendom. For this and much more treasure stacked between the covers of this book, students of all mediæval cultures and not Islamists alone must bless the genius, the knowledge, and the diligence of its author.

JOHN H. HARVEY.

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**Caste and the Economic Frontier.** By F. G. Bailey. Manchester University Press. Pp. 292. Maps. Illus. Indexed. 35s.

**Caste and Communication in an Indian Village.** By D. N. Majumdar. Asia Publishing House. Pp. 358. Bibliography. Glossary. Indexed. Rs. 50.

A great many people, anywhere in the world, are nowadays asking what future lies in store for India and Pakistan, whether India, suddenly possessed of responsible government and universal adult franchise, will make a success of them undiluted.



or perhaps with such alterations as are under consideration in Pakistan, whether when the Government of India loses the dominating premiership of Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru his successors will be able to maintain the general equilibrium which has prevailed under his régime. What has probably surprised most of these inquirers is their discovery that the men who have spent most years in the sub-continent are the least inclined to pronounce outright conclusions. But here in Britain, steeped in the tradition and practice of democratic self-government, students of politics are still puzzling over why, contrary to confident forecasts, our Conservative Government was returned to power by a sweeping countrywide majority in the recent general election. How can anybody safely forecast how the mass mind of India will swing?

The two little volumes forming the subject of this review are of interest to all whose thoughts are concerned about the future of India and Pakistan. Neither of them discusses the whole major problem, but each surveys in detail, at the village or domestic level, some of its basic essentials. Dr. Bailey, now lecturer in Asian Anthropology in the School of Oriental and African Studies of London University, went to India and wrote his book while holding a Treasury Studentship in Foreign Languages and Cultures. He does not claim to have been there before. He concentrated his Indian studies upon his analysis of the changes that "have come about in the internal organization of the Oriya village" of Bisipara, particularly in the structure of Bisipara society, during the last century of British rule—a rule which preserved peace, provided education and easy communications and travel and linked the village people with the outer economic world.

Professor M. N. Srinivas, of the University of Baroda, in an appreciative Foreword declares Dr. Bailey to have produced a book which "constitutes an original and significant contribution to the growing body of village studies in different parts of the world." One cannot go all the way with its conclusions. For instance, one of the great changes in the village in recent decades has been in the sale of land to purchasers of a different social class from the earlier owners and while the author lays the blame for this upon British rule, he omits any mention of the extensive legislation passed by British Indian Provincial Governments to prevent the transfer of land to people of non-agricultural classes.

Similarly, but from the different angle natural to a distinguished Indian of international distinction who was already the author of nearly a dozen books of intimate Indian studies, Prof. Majumdar, M.A., Ph.D. (Cantab), aided by a picked field team of expert helpers, takes us for a close study of social, religious and economic changes that have in modern times taken place in the village of Mohana, "a medium-sized, multi-caste village . . . about eight miles north of Lucknow." He reminds us that an Indian village has a past, a value system, a sentimental system, "all moored in the rich experiences of the past," though at the same time it is not limited by its own village boundaries. Thanks to its response to outer contacts, Mohana has in these respects undergone gradual but relentless and fundamental changes. For example, the Thakurs, who were the dominant caste, have now, with the abolition of the zemindari system by their new State Government, lost both their economic and their social status "and are frantically making a bid for maintaining their hold on the village. Some have become money lenders and are competing with the Sahukars or the Baniyas, some have opened grocery shops in the village and one finds a kind of chaos in the context of rural occupations and inter-caste relations . . . The Kshatriyas have accepted their degraded counterparts and are integrating or fusing into one big caste." The professor leaves his reader with a vivid impression that the ultimate effects of such changes spreading upon the mass mind throughout the land must certainly be fundamental and as yet quite incalculable.

A. H. B.

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**The Story of My Life. Vol. II, 1922-1925.** By M. R. Jayakar. Asia Publishing House, London, 1959. Pp. 742. 75s.

Here is a most entertaining book. Not only because it tells of Dr. Jayakar's prominent part in the direction and labours of the Indian Swarajist party in 1922-25, influential though that was, but, perhaps primarily, because it vividly depicts

the gradual, sure progress of British imperialism to its proper fruition in India, in spite of the obtuse non-co-operation of a large section of Indian nationalist politicians who ought to have been in the forefront of its supporters. What was that imperialism? It was first enunciated, though without that name, by the British King Caradoc, when, some 2,000 years ago, after being betrayed to Roman invaders, he was carried off by them to Rome and there produced before the Senate. Why, he asked, should he have surrendered his kingdom to their armies? Why should the Romans, after making themselves masters of the European continent, seek to reduce the British islanders to vassalage? Nearly 1,400 years later, when England was again in danger of invasion, this time by Germans, the English King and his Ministers, asserting the same principle as inspired Caradoc, issued a Proclamation declaring that England had her own imperium, meaning complete independence and freedom from external interference, equal to that of any foreign Power.

Thus the word empire was officially adopted for official use in the country and from then onwards, wherever the British flag has flown, it has had the same meaning. British statesmen, from their earliest days of authority in India proclaimed it as the ultimate aim of their influence and power there. Perspicacious, educated Indian leaders were able to accept the assurance not only through trust in the good faith of those who gave it but also because their reading of British historical and other literature showed them that Freedom is in the very bones of the British people and must certainly govern their dealings with other peoples. Stage by stage Indian public life was encouraged and assisted to develop and progress along the same path. As it did so, Indian public opinion divided, as opinion does over public affairs in other countries, and so we came to hear of the Moderates, who co-operated with Government, and the Swarajists, literally Home Rulers, who professed to be unbelievers and refused to co-operate. The Moderates were always a large majority and devotedly gave their help in furthering the great cause. The Swarajists, following the dictate of Mr. M. K. Gandhi, whom Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru described as a philosophical anarchist, declined to co-operate, refused office under the Government and declined membership of the Legislatures established by the great Reforms inaugurated in 1921 and pursued what Dr. Jayakar praised and commended as the "tactics of wrecking and destruction."

This non-co-operation ended in defeat not by repression but through its own futility. The Reforms scheme achieved success beyond almost any expectation and this was partly because the non-participation of the Swarajists in operating it left the coast clear for uninterrupted and constructive co-operation between "the Moderates" and Government. The central bi-cameral Legislature, to which the Government of India, though not technically responsible, were in the nature of things bound to be responsive, was brilliantly successful. How largely this was due to good understanding and moderation on the part of the non-official members of the Lower House, the Indian Legislative Assembly, becomes obvious when it is remembered that of its total membership of 140 the official Government bloc numbered 14, to which could usually be added 9 officials representing the Provincial Governments, while all the rest were elected members, responsible to their constituencies, plus the few members nominated to represent special interests, such as Indian Christians, who would be unable to obtain representation by election.

Having failed in their wrecking tactics by leaving uncontested victory to the co-operators, the Swarajists changed their method, contested a large number of seats at the second general election and by winning many of them sent a numerous party into the Assembly to wreck the constitution from within. Vain hope. Hon. members could not sit in the House and refuse to discuss on merits legislative matters of public importance brought before it. Then Party leader Pundit Motilal Nehru accepted election to a Committee charged to consider means to attract young Indians for commissions in the Army. He was sharply criticized for that, but how could such criticism lie while Indians were clamouring for more Army commissions to be given to Indians. Worse followed when Mr. V. J. Patel stood for and was elected President, or Speaker, of the House. Motilal slid into a sharp quarrel with Mr. Gandhi by drinking wine at a legislature dinner party instead of strictly adhering to Gandhian teetotalism.

The general course of these events and others like them was reported in the

newspapers. What Dr. Jayakar's story gives us is a lively off-stage view of his party's rumble tumbles and duels behind the scenes—even of intrigues between Swarajist leaders and British Labour politicians, to put pressure upon Ministers of the Crown. It is well worth reading and throws upon the Indian political history of the time a light both amusingly revealing and usefully instructive.

A. H. B.

**New Patterns of Democracy in India.** By Vera Micheles Dean. Harvard University Press. Pp. 226. Bibliography. Index. 38s.

Mrs. Dean is a keen observer of foreign lands as befits the editor of the Foreign Policy Association and director of the Non-Western Civilizations Programme at the University of Rochester. She has written a sensible and sympathetic profile of India—to use the title of her first chapter. Royal Central Asiatics will find much in this book elementary. Indeed it contains little fresh; but it is freshly and attractively written.

Not every American observer avoids, as does Mrs. Dean, the mistake of confusing technology with civilization, and thus of underestimating India's immense contribution to the wisdom of mankind. She is fair to the British *Raj* but one passage suggests that she does not know of the Englishmen in India's service who from early Company days foresaw her independent destiny. She understands the importance of India's decision to remain within the Commonwealth—it has been called an Indo-British Commonwealth—and deplores the failure of many of her country-people to grasp the importance of the Commonwealth to the world. On India's side she sensed a deep mistrust of the United States which has deplored her neutrality and no doubt dislikes the socialist (or mixed) economic pattern of a country which shares with Asia "the religion of planning," for sound national and practical as well as doctrinal reasons. Mrs. Dean gives the reassurance that India is "devoted to democracy." On the other hand, she analyses the weakness as well as the strength of the Indian National Congress which leans heavily upon Sri Nehru who, she says, is not training a successor.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON.

**No Purdah in Padam.** By Antonia Deacock. Published by George Harrap. Pp. 206. Illus. 16s.

More and more women's expeditions are going from this country to visit the Himalayas and, on their return, writing books about their travels. This is interesting when we remember that in the old days of British rule in India many women travelled in "the hills" during the summer, took it all rather for granted and certainly rarely wrote books about it. They did not, indeed, go as far afield as Antonia Deacock and her friend, but then they were not an "expedition" and did not get assistance of various kinds from all manner of organizations and firms. They probably did not write about their experiences because they realized that they were not "news." In those days, few people wanted to hear about Lahoul, Zanskar or Spiti and any conversation which started "When I was in India" was almost certain to empty the room. The change that has taken place in the thirteen years since 1947 is due no doubt to the sense that the Himalayas are no longer a part of the British way of life and the fact that few people were able to travel far into the mountains between 1939 and the end of the war. It is, therefore, in effect over 20 years since a "trek in the hills" was the normal summer holiday for many British families. Such treks have now, therefore, become "news" and thus acceptable to publishers.

The book under review gives an interesting and straightforward account of a journey from London to Padam, the capital of Zanskar, a village of about 400 people. The first 67 pages cover the approach through Europe and the Middle East and tell of several amusing episodes. The party were honoured by an interview with Pandit Nehru who took a great interest in their plans and treated them most kindly.

The starting point for the journey, on foot like so many others in the past and

no doubt in the future, was Major Banon's orchards in Manali. From there over passes up to 18,000 feet in height they travelled Lahoul and Zaushar to their destination. Their return journey was by a slightly different route passing over the Shingo La instead of the Bara Lacha La. Mrs. Deacock gives a good description of the scenery and the many different types of people they met on their way. They found everyone most helpful and kind and appreciated the friendly hospitality of these mountain people. The whole story is written in a chatty and almost conversational style which gives it all a very personal atmosphere. It is a pity that there is perhaps an excess of such items as "puffing gratefully at a cigarette" or "sipping steaming mugs of tea," which occasionally distract from the description of the majestic surroundings in which the travellers find themselves.

This is a light book to pass a few hours far from the noise and smell of London, for those who have neither the opportunity nor the money to enable them to take a holiday in the clear air and peace of the Himalayas.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

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**India's North-East Frontier in the Nineteenth Century.** By Verrier Elwin. O.U.P., 1959. Pp. 473. 50s.

If anyone expects from the title—for the reservation in time is printed small—that this book supplies a background for appreciation of the problems now facing India along the McMahon Line, he will be disappointed. For Dr. Elwin's gallimaufry consists of passages selected from the writings of early officials, explorers and missionaries, ending with the year 1900, and dealing exclusively with the primitive tribes which inhabit the North-East Frontier Agency, with some extension as far as the Patkoi Hills but excluding the Nagas proper. The selection is linked only by an Introduction written by the selector and stating what he was able to find out about the lives of the contributors. The link is a slender one.

Tibet is rarely mentioned save as inaccessible from Assam and, as the Lama country inhabited by tall men riding horses. "I have never yet met an Abor who had been across," and "I cannot hold out any very sanguine expectations of being able to penetrate so as to behold Tibet from the mountain tops"—writes E. T. Dalton, the most vivid of these authors. As for China, it is only a vague shadow in the background.

Many of the passages selected are delightfully written, ranging from intimate portraits of savage tribesmen and their women and children to panegyrics on the glories of the scenery. The foreword from W. Robinson is eloquent in its tribute to the mountains, rivers, skies and forests of Assam, and there is a fine description of the wonderful panorama seen from Sadiya, so reminiscent of the circle of mountains that stands about Peshawar.

The most gallant of the explorers mentioned is without doubt the French Catholic priest Father Krick, who alone in those days succeeded in penetrating the Lohit Valley as far as the Tibetan outposts in Zayul and was murdered by Mishmis in the To Chu Pass on his way back. No explanation is given by the compiler for his failure to place the tribes in ordered sequence from east to west, or west to east; he treats them in haphazard fashion, dotting about with little regard for geographical propinquity. A more serious charge is perhaps that the selection is arbitrarily confined to a period that ended two generations back, so excluding all later explorers, Indian and British, to say nothing of the knowledge that has been accumulated by Indian administrators since 1947. Even F. M. Bailey, Sarat Chandra, Lama Ugyen, Robert Reid and Philip Mills, are mentioned only in footnotes, and the record itself stops short of the discovery that the Tsangpo of Tibet is indeed the Dihang of Assam, and the main tributary of the Brahmaputra.

For a book so loosely put together, both map and index are deficient; it is impossible to follow the journeys in the one, and the other is full of gaps. There is no glossary, so that the stranger to Assam has to read on some hundreds of pages before discovering, for instance, that a *mithan* is a semi-domesticated bison and *manjit* is madder.

Those who have been following recent controversies will take comfort in finding

that the map, sketchy as it is, does show India's frontier on the Himalayan crest and cannot therefore be used by Premier Chou to support the Chinese claims for a frontier on the line of the foothills.

In short, while much of the original material here put forward has its own fascination, this is an edifice ill-constructed both in time and space, which sadly needs a roof over the structure and a much more lavish expenditure of cement. Perhaps Dr. Elwin will give us a sequel down to 1960.

OLAF CAROE.

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**India Meets China in Nepal.** By Girilal Jain. Published by Asia Publishing House, London. 1959. Pp. 170. 30s.

One is attracted to the fair mindedness of Mr. Jain's case. With painstaking detail he sets out to flood the reader's mind with all the factors that make up the complicated pattern of cross currents behind the rising tide of nationalism in Nepal. His qualifications to interpret the kaleidoscopic turn of events in Nepal's political development are seen in a consistent journalistic curiosity into the human beings behind the splinter parties, these race across the scene in colourful progression. He was once attracted to Marxism himself, thus he understands the numerous twists of the tortuous policy employed by its devotees in Nepal. Much of the material he has obviously gained by contact with political leaders in Nepal; this is balanced by the wider sphere of his own experiences in India. He has a very fair manner of allowing facts to speak for themselves before setting out his own conclusions.

He rightly emphasizes the point that India's security and stability are inextricably tied up with Nepal's in view of the military occupation of Tibet by large Chinese forces. Wisely, however, he stresses that the threat to India's special position in Nepal does not arise solely from the activities of the Chinese government on its borders. The rise of local Communist influence will serve China's interests and militate against those of India; he urges that India should not minimize the threat from the local Communist Party by regarding its weakness at the present time. This is underlined for us by a compelling factor seen in other encroachments elsewhere. It is no accident that some leading families in Kathmandu are well known for their fellow travelling propensity. The sentiment against India, already very strongly developed, predisposes them to accept Chinese Communist arguments. The picture of under-paid clerical workers, the cream of the educated classes, finding the avenues of employment too narrow for further advancement with increasing family requirements in the way of educational facilities and consumer goods quite beyond their reach, is one of deepening despair and ever mounting frustration. This, too, will drive them to align themselves with the forces of disruption.

Mr. Jain's appendix giving full notes on Nepal's economy is of great practical value. He also lists the main channels of communication with their carrying capacity, and describes the state of agriculture, with expected yields in the next few years, with a revealing knowledge of the Birta systems and the allied problem of the Zamindars. How many people, I wonder, would believe that Nepal has largely been a food exporting country in the past, and that today it is a double currency area where Indian and Nepali Rupees freely circulate in all parts? The trade deficit, budgetary deficit and national budget itself all receive fair attention. His remarks on public health and educational facilities should be read by all who are sincerely interested in the welfare of the Nepali people. It is most interesting to know that there has been a good deal of success in the development of the Rapti valley anti-malarial programme which is allowing 25,000 persons to be settled in the valley once this scourge has been eliminated.

For a student of Nepal's international relations the further appendices deal with the Tibeto-Nepalese Treaty of 1792 and that of 1856. The 1923 Treaty between Great Britain and Nepal is also given in detail. It is most interesting to compare the terms of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal in 1950 with those of the Sino-Nepal Treaty 1956 given in appendix F.

Whether dealing with the earlier history of Nepal, the Rana régime, or the odd

partnership of King Tribhuvan with Congress leaders, Mr. Jain is equally informative and positive in his approach. He claims one's attention for a modern and explosive problem by a very fine study of the international affairs likely to affect the peace of Asia for some years to come.

GEORGE F. FOX HOLMES.

**Where the Lion Trod.** By Gordon Shepherd. Illustrated by John Verney. Macmillan. 1960. Pp. 177. 18s.

This is a most intriguing volume, by one who knows his subject and how to write. He now runs the Daily Telegraph Office in Vienna, covering Central and South-East Europe. In the Army, 1940 to 1948, he finished as Lt.-Col. on the British High Commissioner's Intelligence staff in Vienna. Here, with a Cambridge Double First in History, he writes in lighter vein on British "Paw Marks" left on Mother India. But behind his sympathetic and understanding picture is a wealth of knowledge, of how and why the British image persists and the methods of the present administrators in preserving the façade so painstakingly built up in the last two centuries.

Which means, in fact, that the ordinary reader can spend a pleasant hour or two observing the new interpretation of the so-called unchanging East, and the more serious scholar reading between the lines can perceive what Nehru's government are trying to do. Those who know India best will most appreciate this subtle presentation of today's complex political problems. The "Baboo," as Punch once said, may have told his friend he has buttered his bun and now he must lie on it, but the 1960 "clerk" might even try to explain his reasoning. There is a parallel, Morier's 1804 novel about Haji Baba of Ispahan was quite a good story, but it was not until the reader came to know Persia really well that he could appreciate the side lights and innuendos behind its seemingly quite ordinary pictures.

Earlier chapters describe with pathetic understanding the new rôle of the British planters in South and East India, the fading story of India's "Public Schools," and their ultimate future. The present situation in regard to late employees of the British Raj; the position on the Chinese borders; the struggle to replace English as far as possible by Hindu—seemingly a hopeless and unrewarding task. There is much to be learned from old gravestones all over India—whether English, French, Dutch, Portuguese and Tamil; the author has made useful profit from this source. Later chapters touch generally but incisively on the new "red tapes" conforming or opposed to the old ones. The political systems have much in common with the past, though in different guise.

This is a book to buy rather than borrow, to find a place on the shelf of all those who have loved India through the years, and even of those who have not loved it so well.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Islamic Law in the Modern World.** By J. N. D. Anderson. Stevens and Sons, London. Pp. 106. 1959. 25s.

The audience to which these lectures were delivered was drawn together by interest in the Near East, so the treatment of the subject is popular and not technical. That does not mean that it is always easy reading. According to the Muslim creed the law was given by God, so it is perfect and unchangeable; even if not contained in the Koran it is derived from it by accurate deduction or from other revelations given to Muhammad. Actually some of it is the pre-Islamic custom of Arabia. The first lecture reviews western theories of law to find out which is most like the Muslim and decides for "natural law," but with two major differences. Natural law is inherent in the constitution of the world and its precepts can be discovered by man's intelligence while Muslim law is imposed by God and, in the orthodox view, cannot be discovered by human reason. In spite of theory, the sacred law did not govern the whole of life; from early days the caliph sat "to hear complaints," which the judge would not or could not rectify, the historians later record monotonously that

the sultan on his accession abolished illegal taxes. The next lecture describes the introduction of European law; this began in Turkey about 100 years ago with commercial, penal and civil codes. The process has gone on with varying speeds in different countries till now Saudi Arabia and the Yemen are the only countries in the Near East which still recognize the sacred law. The professor points out that devout Muslims preferred to have the law set aside (and kept for a coming golden age) than changed. It was comparatively easy to introduce civil and penal codes but what concerned family life was a different matter. Tunis is the only land so far which has scrapped the sacred law in this sphere. The great injustice was that a woman might be divorced without notice and for no reason yet had no defence against an evil husband. The law of marriage, like the conception of heaven, favoured the man. The law did something for the woman; it limited the number of wives to four—that was progress—a woman might not be forced to marry below her station in life and she kept control of her property. One wonders how far that last condition was fulfilled! The professor thinks well of the law on inheritance which is detailed in the Koran. We must remember its purpose, to maintain the strength of the tribe. The first charge on an estate is the deceased's debts. Relatives are divided into classes, those nearer the dead man excluding the more distant, and the share of each class or individual is defined. One case was so complicated that only one man in the country could work out the fractions. A man may will away only one-third of his estate and may not bequeath anything to a statutory heir. The share of a female was half that of a male. Tribal legislation is out of place today so changes have been made in most lands. It looks as if the intrusion of western ideas will continue and spread; codification of the sacred law will do away with the old type of jurist and his successor will have been trained in western ways. Pakistan has not yet produced a system of law which shall be in accord with Koran and Sunna and also suitable for the present age.

A. S. TRITTON.

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**The Arabs in Israel.** By Walter Schwarz. Faber. 21s. Pp. 172. Index. Illus.

This excellent book might be hailed as a sequel to *Israel in Egypt*.

"During the last ten years Israel's Arab communities have made great progress. In every aspect of life, standards and general living conditions have improved."

\* \* \* \* \*

"The bulk of Israel's Arab population is subject to a military rule that denies them the basic rights of any free citizen."

These two quotations, both from Israeli sources, are taken from the first two paragraphs of this study by Mr. Schwarz, a young British journalist who spent eighteen months in Israel, investigating Israel's Arab minority. The first excerpt is from an official Israeli booklet, "The Arabs in Israel," the second from a poster issued in 1958 by Judah Magnes' heirs, the IHUD Association. Which view is the right one?

In order to find out, Mr. Schwarz went all over the country, met and talked with scores of people, officials, both Jew and Arab; citizens, both Arab and Jew. He scrutinized documents and newspapers. The resulting book is judicial and objective. But never dull: to anyone who knows the country, his picture of places, animals and people are graphic and real. So are his photographs. The book starts by describing a riot in Nazareth on May Day, 1958. This leads to sketches of various types of citizens, from collaborators to Communists. Then come the chapters on living conditions and official attitudes. The most disturbing of these is chapter six, entitled "For Security Reasons." Here we read the story of Kraf Baram, a little village of 600 Maronite Christians, near the Lebanon border. In 1948 they were turned out, in 1951 the Israeli Supreme Court established their right to return. "But the military had the last say. The people were not allowed back, and on September 16, 1953, the deserted village was blown up by the army." This is an extreme example of the way in which Arab land is expropriated, or regarded as "abandoned" in what is held to be the public interest.

The only people to benefit from this attitude have been the Communists.

"In eleven years," writes Mr. Schwarz on his final page "despite material progress, the Israeli-Arab situation has deteriorated. On the one hand, Arab nationalism has done more to feed disaffection than economic progress has done to dispel it. On the other, disillusionment about Israeli intentions has progressively warped the outlook of many Israeli Arabs who had begun by hoping for the best."

"The State of Israel will be based on the principles of liberty, justice and peace as conceived by the prophets of Israel." Mr. Schwarz also quotes this sentence from the Israeli "Declaration of Independence" of May 14, 1948. Among those prophets was Elijah: among those whom Elijah condemned (I Kings, 21) were Ahab and Jezebel for their treatment of Naboth. History vindicated Elijah. It may do so again.

STEWART PEROWNE.

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**Maronite Historians of Mediaeval Lebanon.** (American University of Beirut, Publication of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Oriental Series No. 34.) By Kamal S. Salibi, with a preface by Bernard Lewis. Map. Index. Bibliography.

In an age when the relations of East and West in the Levant have become a topic of perennial anxiety, the history and position of the Maronites commands increasing attention. From being a small Christian "minority" the Maronites have emerged as a political factor of the first importance, and because they constitute the oldest of the Eastern Churches in communion with Rome, as a link between east and west in spiritual significance.

This book is a contribution to the understanding of the early history of the community by a versatile member of a versatile family. Dr. Salibi has already won acclaim as a composer and librettist, a Maronite Menotti. In this study he shows that he is a scholar and humanist as well. The book is, in brief, an analysis of the history of the Maronites under Crusader and Mamluk rule by the three Maronite historians, Ibn al-Qilā'i (d. 1516), Duwayhi (d. 1704) and Tannus ash-Shidyāq (d. 1861). It will be indispensable for any future historian of the period, or student of mediæval ecclesiastical politics, particularly as they concern the Papacy, its eastern policy and the Maronite response to it, because, as Dr. Salibi puts it (page 22), "the study of Maronite and other Lebanese sources is essential to the understanding of the history of the Lebanon in the Later Middle Ages. This history had not yet been written, and no proper history of Lebanon is possible without it. It was during the Crusader and Mamluk periods that the foundations of Lebanese feudalism were laid. It was also then that the earliest relations between Christian Lebanon and Western Europe were established, and that the tradition of Lebanese autonomy first developed."

The production and presentation of the book are beyond praise: they reflect lustre on University and author alike. His next work, on a wider canvas it is to be hoped, will be eagerly awaited.

STEWART PEROWNE.

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**Jungle Nurse.** By Pamela Gouldsbury. Published by Jarrolds, 1960. Pp. 206. Illustrated. 21s.

The long twelve years of the unfolding of the story of the Malayan Emergency is producing its crop of books. These vary much in quality but many of them are of absorbing interest. Mrs. Gouldsbury's book is one of the most interesting of them all. She would not claim for it the status of a scientific treatise nor that it is a model of English prose, but once this has been said let us go on to say that it has one of the essentials of a good story—once opened it is impossible to lay it down.

The authoress must have been more actively and personally engaged in the war against the Communist Terrorists in Malaya than any other one woman, and indeed she has played an individual part in it which few men can equal.

Her story deals with the Aborigines of the Central Mountain Range which it was realized would have to be weaned away from allegiance to the Terrorists—forced allegiance or otherwise—before the "Battle" could be won. The battle was for



the minds and hearts of a majority of the population, and it had to be waged, as General Templar realized, on all fronts and for all the people including the primitive tribal dwellers in the central forests.

The authoress's medical work among these primitive people was in itself of inestimable value—on humanitarian grounds alone, and above all she and those working with her—Williams, Hunt and Noone—realized that civilization must be administered to these backward peoples in digestible doses.

Mrs. Gouldsbury also retells for us the dramatic story of the disappearance of the Ethnologist Pat Noone—swallowed up in the jungle and overrun by the advancing Japanese armies. The mystery of his disappearance was solved after prolonged investigations by his brother—who is the Noone mentioned in Mrs. Gouldsbury's tale—and forms the subject of a book called "Noone of the Ulu."

A most absorbing tale and well illustrated with most interesting photographs.

W. C. S. CORRY.

**Forest Adventure.** Louise Maitland. Published by Robert Hale. Illustrated. Indexed. 18s.

Mrs. Maitland was married to a member of the team of experts which was formed after the last war to help the countries of the Middle East to initiate much needed social and economic reforms. Their work took them to almost every country in the area and Mrs. Maitland would often accompany her husband on his travels. In "Forest Adventure" she tells us of her experiences, grave and gay. She makes no pretence to be an expert herself but she writes engagingly of what she saw and those she met. To those who know the Middle East already she will bring back many half-forgotten memories. Those who do not may be inspired to follow in her footsteps. "Forest Adventure" is not a book for the student, but the general reader will find much pleasant entertainment.

J. M. T.

**Middle East Diary 1917-1956.** By Col. R. Meinertzhagen, C.B.E., D.S.O. Published by the Cresset Press, 1959. Indexed. 35s.

Colonel Meinertzhagen tells us that he is of Danish origin. But he has acquired at any rate one peculiarly British quality, that of identifying himself with the interests of another nation. The other nation in his case is Israel and these extracts from his diary are largely devoted to his activities (not to mention exploits) in furthering the Zionist cause.

The diaries make refreshing reading, for the Colonel says what he thinks in the bluntest language and if he does not always think the same one day as he thought the day before, the inconsistency disarms rather than annoys. The extracts about Lawrence are a case in point. They are indeed highly revealing, but on one page one finds Lawrence shown up as almost a monster of duplicity and on the next as a man who was "loyal to a degree which was almost a religion."

But if there are inconsistencies, there are none about Colonel Meinertzhagen's devotion to Zionism. For him the most constructive outcome of the First World War was the Jewish national home and of the Second World War the establishment of the state of Israel. These were in fact, in his view, the only worth-while dividends of the two wars. All who do not share his enthusiasm are fools or knaves or at best miserable wobblers. His dislikes are many. The Americans, the French, the Arabs, anti-Zionist Jews are all lashed by his vigorous pen, but he gives the prize for ineptitude and double-dealing to the successive British governments and their servants in Whitehall and Palestine whose ungrateful task it was to make sense out of the Balfour declaration, a document described by the Colonel himself as meaningless. Anyone who did not give a hundred per cent support to the Jews against the Arabs, no matter what the issue, was guilty of the blackest moral turpitude. At times the Colonel seems to have shocked even his Zionist friends, as when he publicly advocated an extreme form of apartheid as the obvious policy for the Jews in Palestine.

It might be thought that the diaries are so prejudiced and unbalanced as to be unreadable. But that is not so. On the contrary, in their total lack of inhibition they are excellent fun. One finds too some pretty acute judgments and shrewd prophecies scattered here and there. One prophecy indeed is almost too good to be true, when in an extract dated November, 1951, Colonel Nasser is spoken of as though he were already the ruler of Egypt.

The Colonel's weakness is that he is, if the term be permitted, the perfect propagandee. He will lap up anything that feeds his preconceived ideas. Hence no doubt his temporary beguilement by the Nazis and above all by Hitler himself who impressed him above all things (this was in 1934) by his sincerity and absolute truthfulness. This seems an unusual aberration for a Zionist. But Colonel Meinertzhagen is an unusual man. He found out the Nazis in the end even to the extent of nearly assassinating Hitler and still wonders whether he was right to have refrained from pulling the trigger when opportunity offered. The Colonel has certainly seen life.

J. M. T.

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**Industrialization in the Middle East.** By K. Grunwald and J. O. Ronall. Published by the Council for M. E. Affairs. Pp. 394. Bibliography. Index. \$7.

The Council for Middle East Affairs, New York, decided to sponsor the preparation and publication of this book because they felt the need for a factual evaluation of the prevailing and almost universal advocacy by most of the leaders of the Middle East countries, advisers of the Great Powers and specialists of the United Nations, that industrialization was the cure-all of the ills that plagued the region. These spokesmen and others contended that "Industrialization would increase employment possibilities and purchasing power, would ease population pressures, would bring a more sensible relation between imports and exports; in short, the general standard of living in the Region would be substantially raised." But, the Council asked, what were the facts?; what were the human, financial and natural resources of the Region?; what were the general conditions necessary for successful industrialization?; what account should be taken of such aspects as population, labour conditions, productivity, urbanization, oil and transport?

These and related questions are dealt with in this book. It is described as a "standard source book" and well justifies the title. The American authors had a formidable task to compress into 370 pages without loss of lucidity and essential basic details the prodigious volume of material available to them through national and international sources—the Bibliography lists 250 references to cognate books and other publications of these sources. The result, however, is an easy to read, well-balanced presentation of the many and often conflicting and limiting factors likely to influence the present extent and future growth of industrialization of the Region as a whole (Part I) and each country separately in the Region (Part II). These factors are examined objectively, factually and without dogmatic rhetoric. A minimum of statistics (170 tables and 5 maps) is arranged conveniently to illustrate contiguous subject matter. Further elaboration regarding the scope and composition of the 21 chapters would be inappropriate in this review, because the nature of the book requires that the reader should select his own course of studies. There is a good index and the bibliography provides an adequate list for extension studies.

It is pertinent to comment that the authors have made few attempts to forecast the possible course of events affecting the original assertion that industrialization was a cure-all solution, but they end the Epilogue, "What needs to be clarified is whether, under present conditions, tangible results can be achieved within the limitations of the social and political factors involved; 'If the sick turn away from the Doctor, how can they be cured?' asks a manual of Zen Buddhism." They also state, "The process (i.e. the development of industrialization) is still in flux and it may be premature to draw conclusions. However, while recording facts is the primary duty of the student, these facts indicate trends and problems." This method of treatment and analysis is applied throughout the book and thereby fulfils the hopes of the sponsors

"that it will assist students of the Region as well as business men—bankers, investors, importers and exporters—to a better understanding of the economic problems of the Region, and that it will serve as a practical guide."

Thus the outstanding merit of the book is that it provides for newcomers to the Region an initial basic understanding of general and particular problems upon which more detailed studies and research can be planned.

M. T. A.

**Persian Cities.** By Laurence Lockhart. Published by Luzac and Co., Ltd., 1960. Pp. 188. 72 illus., 6 in colour. 63s.

A revised version, rather than a second edition, of the author's earlier work "Famous Cities of Iran" (published by Walter Pearce and Company, Brentford, Middlesex, 1939, at 7s. 6d.). Your reviewer had hoped that the author would, in this work, have done for the less well-known towns of Persia what he did for the more famous ones in the earlier book. It is to be hoped that he will do so one day. Much of "Persian Cities" is an exact repetition of "Famous Cities of Iran" with additional chapters on Abadan, Ahwaz, Damghan, Dizful, Maragheh, Resht and Susa. Readers who turn to "Abadan" for light on the oil crisis which ruptured relations between Great Britain and Persia will be disappointed; for Lockhart reduces the story to two sentences—perhaps his view of the perspective history will allocate an unfortunate episode in the four hundred years of relations between the two countries!

One has come to expect that all this author's writings will be learned and full of the light of his deep research. This book, however, like the earlier one, is full of stories told almost as asides, which make an excellent and most informative book so easy to read. They say that in Arizona it is so hot that when a dog chases a cat they both walk; but the origin of that story must surely have come from Aristobolus who, as Lockhart here notes, "accompanied Alexander on his expedition, related that the heat during the summer was so great at Susa that lizards and reptiles that tried to go from one side of the street to the other at midday, could not cross quickly enough to avoid being burnt to death."

Any book that Lockhart writes is a book to possess, not to borrow.

G. W. S.

**From a Persian Tea-House.** By Michael Carroll. John Murray. Pp. 209. Map. Illus. 21s.

Michael Carroll spent the first nine years of his life in India and clearly absorbed an understanding and feeling for the East and its peoples. His account of his travels in Persia starts, as the title suggests, in a tea-house in Isfahan and indeed ends there. His use of words is such that we can feel the chill of the morning air, smell the tang of the fire and see the few customers hunched over their charcoal braziers. The tea-house sets the atmosphere for the whole book and we are introduced to many people, met through visits to tea-houses, journeys on buses or haggling over carpets and antiques in the bazaar. The author clearly feels at home in Isfahan and all his descriptions of other places are linked with it. He writes with great sympathy of the friends he makes and while he may sometimes make fun of people, his humour is always kind.

Whether writing of Isfahan, Persepolis or Meshed, Mr. Carroll always links the present with the past and from considerable reading he is able to give meaning to the buildings he describes. Never is he too long and yet his descriptions are more than adequate to recall their beauties to those who know the places or to create a desire to learn more in those who have not seen them.

If the chronology of his journeys is not entirely clear, this does not greatly matter since he gives us sketches of various scenes and places in such a way as to show Persian life as it is lived by the people. It is better to take each chapter as an entity and not to worry how Mr. Carroll and his friends got from Kermanshah to Isfahan

nor at what stage of their travels they went to India so as to arrive in Zahidan in February. There is a sketch map which indicates the sections covered by each chapter and with this we must be satisfied. A straight day-to-day account would never have given so happy a view of Persia as a whole.

The party entered Persia from Turkey and then travelled from Tabriz to Kermanshah. We then move from Isfahan to Shiraz with an unpleasant episode in Yazd: on to Kerman and from there across the Dasht-i-lut to Meshed. A description of Qum and Teheran and then to the Caspian and the Russian Frontier. One of the most interesting parts of the book is the description of the diversion to Charbahar on the Makran coast, which has been visited by few Europeans. On the return to Zahidan the car broke down and had to be abandoned, so they travelled by bus and Michael Carroll went alone by the same means from Zahidan back to his friends of the tea-house in Isfahan. It will be seen, therefore, that they travelled far and covered roads not commonly described in travel books today.

The chief interest lies in Mr. Carroll's ability to bring to our senses the scene, and whether he is talking of the strangeness of the silent desert or describing the Bakhtiari as they move on their annual migration past the rocks of Bisitun we feel that we are with him on the spot. His characters live and at the end of the book we feel that we too are friends with Hassan in the tea-house at Isfahan, Amin in the carpet shops of Meshed, or Johnny in Zahidan, to whom Michael Carroll gave his "Baghdad Hat." He describes most graphically the discomforts and humour of journeys by bus and his fellow travellers live as clearly as if we had seen them for ourselves.

This is just such a book as anyone who loves Persia would wish to write and we can only envy Michael Carroll and his friends their opportunity and enterprise in seizing it. An unorthodox journey without the limitations of a regular itinerary and also, apparently, of time, enables them to visit places not often seen and to get to know others possibly better than many who have lived longer in the country, but were hindered by their status and position from travelling as they wished in a most informal way. It was as if these three young men had identified themselves with the country and yet remained sufficiently apart to report their experiences and impressions in an entirely objective way. This is a book to be highly recommended to anyone interested in the Middle East or to those who wish a happy introduction to it. We must hope that this author will soon give us a further book on similar travels.

J. E. F. GUERITZ.

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**The Day of Sacrifice.** By Fereidoun Isfandiary. Heinemann. 1960. Pp. 241-7½" x 5". 15s.

This is a light novel on ordinary Persian life in Teheran today. The author is a well-to-do, travelled and sophisticated Persian of 28.

His hero, Mr. Kianoush, becomes mixed up in a successful attempt to assassinate his father's friend, the Minister of the Interior, in an official function at a Mosque, by a hostile clique. Kianoush's father had asked his son to warn the Minister not to attend the Mosque, but by a series of mishaps the warning miscarries and Kianoush becomes involved with the "Enlightened Party" clique responsible.

Modern Teheran in 1960 is not quite the playground it was to Morier's Haji Baba in 1804, in what the Persians later thought to be the first wholly Persian novel, but many of the characters and methods are strangely reminiscent of those early days. Kianoush is lazy and unreliable, with not a few of those lovable qualities which continue to attract the western traveller. His interest in the attractive wife of a senior officer seems to him more important than the life of a member of the government. Kianoush's amorous technique conforms largely to that of the Anglo-Saxons, but seemingly without too many disturbing inhibitions.

As a study of Persian life in 1958 this vignette of a much travelled student of modern Iran has much to commend it.

G. M. ROUTH.

**Rakaposhi.** By Mike Banks. Secker and Warburg, 1959. Pp. 222. Illustrated, appendices, index. 25s.

This book is a well-written and well-illustrated account of two expeditions to Rakaposhi in the Karakorum. The first, a four-man Anglo-American team, came near to success in 1956. Two years later a larger British-Pakistani Forces Expedition reached the top. Captain Mike Banks was leader of both expeditions.

The author appears to have a way of getting what he wants; product of great determination, clear aim and an ability to think ahead, to learn from experience and to await the right moment to strike.

His easy style may tempt the reader to think that the conquest of Rakaposhi was easy—it was not so. Had there been a moving staircase from base to peak, it would have taken endurance to face the blizzard on the upper slopes. The light touch is not gained by understatement for we are faced with each problem as it emerges. The author does not play down, nor play up the difficulties. His skill as a writer lies in his refusal to strike an attitude, to pretend that he sought more than to achieve his self-imposed task, not at all costs, but if possible. He is matter of fact, lively, direct.

The following example of the author's rare but effective venture into introspection has something of the quality to be found in the writings of that early master of mountain literature, Geoffrey Winthrop Young.

"My Greenland and Rakaposhi experiences in addition to keeping me fully up to date in cold weather and mountain techniques, which were useful in my job, gave me a rare insight into my own reactions to the whole gamut of emotions; fatigue principally, boredom, frustration and hardship often, danger occasionally. This self-knowledge, this revelation of the flaws in one's make up, is the most priceless acquisition a man can make. Only through the recognition of one's weaknesses can strength be assessed. Only when a frailty is acknowledged may it be fought and conquered." *Outward Bound*, could not put it better.

More often, Mike Banks is content to record the significant moments with wit and despatch. Those who dislike the use of Christian names, the use of colloquial service language and rather crude descriptions of life in high regions without all mod. con., are advised not to read this book. Those who are prepared to push through a short introduction (due to the fact that two expeditions are here described in one book) will enjoy the invigorating writing, as skilled and as bold as the climbing itself.

A. S. A.-B.

**The Red Snows.** By Sir John Hunt and Christopher Brasher. Hutchinson. 1960. Pp. 170. Illustrated and including appendix giving history of climbing in the Caucasus and Index. 25s.

Many members of the Society will have heard Sir John Hunt talk about the 1958 Caucasus Expedition in January, 1959, or will have read the report of his talk in the *Journal*. (Vol. XLVI. Part II. 1959.)

This book amplifies the talk and is written by Christopher Brasher, with two chapters as told to the author by George Band. The one chapter by Sir John Hunt illustrates the difference between climbing in the Caucasus as compared with Alps or Himalayas and concludes with "credit titles" wearying here, as after a film, only to those who seek an evening's entertainment, but of interest to those eager to review the supporting cast.

There can be no limit to the number of such books for those whose passion it is to set foot upon the peaks, in actuality or in imagination. Each book is devoured, whether spicy, stodgy or good plain fare. To be honest, this book belongs to the last category. Expeditions must be paid for by the writing of articles and of a book, in the making of films and broadcasts and we have here no attempt to hide the truth. But this is best quality bread and fresh, dairy butter; it looks good, it goes down well and it satisfies all but the few who prefer whole-meal, the truth without the polish.

Illustrations are good to excellent; well up to the standard we have come to

expect of a numbed and breathless photographer. Mountain views suffice to illustrate the text. Views of rock and of ice are few in number, for there can be nothing steeper than the price of illustrations and the near view is much the same, whether in the Caucasus, the Himalaya or in Scotland. We are permitted to scan the features of the Dramatis Personæ; but barely to view the features of the hosts, only glimpses—and a haunting photograph of a Balkarian shepherd who has felt and now feels again the wind from the West and the Siberian cold, but he wisely keeps his mouth shut.

The one map is poor, with some excuse. Nevertheless, how much it is to be desired that Authors and Publishers would vow to provide, in future, place on a map for every mention in the text, all other names excluded. Generations of readers would sigh with relief.

The book is capably but prosaically written by a Christopher Brasher curiously outpaced by George Band, whose account of a route up the Shkhara and a magnificent new route up Dykh-Tau emerges crisp and vital, with a minimum of detail; too brief for the expert, I am sure, but stimulating reading for the general reader.

Finally, what might have given exceptional interest to this book, Russian climbers on their home ground, has been touched on but not grasped. Difficulties in communication, the stoicism of the mountaineer and great tact in the writing of this book, blanket the view. We enjoy tantalizing glimpses, through the cloud. Frontier troubles, the journey to Moscow, Spartak Camp—Outward Bound with an element of Hitler Jugend thrown in—and Russian Climbers; how one would like to know more! But a start has been made by John Neill and his friends who first thought of this expedition and pressed against the iron curtain for five long years, and by Sir John Hunt who lent his weight and by Eugene Gippenreiter who discovered that the curtain was of red tape and that it could be pulled apart. By careful planning, with superb skill and judgment—"Far better lose face than life"—with good humour and endless patience, tackling one difficulty at a time, the expedition reached the summit.

National pride, suspicion, *amour-propre*, the ruin of international sport, which appear for a brief moment in this book, must be fought by united endeavour. I can think of no finer example of trust and comradeship than that provided by George Band and Anatoli Kustovski, who climbed wholly dependent upon, yet barely able to communicate with, each other, while millions of their fellows turned to glare at one another in Iraq, in the Lebanon and around the world.

"... there was no need to rush ahead and prove that one or the other was superior. Mountains are too big and men too small for that."

A. S. ARNOLD-BROWN.

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**Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia.** By Serge A. Zenkovsky. Harvard University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1960. Pp. 345. Maps. Bibliography. Index. 54s.

Mr. Zenkovsky has brought together in one place a great deal of unusual information on a little-known and little-studied subject—the unco-ordinated groping for political, judicial and cultural freedom by a large part of the Muslim population of pre- and post-revolutionary Russia up to the year 1920. He has made objective and coherent use of a prodigious range of source material and it can be said without fear of contradiction that his study of this subject is by far the best documented and most comprehensive which has yet appeared in English.

It is interesting to speculate on how future historians will deal with the phenomenon of so-called nationalism as it appeared in the Middle East and Central Asia during the first half of the twentieth century. Mr. Zenkovsky is clearly assailed by some doubts whether the unco-ordinated although simultaneous struggles of the Turkic Peoples of Russia can fairly be called a nationalist movement; in the course of his research he became aware of the cross-currents of radicalism and conservative territorialism and admits that he has had to revise his original opinion that Turkic nationalism or pan-Turkism was the main force "animating the minds and political

efforts of Russian Turks." He eventually came to believe that "their common attachment to the religion and culture of Islam" was in many instances a more important factor; in the end he decided that while the factors of pan-Turkism and Islam were both present, they actually operated against each other.

Mr. Zenkovsky describes four kinds of movement among the Turkic peoples of Russia: liberal reformist movements like those of Gasprinskiy; clerical or religious movements which sometimes resorted to violence; international movements vaguely connected with movements in adjoining countries; and finally, after the revolution, a few instances of something approaching nationalist movements in the accepted sense in the Volga and Ural regions, Transcaucasia and Kazakhstan. Only in Bashkiria and Kazakhstan, however, were there clear manifestations of that most characteristic creature of nationalism—a desire to exclude foreign, that is, Russian and Ukrainian, settlers. Only the liberal intelligentsia was capable of grasping the political implications of pan-Turkism and pan-Islam, and after the revolution it received no material support from Turkey or much spiritual inspiration from the Islamic world outside the U.S.S.R. The failure of the leaders to agree among themselves and the inertia and lack of organization of the Muslim masses made it possible for the Soviet authorities to impose the solution best suited to their own requirements.

It is tempting to compare the struggles of the Turkic peoples of Russia described by Mr. Zenkovsky with similar movements in the Arab world. There are many points of resemblance as well as some important differences. Both were made possible by the embarrassment caused to the ruling powers by war or revolution; both had the potential bonds of union of Islam and common or similar language; both had in the end to submit to a solution imposed by a foreign power, solutions which were very far from those at which their idealist architects had been aiming. Whereas, however, the countries carved out of the Arab part of the Ottoman Empire were quickly able to achieve some kind of international status and to exchange representatives and political opinions with the outside world, the peoples of the artificially contrived Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R. were, and still are, rigidly confined within the frontiers and political system of the Soviet Union. On the whole the linguistic and other cultural bonds of unions are much stronger among the Arabs than among the Turkic peoples. As Mr. Zenkovsky points out, the languages of the latter "have become so differentiated as to prohibit the adoption of a common Turkic literary tongue." Ottoman Turkish, whether written in the Arabic or Latin character, is, and always has been, largely unintelligible to all the Turks outside Turkey, except, perhaps, to those of Azerbaydzhan. Written Arabic, on the other hand, is the common language of educated intercourse throughout the Arab world. When it is considered that with all these advantages the progress towards Arab unity has so far been minimal, it is hardly surprising that Mr. Zenkovsky should wonder whether Turkic nationalism can be said to have existed at all.

Mr. Zenkovsky's book stops short before the creation of the Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R. in their present form. He does, however, refer to it in his concluding chapter and he finds that it could "only frustrate Turkic national feelings since the new Turkic autonomous territories came under the control of the Soviet State and the Communist Party." It is of some interest that having set their faces against pan-Turkism and having formulated the nationalities' policy, which in effect is one of "divide and rule," the Soviet authorities should now be assailed by qualms lest the deliberately synthetic creation of national republics should give rise to the very "bourgeois nationalism" which they sought to destroy. The matter is further complicated for them by the obvious contradiction in their policy, developed in 1955, of backing pan-Arab nationalism and bourgeois nationalism while continuing to inveigh against pan-Turkism, pan-Islam and bourgeois nationalism among their own Muslim peoples. The present Soviet policy seems to be to continue supporting bourgeois nationalism in individual Arab countries but to stop talking about pan-Arab nationalism. Inside the U.S.S.R. the attacks on pan-Turkism, pan-Islam and bourgeois nationalism (now more often called *mestnichestvo*—"localism") are being maintained, but at the same time there has recently been a tendency to minimize the differences among the Turkic languages and to emphasize the common racial and cultural origins of the Turkic and Iranian peoples of Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

Mr. Zenkovsky's treatment of the fortunes of the various Turkic peoples of Russia is somewhat uneven. The amount of space—nearly five chapters—devoted to the Tatars is, perhaps, disproportionate. From his other writings it is clear that Mr. Zenkovsky has a special interest in the Tatars and their history. Much of the Tatar material is of great importance; it explains, although it does not shed any new light on, the theories and activities of Sultangaliyev, whose plans for the creation of a special form of Communism more suited to Asian peoples threatened to undermine the whole Soviet nationalities' policy, and resulted in his liquidation. A notable feature of the book is a useful and comprehensive account of the personalities and problems involved in the Jadid movement.

This book is indispensable for all students of the formation and development of the Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R. The bibliography and the maps are excellent. In the opinion of the reviewer, however, the value of the work could have been still further increased if it had been submitted to the scrutiny of someone more familiar than Mr. Zenkovsky appears to be with the relevant non-Russian languages and with the problems of their transliteration. It is no more correct to call Persian the Iranian language than it would be to call Spanish Latin: the Persians themselves call it Farsi of which Persian is a quite reasonable western adaptation. Seda-i-Vatan does not mean Voice of the Times (p. 97), but Voice of the Fatherland. It is irritating to see Ishtirakiyun (Communists) written as Ishtiraki Yun. And although the use of the word Turkic to render the Russian Tyurkskiy (as distinct from Turetskiy—Turkish) is obviously necessary, such references as "the Turkic town of Baiazet" (p. 103) instead of "the Turkish town of Bayazit" are regrettable and misleading. There are many other such solecisms which can hardly be attributed to the printers and it is to be hoped that they will be corrected in later editions.

G. W.

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**Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917.** A Study in Colonial Rule. By Richard A. Pierce. University of California Press. 1960. Pp. 359. Maps. Bibliography. Index. \$7.

This is the fullest and most objective account of Imperial Russia's rule over Central Asia up to the time of the Revolution which has ever been written. The Tsarist régime was scarcely less intolerant of foreign observers than its Soviet successor, and it likewise discouraged impartial investigation into official matters by its own nationals. In spite of this, some excellent books were written, the most notable of those in English being Schuyler's *Turkestan* and Curzon's *Russia in Central Asia*. But the first of these was published in 1876 and the second in 1889, and they thus cover less than half the period now treated by Mr. Pierce. Many of the other English works on the subject are vitiated by the spirit of Anglo-Russian rivalry which informed them. Since the Revolution, any kind of close, impartial observation has been impossible, and until quite recently all Soviet writing has been mainly concerned with expatiating on the iniquities of Tsarist rule, largely, it seems, in order to emphasize the achievements of the Soviet régime which followed it. Incidentally, the statement in the publishers' blurb that Imperial Russian rule is now described by Soviet writers "as having been beneficial and progressive" is not quite correct. The contention of modern Soviet historiographers is that the *result* of the Russian conquest of Central Asia was on the whole beneficial rather than otherwise, because it brought the people of Central Asia into contact with the Russian people. They continue to inveigh against the Russian administration and this prevents them from describing in any kind of detail the many reforms introduced during the Tsarist period, reforms which Mr. Pierce describes so lucidly, and which provided the indispensable basis for later development under the Soviet régime.

The book is divided into five parts: conquest and administration; colonization; economic development; the clash of cultures; and Imperial twilight. Mr. Pierce has made extensive use of a very wide range of source material. This includes not only much pre-Revolutionary Russian material not so far examined, but some earlier Soviet historical works which were much more objective than those written later. In every field of his inquiries, except perhaps that of the actual



military conquest of Central Asia, he has been able to add a great deal to existing information. The account of the 1916 Revolt, for instance, is exceedingly well done and he has made most effective use of Fritz Willfort's *Turkestanisches Tagebuch* which was not referred to in Sokol's standard account—*The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia*. The treatment of the subject is throughout reasonable and objective. The style is clear and readable and the book is well provided with maps, a bibliography, and appendices. Indeed, the only serious criticism which can be levelled is in the manner of transliteration. Mr. Pierce, as he explains in his preface, is well aware of the difficulties of this, but many readers will not find his solution satisfactory. The plan of transliterating names and terms in Turkic and other non-Russian languages direct from the Russian version may have certain technical advantages, but it tends to obscure the powerful influence exercised by Arab, Persian and Islamic civilization on such matters as justice, land tenure, and the control of irrigation water. Thus we have "miul'k" for the well-known Arabic "muik" and "zamin-i-podshohi" for "zamin-i-pādshāhi." Again, a serious disadvantage of using the Library of Congress system, or a modified form of it, is that it is not, in fact, the system used in transliterating names on all maps of the Soviet Union nowadays published in the United States and Britain. Finally, while it is clearly appropriate to refer to places by the names current during the period under review, it would be helpful to give their present names either in brackets in the text, or in an appendix.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Mr. Pierce's book. Apart from its own intrinsic merit, it provides an excellent introduction to another work which appeared almost simultaneously and which is reviewed elsewhere in this issue of the Journal—S. Zenkovsky's *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*. Together these books provide a most valuable key to the understanding of the present situation in Soviet Central Asia. They also aid the impartial student of affairs to assess at its true worth the Soviet claim not only that the present régime has eschewed all forms of colonialism, but that the former régime did not practise colonialism either. For although Soviet writers continue to criticize Tsarist methods, they do not now describe these methods as "colonialist." (Unlike the First Edition, the article on "Colonies" in the Second Edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopædia makes no mention of Imperial Russia having ever had any colonies.) Mr. Pierce shows conclusively that many of the achievements for which the Soviet régime now claims the sole credit were in fact initiated before the Revolution. These include irrigation schemes and plans for the stabilization of the nomads, in both of which considerable progress was made by Tsarist administrators. Mr. Pierce also shows, however, that most of the Tsarist administrative, economic, and cultural reforms were primarily designed to aid Russian colonization and that there was at no time any question of preparing the native peoples for self-government. It is particularly interesting to note that the concept of the Russian people as "the elder brother" of the peoples of Asia so popular during the Soviet régime, was in fact initiated in Tsarist times and its significance then was evidently no more altruistic than it is now. This of course is not to say that Tsarist rule did not improve the material conditions of the peoples of Central Asia, that Soviet rule has not improved them still further, or finally that a liberalized form of Tsarist rule might not only have surpassed Soviet material achievements, but advanced to the grant of real self-government and self-determination to the people.

G. W.

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**Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia.** By Geoffrey Wheeler. Published by the Inst. of Race Relations. 6s.

This is an admirable little book. One wishes that all authors could compress so much of interest into sixty odd pages.

Colonel Wheeler is no propagandist. Having described what Soviet Muslim Asia consists of and how it came to take its present form, he sets out to discuss quite dispassionately how the Soviet Union manages to reconcile its vaunted horror of colonialism with the possession of a large colonial empire, what it is doing and

has done to govern and develop it, and what the impact has been on the native population. One or two points stand out in this absorbing study—the fundamental Soviet antipathy to Islam, the dynamism of the Russians in raising the material standards of their Asian possessions so that these Muslim republics now enjoy much higher standards than the neighbouring Asian countries, and the unlikelihood in any foreseeable future of a change in their present status. The Russians are there to stay and Russian immigrants are still pouring in. What is the real attitude of the Muslims towards the present régime? Colonel Wheeler has to admit that it is difficult to assess. Perhaps in any case it does not very much matter, though there are apparently many indications of Soviet apprehension.

Colonel Wheeler has an enlightening chapter on the vast effort now being made by the Soviet Government in the study of eastern affairs and laments that it so outshines any similar Western effort. Russia is evidently determined to be the cultural mentor of the East and it will be a pity if the West accepts this as one of the facts of life. One would like to know how it is regarded by the Chinese, but that is beyond the range of this short volume.

J. M. T.

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**My Russian Journey.** By Santha Rama Rau. Published by Gollancz. Pp. 300.  
21s.

"My Russian Journey" is a pleasure to read, although the authoress, on the strength of a few months' stay in the Soviet Union, does not attempt, like so many superficial observers, to go beyond recording her personal experiences and impressions. Her command of English, albeit sprinkled with Americanisms, makes her descriptions vivid, convincing and often humorous.

With her husband as interpreter and her steadily growing knowledge of the language, she struck up chance acquaintance with a wide variety of Soviet citizens, and her accounts afford an illuminating picture of present-day life in the U.S.S.R., at least in the three cities which she visited.

The Russian hunger for outside contacts was brought home to her when an early acquaintance described the Hotel Astoria in Leningrad as the most amusing rendezvous "because one can see foreigners there." Many younger Russians revealed their interest in the superficial attractions of American life and manners, although this attitude is frowned upon by the older generation. On the other hand, the parrot-like repetition of "*Hindi-russki bhai-bhai*" at length induced a feeling of irritation.

The authoress gathered the impression that, within the context of Communist rule, Russians hope that conditions will improve, and Khrushchev is credited with a measure of liberalization, although voices are still lowered when telling political jokes or making cynical remarks about the régime: few of her acquaintances invited her to their homes or would even give their addresses.

The only unsympathetic contacts were the oppressive State Tourist guides, all necessarily members of the Party, whose function was to steer foreigners away from unorthodox sightseeing.

She remarks on the lack of privacy due to over-crowding, and the consequent difficulties of courtship. She is also struck by the lack of spontaneous gaiety and the Victorian atmosphere of urban existence, coupled with the natural yearning for colour and the good things of life.

The complications of household shopping, or of collecting a parcel at the post office, are typical examples of the time-wasting involved in excessive bureaucracy. She learned the distinction between a "comrade" and a "friend"; the former might report on your behaviour, a friend never. "Only in Russia," she shrewdly remarks, "does one search so diligently for motives."

Marriage, always an unstable partnership in Russia, has now often a materialist basis, in that both partners usually need to work, and the economic factor is apt to dominate. With other observers, she deplores the lack of *chic* in the women.

The indulgence of children is a strongly marked Russian characteristic, balanced by the facts that they are plunged into the struggles of adult life at an earlier age than in the West, and that living conditions in the cities discourage large families.

The authoress suggests that the docility of Russian youth may be partly attributed to the habit of wrapping infants in swaddling clothes.

She was charmed by the decayed yet lingering elegance of Leningrad, and in her successful search for Dostoyevsky's home discovered slums which must have changed little since the Nineteenth Century. She was made aware of the Lenin-graders' pride in the "City of Peter" and of their disdain of "commercial" Moscow.

All observers have commented on the shortage of accommodation, but it is interesting to learn that a Soviet citizen must present his identity card before he can get a room in a hotel, and cannot in any case obtain one in his home town. At the same time the authoress is struck, during her drives in the Moscow environs, by the isolation and boredom of village life which encourages the drift to the towns.

Like all visitors to the U.S.S.R., she is full of admiration for the theatre, but adds that the atmosphere is one of dedication to "culture" rather than of enjoyment, and that few post-revolutionary productions can compare in quality or popularity with the classics.

There are fascinating glimpses of the way in which the privileged castes live. When the authoress went to tea with a successful writer, she was received by a smartly-dressed maid who ushered her into a flat elegantly furnished. Approved writers, being paid by the State, are given salaries and other privileges (such as hostels) which enable them to concentrate entirely upon their profession. All the *elite* have country *dacha* in addition to town flats or houses: their children, who ape foreign habits and are better at spending money than earning it, look like presenting a problem in the future.

As an Indian, her views on Russia's place in Asia are illuminating. She observes that while the Russians' standard of living appears low in Western eyes, to Asiatics "they do not seem so badly off." She is impressed by "a sense of Asia" in literature and the theatre, but not till she visited Tashkent and Samarkand did she feel completely out of Europe, although even here the Great Russians are imposing their general pattern.

The book finishes somewhat abruptly with the crossing of the frontier, and there is no attempt at summing up. Perhaps this is the wisest ending for a story packed with individual impressions.

J. V. D.-H.

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**Hannibal. One Man Against Rome.** By Harold Lamb. Robert Hale, Ltd., 1959. Bibliography. Maps. Indexed. 21s.

The author of this excellent study of the character and achievements of the great enemy of Rome is the well-known American historian and author of popular works on Charlemagne, Ghengiz Khan, Tamerlane, Alexander and others. He is primarily a student of the history of mediæval Asia.

In writing this eminently readable work on the life of Hannibal he has performed a most useful service of resuscitation. Although the great Carthaginian is known to all of us and the exploits of his elephants are, even today, a source of Alpine controversies, he remains what he evidently wished to be, a retiring and enigmatic figure. To an extent, however, Mr. Lamb lifts the veil and gives something of an impression of the genius and splendid abilities of the great commander whom the Romans feared above all and whose defeat was not only necessary for survival but for their future ascendancy in the Mediterranean and Europe itself. Besides doing this and introducing a number of his followers, the book provides us as well with an excellent portrait and character study of his implacable opponent, Scipio Africanus.

The contest between them, as Mr. Lamb points out, coincided with a turning-point in history when the era of tyrants and city states was ending. When the last of these, Pyrrhus was defeated in 275 B.C. he is said to have remarked "What a fine battleground I am leaving to the Romans and Carthaginians." A study of the war, and in particular the course of the rise of Roman sea power, provides particularly important lessons for students of strategy. Had the Romans not overcome their prejudices against naval operations and secured their victory over the Carthaginians at Mylae in 260 it is doubtful whether the long overland expedition through Spain

would have been necessary. Even if this means of approach had been adopted it might have been supported by a strong sea-based invasion at the moment of the weakening of the Roman forces after Cannæ.

It is difficult today to assess the arguments which Hannibal used to impress his heterogeneous and largely Spanish army in its invasion of Italy and the author is not explicit enough. But Spain has always been a poor country for most of its inhabitants. Perhaps the local nobility were mainly swayed by the personality of Hannibal and needed no other arguments.

There is a good laconic account of the campaign leading up to Cannæ and the battle itself. He does not explain and it is doubtful whether anyone has as yet with any degree of adequacy, the incredible incompetence of the Roman forces in that battle. Nor why Hannibal did not press home his victory when his intelligence must have been so good. His actions are described, but his motives still elude us.

It is pleasant to be able to read the account of a trivial incident just before Cannæ (recounted on p. 98) that of his conversation with Gisco, who said, while watching the advance of the Roman army "It is a most amazing thing to see such a number of men." Turning to Gisco, Hannibal replied "I'll tell you something more amazing. In all that number there is no other one called Gisco." It is difficult not to believe that such a remark really may have been made and that for a moment the veil of time is lifted. The incident evidently preceded the critical moment of one of history's greatest battles which has decisively influenced military thought and action down to our own times, and certainly the fate of the Mediterranean world for centuries.

Profiting by Hannibal's failure to achieve his strategic aim, the physical capture and destruction of Rome, and of the magic already surrounding the name of that city, the Romans did not make the same mistake when Scipio was able to take the offensive many years later, and achieved his aim of the destruction of Carthage.

As Mr. Lamb so rightly points out, the deadly contest between the two men brought about as a historical inevitability the Roman Empire, which emerged as a product of the forces and capabilities mobilized for the struggle, whose nature was so well summed up by Polybius. "The Carthaginians fought for their own preservation and the sovereignty of Africa, the Romans for supremacy and world domination." It is not so apparent that in the ultimate it was also a contest between Asia and Europe and that then, as later, a phase of subjugation of the former by the latter was achieved by the decisive influence of sea power.

A. H. S. CANDLIN.

**Turkey's Politics.** The Transition to a Multi-Party System. By Kemal H. Karpat. Pp. xiv + 522. Bibliography. Index. O.U.P. for Princeton. 60s.

This is a reference book for the library shelf or the specialist. The author is a Turk, well qualified to write with authority on such an important aspect of contemporary Turkish life. Parts of his work have been presented as a doctorate dissertation to New York University. Dr. Karpat has since been appointed acting director of the School of Public Administration in the newly established Middle East Technical University in Ankara.

After introductory material on the Ottoman movement for *islâh* (reformation) which led ultimately to *inkîlâp* (revolution), the author shows that while under the Sultans the aims of modernization were partly military and partly political, the Republic introduced the social and economic elements as fundamental for the improvement of society. The substance of the book is a detailed analysis of the transformation of the Republic, after Atatürk, from a one-party to a multi-party system, not only in the light of these social and economic elements, but also taking into account political and even personal factors. The study is primarily concerned with the years 1945 to 1950.

Like many writers on contemporary affairs, some of Dr. Karpat's appraisals have been rendered obsolete by recent events. For since the victory of the Democratic Party over Atatürk's own party, the country seems to have changed only the names of those in power, not their philosophy or their methods. To many observers,

Mr. Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister, does not seem to be much less dictatorial than Atatürk himself. Despite this fact, Dr. Karpāt is optimistic about the future survival of democracy in Turkey, although he tries to be strictly factual in his work and leaves the reader free to draw his own conclusions.

The sources used are very impressive. Perhaps the most significant thing about the Bibliography is the extensive use of Turkish newspapers, journals, pamphlets and the like, which are not easily accessible. Dr. Karpāt makes good use of them together with many works in European languages.

Apart from subjects devoted strictly to Turkish politics, the student of international affairs will find many other significant matters discussed in this book. For example, the place of secularism and religion in Turkish politics (pp. 271 ff.), Communism (pp. 349 ff.) and a forecast of the future (pp. 442 ff.).

Dr. Karpāt was presumably brought up under the Republican system. He is generally in sympathy with its secular measures, but he does not underestimate the force of religion in the life of the Turkish people today. In fact, his account of religious life is one of the most informative sections of the book. He does, however, show disturbing evidence of the estrangement of some of the educated Turks from Islamic concepts, and inadequate awareness of the connotation of important Islamic terms. "In 1925," he writes, "sects, convents and monasteries were closed" (p. 54). The three terms, borrowed from Christian terminology, are inappropriate and are misleading. As a Muslim, the author might have recalled that there is no monasticism in Islam: *lā rahbāniyata fil' Islam*. What he means, of course, is the suppression of the mystic orders (*turuq*) and the closure of their centres (*taḳāya*). Equally inappropriate is his reference to Abū Ḥanīfa (p. 282) as the "founder of the Orthodox Muslim Sect." If "sect" it must be for the Arabic *madhab*, then Abū Ḥanīfa was one of the founders of the four schools of theological thinking in orthodox Islam.

Dr. Karpāt's book is published at the time of an international press uproar. Nineteen hundred and sixty has been designated to mark the centenary of Turkey's first newspaper. However, the Turkish Press Law, under a Republic, permits prison sentences for publishing any material designed to "damage the political or financial prestige of the State" or "to belittle persons holding official positions." The veteran Editor of *Vatan* has been put behind bars for publishing a translation of an article, written by a respected proprietor of an American paper, considered as "belittling" Mr. Menderes. Does this, and other lapses, indicate a revival of the despotic methods of the Sultans, or is it only an inevitable and transient chill occasioned by the still unfamiliar weather of Western democracy? Dr. Karpāt understandably, and wisely, does not give a definite guide. But, if anything, he creates an impression of confidence in the ultimate victory of a democratic system, if not the Western form of democracy, in Turkey.

A. L. TIBAWI.

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**Turkey: An Economy in Transition.** By Z. Y. Hershlag. Pp. xv + 340. Charts. Bibliography. Index. Van Keulen N.V., The Hague. 55s.

This book has two main objectives. In the author's words they are "(1) to follow the evolution of the concept of economic development in republican Turkey as it influenced actual progress in focal spheres of economic activity; and (2) to analyse the economic activities themselves in order to draw conclusions about the scope of progress, the autonomous elements of economic development and those implanted by the economic system, as well as the recurring impact of economic realities on the economic concept and régime."

If the reader could mentally translate this passage into less involved and more concise language, he should not be put off by such a noisy, if innocent, initial bombardment. The book is a painstaking piece of investigation which deserves careful reading. Its author was born in Poland, and is now a lecturer in economics at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem from which he received his doctorate.

Taking agriculture, industry, foreign trade and public finance as his main concern, he divides the economic history of the Turkish Republic into three rough periods. The first, extending up to 1933, is called the "liberal"; the second, up to 1950, is

called the "etatist"; and the last "free enterprise" which started with the victory of the Democratic Party. Then each subject is studied in detail and illustrated with tables, charts and graphs. There are obvious gaps, notably the subject of labour, but the author himself explains that this is occasioned by the inadequacy of sources of material. He has, however, made amends for this deficiency by writing a short appendix (pp. 289-298) on the subject.

Dr. Hershlag's Bibliography includes many official and other sources in Turkish in addition to numerous general works in European languages. Those familiar with the post-war economic problems of the Middle East will recall the skill and fairness of the series of reports written by the experts of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the economies of, for example, Iraq and Jordan. In 1951 a mission of the Bank issued its survey of *The Economy of Turkey*. It is surprising that the author dismisses such an important survey, among others, as falling short "of the vital developments in the Turkish economic concept and activities during the first half of the Fifties." It does not appear in the Bibliography.

It remains to say a word about the method of treatment. The author, on the whole, remains within the range of facts and figures. He draws few conclusions and abstains from passing judgement or making definite forecasts. There is a great deal of Blue Book material in his work, and it may be considered too short on important subjects such as "the national income and the standard of living" and the "rate of growth and economic policies." But to ask an author, who has done so much, to do more, is perhaps too exacting.

A. L. TIBAWI.

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**Yemen on the Threshold.** By Erich W. Bethman. Published by American Friends of the M. E. Inc., Washington D.C. Pp. 74. Illus. Index.

For the main part, this little paper-backed book of seventy-eight pages is a narrative of a journey to the Yemen by Mr. Erich W. Bethman in March and April of 1959 (Ramadhan, 1378 A.H.). This journey enabled him to visit San'a, the capital in the Zeidi highlands; Taiz and Mocha in the Shafai west; and to pass through Hodeida in the Tihama, and Ibb, Yarim, Dhamar and Mabar, on the way to San'a. He was also lucky enough to see some of the ruins of the Sabe'an Moon Temple at Marib, in the east.

In his foreword, the author says that he had hesitated to record his impressions because he felt that books written as the outcome of one visit were not always well balanced. Few will quarrel with this statement. Yet, had he stayed longer he might not have emerged much wiser, because the Yemen continues to remain in a vacuum, with a present as uncertain as its future is unpredictable. In the circumstances, Mr. Bethman's task was not an easy one, and the book probably achieves as much as could be expected within its modest scope.

Some of the author's comments are sound enough, although I do not agree with all his conclusions. I would not, for instance, describe the Zeidis, the ruling minority, as a tolerant sect. It is certainly a sign of the times to hear of the Ulema talking freely to a foreigner on religious matters. In my day, even with the support of the late Imam Yahya, I never achieved a private talk with an Alim.

I cannot agree that the Yemen of today is any longer of strategic importance, but that it does require "unselfish friends and wise counsellors" is undoubtedly true, particularly during the period of transition (or revolution) that lies ahead. Certainly the country's greatest, perhaps only, asset is its agriculture, and this must be developed; but education is the crying need for its highly intelligent youth, directed by a government dedicated to the progress and welfare of its under-privileged peoples.

Finally, I must confess disappointment in the book's photographs, or is this because one expects such a high standard from all Americans?

B. W. SEAGER.

**A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder.** By Dr. J. R. Partington. W. Heffer and Sons, Cambridge. Pp. 379. Indexed and Illustrated. 70s.

Students of military science and in particular those who are interested in the chemical background of what have now ironically become known as conventional weapons, have good reason to be grateful to Dr. Partington for providing them with a remarkable compendium of martial recipes and anecdotes.

This well-documented history of the evolution of Greek Fire, the precursor of C.W., and of Gunpowder, is yet another contribution of an exceptionally versatile and learned author to the history of science and technology in which field as well as his own more academic one of physical chemistry, he is justly renowned.

What in particular emerges from this treatise is the revelation of the comparatively high degree of skill which was achieved in early times, as early as the crusades, for example, after which, until modern times and smokeless powders and high explosives, comparatively little progress was made between the days of Roger Bacon and the earlier duPonts. A certain scale of energy when once applied to military operations did not become sensibly altered until the advent of nuclear fission.

Implicit also in the book is the description of a comparable rate of invention and development shown in these matters by almost all races with any pretensions towards civilization. There was indeed very little difference in the techniques of gun founding and powder manufacture in Europe and in say, China in the 14th and 15th centuries. Europe at a later period, having profited by the rapid development in the metallurgical and engineering aspects of applied science, went swiftly ahead in the period following that covered by this book, but the balance is swinging yet again and we are reminded that we are once more facing a situation of peril such as Asia and Europe have not experienced for centuries.

Among many other fascinations, Dr. Partington's account contains the famous cryptogram LURU VOPO VIR CAN UTRIET in which Roger Bacon attempted to conceal his sinister discovery. Then as now, security measures were unable to conceal a secret considered to be so vital in the affairs of nations and which led the Kings of France ultimately to inscribe on their cannon "Ultima Ratio Regum."

Also he is rightly pitiless in his exposure of myths and pretensions such as that of "Black Berthold" the mythical German monk who has often been chronicled in the service of German prior claims to the invention of "schiesspulver." Naturally there is much said about that country and its extensive contribution to these arts, including a quotation from the artilleryist and author, Köhler—"Die Waffe ist der Ausgangspunkt aller Kultur" (The gun is the source of all Culture) and entertaining descriptions of mediæval siege artillery pieces such as Faule Grete used in the 15th century and described in a popular song composed in Nurnberg in 1863:

"Wie ein Bierfass war die puderdose  
Und die Starke des Metalls am Stosse  
Mass drei Achtel Ellen rheinisch gut  
Und ihr Korn war wie ein Zuckerhut."

There is an extremely interesting foreword by Lt.-Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, K.C.B., who writes from the standpoint of an acknowledged authority on the gunner's art and who retired not so long ago from the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment. In it he refers to the book as "virtually an obituary" (for conventional explosives). Would that he were right in the use of this phrase. Even in these days of the commanding strategic importance of nuclear weapons we have yet to see the last conventional explosives and perhaps less energetic but none the less deadly products of the military chemist.

It is somehow today a little more difficult to visualize a condition conveyed to us in this book when a piece of artillery would in fact be cheaper than a bow, yet it seems that in England in 1355 the cost of a cannon, albeit a small one, was 13/4d. while a large crossbow cost 66/8d. Small wonder that the true and chivalric form of the feudal system came to its ultimate crisis in England in the wars of the Roses.

There is ground for reflection after reading this book that just as Desert Power was a significant factor in world strategy at the time of the Tartar ascendancy (and

these shared artillery and explosives with other nations), deserts again in the last war were the scene of so many decisive operations, and today their power becomes more absolute than in the times of Ghengiz Khan. No longer does the Mongol tuman emerge from them but the same desert which was its crucible, serves as the proving ground for the weapons which are the ultimate expression of the arts described in this book.

A. H. S. CANDLIN.

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**New Fabian Colonial Essays.** Edited by Arthur Creech Jones. The Hogarth Press, 1959. Pp. 271. 25s.

It is to be hoped that this book, edited by the well informed and able Mr. Creech Jones, will find a wide circle of readers since it is well timed and informative, although in some of its essays, notably in the one entitled "International Machinery for Colonial Liberation," there is a strong and sadly misconceived anti-colonial bias. In the case of this particular essay it is interesting that, in a piece of writing by an official described as a United Nations Technical Representative, there is barely a word about the kind of machinery which ought to be used in the technological and economic processes necessary for the welfare of the territories with whose political affairs he concerns himself so censoriously. This comment is one which this reviewer finds obliged to make in connection with the whole book, although for the most part this is neither the fault of the editor nor of his authors.

It is incredible, however, to those who have long been interested in such matters that there is no significant information whatever about resources, about surveys, about development or industrial growth, or about scientific research undertaken either to promote these activities or even pure research directed at the betterment of human welfare. This is the more unfortunate since so much admirable and disinterested work has been done by all too few, as any reader of E. B. Worthington's "Science in the Development of Africa" will appreciate. The main accent is on African affairs although the problems are shared by other colonial or former colonial areas in S.E. Asia. An explanation of the strange omission of the issues which now interest the inhabitants of these countries more than any others—except the wish for autonomy—is provided by this revealing passage in the essay by Balogh called "Britain and the Dependent Commonwealth" (p. 100).

"But even had the longer-run implications of the 'liberal' policy in the relations of the Metropolitan country to the dependencies been duly realized as they patently were not, there was, unfortunately, a further grave difficulty. The Colonial Office lacked the influence to protect the interests of its wards against the requirements of other British Departments of State. It also lacked economic knowledge. There was always the grave danger that colonial interests would be subordinated to the interests and prejudices of the Home Departments and especially of the Treasury.

"As far as technical advice was concerned, there can be no doubt of the goodwill and endeavour of post-war governments. These efforts were, however, also to a considerable extent frustrated and for two main reasons.

"There was, first of all, a severe lack of expert knowledge in Britain itself. The pre-war period with its disappointing mixture of commercial protection, unemployment and lack of initiative had not encouraged the acquisition of technical knowledge. The general tone of the British educational and social structure and especially the Civil Service structure positively discouraged it and there was no attempt even to change the basic conditions."

There is mention in the last essay by Eirene White of the way in which the Foreign Languages House in Moscow sends 4,000,000 books a year to India in English (and heavily subsidized) and that the British contribution is infinitesimal and almost entirely left to private enterprise. Since much of this Russian literature concerns itself with very skilfully drafted accounts of alleged Soviet supremacy in Science and Technology, or take the form of excellently written scientific texts, the increasing influence of Russia in the ordering of scientific and industrial affairs in that country and others in a similar position, is not at all surprising and indeed inevitable.

Harold Ingrams, in his well-informed essay "Administration and the Oversea



Service" has some exceedingly pertinent things to say about the process of divestment of colonial trappings and the aims and attitudes of the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office whose workings he evidently understands. The conception of a unified service to deal with all commitments abroad is no new idea but he must be well aware of the considerable snags in the evolution of any such scheme.

There are some exceedingly valuable observations about education in the book by individuals who are particularly well informed about this project. Again, however, there is little evidence of a proper understanding of the vital importance of technical education which is by far the greatest need in these countries. If we are to continue to serve them we must provide them with citizens who can contribute properly to their progress. If we disappoint them and there is no reason why we should, they will turn elsewhere.

A. H. S. CANDLIN.

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The following publications are available to members using the library at 2 Hindle Street.

Administrative Science Quarterly  
 Food and Agriculture Organisation  
 Bulletins  
*The Arab World*  
 Memo to the Arab Economic Council  
 by Emile Bustani  
*Bulgaria Today*  
 Caucasian Review  
 Commonwealth Challenge  
 Current History  
 Current Notes on International Affairs  
 The Eastern World. The Asia Monthly  
 Explorers Journal

Far Eastern Survey  
 Far East Trade  
 The Geographical Journal  
 Geographical Review  
*Risalat al Naft*  
 Middle East Forum  
 Middle East Journal  
 Pacific Affairs  
 Qantas Empire Airways Monthly  
 Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society  
 Tropical Diseases Bulletin  
 World Veteran

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*Acta Geographica*. Société de Géographie. Mai et juin 1960.

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L'Orientaliste. 1960. No. 3.

## NOTICE TO MEMBERS

For the past few years the Journal has carried a notice appealing to members to sign a deed of covenant. The Council again appeals to all members to sign this deed of covenant, and would particularly ask that those proposing candidates for election point out to them the advantage which will accrue to the Society if they sign such a deed.

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of .....

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The first payment is to be made on the .....

Dated this ..... day of ..... 19.....

Signed, sealed and delivered by the said .....

In the presence of: .....

Address of Witness to your signature .....

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(NOTE—The Deed must be signed by the subscriber on a date prior to the date of the first yearly payment, as shown in the body of the deed.)

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THE principal objects of the Royal Central Asian Society are to maintain in England a centre for the provision and dissemination of information concerning Central Asia and adjoining countries, and to further international friendship.

The Council welcomes applications for Membership from those whose work, studies or military service are connected with one of the countries of Central, Western, and South-east Asia in which the Society is interested. Such Members are of the greatest help in keeping the Society up to date in its information. Members also can maintain their existing interest in these countries by keeping in touch with fellow Members.

Persons who desire to join must be proposed by one Member and seconded by another, and must then be balloted for by the Council. Ladies are admissible. The Annual Subscription is £1 10s. (£2 for residents in the London area.) There is an Entrance Fee of £1 payable on election.

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